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Abstract
The recent development of civil society in Japan has resulted in considerable 
attention to the concept of the public interest. The increasing demand for 
accountability in its policy-making has led to an intense exploration of the concept of 
the public interest in Japanese planning practices. Despite this, comprehensive 
studies of the role of public interest in the development of Japanese planning are 
absent. Although the legitimacy of the public interest has been largely discredited 
among Western academics, the concept did have a significant impact in developing 
and shaping planning objectives and procedures in Western liberal states. 
Acknowledging the importance of the public interest for mobilising Western 
planning, this thesis investigates the origins and developments of the public interest 
in Japanese planning, within the framework of the country’s progress towards 
modernisation.
Japan’s late entry to modernisation significantly affected its interpretation of the 
public interest and planning. As Japan’s prime modernisation objective was the 
creation of economic growth to establish sovereignty, the boundary between the state 
(public) and the market (private) led to contradictory planning regulations. Japan’s 
central bureaucracy dominated the public sphere to maintain the developmental state 
regime, by restraining and guiding civil society, as well as preventing local 
autonomy in planning operations. Moreover, whereas the rule of law protects 
citizens from the arbitrary powers of the state in Western liberal states, the legal 
justice in Japan’s planning system has not been very successful in defending the 
public interest as a collective concern for citizens. In fact, the public interest in 
Japan worked to prevent its citizens from challenging planning policies. The concept
of the public interest has been so static in Japan that its planning policy has failed to 
be more accountable to its citizens.
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Usage for Japanese Names
Japanese names are given in the text in their normal Japanese order, surname first. 
However, all names in references appear in first name-sumame sequence.
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Part One
Chapter One: Introduction to the Study
Article 25: All people shall have the right to maintain the minimum 
standards of wholesome and cultural living. In all spheres of life, the 
State shall use its endeavours for the promotion and extension of social 
welfare and security, and of public health.
Chapter III. Rights and Duties of the People, The Constitution of Japan, 
Promulgated on 3rd November 1946
An individual living in modem democracies expects to be entitled to human rights. 
These rights are not limited to fundamental ones such as liberty, but also include 
‘positive’ rights such as a right to a minimum standard of life. Although this right to 
social citizenship is often taken for granted in advanced liberal democracies, it in fact 
took over 100 years to become established. Indeed, while clean water, fresh air, 
roads, public transport networks and parks consist of the basic human needs in 
contemporary society, the state did not always provide or protect those public goods 
for its citizens until recently. Providing and maintaining these physical 
infrastructures necessitated the state’s involvement, which became to be called 
regional and urban planning. Although regional and urban planning is often 
interpreted simply as the control of developments, regeneration and town building, 
the above short list of physical infrastructures indicates that planning in fact deals 
with a broad range of policy concerns in contemporary society. Planning, as a 
shorthand for regional and urban/ town and country/ city/ environmental planning, 
determines the quality of human life, and thus has a strong link to the foundation of 
citizenship rights in the modem state.
Notwithstanding its central importance in contemporary society, planning represents 
a relatively new role for the state. This is particularly noteworthy given the fact that 
policy choices and decisions in planning now affect a great majority of population in
10
a country. Modem planning became widespread from the early twentieth century 
(Hall 1996a; Ward 1994). This is also the period when the idea of positive rights 
started to emerge in advanced economies. The development of the mass media, 
telecommunications and transport as well as a large increase in the number of 
planning professionals enhanced exchanges of ideas and the creation of theories in 
the field of planning studies. Not only did this increase in producing a large number 
of innovations, but it also led to a certain level of convergence of central ideas in 
planning. Nonetheless, the outcomes of planning policies as well as their impacts on 
living conditions appear to be dissimilar across various modem nation-states. 
Differences in the built environment are more pronounced when comparing Western 
states and former colonial and Asian states.
Planning represents a paradox in a liberal economy. While the core principle of a 
liberal economy rests on the idea of individuals’ freedom, wills and choices in 
pursuing personal happiness, individuals still have to rely on the state’s control and 
intervention for the provision of basic necessities for living and other public goods, 
which are provided only through planning in the public interest. As such, the studies 
of the public interest in planning can illuminate the current debate about the desirable 
role of the state to protect citizenship in liberal economies.
In Asia, Japan provides a very good case for research of the development of planning 
in a modem nation-state, as the country is the first successful liberal democracy 
outside the Western world. Joining in the OECD in 1964, Japan became one of the 
richest countries in the world by the end of the twentieth century1. However, despite
1 Japan’s National Income per capita in 1994 came to the third ($29,244) among OECD countries, 
next to Switzerland ($32,709) and Luxembourg ($29,375). The figure was much larger than the USA
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its substantial economic wealth and the endorsement of human rights in the 
Constitution of Japan, the majority of Japanese still face substandard housing stocks 
and insufficient infrastructures2 (Japan. Economic Planning Agency 1995: Ch.l). 
Opinion polls also show that many Japanese are still dissatisfied with their quality of 
life (Japan. Economic Planning Agency 1995; McCormack 2001). The condition of 
Japan’s planning indicates that technology, knowledge, wealth and even its formal 
democracy regime is not sufficient to bring the best planning practice to its people.
Regarding Japan as a latecomer to modernisation, some may believe that its modem 
planning system is still underdeveloped. This claim, however, appears to be invalid 
since Japan’s first statutory planning system dates back to as early as 1919, just ten 
years after the introduction of the Housing, Town Planning, etc. Act in the UK. 
Moreover, the concept of Garden City initiated by Ebenezer Howard (1850-1928) in 
1898 in the UK was swiftly introduced to Japan3 shortly after his publication of 
Garden Cities o f  Tomorrow (Howard 1902). Inspired by the original design of 
Garden City by Raymond Unwin, the development of Japan’s Garden Suburbs, 
Takarazuka and Denen Chofu, also started in the 1910s.
During my study abroad, I encountered a hypothesis to understand the paradox in 
contemporary Japan: the discourse on the public interest. The public interest was a 
rarely used term in Japan’s planning policy-making. Therefore, I was very surprised 
when I learnt that the wording of the public interest is included in almost all articles 
in planning regulations of British Columbia during my study in Vancouver, Canada.
and other EU countries. Asahi Shimbun. 1996. Asahi Shimbun Japan almanac 1997 ed. Tokyo: Asahi 
Shimbun. p.74.
2 Please see the next section, 1.1 for the details of this account.
3 The Home Ministry’s staff published a report titled ‘Garden City’ which introduced Britain’s Garden 
City developments to Japan in 1907. Ishida, Yorifusa. 1987a. Nihon Kindai Toshi Keikaku no 
Hyakunen (A hundred years o f  Japan's modern city planning). Tokyo: Jichitai Kenkyusha.
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I was also very impressed to know that public hearings were held for nearly all 
planned developments and that many stakeholders attended them through my 
planning study in Canada, Australia and the UK. I also noticed that citizens, 
developers, politicians and planners fiercely disputed the meaning of the public 
interest in planned projects in leading democracies. It was fascinating for me since 
so many developments went on in Japan without even being discussed. Many 
Japanese citizens often only knew about planning projects in their own 
neighbourhood after developers had started proceeding with such developments. 
Were there any opportunities for ordinary Japanese people to discuss the public 
interest of planned projects? What could Japan’s local residents do when the 
construction of such developments, of which many residents disapproved, had 
already started?
This thesis investigates reasons behind Japan’s failures in planning policies within 
the framework of the modem state development. A central concept in understanding 
the progress of modem planning is the public interest. Despite the considerable 
recent criticism towards this concept (Jacobs 1972; Pennington 2000; Reade 1987; 
Sandercock 1998a), the idea of the public interest has been an inspiration as well as a 
catalyst to mobilise modem planning thoughts and practices in Western liberal states. 
In these states, there was a clear presumption that modem planning practices should 
be conducted in accordance with the public interest (Glass 1973; Taylor 1998; Ward 
1994). Even after some academics in planning rejected the concept, it remained as a 
symbol or a catchword in the arenas of legislature, public consultation and judicial 
review to discuss policy concerns (Campbell and Marshall 2000; Davies, Keate, and 
English Heritage. 1995; Friedmann 1973; Howe 1992; Taylor 1994).
13
Japanese policy-makers and academics largely ignored the concept of the public 
interest in planning at least up until the 1990s, except for a brief period of 
burgeoning social movements in the early 1970s. I assume that the absence of 
democratic machinery to pursue the public interest in planning - debates of what 
constitutes the public interest, mechanisms allowing such contentious issues to be 
widely discussed in public, and statutory systems in which conflicts of interests are 
resolved fairly - is an obstacle for progress of planning in Japan.
This chapter first introduces the impacts of Japan’s past planning policies on its built 
environment and citizens’ welfare. Then I explain rationales for this research: why I 
investigate the relationship between Japan’s planning policies and the public interest. 
Section 1.1 discusses the contradiction in modem Japan, that is, the poor quality of 
life in the affluent society. Section 1.2 addresses theories and debates of the public 
interest in modem planning development. Finally, section 1.3 presents research 
questions, underlying theories, and central research materials and then details the 
structure of the thesis.
1.1. Japan: Contradiction within the Economic Superpower
Within fifty years after the devastation of the Second World War, Japan rebuilt a
robust economy from ashes and became the envy of many developed and developing
countries. Its low crime rates, high education standards and stable domestic political
relations enabled the nation to continuously increase its productivity and develop
significant technological innovations. In 2004, in terms of Gross Domestic Product
(GDP), Japan ranked as the second largest economy in the world (OECD 2005a).
Furthermore, at least up until the early 1980s, Japan was one of the most egalitarian
societies in terms of income distribution among the OECD countries (Tachibanaki
14
1998). Japan also succeeded in instituting relatively efficient state welfare systems 
such as unemployment benefits, child allowance, pensions, free medical care to the 
old, and a well-functioning National Health Service* (Takahashi 1997).
On the other hand, it is also well-known that the level of quality of life, measured by 
the quality and size of housing, the provision of sewerage, parks, cultural facilities, 
urban design and other amenity-related infrastructures, is still lower than those 
reported by other OECD countries (Keizai Kdhd Center 2003: Ch. 10). In particular, 
housing in Japanese metropolitan areas such as Tokyo is far below international 
standards. The 1979 EC report even described Japanese housing (for the middle- 
class) as a ‘rabbit hutch’5. Despite its low quality, the average cost of a residence in 
Tokyo in 1994 amounted to almost 13 times the average annual income in the 
country. This was in a marked contrast to New York (about 3 times), Paris (3.5 
times) and London (just below 7 times) (Kawai 1996).
Although postmodernists or cultural relativists may say that Asian people prefer 
small houses (Lim 1998; Townsend 1979), this is not necessarily the case in Japan. 
While the average size of owner occupied housing in the country was 122.7 square 
metres in 1998 (Japan. Research Institute of Urban Development Corporation and
4 Although Japan’s level of welfare provisions is far behind other leading economies, the majority of 
Japanese were relatively content with its social security services up to the early 1990s. Goodman, 
Roger. 1998. The 'Japanese-style welfare state' and the delivery of personal social services. In The 
East Asian welfare model, edited by R. Goodman, G. White and H.-J. Kwon. London: Routledge. 
Tsukada, Hiroto. 2002. Economic globalization and the citizens' welfare state: Sweden, UK, Japan, 
US. Aldershot: Ashgate.
However, this would not be the case anymore as the safety net of the Japanese economy represented 
by lifetime employment system and stable family relations are disappearing and the relative poverty 
ratio in Japan has increased during the last fifteen years. OECD. 2005. Selection o f OECD social 
indicators: how does Japan compare? (2005) Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, 2005b [cited 18 April 2005]. Available from 
http://www.oecd.Org/document/24/0,2340,en_33873108_33873539_2671576_l_l_l_l,00.html.
5 This issue was widely covered by the Japanese media in the 1980s along with the word of ‘economic 
animal’. Although this turned out to be ‘misunderstanding’ by Japanese reporters in later years, 
‘rabbit hutch’ became a catchword to stand for the poor quality of living in Japan mismatched with the 
nation’s affluence in the next two decades.
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The Building Center of Japan 2003), the 2004 government’s opinion poll showed 
that 74.3 percent of the sample responded that the ideal size for a detached suburban 
house was larger than 150 square metres (Japan. Public Relations Office. Minister's 
Secretariat. Cabinet Office 2004).
The problems of Japanese housing are related not only to its size and costs but also to 
the physical condition of the housing stock. More than 30 percent of the housing 
stock in Tokyo and other urban areas was identified as decrepit, requiring 
reconstruction or at least proper maintenance (Tokyo. Metropolitan Government 
1998.). The dangers associated with the poor housing manifested themselves in the 
disaster caused by the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake in the Kobe area, 
which claimed 6,425 lives. The deteriorated housing was reported to be one of the 
major causes for the high number of casualties (Foreign Press Center Japan 1997).
Another fact related to the poor quality of life in Japan is a lack of open space in its 
cities. International comparisons of park space per capita in metropolitan areas 
indicate an acute shortage of open space in Tokyo (3.0 square meters) in contrast to 
New York (29.3 square meters), London (26.9 square meters) and Paris (11.8 square 
meters (Japan. Research Institute of Urban Development Corporation and The 
Building Center of Japan 2003). Similarly, the ratio of road area to total urban area 
is 7.5 percent in Tokyo, compared to 30 percent in New York and 20 percent in 
Seoul (Tokyo. Metropolitan Government 1998). The lack of urban open space in 
Japanese metropolises is likely to exacerbate the damage by future earthquakes as 
proven by the Great Kanto Earthquake which killed 142,807 in Tokyo in 1923.
In a country which is prone to earthquakes, these situations can be devastating.
Indeed, it is predicted that Tokyo, which has been continuously growing, will
16
experience another major earthquake in the future. In order to mitigate the impacts 
of future large-scale disasters, appropriate planning policies such as an increase in 
urban open space, the redevelopment of derelict inner city areas and the removal of 
unsafe housing are required.
Furthermore, the profiles of the casualties of the 1995 Great Hanshin-Awaji 
Earthquake illuminated another problem of planning in Japan: increasing social 
inequality and geographical segregation under the global economy. The majority of 
the casualties were the most vulnerable populations in Japanese society. They were 
disproportionately the poor, elderly, women and minorities living in low-quality 
housing in the inner cities of Kobe, which are contrasted to the city’s newly built 
affluent suburbs (Habitat International Coalition 1996; Hirayama 2000; Osaki and 
Minowa 2001). The disaster eventually exposed the myth of the egalitarian and 
affluent society in post-war Japan.
The rapid economic growth in post-war Japan created a two-faced nation state. One 
is an affluent society with a relatively fair distribution of incomes and consumption, 
a well-established education system and an efficient social security system. Another 
shows its injustice and poor quality of life lacking affordable good quality housing, a 
disaster prevention system, comfortable transport networks with manageable 
congestion, noise and pollution prevention, ample open spaces, amenities and 
aesthetic urban design. It is the coexistence of these two faces within Japanese 
society that has constantly puzzled foreign observers.
Judging from current conditions in Japanese cities, however, there is little evidence
that the state conducted planning policies responding to social needs in the public
interest. To assess why the Japanese government was so ineffective in many areas of
17
planning policies, it is useful to analyse the origins and development of these policies 
in relation to the public interest. The historical analysis of planning institutions will 
show how the public interest in planning has been constructed in Japan and how the 
discourse on the public interest can be contested in its democracy. The outcome will 
aid the understanding of the paradox of modem Japan: the poor quality of life in an 
economic superpower. Furthermore, a comparison of Japan’s planning with those in 
other advanced democracies also illuminates the relationship between Japanese 
planning and its modem state development.
1.2. Debate on Planning and the Public Interest
The modem planning system is a product of the modem state. Although exact 
definitions of the modem state are problematic, there are several central features 
(Anderson 1986; Hall and Gieben 1992; Pierson 1996 See more detailed arguments 
in 2.2). In the process towards the modem state, four major ingredients are 
identified: ‘the emergence of modem democracy, the spread of industrialisation, and 
the evolution of nationalism and the growth of socialism6’ (Anderson 1986). In 
eighteenth-century Europe, after the establishment of the territoriality and 
sovereignty of nation-states under absolutist regimes, the unconditional power of 
monarchies wore off with the rise of the bourgeoisie democracy and capitalism. In 
particular, the emergence of capitalism, which was accompanied by industrialisation 
and urbanisation, formed an important foundation of the modem state, and 
subsequently led to the birth of modem planning systems in Western states 
(Benevolo 1967; Engels 2001; Hall 1996a; Sutcliffe 1981).
6 In my opinion, socialism should be replaced with social citizenship.
18
In order to understand the growth of the modem planning system, the analysis of the 
concept of the public interest is important. In nineteenth century West, faced with 
the public health crisis in industrial cities, the sustainability of the laissez-faire 
economy was questioned (Ashworth 1954; Benevolo 1967; Fraser 1984). 
Simultaneously, the urban working classes also challenged bourgeois liberal 
democracies in Western Europe (Geary 1981; Hinton 1983; Jones 1976). The public 
interest was a key concept for the state in intervening into the free market principles 
on land-use to counter public health problems as well as counteract the discontents of 
the working classes in European industrial cities (Ashworth 1954; Benevolo 1967; 
Fraser 1984: 67; Hall 1996a: Ch.2). The re-definitions of the public interest in 
planning gave rise to social citizenship in Western liberal democracies (Cullingworth 
1999; Friedmann 1973; Ward 1994). While the diverse concepts of the public 
interest are fully explored in Chapter 2, the next section introduces arguments about 
the public interest in planning, and then explains its role in planning development in 
the West.
Arguments about the public interest
The following quote illustrates the view held by many planners up until the early 
1970s about the role of the public interest:
First and foremost, there is comparatively little scepticism or even 
curiosity about the [British planning] system because it has been 
established by common consent, in recognition of the public interest 
(Glass 1973: 49).
Although the concept of the public interest played an important role in Western 
planning histories (Cherry 1996: 223-224; Hague and McCourt 1974; Ward 1994), it 
should be noted that the public interest has been understood in two different ways
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(McLean 1996). First, the public interest can be interpreted as the aggregation of 
interests of those affected by a policy or an action under consideration. This 
interpretation was adopted by Jeremy Bentham (1748-1832, English philosopher), 
who argued that: ‘the interest of the community then, is what?...the sum of the 
interests of the several members who compose it’ (quoted by Flathman 1966: 15). 
This position, however, has an obvious problem: how can the heterogeneous 
individual interests of members of a community or the public be reconciled?
The second meaning of the public interest is the common interest of members of the 
public. This interpretation, however, also faces a challenge: how can a common 
interest of the public be identified? This pragmatic problem has triggered criticisms 
towards the perception of the public interest as shared concerns. In The Conceptual 
Muddle (1962), Frank Sorauf strongly disagrees with this view as follows:
[Decisions in the public interest] apply to few concepts in political
science as aptly as they do to ‘the public interest’  Clearly, no
scholarly consensus exists on the public interest, nor does agreement 
appear to be in the offing. Not only do scholars disagree on the defining 
of the public interest, they disagree as well as about what they are trying 
to define: a goal, a process, or a myth (quoted in Held 1970: 1).
The difficulty in identifying the public interest is caused by the need to make value 
judgments. Whose interests count the most? Ironically, the growth of public 
administration, in combination with the development of science and public 
management skills derived from recent war experiences, provided a solution to this 
problem (Marshall and Choudhury 1997; Taylor 1998). Rationality, based on results 
from scientific social research, apparently eliminated difficulties of value judgments 
in defining the public interest. Planners were inevitably drawn to this solution as 
explained here:
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Such an approach compels administrators to rely uncritically on 
instrumental techniques rather than seek clarification of what the public 
interest is in an open dialogue. For the rationalist, the meaning of the 
public interest thus ends in becoming what the experts have determined 
(Marshall and Choudhury 1997: 123).
However, with the belief in the superiority of mathematical science and technology 
in planning decisions, the public interest lost ground as a keyword for an open 
discussion for forming collective interests (Marshall and Choudhury 1997; Reade 
1987; Thomas and Healey 1991). Replacing the public interest with technocratic 
rationality contributed to the declining of the public faith in the modem planning 
system in Western liberal democracies (Marshall and Choudhury 1997; Taylor 1998).
Whither the public interest?
Relying strongly on the rational planning model, planners up to the 1960s promoted 
development projects such as slum clearance and motorway construction in the name 
of the public interest (Hall 1980; Jacobs 1972). These projects provoked large 
protests in many Western countries. Inner-city residents fiercely claimed that they 
preferred to live in improved old Victorian houses to living in new high-rise 
buildings (Taylor 1998). Urban motorways built in the middle of residential areas 
were severely opposed by affected communities (Hall 1996b; Taylor 1998). In The 
Death and Life o f  Great American Cities (Jacobs 1972), Jane Jacobs offered a savage 
criticism towards existing planning practices about how planners identified the 
public interest. She argued that the strong belief and reliance on rationality in 
planning killed cities as social and common spaces for the public.
Furthermore, social scientists who have advocated a conflict model of society 
claimed that capitalist societies are composed of different groups with different (and 
often conflicting) interests; therefore, no common public interest exists (Reade 1987;
21
Sandercock 1998a: 196-9; Simmie 1974). This view is typically represented by 
pluralist theory in political scientists in the USA (Dahl 1961; Lindblom 1959) and to 
a certain extent, accords with rising postmodernist/ feminist critiques in social 
science disciplines (Bauman 1999; Giddens 1990; Sandercock 1998b). As a result, 
the idea of the public interest, which used to be identified as a rationale for planning 
technocrats, was seriously attacked from the 1960s in the West (Meyerson and 
Banfield 1964; Pennington 2000; Reade 1987; Sandercock 1998b: 196-9).
In addition, the public interest in planning was also attacked by both left wing and 
right wing political ideologies. Marxists argue that the role of planning in a capitalist 
democracy is in fact to enhance the accumulation of wealth of the capitalist class 
(Castells 1977; Cockbum 1977; Harvey 1973; Simmie 1981). By providing 
necessary urban infrastructures, efficient production of capital is reinforced for the 
sake of the industry in the long run despite the economic loss of the businesses in the 
short term (Harvey 1973). From this point of view, public goods such as social 
housing and parks serve to contain the social strife, that might otherwise undermine 
the capitalist order as experienced in nineteenth century industrial cities (Benevolo 
1967; Hall 1996a).
From the other side of the political spectrum, neo-liberals not only disagree with the 
existing planning system but also denounce the entire welfare state model and the 
efficiency of a big government (Hoover and Plant 1988; Pennington 2000). The neo­
liberal attacks on the modem planning system are partly based on a suspicion, shared 
with Marxist arguments, ‘...that government from time to time uses the planning 
system as a means of promoting different interests’ (Reade 1987: 185). As only a 
limited number of groups in a society can influence political decision-making, the
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enlargement of the bureaucracy and its closeness to politically resourceful groups 
may distort the equal allocation of resources in a society, thus distorting democracy 
(Klosterman 1996; Pennington 2000). Hence, neo-liberals argue that reducing the 
state’s role in planning will promote a more equal distribution of gains from planning 
among the population by means of an effective market mechanism (Klosterman 
1996). This argument is enhanced by public choice theory which claims that the 
existing planning system is in favour of powerful interest groups instead of the 
general public (Pennington 2000). With all these antagonistic views towards the 
modem planning system, ‘the concept of the public interest has come under severe 
attack in planning practices, in academia and in the world of politics’ (Klosterman 
1980: 323).
Tbe public interest: a catalyst for changes in planning
Despite the difficulties in constructing the definition of the public interest, the 
contribution of the concept in Western liberal democracies cannot be denied. The 
public interest as a common interest is the central concern of everyday politics. As 
such, it is related to the role of the modem state. The importance of this issue was 
pointed out as follows:
The problems associated with ‘the public interest’ are among the crucial 
problems of politics. Determining justifiable governmental policy in the 
face of conflict and diversity is central to the political order; it is a 
problem which is never solved in any final sense but which we are 
constantly trying to solve. The much-discussed difficulties with the 
concept are difficulties with morals and politics. We are free to abandon 
the concept, but if we do so we will simply have to wrestle with the 
problems under some other heading (Flathman 1966: 13)
Furthermore, John Rawls proposed a revolutionary idea about human intelligence in 
understanding the relationship between planning policy and the public interest in a
23
modem society. In his Political Liberalism, Rawls suggests that human intelligence 
is twofold -  firstly, reasonable and secondly, rationale (Rawls 1993: 47-88). 
‘Reasonable’, he reckons, is that persons, institutions, or doctrines can act being fair 
and cooperate with others not only for their own interests but for the whole of society. 
Therefore, being reasonable is important for people to identify common interest and 
ends. Rawls considers that being ‘rational’ is the ability ‘to adopt the most effective 
means to ends, or to select the more probable alternative, other things equal’ (Rawls 
1993: 50).
In fact, the implementation of policy is divided into two processes as its Japanese 
translation, seisaku, consists of two words: politics (sei) and strategies (saku). 
Rawls’ theory fits this insight that planning (or public) policy is twofold: the public 
interest and strategies. The public interest is a key word for all people to reach a 
‘reasonable’ end in politics of planning. The strategies of planning can be achieved 
by ‘rational’ thinking. Rawls claims that reasonable and rational agents should be 
the units of tasks necessary in political and social life (Rawls 1993). Therefore, it is 
impossible to implement planning policy without identifying the public interest. 
Essentially, the concept of the public interest has acted as an important catalysing 
force in stimulating the ongoing discussion on what planning is for.
The contributions of the public interest to Western planning development can be seen 
as being four-fold. First, the public interest contributed to the development of 
government interventions in the laissez-faire economy (Ashworth 1954; Fraser 1984; 
Hall 1996a). Public health problems that resulted from ill-suited land-use required 
the government to regulate the free market principle (Ashworth 1954; Fraser 1984; 
Hall 1996a). Also, governments became responsible for the supply of urban
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infrastructures to residents, regardless of their social status. The resulting 
government interventions in the market transformed the laissez-faire economy into 
an economy of more mixed nature. Excess profits from landowners were curbed in 
the public interest and subsequently redistributed through newly empowered 
government functions. This contributed to the formation of the welfare state, based 
on the new political and economic principles of the redistribution of resources within 
a capitalist society.
Second, the consideration of the public interest in housing reforms for the working 
classes meant that the government started to include the interests of the masses, 
which had previously been ignored in the bourgeois democracy (Ashworth 1954; 
Cherry 1996; Jones 1976). While universal suffrage in cities enabled the working 
classes to participate in politics, the public interest discourse in the working class 
housing reform facilitated an expansion of ‘positive’ human rights, which were not 
just limited to ‘negative’ human rights such as liberty and the freedom of choices 
(Dyrberg and University of Essex. Department of Government 1992). Although the 
provision of affordable housing and the improvement of the urban environment was 
concession from the urban elite class to the masses in the name of the public interest 
(Ashworth 1954; Hall 1996a), this led to the further enhancement of citizenship of 
the working classes in urban life. Besides, these public goods in urban life, which 
had been provided by philanthropists in the nineteenth century (Addams 1893; Hill 
1883), came to be recognised as a part of citizenship rights for all classes. 
Subsequently, the provision of these goods came to be the responsibility of the state 
in a capitalist democracy. As such, the public interest in planning promoted the 
development of social citizenship in the West.
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Third, although the concept of the public interest in policy-making has often been 
criticised for its ambiguity, the introduction of the concept provided people with 
social and legal latitude to contest policy-making decisions (Dyrberg and University 
of Essex. Department of Government 1992). The concept allows people to challenge 
the legitimacy of both public and private sectors’ behaviours by disputing whether 
they are in line with the public interest. Not only can people form pressure groups to 
promote certain planning policy in a legislature stage but also voice their concerns at 
public inquiries in plan-making processes. If people are still discontent with 
planning decisions, they may have opportunities to contest the legitimacy of 
government judgements, when they have sufficient ground to do so injudicial review. 
This is the dynamics of how the public interest has transformed the discourse of 
planning in liberal democracies in the West.
Finally, the right to challenge government policies created a situation where the 
general public now has the right to be informed about, and be involved in, formal 
planning decision-making procedures. Indeed, it is nowadays impossible for 
governments of advanced liberal democracies to decide planning policies without 
transparency and the use of public consultations. In most modem liberal states, 
citizens are legally entitled to access to public information about planning decision­
makings and participation in plan-making processes.
In retrospect, the concept of the public interest has served as a vehicle to transform 
existing planning systems and to make planning policy more accountable to citizens 
in the West. It helped to overcome shortcomings of free market capitalism, 
stimulated political participation of the working classes, strengthened social 
citizenship and gave an opportunity for citizens to challenge the state and businesses
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about what would help to achieve a better quality of life. Since the concept of the 
public interest played a multifaceted and central role in defining criteria of planning 
policy as well as policy processes in Western modem states, a study of the public 
interest in planning in other democracies could help to understand the dynamics of 
planning policy and improve policy processes in advancing citizenship rights in these 
states.
1.3. Research Design
The concept of modern planning
Town planning as physical design or layout of built environments has existed 
throughout human history. Ancient civilizations had capital buildings; medieval 
cities in Europe and Japan thrived. What makes modem planning different from 
these early versions is that it emerged along with rapid industrialisation, urbanisation 
and democratisation. Modem planning uses regulations and incentives to control 
land-use. Bureaucracy, which is accountable to taxpayers, carries out planning 
administration under the rule of democracy.
However, the complex history and practice of modem planning makes it difficult to 
construct a precise definition of its concept. Literally, planning can be taken to refer 
to the science of decision-making. Modem planning is related to making spatial 
physical plans for the future. Modem planning is also a matter of politics because 
‘.. .town planning as a political project has involved greater state control over private 
activity, particularly in the use and exploitation of land.’(Ward 1994: 4). Combining 
its various features, planning in this thesis is defined as a future-oriented policy 
decision-making concerning the built environment. Important to note is that,
although housing policy tends to be treated as a part of social policy in the 
contemporary welfare state, this thesis includes housing policy in its analysis due to 
its importance for the creation and development of modem planning systems in the 
West.
Aims of the thesis
Whilst the concept of the public interest played an important role in the development 
of Western planning, the concept has been construed in a different way in Japan. In 
fact, there are different terms for the concept of the public interest in Japan in 
academic circles, the legal world and in the mass media, although all three terms 
have been used interchangeably as an equivalent to the public interest in English. 
The three common terms are kokyo no rieki (the public interest), kokyo sei (the nature 
of publicness) and kokyo no fukushi (the public welfare). The expression of the 
public interest is the least common in Japan, and this is mostly used in official 
documents. In the legal world, the term public welfare has a meaning equivalent to 
the public interest in the West. Academics and the media prefer the nature of 
publicness to the public interest. The disagreement in the use of the public interest 
also means that there were few discussions in the media and academic circles about 
this concept in the past.
However, the concept of ‘public’ in policy-making has recently attracted a lot of
attention from academics, the media and citizens in Japan. This stems from the
nascent idea of civil society which has become very popular due to the achievement
of the voluntary sector in providing social services following the Hanshin Awaji
Earthquake (Kuroda 2003; Osborne and Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies. 2002;
Shaw and Goda 2004; Yamamoto 1999b). Simultaneously from the 1990s, Japanese
28
intellectuals also introduced writings about civil society and the public sphere from 
the West to Japan (Katsuragi 2005; Saito 2000; Sasaki and Kim 2002; Yamamoto 
1999a; Yamawaki 2004). Planning has become a discipline in which the idea of civil 
society and kokyo sei (the nature of publicness) is passionately debated (Evans 2002; 
Hayashi and Ito 2000; Koizumi 2003; Nakazawa 2003) because the concept of 
machi-zukuri (literally town-making, close to the concept of community planning in 
English) through democratic citizen participation was once the issue in the 1960-70s 
(Avenell 2006; Krauss and Simcock 1980; Lewis 1980). Moreover many cities need 
a new model of planning after communities were tom apart from excessive 
developments during the bubble economy period.
Although the concept of ‘public’ and the public realm in planning has increasingly
become the object of academic inquiries, there seem to be some missing elements in
the current arguments in Japan. First, many Japanese academics discuss the concepts
of ‘public’ by simply introducing seminal academic works on the public sphere such
as the works of Jurgen Habermas (Habermas 1987; Habermas 1997) and Hannah
Ardent (Arendt 1998) (e.g. Katsuragi 2005; Saito 2000; Sasaki and Kim 2002;
Yamawaki 2004). Others explain that Japan has a different concept of public {ko),
which has been developed by the influences of Chinese Confucianism and the feudal
times, in particular Tokugawa era, of Japan (Kurozumi 2002; Mizubayashi 2002).
These arguments of ‘public’ seem to offer little in examining how the concepts have
impacted on Japanese politics and society. Criticising the situation, Maruyama
Masao once ridiculed the studies of political science in Japan saying that they
uncritically collected new ideas from all over the world like a museum curator
(Maruyama 1963b). Maruyama claimed that Japanese political scientists exhibited
new theories from the West in their works until they became outdated; nonetheless,
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these academics did not try to assess the nation’s political reality using these 
imported theories (Maruyama 1963b).
Likewise, defying ‘the authority-defined’ public interest, Japan’s left-wing 
academics and social movement campaigners have emphasised the establishment of 
the ‘new’ publicness (atarashii kokyosei) or the citizens’ publicness (shiminteki 
kokyosei). This means that they encourage citizen participation in planning by 
developing ‘citizen-initiated’ public realm to make planning being accountable to 
citizens (Hayashi and Ito 2000; Koizumi 2003; Satoh 2004). Nevertheless, a 
question should be raised about why citizens’ movements on planning issues in the 
earlier period, which also demanded that government accounted for the public 
interest based on local needs (Avenell 2006; McKean 1981; Steiner, Krauss, and 
Flanagan 1980), faltered in the mid-1970s (Mason 1999). Furthermore, Japan’s pre­
war history, in which the nation’s grassroots civil organisations actively supported 
the oppressive ultra-nationalism (Garon 2003; Maruyama 1963c), suggests that the 
existence of civil society and citizen participation is not sufficient enough to achieve 
just planning goals.
Some academics illuminated why the ‘public’ concept in Japan has differed from the 
West and how it has affected politics (Matsumoto 1978; Oguma 2002) and some 
perspectives of social reality (Boling 1990; Iokibe 1999; Terao 2000; Yamawaki and 
Osawa 1998). Sorensen recently wrote about the characteristics of the public realm 
in Japan and their impacts on Japanese planning development (Sorensen 2005). He 
concluded that the narrowness of the public realm in Japan produced the nation’s 
distinctive planning culture, which had emphasis on economic development (ibid). 
However, scholarship has not yet been successful in examining to what extent the
30
multiple discourses on ‘public’ discussed in the West (see Chapter 2) have shaped 
the public interest in Japanese planning (e.g. Edo 1980; Iwami 1985; Terao 1999). 
There is no comprehensive investigation on how the public interest in Japanese 
planning has been historically formed and deployed in planning practices.
On the studies of Japanese planning histories, there are some excellent works which 
detail the historical development of Japan’s planning policy since its inception 
(Ishida 1987a; Ishida 1987b; Sorensen 2002). Others focus on the analysis of 
planning policies in specific periods such as the era of post-war reconstruction in 
1945-52 (Ishida 2003; Tiratsoo 2002), social movements in the 1960-70s (Avenell 
2006; McKean 1981; Steiner, Krauss, and Flanagan 1980) and neo-liberal urban 
developments in the 1980s (Hayakawa and Hirayama 1991; Iio 1993; Otake 1993). 
Moreover, a number of academics have written about Japan’s modem architecture 
development and its relationship with culture and society (Coaldrake 1996; Jinnai 
1994; Nute 2004; Shelton 1998; Stewart 1987; Suzuki 2001). However, these works 
do not offer strong theoretical accounts of why some important concerns in Western 
planning such as quality of life and liveability have never been high on the agenda 
for Japan’s planning and why it has been difficult to change the status quo. This 
thesis intends to fill this gap and offer new insights on Japan’s planning development 
in the course of modernisation.
Theories and approaches
A modernisation process, in particular, industrialisation and its negative impact on a 
society instigated the development of planning and the public interest in the West 
(Ashworth 1954; Hall 1996a). Therefore, to investigate the relationship between 
Japanese planning and the public interest, it is necessary to analyse Japan’s path
towards a modem state. The modem Japanese state and its planning system emerged 
after the 1868 Meiji restoration. Important to note is that the development of the 
Japan’s modem state progressed in a distinctive way (Gordon 2003; Norman and 
Woods 2000; Tipton 2001) from Western liberal states, where the modem state 
developed gradually and continuously into the current form along with 
industrialisation and democratisation. Instead, radical revolution transformed Japan 
from a feudal community to a modem nation-state, and the new government initiated 
industrialisation and planning policy (Beasley 1995; Sorensen 2002; Tipton 2001). 
This inception of Japan’s modernisation and planning can be contrasted to the origins 
of planning in the West.
While Japan’s public administration emerged by imitating Western state 
administrations (Beasley 1995), modem state institutions in Japan, in particular for 
planning development, contain origins and principles that were very different from 
those in nineteenth century Western liberal democracies. As mentioned above, the 
Japanese government solely focused on industrialisation and the establishment of 
sovereignty. These modem state institutions have had influences on the role of the 
state and public policy outcomes.
Japan’s inception of the modem state, in particular the relationship between 
capitalism, civil society and the state, strongly affected its planning development. 
My research presents the modem state of Japan as being representative of the 
developmental state model (see Chapter 2 in more detail), which differs from the 
welfare state model adopted by countries such as the UK in relation to the 
development of planning policy. While Japan did import modem state 
administration and planning instruments from Western states (Ishida 1987a;
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Sorensen 2002), its built environment is very different from those in Western states. 
My hypothesis is that the construction and interpretation of the public interest in the 
course of its modernisation resulted in another type of planning policy development 
in Japan.
Combining historical and institutional analysis, the approach adopted in this research 
is in the tradition of historical institutionalism. Ashford (1992) summarises the 
advantages of this approach as follows:
A particular policy study is not simply a building block for one or more 
lawlike generalizations as conceived in normal science but is 
simultaneously a historical narrative, a portrayal of particular motives 
and intentions at work in a particular setting, an account of prevailing 
ethical and moral standards at work in political and social life at some 
moment in history, and an exercise in defining political and social reality 
for policy makers and the public (Ashford 1992: 4-5).
Moreover, historical institutionalists emphasise how institutions affect policy 
outcomes in the following manner:
[Historical institutionalism] emphasize the role of institutional choices 
made early in the development of policy areas, or even of political 
systems. The argument is that these initial choices (structural as well as 
normative) will have a pervasive effect on subsequent policy choices 
(Goodin and Klingemann 1998 : 210).
Extending on this, I will argue how ideas determined the role of institutions and 
policy choices in the process of planning policy-making. Here, ideas are interpreted 
as shared beliefs (Goldstein 1993a: 11) among politicians, members of public 
administration and policy advisors, who had significant impacts on policy choices 
(Goldstein and Keohane 1993b; Thomley 1991). The meaning and discourse of the 
public interest reflects these shared beliefs that have been present in Japan’s planning 
institutions. In order to identify how the concept of the public interest has been
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constructed in the contemporary planning regime, I rely in my research on textual 
analysis of policy statements, interviews and judicial review cases.
Furthermore, I will review Japanese planning development based on feminist 
critiques to find out why certain discourses, such as the quality of life, have failed to 
materialise in its policy-making. Feminist critiques in this thesis do not simply mean 
analysing power imbalance between genders, but examining planning reality in Japan 
from the viewpoints of people being oppressed and factors not being noticed (Bacchi 
1999; Rendell, Penner, and Borden 1999; Sandercock 1998a). Marxist analysis 
based on class and economic inequality cannot fulfil this objective very well. First, 
post-war Japan once succeeded in minimising class differences in terms of income 
distribution (Tachibanaki 1998). Second, as fully analysed in Chapter 7, even 
Japan’s middle-class population could not escape from negative impacts caused by 
its policy failures in planning. ‘An interest in class, race and gender’ will help to 
explore hidden agenda in policy-making and illuminate inequalities of power 
distribution in society (Scott 1986: 1054).
Besides ideological and institutional factors shaping the public interest in planning, 
the legal framework in Japan has also operated in a distinctive manner from Western 
liberal democracies. In a modem democracy, a constitution is a foundation to protect 
citizenship and the public interest. Planning laws and regulations should be in 
compliance with the constitutional mle. Robert A Dahl explains in Polyarchy: 
Participation and Opposition (Dahl 1971) that there are two requirements to realise a 
truly democratic state: political participation represented in suffrage and the right of
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public contestation7. He considers that there is no true democracy in communist 
countries, as there are few opportunities where people can challenge the legitimacy 
o f the authority (Dahl 1971). Indeed, the discourse on the public interest in planning 
has been redefined through legal challenges in liberal democracies about whether 
both public and private actions are in the public interest as stipulated by the 
constitution. In this context, the 1946 Constitution of Japan is also special because 
the US Occupation Force drafted it. Partly because of this origin, the Constitution of 
Japan, which ultimately rules the pubic interest, has tended not to be referred to often 
by the judiciary for legal disputes in planning (see Chapter 7). While the 
Constitution of Japan strongly supports the ideal of citizenship, the divorce of the 
constitutional rule from planning justice has also affected the public interest 
discourse in Japan.
Therefore, I used three research methods to analyse the concept of the public interest 
in planning in Japan: first, studying its historical construction derived from its 
distinctive path to modernisation; second, analysing its institutional constraints; and 
third, how the government understood the concept of the public interest in planning 
implementation. Three approaches can be justified because this research is to 
analyse a subtle use of power and control of the planning agenda as well as the right 
to challenge government decisions when people articulate the public interest. This 
cannot be done using a power struggle model among interest groups in planning 
policy-making as realist political scientists suggest (Dahl 1961; Dunleavy 1980; 
Lindblom 1959; Lowi 1979; Pennington 2000). The main objective of the research
7 The term polyarchy is an artificial term introduced by Dahl to describe the perfect condition of 
democracy, as Dahl believed that there is no fully democratised state in the real world (see Dahl, 
1971).
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is first, to find out why particular policy choices have never been set on the agenda 
(Bachrach and Baratz 1962) or even entirely overlooked (Lukes 1974) in Japan’s 
planning development, and second, why such policy choices have not changed.
Research questions
The central research question is:
What have been the roles of the public interest in the development of Japanese 
planning? i
Sub-research questions:
• What forces have determined the way that the public interest in Japanese 
planning has been historically constructed, especially in relation to the market, 
the public sphere, social life and domestic life (see Chapter 2)?
• Why has Japanese planning failed to produce good quality of life although 
the government has continued to import planning tools from the West and the 
national income has been one of the highest in the world?
• Why has the idea of the public interest in Japanese planning rarely been 
contested? Why has it been difficult to change the status-quo?
Identification of the information requirements
In order to investigate the origins and development of the public interest in planning 
policies, this research requires an extensive review and analysis of the modem 
history and institutions of Japanese politics and society. For this analysis, I will 
review literatures of Japan’s modem and planning history, planning policy
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statements, government reports and documents of administrative guidance on 
planning policy in order to understand the goals of Japanese planning. This analysis 
draws heavily on materials issued by the central government, as Japanese planning is 
largely under the control of the central bureaucracy. In addition, I look at 
biographies and interviews with key people who were in the position to influence 
Japan’s planning policies. In Japan, it is often long after leaving the office that these 
people reveal what the real goals and intentions of particular set of policies were. As 
such, these sources may constitute important aids to understand the reasons behind 
planning decisions.
The court rulings of planning disputes are a very important source for this research-, 
as there are no formal opportunities for Japanese citizens to interrogate and challenge 
the legitimacy of proposed plans before implementation. Due to this very limited 
extent of participation in the planning process, the court is a final resort for Japanese 
citizens to resolve planning conflicts. The cases analysed in this thesis are the most 
cited court rulings in leading legal journals in Japan about the public interest and 
planning. While a number of lower court rulings were selected from the Japan’s 
Supreme Court Database by matching the wording of the public interest and city 
planning9, the majority of the cases reviewed are the Supreme Court rulings. I 
selected the cases based on the classification of the public interest discourses 
introduced in Chapter 2. The selected rulings represent ongoing discussion of the 
role of the public interest shaping a relationship between the state and the market, the 
nature of the pubic sphere, the ideas of sociability, and feminist critiques towards
8 Jurist, Hanrei Times and Hanrei Jiho
9 From Gyosei Jiken Saiban Reishu (judicial review cases) database, 167 cases were hit under those 
wordings on 10 July 2006. See http://www.courts.go.jp/
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modem planning such as safety concerns. The reviewed rulings demonstrate how 
citizens challenged the official discourse on the public interest in planning which the 
state deployed to attain its goals, and reveal how the state countered the citizens’ 
claims.
In the Japanese litigation system, there is little chance for citizens to win cases 
against public administrators and developers on the ground of the public interest. As 
a result, there have not been many court rulings about planning issues. The legal 
suits related to planning were most often found in environmental planning disputes 
about concerns such as air and noise pollution caused by the development of new 
infrastructures in residential areas. Therefore, I also use this type of lawsuit in my 
thesis to better understand the role of the public interest in planning.
The structure of the thesis
This thesis explores the discourse on the public interest in Japanese regional and 
urban planning in a historical context. The history of Japanese planning policy is 
analysed along with its modernisation, in comparison with similar development in 
Western states. This thesis consists of three parts. Part One consists of this chapter 
and chapter Two. Chapter Two discusses the development of the modem state and 
analyses the process towards the birth of the modem planning system. It is argued 
that the modernisation process has affected the distinction between public and private 
spheres and suggests that the public interest in planning is construed in line with this 
distinction in modem states.
Chapters Three to Five contains the historical construction of the public interest and 
planning culture of Japan, forming Part Two. Chapter Three describes the
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emergence and development of the Japanese modem state from 1868 to 1945. The 
emergence of the planning system is analysed alongside the growth of Japanese 
state-led capitalism and military expansion. Chapter Four looks at the shift from the 
Japanese pre-war authoritarian regime to democracy under the US occupation. 
Despite the positive impact of the US-led democratic reforms on post-war Japan, this 
chapter shows that the planning system was not significantly changed by the reforms. 
While the reforms during the occupation encouraged Japanese society to become 
more democratic and egalitarian, the shift in the US’s policy towards an emphasis on 
economic development in Japan reduced the chance for the Japanese to dismantle its 
pre-war authoritarian bureaucracy. Chapter Five explains how Japanese planning 
policy became a tool for industrial development and was subject to the rules of its 
strong bureaucracy. While Japan’s spatial economic strategy contributed to the 
creation of its national wealth, it was also accompanied by negative externalities. In 
fact, the developmentalism of Japan’s planning policy adversely affected citizens’ 
quality of life and even the economy itself after Japan became an economic 
superpower. The chapter explores the emergence and limitations of the citizen’s 
‘public’ interest as an alternative to the state’s ‘public’ interest.
Part Three contains Chapters Six, Seven and Eight. Chapter Six examines the roles
of post-war institutions and systems in Japan which prevented the formation of the
‘alternative’ public interest within planning policy-making. It is worth mentioning
that Japan’s public institutions, as well as other social institutions, carry the legacy of
the Meiji Restoration. In analysing these matters, this chapter focuses on institutions
that influence planning policy choices in the legislative, executive and judicial
branches of Japan’s modem state. Chapter Seven analyses the discourse of Japanese
planning system by investigating the concept of the public interest in planning and
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environmental litigation. I examine legal cases that represent the major opinions of 
the Japanese courts, focusing on the Supreme Court rulings. The cases correspond to 
key planning disputes in contemporary Japan, involving human/environmental rights, 
local autonomy and third party interests.
Finally, Chapter Eight summarises and highlights the main findings of the thesis 
related to the role of the public interest in Japanese planning. The concept is deeply 
influenced by the origins of Japan’s modem state, in particular the relationship 
between the state, market and society. The conclusion will illuminate how the 
concept of ‘public’ represented by the public interest affects planning policy 
development in modem Japan. The conclusion also summarises major obstacles to 
change Japan’s planning administration in relation to its cultural, institutional and 
legal framework.
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Chapter Two: The Public Interest and the Modern State
Created during the process of modernisation, modem planning systems and their 
ideologies were inevitably shaped by the paths towards the modem state. The 
concept of the public interest also emerged under modernisation, beginning to play a 
central role in the formulation of planning and other public policies. It is important 
to note here that the concept of the public interest is not straight forward, as Chapter 
1 showed that there is a lot of contention about the perception. The meaning of 
‘public’ in the concept of the public interest in fact has four aspects in the West, 
based on its boundaries with the private sphere (Weintraub 1997). I believe that this 
boundary has constantly shifted through public debates and politics so that it has also 
changed the concept of the public interest. Therefore, the definition of the public 
interest differs over time and across modem states, depending on the stage of 
modernisation in a nation. In order to fully understand and appreciate competing 
arguments about the public interest in contemporary planning systems, we need to 
analyse the political history of the modem state.
This chapter explores the conceptual development of the public interest in relation to 
the modem state. Section 2.1 explains the common characteristics of the modem 
state and its process of evolution. This is followed by an analysis of how 
experiences of latecomers to modernisation differ from leading modem states in
s.
Western Europe. Section 2.2 gives the details of the developmental state of Japan, 
where modernisation was in principle conditioned by an international order. This 
section also discusses the impact of the developmental state on early Japanese 
planning development. Section 2.3 examines the complex arguments about the 
public interest, derived from the four major distinctions between public and private
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spheres that are used in Western liberal democracies. Section 2.4 investigates the 
interpretation and use of the public interest in modem Japan, using the classification 
introduced in section 2.3. This section shows the unique characteristics of the public 
interest that originate from Japan’s relation with the outside world. Section 2.5 
summarises the findings from the previous sections, and consider why the public 
interest in Japan has a different logic compared to Western liberal democracies.
2.1 The Development of the Modern State
Development in Europe
The current form of the nation-state is a rather new entity in political history (Hall 
and Gieben 1992; McLean 1996). Despite the rise of empires in the wake of 
civilisation and flourishing city-states in the Middle Ages, anthropologists 
established that people have for a long time lived in stateless societies, which were 
based on communities that were not necessarily ruled by state authorities (Hall and 
Gieben 1992; McLean 1996). Nonetheless, after a long feudalistic era, the absolute 
state transcended into the nation-state with sovereign power, which then gradually 
developed into the modem state (Eccleston 1986; Hall and Gieben 1992; Pierson
1996).
Although there is no agreed view of the modem state, Max Weber offered the most 
influential definition in his works (Pierson 1996). According to Weber, the 
following characteristics of the modem state are particularly important (See also 
Giddens 1985; Mann 1993; Tilly and Ardant 1975): (1) monopoly of the means of 
violence; (2) territoriality; (3) sovereignty; (4) constitutionality; (5) impersonalised 
power; (6) public bureaucracy; (7) authority / legitimacy; (8) citizenship; (9) taxation
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(Pierson 1996 : 8). It is generally accepted that the modem state with these 
characteristics emerged in Western Europe between the eighteenth and nineteenth 
century (Hall and Gieben 1992).
Western states contained two precursors that were particularly important to the 
modem state development. First, the Enlightenment and the birth of social science 
challenged traditional ideas and beliefs, in particular of religion (Hall and Gieben 
1992). Breaking the chains of unreasonable suppression from churches and rulers, 
people were able to progress by following reason and rationality of science based on 
empirically tested knowledge with new technologies (Porter 1990). The 
Enlightenment and the progress of social sciences in seventeenth- and eighteenth- 
century Europe was crucial to the progress of liberal democracy, in which people 
were free from ‘cruelty, injustice and despotism* of feudal and absolute rulers (Hall 
and Gieben 1992: 37). The radicalism of the Enlightenment enabled the progress of 
both industrialisation and liberal political thoughts.
Second, the absolutist regime established the nation-state prior to the development of 
the modem state (Giddens 1985). In fact, some take view that the foundations for the 
modem state -  ‘monopoly of violence, territoriality, sovereignty, bureaucracy and 
taxation’ -  were established during the era of absolutism (Pierson 1996: 52). 
Numerous wars between absolutist states over territories enhanced institutional 
development towards the modem state (Giddens 1985; Mann 1993; Tilly and Ardant 
1975). Growing military expenditure pressed absolute monarchies to centralise legal 
power and establish systematic mechanisms for tax collection, as well as to create a 
bureaucracy that carried out those administrations (Giddens 1985; Mann 1993).
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However, surveillance under law and order in absolutist states was not sufficient to 
achieve the state goals. After all, absolute monarchies needed cooperation from their 
subjects, and they obtained it in exchange of political participation in the form of 
parliament (Giddens 1985). Furthermore, to mobilise the subjects for state goals, it 
was necessary to set up a collective identity as a nation. This led to the creation of 
official nationalism (Anderson 1991; Broers 1996). Therefore, it can be said that the 
territorial expansion of nation-states necessitated diffusion of political power, which 
in turn weakened the power of absolute monarchies.
While the rise of military power ironically led to the decline of the absolute 
monarchy, the development of absolute states facilitated the process towards the 
modem state. The absolute monarchy supported industrialisation and technological 
development for modem wars (Mann 1993). However, industrialisation also resulted 
in the empowerment of a capitalist class, thus eroding the power of the traditional 
ruling class: landowning aristocracy (Giddens 1985: 158). Concurrently, both the 
Enlightenment and industrialisation advanced the idea of liberal democracy. In the 
following stage, the bourgeois class (citizens) mobilised people of similar ethnicity, 
culture and language to take away political power from monarchies and delegate this 
power to popular congresses under the banner of ‘(popular) nationalism’ (Anderson 
1991; Broers 1996; Day and Thompson 2004). Consequently, political participation 
of the bourgeois class expanded in the nineteenth-century modem state.
After the bourgeois class had successfully secured civil rights (the freedom of 
choice) and political rights (political participation) in the modem state (Hall and 
Gieben 1992; Pierson 1996), the working classes started to challenge the legitimacy 
of privileges enjoyed by the bourgeois class (Engels 2001; Geary 1981; Hinton 1983).
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The pursuit of civil and political citizenship by the working classes later led to the 
formation of social citizenship10 in the twentieth century (Layboum 1995; Marshall 
1964; Thane 1996). In addition to the representation in national and local assemblies, 
many civil society organisations such as labour unions and women’s rights groups 
campaigned for citizenship, using the media, mass demonstrations and lobby 
activities. Through this process, the ideal of an egalitarian society was crystallised in 
the construction of the welfare state in post-war Western Europe. The development 
of modem planning in the West cannot be separated from the class struggle of the 
urban working classes in the development towards the welfare state (See more detail 
in 2.3).
Non-Western state development
The route to the modem state varies considerably across nations, especially for 
latecomers to modernisation such as former colonial states in Asia, Africa and Latin 
America as well as non-colonised states such as Japan. These countries (except 
white immigrant countries such as the USA and Australia) lacked the two important 
forerunner stages of modernisation seen in the West: the Enlightenment and the 
establishment of the nation-sate. This absence seems to have affected their 
development towards the modem state. For building a nation-state, these former 
colonies and Japan, which was facing threats to be colonised, had a strong need to 
unite their populations and mobilise them for national sovereignty against an 
imperialist order. For this struggle, nationalism, especially connected to the nations’
10 The concept of social citizenship was originally introduced by T.H. Marshall in his Class 
Citizenship and Social Class (1963).
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cultural past and traditions, was emphasised in their modernisation processes 
(Chatterjee 1993; Iida 2002; McVeigh 2004).
In the West, nationalism was used to unity the middle classes and gain support for 
parliamentary democracy, while weakening or dismantling the powers of absolute 
monarchies and the traditional ruling class (Anderson 1991; Day and Thompson 
2004). The French Revolution is a good example of this liberal nationalism 
(Anderson 1991; Broers 1996; Ozkirimli 2000). Although the newly emerged 
bourgeoisie class was a key actor for this nationalism and modernisation in Western 
Europe, traditional elites played leading roles in Japan and former colonies (Gluck 
1985; Norman and Woods 2000; Omvedt 2003; Stronach 1995).
In contrast, nationalism in colonial nations and Japan was incorporated in the revival 
of the nations’ old power and traditional values against Western imperial culture 
(Chatterjee 1993; Iida 2002; McVeigh 2004). In these countries, nation-state 
building, in which traditional elites organised the masses under ethnic, but often 
authoritarian sentiments, had significant impacts on the formation of formal 
democracy and the public sphere (Eccleston 1986; Norman and Woods 2000; 
Omvedt 2003). Accordingly, modernisation in these nations inevitably carried the 
notion of ‘authoritarian nationalism’, in which the state and its administration tended 
to possess strong power to mobilise their populations for ‘the success of the nation’ 
(Eccleston 1986; Eisenstadt, Schluchter, and Wittrock 2001; Gluck 1985; Norman 
and Woods 2000; Stronach 1995).
In this model, nationalism plays a peculiar and powerful function in the promotion of
industrialisation under the state’s guidance to strengthen the military and the national
economy. This applies profoundly to Japan, which was facing serious threats of
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falling victim to colonisation (Beasley 1995; Gordon 2003). This formula of state 
development was expressed in the slogan ‘fukoku kydhei (enrich the country, 
strengthen the military)', which combined with Confucian ideology in East Asia11, 
can be named as the developmental state (Castells 1992).
In addition to the powerful role of nationalism in modernisation, the absence of 
authentic enlightenment movements in these nations also determined their natures of 
‘modem states’. As explained earlier, the ultimate essence of the Enlightenment was 
the emancipation of human beings from the repression of religious values and feudal 
tradition (Porter 1990). However, while latecomers to modernisation desperately 
needed to import Western science and technology, they tended to ignore the core 
ideologies of the Enlightenment when they implemented industrialisation in their 
homelands (Bartholomew 1989; Nakayama 1984). Anti-colonial national resistance 
was deeply connected to the resurgence of old powers in these nations; the new 
regimes carefully removed anti-traditional radical elements from science in the 
process of modernisation (Bartholomew 1989; Nakayama 1984).
In Japan, for example, the state enthusiastically promoted science and technology 
under the catchword of ‘hunmei kaika (civilisation and enlightenment)’. However, 
the same authority simultaneously stressed ‘wakon ydsai (Japanese spirit, Western 
technology)’, in order to preserve ‘national’ values when importing modem 
technologies and institutions from the West. In fact, the Japanese authority in the 
late nineteenth century was deeply concerned about the possible influences of British
11 During the modem nation-state building in East Asia, the elite extensively deployed and 
manipulated the Confucian tradition, which emphasises the family value and respect for authority, in 
order to counter the illness of Western industrialisation -  the rise of political liberalism and ‘lack of 
discipline’ of the working class. See Tu, Wei-ming, ed. 1996. Confucian traditions in East Asian 
modernity: moral education and economic culture in Japan and the four mini-dragons. Cambridge, 
Mass: Harvard University Press.
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and French liberal thoughts, the basis of modem science, which would ‘demoralise’ 
the general population from the virtues of hard work and obedience to the ruling 
class (Gluck 1985:105; Iokibe 1999). Considering the importance of the 
Enlightenment in the establishment of fundamental human rights in Western liberal 
democracies such as liberty, the selected import of science, in particular social 
sciences such as politics, philosophy and sociology, obstructed the progress of 
citizenship in Japan in later years (Maruyama 1963d).
The absence of the Enlightenment in Japan seems particularity to have affected the 
advancement of social citizenship. Most modem states nowadays have features of 
the welfare state to ensure social citizenship. Contemporary Japan certainly has 
features of the welfare state. However, the Japanese government expenditure in this 
area has been much smaller in comparison to its European counterparts (Japan. 
National Institute of Population and Social Security Research 2004:29; Katsumata 
and Yamada 1998)12. While the forms of the welfare state vary across modem states 
(Ashford 1988; Esping-Andersen and European University Institute 1988; Esping- 
Andersen and United Nations. Research Institute for Social Development 1996), its 
core role is to compensate for negative externalities of the free market economy and 
to protect social rights of citizens (Fraser 1984: xxi). What is significant in Japan is 
the government has spent a far larger share of the national budget in promoting the 
economy than supporting the socially deprived among developed economies.
12 In 2001, Japan’s social security expenditure amounted to 24 percent of its national income. The 
equivalent rates in other OECD member countries were 17 percent in the USA, 29 percent in the UK, 
39 percent in Germany and 42 percent in Sweden. Due to the rapidly ageing population, Japan’s 
social security expenditure has risen sharply in the recent past. Up to the beginning o f the 1990s, only 
10 percent of GDP was used to cover social security expenditures so that its ratio was much lower 
than other OECD countries including the USA.
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Because of its emphasis on economic development in the public policy choices, 
Japan is often labelled as a developmental state. Despite Japan’s small expenditure 
in social security, the government spending on fixed capital projects, so called kokyo 
jigyd (public works) has been much higher than those of other liberal economies 
throughout post-war years (Atkinson and van den Noord 2001; Igarashi and Ogawa 
1997; Miyamoto 1998). In 2000, spending on public works reached 8 percent of 
GDP, in comparison to the OECD average of 3.4 percent (Atkinson and van den 
Noord 2001: 49). While academic attention has tended to focus on the 
‘development’ functions of Japanese society (Johnson 1982; Katz 1998; Okimoto 
1989), the crucial characteristic of the developmental state is the authoritarian value 
that demanded sacrifices in social welfare. The following section discusses why the 
economic-centred value of the developmental state progressed and how it affected 
the early stages of planning policy-making in Japan.
2.2 The Birth of Japan’s Developmental State
The origins of Japan’s developmental state
Japan’s path to the modem state was seriously conditioned by international relations.
Unlike Western countries, Japanese modernisation did not take place as a result of
internal pressures. Its relatively peaceful and secluded feudal period was threatened
in the nineteenth century, when Russian, British, and American vessels approached
Japan and urged the nation for trade (Aoki, 1994). Japan had to implement a
program of radical modernisation to avoid being colonised by the West. Facing
threats to its sovereignty, Japan’s modernisation had to be realized promptly under
the control of a small number of men of spirit (the shishi), who were mainly lower
ranks of the samurai class in the Tokugawa feudalism era (Gordon 2003; Tipton
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2001). They were loyalists, who reinstated the absolute monarchy through the 1868 
Meiji Restoration. These loyalists constituted the executives of the new government 
and carried out the modernisation projects of Japan (Beasley 1995). Because Japan’s 
transition to the modem state was implemented under such peculiar circumstances, 
other factors that played important roles in modernisation in Western countries -  
democracy, industrialisation and social democracy (Anderson 1986) - were 
significantly affected.
In general, the developmental state is understood as follows:
A state is developmental when it establishes as its principle of legitimacy 
its ability to promote and sustain development, understanding by 
development the combination of steady high rates of economic growth 
and structural change in the productive system, both domestically and in 
its relationship to the international economy (Castells 1992: 56).
The ultimate objective of the newly-established state of Japan was to obtain military 
and economic strength under nationalism. Other roles of the state were all 
subordinate to this goal. Nonetheless, the report by the Iwakura Mission (1871-3) 
whom sent to Europe and the USA suggests that the Japanese elite was also well 
aware of the possible impacts of industrialisation and urbanisation on society. The 
official account by the Mission of Berlin in Germany on 9th March 1873 read as 
follows:
As Berlin is an emerging capital, its citizens are simple in their ways and 
not as frivolous in manner as people in other great cities. However, as 
the city has prospered, they have become increasingly decadent, and 
particularly over the last few years they have degenerated noticeably 
(Kume, Healey, and Tsuzuki 2002: 296).
The reason for the coarser manners of the people of Berlin lies 
principally in the domineering bearing of soldiers and students. While 
this may be natural for the soldiers after all the recent wars, the students, 
too, are highly excitable by temperament and not even the police have 
much authority over them. This has come about perhaps because the 
spread of liberal ideas to Germany in the wake of the French Revolution
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coinciding with the introduction of constitutional government in Prussia. 
Although this did not lead to unrest as in some other countries, the 
students and society in general exerted considerable pressure on the 
government, with the result that universities now hold tremendous 
influence (Kume, Healey, and Tsuzuki 2002: 298).
Accordingly, the Japanese authority had another objective for its nation building. It
was suppressing mass democracy and socialist ideas to enable its modernisation from
above.
Early planning in the developmental state
Modem planning in the West generally emerged to regulate and mediate 
environmental impacts caused by industrialisation. The ideas behind planning 
development in the West can be contrasted with the developmental state ideology: 
the aim of the former was to limit the free market power over land-use (Fraser 1984; 
Hall 1996a). Another rationale behind the development of the Western planning was 
to mitigate class conflicts in cities (Ashworth 1954; Benevolo 1967). Faced with the 
discontents of the urban working classes, the middle class tried to improve the 
‘morals’ of the working classes by improving their housing (Ashworth 1954; 
Benevolo 1967; Hill 1883).
Japanese planning has followed a path that is completely different from the West. As 
a latecomer to modernisation, Japanese planning policies tended to focus on the 
efficient use of space to facilitate and accelerate capitalist development. Urban 
planning was regarded as a part of economic planning policies rather than means to 
control private interests on land-use. The Western planning model, in which the state 
acts as a regulator to reconcile conflicts on land-use in the market economy, does not 
fit to the origin of Japanese planning.
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More often than not, the state in Japan has been closer to capitalist interests on 
planning issues in order to enhance the production capacity of the national economy. 
In fact, in the pre-war period, the state itself owned the important industries such as 
armament production. The strong state initiatives provided the necessary 
infrastructures for the development of key industries throughout the pre- and post­
war period. Therefore, Japanese modem urban planning did not develop as a 
response to chaos and epidemics as it did in nineteenth-century Western cities, where 
the free market failed in land use during industrialisation and rapid urbanisation. 
Instead, planning in Japan was first recognised as a medium to provide essential 
infrastructures for industrialisation.
While another strand behind planning development in the West was its utility for a 
social reform, this intention was also absent in Imperial Japan. This was because the 
pre-war Japanese authority exercised other methods for controlling the social 
discontents (see the following chapters). Therefore, the idea of providing the quality 
life for all the population through planning is still underdeveloped in contemporary 
Japan.
Chalmers Johnson (1982) defines the developmental state as descending from the 
German Historical School - sometimes labelled ‘economic nationalism, 
Handelspolitik, or neo-mercantilism’. He also points out an important difference 
between the developmental state and the Western liberal state in terms of the relation 
between the state and the market as follows:
In states that were late to industrialise, the state itself led the 
industrialisation drive, that is, it took on developmental functions. These 
two differing orientations toward private economic activities, the 
regulatory orientation and the developmental orientation, produced two 
different kinds of govemment-business relationships. The United States
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is a good example of a state in which the regulatory orientation
predominates, whereas Japan is a good example of a state in which the
developmental orientation predominates (Johnson, 1982: 19).
This is an important observation, if we are to understand the relationship between the 
Japanese government and the market as well as the implication of Johnson’s view for 
planning policy in Japan. The state was keen to assist capitalists to increase 
production, but it was rather indifferent to regulating how the private sector should 
use space. The priority being firmly set on economic development, land was seen as 
a necessary asset for production in Japan. Later land became regarded as a
commodity which itself produces capital gain.
An introduction of modem architecture in city centres was also important in Japan’s 
modernisation project. In addition to infrastructures like roads and bridges, the 
construction of Western-style grand architecture pieces in Japanese cities was 
considered to be necessary to impress foreigners. Accordingly, civil engineers and 
architects came to represent the core of planning professionals in Japan. The origin 
of Japanese planning was in a sharp contrast to the origins of modem Western 
planning, which involved the construction of sewage systems for public health and 
housing reforms for the urban poor to mitigate the impacts of the free market 
economy in cities. In Japan, the use of planning to improve the quality of life for 
citizens was only a secondary goal, and the control of land use was limited until the 
1923 Great Kanto Earthquake. Within this context, planning merely involved 
building of infrastructures and pieces of architecture in Meiji Japan and it essentially 
lacked implications for social reforms.
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2.3 The Public Interest in the Modern State in the West
The development of the modem state led to the growth of political institutions, which 
meant that the legitimacy of state governance became an increasingly important issue. 
The expansion of political institutions in the modem state posed a question: what 
constitutes the public interest? In other words, what is the distinction between public 
and private? In the age of absolutism, this was simple. A monarchy equalled the 
‘public’, since the monarchy’s legitimacy was justified on the claim of ‘divine right’ 
backed by churches (Hall and Gieben 1992: 84). However, it became much more 
difficult to answer this question against the backdrop of the expansion in the state’s 
role and political participation under mass democracy.
In fact, the meaning of the public interest has been very much entangled with 
characteristics which constitute the modem state. The concept has constantly 
changed according to the distinctions between the public and private domains which 
have also shifted by public debate. As a result, the discussion about the public
r
interest in planning is more complicated. To get a better understanding of these 
issues, the first part of this section classifies current debates about the concepts of 
‘public’ and ‘private’. The second part shows how the arguments have contributed 
to shaping the public interest in planning in the West.
The public/private distinction in politics
The distinction between public and private is a core issue in social and political 
analysis in the modem state. However, there seems to be considerable confusion 
about what constitutes public and private (Weintraub 1997: 1). The reason for this 
confusion is that there are multiple dimensions to the concepts of public and private,
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and thus numerous ways to contrast the two concepts (Weintraub 1997: 3). Although 
what is ‘private’ always defines ‘public’, there appear to be four major themes which 
distinguish public from private domains. These are: 1) liberalism: the market and the 
state; 2) citizenship and the public sphere; 3) ‘public’ life as sociability; and 4) 
feminism: private/ public as family/ civil society (Weintraub 1997). By using 
Weintraub’s classification, issues surrounding the public interest can be understood 
better.
In the first classification, the state as public is contrasted to the market as private in 
dichotomies such as public/private sector. In debates on privatisation of the public 
sector’s services, ‘public’ means ‘the administrative state’ (Weintraub 1997: 8-11). 
This interpretation of the state and the market as public versus private appeared when 
market powers grew and caused social problems in the nineteenth-century modem 
state. The administrative functions of the state expanded to govern the relationship 
between the market and society to ease these problems (see Chapter 1).
According to the second classification, the public sphere or the public realm mainly 
stands for ‘the realm of political community’ or ‘civil society’ where citizens take 
part in political debates, discussions, collective decision-making and actions 
(Weintraub 1997: 10-16). The public sphere is not subordinate to either the market 
or the state; it is the sphere in which in principle citizens have open access and form 
public opinions freely (Habermas 1997: 105).
In the third classification, ‘public life’ as social life does not necessarily refer to
political activities alone, but more generally to spontaneous and lively ongoing
interactions among heterogeneous individuals and groups in a society (Weintraub
1997: 17). The activities of public life tend to occur in certain spaces, in particular in
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cities in modem life (Jacobs 1972). Consequently, social life, which is distinguished 
from intimate and emotional private life (Weintraub 1997: 20), is often discussed in 
conjunction with the creation of such physical spaces.
Lastly, there is a distinction between private and public in discussions involving the 
domestic versus public split of life (Weintraub 1997: 27). According to this view, 
which originated in Aristotle’s Politics, the private sphere was the women’s sphere 
as women traditionally and disproportionately occupied domestic or family 
dimensions of life (Elshtain 1997; Weintraub 1997). Feminist critiques challenged 
this division of the private and public life based on fixed gender roles and the 
inferiority of the private domain to the public domain in the modem state (Elshtain 
1997: 606; Landes 1998; Lister 2002; Phillips 1998).
The development of the public interest in planning
Modem planning in the West has developed to redefine existing boundaries between
public and private domains. Citizens in a liberal democracy have continuously
confronted the definitions of the public interest based on these public/private
boundaries. Questions about existing notions of the public interest arise from
political conflicts, economic problems, and changes in societal relations. Faced with
ongoing challenges from citizens, the public interest, and therefore planning
governance itself, has had to be revised accordingly. Therefore, rather than a static
concept, the public interest is a vehicle for changes in planning practices about the
desirable forms of the built environment, governance, democracy, collective values
and human rights in the Western liberal democracy. Thus, the ultimate value of the
public interest in modem politics and planning should be its contestability in all
arenas of political processes: legislature, public administration and the judicial
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system. Then, how have public/private dichotomies, which shape ‘the public 
interest’, affected the discourse of planning in the West?
First, the emergence of planning policy in the modem state was a turning point of the 
relationship between the market and the state. The principle of a laissez-faire 
economy, free from state interventions, was modified following the crises of the 
foundations of economic production -  a loss of productivity indirectly or directly 
caused by deteriorating public health in cities (Ashworth 1954; Fraser 1984; Hall 
1996a). Furthermore, the state also had to provide the necessary infrastructures to 
make urban life work smoothly for both capital and labour (production and 
consumption) (Harvey 1985; Klosterman 1996). The constraints on the 
environmental and physical capacity of early industrial cities in the West changed the 
boundaries between private (the market) and public (the state) in a capitalist society.
Second, industrial cities in the nineteenth-century Europe and the USA presented 
opportunities and spaces where the public sphere could thrive. The public sphere, 
which originated from the Greek or Roman polis, was first revived by the 
bourgeoisie in the capitalist society to counter the power of aristocracy (Habermas
1997). However, capitalist cities not only strengthened the ‘bourgeois’ public sphere, 
but also mobilised the urban working classes to achieve political citizenship (Engels 
2001). While the ‘free’ wage-labour and the capital were merely transplanted from 
traditional feudal villages to urban factories and offices, life in industrial cities made 
the masses conscious of the deep class division and inequality in the capitalist society 
(Giddens 1995: Ch.6). This class consciousness led to social discontents, and 
intensified the growth of labour movements in late nineteenth century and early 
twentieth century European industrial cities (Geary 1981; Hinton 1983; Jones 1976).
Labour movements stimulated the realisation of mass democracy followed by the 
provision of social security and social housing in Western Europe.
Urbanisation and labour movements also altered the characteristics of the public 
sphere in Western industrial cities. The public sphere grew further by the expansion 
of political citizenship: this came to include all adult males and females in later 
years. Planners in local governments and civil society responded to urban social 
problems by improving the living conditions of working class people (Sutcliffe 
1980). State initiatives in social reforms such as the improvement of working class 
housing, which was previously considered as private concerns, became to be an 
‘public’ affair (Ashworth 1957; Benevolo 1967; Sutcliffe 1981). Since then, 
planning policies to ensure the quality of life in communities became a major issue 
debated in the public sphere in Western liberal democracies.
Third, the creation of spaces for ‘public life’ also became a main planning challenge
in the modem state (Gehl and Gemzaee 1996b; Madanipour 2003; Worpole 1992;
Worpole 2000). As seen in the development of the public sphere in the late
nineteenth century, urban spaces such as streets, parks, and squares were important
for the gathering of people, the exchange of information and opinions, and also for
mass protests (Jones 1976; Mitchell 2003). Not only were these public spaces
important for political activities, they were also crucial to social life (Van Rooijen
2000; Worpole 2000). However, planning was reduced to the idea of functionalism
in the mid-twentieth century, based on Le Corbusier’s proposal, A City as the
Machine for Living (Gehl 1996a; Le and Etchells 1929). Suburbanisation,
motorisation and the separation between work and living spaces in modem cities
made it difficult to maintain public spaces as lively places (Taylor 1998; Ward 1994).
Jane Jacob’s criticism towards modem planning is mainly based on this decline of
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social life in modem cities and the breakdown of established inner city communities 
in late twentieth-century American cities (Jacobs 1972). Since the late 1960s, the 
concept of the public realm as social life has again become the central issue of 
planning in Western liberal economies (Gehl and Gemzaee 1996b; Jacobs 1972; 
Madanipour 2003; Worpole 1992).
This reflects the emergence of new democracies calling for social justice in cities 
(Gehl 1996a; Mitchell 2003). Social justice in the built environment required 
increases in accessibility for all citizens, mixed land-use, pedestrian freedom and the 
preservation of cultural and natural heritage to revitalise the public life in modem 
Western civilisation (Partners for Livable Communities 2000; Tibbalds 1992). In 
Western planning development, public space increased its importance with the 
progress of democracy, in order to mitigate social and spatial divisions between the 
rich and the poor, and materialise social cohesion or rebuild social capital of 
communities in fragmented industrial cities (Madanipour 2003: 217-224; Mitchell 
2003; Worpole 2000).
Social life in space often entails sharing common experiences in the same place. The 
place where events occur and many people meet has become an important symbol for 
people to bring back the memories of communities (Tibbalds 1992; Worpole 1992). 
In this context, public space often represents the national, local and social 
representation of the modem nation-state shared by its citizens (Larkham 1996). One 
direction for the development of public space is the preservation and revitalisation of 
heritages; another is the creation of new sociable space to display the ideal imagery 
of the public for the future. Many recent developments often combine these two 
types of public space.
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Planners in the West always concerned themselves with the creation of public spaces, 
in particular amenities, where people could enjoy light, air and the green in the 
public interest (Gehl and Gemzaee 1996b; Hall 1996a; Van Rooijen 2000). There is 
a cynical view that the early planners had a hidden motivation of stimulating moral 
reform of the ‘lazy’ working class population by encouraging commoners to have 
healthy living using those open spaces in cities (Davis 1983; Laurian 2006). Even so, 
it is essential that public spaces and buildings as well as the fa?ade of private 
properties became increasingly recognised as the representation of the public domain 
and were viewed as contributions to the aesthetical symbols of social democracy in 
the twentieth-century modem state (Worpole 2000).
Fourth, feminists’ critiques towards the gender biased public-private distinction as
public (male) vs. domesticity (female) is also relevant to modem Western planning
development. Although the history of modem planning development was told in the
male domain (Meller 2004), middle-class women in industrial cities initiated early
planning efforts in the form of working class housing improvements in the U.K. and
the U.S.A. (Ashworth 1954: 85-86 ; Hall 1996a: Ch.2). Octavia Hill (1838-1912)
dedicated her life to improve the quality of life of the urban poor in the inner city of
London (Hill 1883). An American woman, Jane Addames (1860-1935), who visited
East London in 1888, was deeply impressed by the charities’ works on slum
improvements (Hall 1996a: 40). On her return to the U.S., she committed herself to
improve the settlements of poor immigrants in Chicago (Addams 1893; Addams
1907). Dame Henrietta Barnett (1851-1936), a socialist campaigner, planned and
developed Hampstead Garden Suburb, which incorporated well-designed housing
and Hampstead Heath, and formed them into a new community (Barnett 1928). Her
idea was to promote the integration of the poor and the rich by sharing beautiful open
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spaces and other amenities in Hampstead development (Barnett 1928). Their 
initiatives also changed the existing boundary of public/private domains by 
improving personal matters such as housing and health.
These female pioneers in early planning development shared the common awareness 
and tactics to improve the conditions of the urban poor, in particular for women and 
children. They first realised that poor urban environments of Victorian slum 
settlements were a part of the causes of ill health, incest and other immoral behaviour 
of the urban working classes (Addams 1893; Hill 1876; Hill 1883; Meller 2004). 
Their approach was human-centred (Meller 2004), compared to the environment- 
centred attitude in planning that was characteristic of male professional planners 
(Hawtree 1981). However, because of this human right approach, women’s role in 
modem planning became considerably marginalized in the West (Meller 2004) after 
planning came to be regarded as a science to manage built environments by ‘(white) 
male’ engineering and architecture experts (Hawtree 1981).
Although the contribution of female philanthropists to the emergence of modem 
planning had been long ignored, Jane Jacob’s sharp criticism about the de-humanised 
face of modem planning revived the forgotten tradition of people-centred planning 
(Jacobs 1972). Since the 1980s, feminist critiques have stimulated an important 
wave of new theory development in planning (Greed 1994; Ritzdorf 1996; 
Sandercock and Forsyth 2000). Prior to the development of feminist planning theory 
in advanced economies, many academics have acknowledged that the role of women 
is crucial in achieving fair objectives of economic and social planning in developing 
countries (Greed 1994; Sandercock and Forsyth 2000). Feminist critics consider that 
existing urban design in developed states is far removed from the needs of women
who often juggle work and domestic responsibilities (Milroy and Andrew 1988; 
Stimpson 1981; Whyte 2000). In their research, many women expressed discontents 
about the location of facilities, the design of public spaces, transport networks, 
motorisation, and the lack of security in modem cities, which were almost 
exclusively designed by male planners. Feminists started challenging the existing 
boundaries of the public-private domain as follows:
While abolishing all divisions between the private realm and the larger 
world would be undesirable, feminists indicate that in the arena of urban 
planning the line between public and private or domestic life has been 
drawn to men’s advantage. Thus the public domain is a physical 
construct that by definition represents a whole set of contested political 
and economic issues within planning (Sandercock and Forsyth 2000:
453).
Feminist thoughts have helped to remind policy-makers that the goal of planners is to 
incorporate different voices in decision-making in the public interest (Fainstein 
1996; Ritzdorf 1996).
As planning policy affects many aspects of human life, planning turned out to be an 
important policy arena where the public interest of liberal democracies was contested. 
Subsequently, the results of these challenges in turn altered the existing paradigms of 
the public interest. Although challenges by citizens did not eliminate all planning 
problems, the endless trials, arguments and conflicts about the public interest in 
planning served to improve the quality life in the West. On the contrary in Japan, 
there have not been many arguments to challenge the concept of the public interest in 
planning in the past. This seems to stem from the rigidity of its public/private 
boundaries, its historical construction and the absence, of a statutory framework to 
allow such challenges. The next section examines distinctive features of Japan’s 
public/private dichotomies in comparison with ones in the West.
2.4 The Public Interest in Japan’s Modern State
From the analysis in the previous section, it is important to find out what role the 
public interest has played in shaping the objectives of Japan’s planning policies. The 
process in which the public/private distinctions have been identified is also crucial to 
figure out its impact on Japan’s planning development. This section examines the 
concept of ‘public’ in Japan in comparison with ones in the West.
There are significant differences between the West and Japan with respect to the 
distinction and the origins of ‘public’ and ‘private’ concept (Boling 1990; Iokibe 
1999; Matsumoto 1978; Terao 2000). Whereas ‘in English, the word “public” comes 
from the Latin word poplus (meaning all adult males of a population)’, the original 
meaning of the Japanese equivalent, kd or oyake, is the “great house” of the emperor, 
implying the authority (Boling 1990:139). Many observers agree that ‘private (shi)' 
still carries a negative or inferior connotation to ‘public (ko)\ and there is a vertical 
relation between public and private domains in Japan (Boling 1990; Iokibe 1999; 
Koschmann 1978; Matsumoto 1978; Mizubayashi 2002; Terao 2000). Having 
originated in Confiician China, kd as an authority and shi as an individual represents 
the relationship between a ruler and the ruled in feudal Japan (Kurozumi 2002; 
Mizubayashi 2002). In addition to the difference in roots, although kd nowadays 
holds nearly the same meaning as public in English, the Japanese kd does not include 
the English meaning of public as ‘political process or decision-making, open to the 
scrutiny and participation of ordinary citizens’ (Boling 1990: 140).
As the differences in the origins and connotations of ‘public’ and ‘private’ indicate,
there is a disparity in the discourse on the public interest between Japan and the West.
The meaning of ko comes from a monarchy, an authority and a state equivalent to the
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ruler. On the other hand, although the meaning of kd in contemporary Japan includes 
the implications of commonness or openness such as kokyo kukan (public space) or 
koshu denwa (a pay phone), kd does not entail the notion of people or more precisely 
citizenship. Furthermore, kd does not refer to ‘social’ either, despite its modem 
notion of being common or open to people. In addition to the meanings of ‘ko' itself, 
the distinction of ‘kd’ and ‘shV (public-private) has developed Japan’s distinctive 
discourse on the public interest in the path towards the modem state. The differences 
in the discourse on public and private dichotomies between Japan and the West will 
be summarised based on Weintraub’s classification in the following sections.
The state and the market
The difference between Japan and Western liberal democracies in public-private 
relationships exists in the boundary between the administrative state and the market. 
Japan’s industrialisation started from the Meiji oligarchy’s (the powerful and 
enlightened ex-samurai group) close ties to wealthy Tokugawa merchants who 
supported the 1868 Meiji Restoration (Norman and Woods 2000: 49-62). While the 
government gave advice, support and protection to the start-ups of banking industries, 
it also set up key strategic industries such as steel and mining in order to strengthen 
the military (Allinson 1999; Beasley 1995; Norman and Woods 2000: Ch.4).
In the 1880s, the government sold many state-owned firms to private enterprises,
which had maintained close links to the Meiji oligarchy (Allinson 1999; Beasley
1995; Norman and Woods 2000; Tipton 2001). This sale created Japan’s oldest
zaibatsu (conglomerate) groups, led by banks such as Mitsubishi, Mitsui, Sumitomo
and Yasuda. The political and business elites in the early Meiji era were also
strongly connected by personal liaisons such as marriages. They also shared the
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same goal which was to modernise Japan in order to support national sovereignty 
against the Great Power of the world. These historical origins of Japan’s 
industrialisation have rendered the distinction between the administrative state and 
the market ambiguous.
As a result, contrary to vocal claims since the 1980s that Japan is a highly regulated 
state which needs *kisei kanwa (deregulation)’ (Carlile and Tilton 1998; Jacobs and 
OECD. Regulatory Reform Programme 1999; Japan. Provisional Council for the 
Promotion of Administrative Reform 1989; OECD 2004), some view that Japanese 
industries are for the most part ‘unregulated' (e.g. Kerr 2001: 137). Although there 
are regulations to control or guide industries (Johnson 1982), they do not actually 
‘regulate firms’ to promote fair competitions in the market and protect consumers 
(Johnson 1982; Kerr 2001; Lincoln 1998). The absence of strong regulatory 
measures towards market behaviour manifests itself in the lack of lender-liability law 
and the weakness of product-liability law (1994), environmental impact assessment 
law (1997) and laws against insider trading (1989) or against false financial 
statements (Kerr 2001: 137).
This observation is in line with John O. Haley’s view that the Japanese authority 
governs the market and society not with laws but with consensus (Haley 1992). He 
argues that laws in Japan are weak as means for the governance of the society and 
thus the authority instead seeks for voluntary compliance from organisations and 
people (Haley 1992). This argument is quite persuasive, given the fact that the 
Japanese central bureaucracy often uses ministerial ordinances (shorei) and 
communications {tsiitatsu) to give instructions to local governments and firms rather 
than relying on the effect of laws. The purpose of such non-statutory orders are to
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control the behaviour of firms and to provide certain specification for local 
governments to comply with laws (Johnson 1982; Johnson 1995; Pempel 1974). 
Governmental controls without laws have advantages for the Japanese bureaucracy: 
they can bypass lengthy legislature processes in parliament and manage the society 
without political intervention and public awareness.
In the late Meiji era, the state’s guidance for the economic growth was further 
developed in the form of education and moral suasion in private life to promote the 
value of ‘hard work and frugality’ among its people (Garon 1994; Garon 1997; 
Tipton 2001). The legacy of the state’s moral campaigns in the pre-war era is still 
visible in modem Japan, as employees tend to regard their employers’ interests as 
almost equivalent to ‘the public good’ (Boling 1990: 145). The loyalty and 
commitment of Japanese workers to the employer is often expressed as messhi hoko 
(sacrifice of self in service to the public). The pre-war government’s strategy of 
social mobilisation through influencing individual beliefs further blurred the 
distinction between the state as ‘public’ and the market as ‘private’ (Rohlen 1989).
The public sphere as a political community
In contrast to the ambiguous boundaries between the state and the market, there is a
sharp divide between the public sphere and the private sphere in policy-making in
Japan. Here, the public sphere means ‘as a sphere mediating between state and
society, a sphere in which the public as the vehicle of public opinion is formed’
(Habermas 1997: 105). In this sense, Maruyama observed that Japan’s pre-war state
engulfed both public (civil society) and private spheres (Maruyama 1963a: 6-7).
This division seems to originate from the inception of parliamentary democracy in
Japan. Both Japan and Western countries established parliamentary democracy
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systems in the nineteenth century. The discourse on the public interest cannot be 
separated from the development processes towards popular democracy. Since 
parliamentary democracy was established in the West, what the public interest stands 
for has been redefined through debates in the academia, the media and the parliament 
along with an increasing size of the electorate. Political conflicts among social 
groups in the industrial economy affected its definition.
In Japan, after the Meiji oligarchy finally removed the disgruntled ex-samurai clans 
from politics following the 1868 Restoration, those ex-samurais who were excluded 
from politics started demanding political participation through the Freedom and 
People’s Right Movement (Gordon 2003; Tipton 2001). Compelled by both 
domestic and international (as a showcase of the modem state) pressure, the Meiji 
government finally opened the first parliament in 1890. Nonetheless, fearing that 
political participation and growing Westernisation would undermine Japan’s 
economic achievement in the future, the Meiji authority endlessly campaigned for 
denying the accountability of parliamentary politics to the public and simultaneously 
‘edifying’ the Japanese populace to serve the nation’s goals (Beasley 1995; Garon 
1997; Gluck 1985).
Therefore, it is not surprising that the beginning of Japan’s modem democracy was 
accompanied by the introduction of kyoiku chokugo (the Imperial Rescript on 
Education) in the same year, which preached the virtues such as hard work, civil 
obedience and national sacrifice, centred on the emperor as the head of the (family) 
state and Shinto (Gluck 1985; Tipton 2001). After the promulgation of the Meiji 
Constitution on the 11th February 1889, which granted the emperor the executive, 
legislative, diplomatic and military power of the state (Allinson 1999: 15), the Meiji
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oligarchy issued an ordinance to declare the immunity of high rank civil servants 
from politics, claiming the bureaucracy’s importance in having ‘specialised 
knowledge’ and their ability to manage ‘the now extremely detailed laws’ in public 
administration (Gluck 1985: 55). Yamagata Aritomo (1838-1922), the leader of the 
Meiji oligarchy, explained this as follows:
[changing policy official with each cabinets would result in an] 
administration losing its character of impartiality and independence and 
becoming a tool of favouritism and self-interest. Thus, if administrative 
officials are not made to stand -  impartial and non-partisan \fuhen futo] -  
apart from politics, one cannot hope to have fair and impartial 
administration (Tokutomi 1933: 371-372, cited by Gluck 1985: 55).
With the ideology of chdzen shugi (the supreme principles of justice and the public 
interest), the Meiji oligarchy emphasized the superiority and impartiality of the state 
bureaucracy in policy-making to self-serving party politics and politicians who did 
not have ‘expertise’ in science and technologies (See also Chapter 3). Through this 
campaign, the Meiji government tried to reaffirm the ancient East Asian political 
concept of ‘the division of the ruler and the ruled’, which still accentuates Japanese 
politics in the dichotomy between the kan (official and government) and the min 
(people) (Barshay 1988; Gluck 1985; Matsumoto 1978). The hierarchy between the 
kan and the min was also translated into the deep division between kd (public) and 
shi (private) in Meiji Japan.
Furthermore, another notable aspect of the Meiji democracy was the definition of the
min (people in Japanese) as contrasted with the kan. In the early years of democracy,
only 1.1 percent of the Japanese population had the vote and the large majority of the
Japanese populace was excluded from elections (Gluck 1985: 67). The min (both
politicians and the electorate), therefore, was equal to the gentry class, who held
large tracts of land in the countryside, or other elite members of the society (such as
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journalists, intellectuals or notables). The views of these minorities were regarded as 
a representation of ‘the public opinion (yorori)\ whereas the masses were not 
politically defined nor represented (Gluck 1985; Huffman 1997). Once 
parliamentary politics started in Meiji Japan, the elite min gradually acquired more 
power to introduce their interests into party politics, so that policy outcomes became 
increasingly clientelistic (Gluck 1985; Silberman 1982).
In contrast, the masses, the majority of whom were poor urban dwellers and tenant 
farmers, were totally neglected in politics, which occasionally drove them to riots 
during periods of economic depression in the early twentieth century (Gordon 1991; 
Okamoto 1982; Tipton 2001). The demand for democracy as well as labour and 
tenancy disputes intensified after the 1917 Russian Revolution and with the global 
depression after the First World War (Gordon 1991; Maruyama 1963c: 27). It is in 
this period that the right wing and fascist movements started exerting influence on 
politics, supported by lower middle classes based in villages (Maruyama 1963c: 26- 
34). In addition, the elite also felt that serious social conflicts would weaken the 
nation’s unity for its future development so that the bureaucracy, zaibatsu and 
military too started supporting the capture of overseas territories proposed by ultra 
nationalists (Maruyama 1963c; Storry 1957; Wilson 1969). A radical nationalist, 
Kita Ikki (1884-1937) argued in his Nihon Kaizo Hoan Taiko (Outline for the 
Reconstruction of Japan, 1924) as follows:
Justice [wrote Kita] is the proper demarcation of interests. As the class 
struggle within a nation is waged for the readjustment of unequal 
distinctions, so war between nations for an honourable cause will reform
the present unjust distinctions [between nations]  The socialists
of the West contradict themselves when they admit the right of class 
struggle to the proletariat at home and at the same time condemn war, 
waged by a proletariat among the nations, as militarism and 
aggression If it is permissible for the working class to unite to
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overthrow unjust authority by bloodshed, then unconditional approval 
should be given to Japan to perfect her army and navy and make war for 
the rectification of unjust international frontiers. In the name of rational 
social democracy Japan claims possession of Australia, and Eastern 
Siberia13.
As argued here, nationalists saw themselves as social democrats and their opinions 
gained strong support among the underprivileged. As a consequence, those who 
opposed to the nation or the opinions of the authority became increasingly being 
marginalised as hikokumin (unpatriotic Japanese) in pre-war Japan. Not only the 
Japanese establishment but also the majority of citizens actively promoted this view, 
since Japanese citizens assimilated their personal identity into the national identity 
which was constructed by powerful social groups during this period (Brown 1955; 
Iida 2002; Maruyama 1963a).
It is also significant that the promulgation of the 1889 Constitution and the Imperial 
Rescript on Education in 1890 had considerable impacts on the development of 
political philosophy and ideas among academics (Maruyama 1996). Japanese 
intellectuals, then synonymous with academics or journalists, had a substantial 
influence on the development of the public sphere in Meiji Japan (Barshay 1988; 
Huffman 1997; Marshall 1977). Up to the opening of the parliament, all types of 
Western academic thoughts were introduced into Japan, and in a way, there were 
more liberal arguments in the early Meiji society (Maruyama 1996; Pittau and 
Harvard University. East Asian Research Center 1967). However, after the 
introduction of the 1889 Constitution and thie Imperial Rescript on Education, 
kokutai (national polity)14, which was embodied by the emperor, became the
13 As translated and cited by Storry (1957:38).
14 Maruyama argues that ‘Since the nation includes in its ‘national polity’ all the internal values of 
truth, morality, and beauty, neither scholarship nor art could exist apart from these national values.’ 
(Maruyama, 1963b: 6).
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orthodoxy of political philosophy in Japan (Maruyama 1996). Since then, although 
many Meiji intellectuals were familiar with Western liberalism, their ideologies of 
politics seemed to be more or less bound by two beliefs: (1) the nation, with the 
emperor as the symbol, should be the centre of the public sphere; (2) political 
institutions themselves should be self-sufficient to run the government (Barshay 
1988; Matsumoto 1978).
In reality, the idea of ‘national polity’ was ambiguous and the word itself did not 
represent specific ideas (Maruyama 1996; Pittau and Harvard University. East Asian 
Research Center 1967). However, once it became the official orthodoxy, ‘national 
polity’ set certain limitations on people’s ideas and worked as an invisible constraint 
on liberal ideas in Japanese society (Pittau and Harvard University. East Asian 
Research Center 1967). At the same time, national polity became increasingly 
manipulated to legitimise the behaviour of those who were in power or in an attempt 
to gain power like ultra right-wing advocates. Furthermore, by the introduction of 
national polity, the Japanese people became ‘the subjects’ of the emperor, not 
autonomous ‘citizens’ (Maruyama 1996: 127-128).
Because ‘national polity’ had the effect of eliminating those who opposed to the 
nation, on the surface (tatemae) politics in Japan emerged to be conflict-free, 
embracing Japan’s ancient tradition of ‘wa (harmony)’. In fact, wa, as a 
quintessence of Japan’s collectivism initiated by Prince Shotoku (572-621), was the 
invention of Japan’s modem elites (Ito 1998). In this context, any private interests 
were considered to be self-centred ‘individualistic desires and emotions’ and 
therefore vulgar, while the public interest (national polity) appeared to represent
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‘virtuous actions in accord with universal principles, free from individual impulse’ 
(Matsumoto 1978: 21).
The Imperial Rescript on Education made it possible for the subjects to accept this 
crafty suppression without much doubt (Gluck 1985; Maruyama 1996). After the 
Kotoku incident, where the authority executed twelve anarchists between 1910 and 
1911 for planning to assassinate the emperor, Japan’s prominent intellectuals, such as 
Nagai Kafu (novelist, 1879-1959), Natsume Soseki (novelist, 1867-1916) and Mori 
Ogai (medical officer and novelist, 1862-1922), stopped discussing politics and 
increasingly concentrated on ‘private’ topics (Maruyama 1996: 126).
As a consequence, while Japanese intellectuals introduced new political thoughts into 
academic discussions and the media, these imported ideologies were always in 
accordance with ‘national polity’. Although Japan’s pre-war authority used 
repressive tools to control liberalism, despotism alone was insufficient to rule and 
mobilise the national population (Barshay 1988; Barshay 2004; Garon 1994; Garon 
1997; Giddens 1985; Maruyama 1996). Japanese intellectuals also came to believe 
that the masses should be guided for fukoku kydhei (enrich the nation, strengthen the 
military) to achieve sovereignty as the ultimate national goal (Barshay 1988; Barshay 
2004; Matsumoto 1978).
In addition to the Imperial Rescript on Education, ‘the invented tradition’ in modem
Japan also helped to cultivate the ‘nationalistic’ virtues of purity, modesty, frugality,
hard work, consensus and obedience (Vlastos 1998). Whereas democracy in the
modem Western states developed to govern people and to mediate different self-
interests in a society, in Meiji Japan, the ideas about the political community lacked
this focus (Barshay 1988; Barshay 2004; Matsumoto 1978; Pittau and Harvard
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University. East Asian Research Center 1967). The denial of self-interests in 
democracy in the public interest not only led to the totalitarian regime in pre-war 
Japan but also significantly influenced on the political culture in post-war Japan 
(Barshay 1988; Matsumoto 1978; Vlastos 1998).
The opening of Japan’s parliamentary democracy as well as the development of the 
public sphere was so undermined that politics largely became disconnected from 
ordinary Japanese citizens (Gluck 1985; Richardson 1974; Stronach 1995). This is 
why the Japanese word ‘public’ (kd) does not include the notion of political 
participation even today. Originated in the Meiji period, the discourse on public 
became so deeply entrenched in the Japanese mind that the public interest in policy­
making came to be regarded as representing the authority’s interest, or at most the 
interest of a limited group of notables rather than that of the general public even in 
post-war Japan.
The public realm as social life
In relation to political participation in Japan, the concept 'kd' (public) does not
include the meaning of ‘social life’. Although Japanese words like komin-kan
(community hall), koen (park) or kokyo hoso (public broadcasting) represent
common spaces or mediums open to the public, the ‘kd’ here primarily means that
the government manages these facilities for people and does not necessarily indicate
spontaneous public participation. The phenomenon also arose from cultural policies
implemented by the Meiji authority. Under the slogan of ‘civilisation and
enlightenment’, the Meiji authority initiated the strict controls of cultural life which
consists of the core of social life. This was illustrated by the government order to
destroy temples, statues of Buddha and Sakyamuni immediately after the Meiji
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Restoration (Beasley 1995: 81). This policy was also reflected in the notion of 
Tokyo as a new imperial capital (teito), rather than a city of culture (<miyako) which 
characterised Edo, Kyoto and Osaka before the Meiji Restoration (Smith 1978: 55). 
Since then, the Japanese government has tended to support only ‘authorised’ culture 
so that it has stifled alternative cultural forms.
Nonetheless, it does not suggest that there has been no active social life in Japan. In 
fact, foreign observers witnessed that the streets of Japanese inner cities had rich 
social life throughout modem times (Cybriwsky 1998; Seidensticker 1983). The 
vitality of metropolitan areas was the virtue and fascination of non-Japanese visitors, 
because it resulted in lower crimes, thriving cultural life and urban economies 
compared to Western counterparts (Alden 1986; Cybriwsky 1998; Sorensen 2004). 
In fact, the low city of Edo, the commoners’ district in the old Tokyo, was a centre of 
thriving Edo culture, as its theatre and entertainment districts were located there 
(Jinnai 1994; Seidensticker 1983). After the Meiji restoration, the state took over 
most of the sociable spaces in Japan’s traditional cities and marginalised social life 
from public spaces (Coaldrake 1996; Kerr 2001; Waley 2002).
The concept of public as sociability was not clearly recognised as a policy agenda, 
and therefore not incorporated in its policy-making in contemporary Japan. In fact, 
the Japanese elite had to monopolise and restrict the autonomy and spontaneity of 
social life in fear of social disorders during the pre-war period. Furthermore, the 
Meiji authority needed to reconstruct Japan’s ‘tradition’ and culture centred around 
the Imperial Family and Shinto to legitimise the new imperial state (Fujitani 1993; 
Gluck 1985; Tanaka 2001). In the end, culture and social life was also used by the 
elite to promote their ideal nationhood in modem Japan (Fujitani 1993; Gavin 2000;
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Gluck 1985; Vlastos 1998). As the creation and preservation of public spaces in 
modem cities and countryside has been so important in Western planning, the 
absence of the sociability concept as the public interest in Japan has had considerable 
impact on its planning policy.
The domestic and public domain
As in the West, the Japanese authority considered the domestic sphere as woman’s in 
contrast to political and economic life which men dominated. Political participation 
of Japanese women was rejected by the 1890 Shiikai oyobi Kessha Ho (Law on 
Associations and Meetings), as it was claimed to be against women’s social value 
(Nolte and Hastings 1991: 154). On the other hand, the state promoted ‘womanly 
virtues as those of modesty, frugality and purity’ which modelled on an ideal of 
Victorian British women (Tipton 2001: 61). This moral campaign was very effective 
since rydsai kenbo (good wife, wise mother) still captures the most idealistic figure 
of a Japanese woman in contemporary Japan (McVeigh 2004: Ch. 12; Uno 1993).
Nonetheless, the Meiji authority regarded the home as the forefront of the public
domain to increase economic productivity as well as reproduce ‘nationalistic values’
through child-rearing (Garon 1993a; Garon 1994; Garon 1997; Nolte and Hastings
1991). While child-rearing was supposed to be the most important role for women,
household savings, collaboration during wars and charitable works were designated
as central female roles by the state and state-sponsored organisations (Garon 1993a;
Garon 1994; Mackie 2003; Takeda 2005). Although women did not have the
opportunities for direct political participation, the domestic sphere increasingly
became the vanguard to maintain and create ‘traditional’ as well as ‘modem’ virtues
of the Japanese which the state considered to be desirable (Garon 1994).
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Although there have been feminist movements in Japan trying to fight against these 
imposed gender roles, there seemed to be strong opposition from the state, businesses 
and certain types of civil society organisations (mainly religious and right wing 
organisations). In particular, the state’s suppression and manipulation of women’s 
role in Japanese society still appears to be pervasive. For example, the state still 
encouraged an ideal of ‘good wife and wise mother’ through tax incentives to 
housewives and a special curriculum designed for women in higher education. Most 
importantly, through segregation and guidelines for women by the state’s 
administration, Japanese women do not have equal opportunities at the workplace 
(Japan. Ministry of Health Labour and Welfare 2005).
Despite the introduction of the 1986 Equal Employment Opportunity Act (.Danjo 
Koyd Kikai Kinto Ho) women in the labour market have been in a way further 
marginalised since the enforcement of this act in Japan. Although the wage gap 
between male and female full-time workers narrowed from 59.6 percent in 1985 to 
67.6 percent in 2004, the average earnings of female part-time workers dropped from 
76 percent to 65 percent of the average female full-time worker’s wage in the same 
years (Japan. Ministry of Health Labour and Welfare 2005: 7). Moreover, the ratio 
of female part-time workers in the female labour force increased from 22.0 to 39.9 
percent in the period of 1985-2004 (ibid).
On the other hand, the ideal of the Japanese traditional family is disappearing. The 
marriage rate in Japan fell from 10.0 per 1,000 people in 1970 to 5.7 in 2004, and the 
divorce rate reached 2.15 per 1,000 people in 2004 (Japan. Statistical Research and 
Training Institute 2005: Ch.2). Considering these figures, the economic position of 
Japanese women has been worse off considerably in the recent past. Nonetheless,
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Japanese women have hardly taken actions against their recent social and economic 
marginalisation. While the 1946 Constitution of Japan protects the citizenship of 
Japanese women, feminist movements in Japan are seemingly far behind their 
Western counterparts.
A famed feminist slogan ‘the personal is the political’ appeared to be paradoxical to 
the social history of Japanese women. The message is originally for the 
empowerment of Western women to articulate their constraints in the private life as 
issues in the public world. Feminist critiques argue that the suppression of women is 
set by the cultural norms of patriarchal-liberalism that originated in the Victorian era 
(Landes 1998; Lister 2002; Pateman 1983; Phillips 1998). In nineteenth century 
Western liberal society, it was mainly religions and civil society which worked to 
cultivate ‘female virtues’ rather than the state’s authority. In Japan, the authority 
took advantage of the role of women in the private domain to promote ‘the public’ 
(nationalistic) paradigm in their family life. The weak development of feminism in 
Japan seems to be a consequence of the state’s dominance of the private domain, 
which can be read reversely as ‘the personal is the political (the state’s domain)’.
2.5 Conclusion
In Western liberal democracies, defining what constitutes the public interest has been
essential in politics and policy-making. Therefore, the meaning of the public interest
changes depending on politics, and are subject to time frame and location. In
contrast, the meaning of the public interest in Japan has remained rather fixed as if it
were treated as ‘given’. This rigidity is partly due to the origins and subsequent
development of the modem state of Japan. Urged by foreign threats, the leaders of
modem Japan invented kokutai (national polity) to unite and mobilise their citizens
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for sovereignty. The emperor was an embodiment of kokutai as the God of Shinto. 
In contrast to Western modem histories, the genesis of the modem state of Japan is 
the fusion of the monarchy and religion into politics based on this myth.
Under Japan’s nationalism, the elite created an imaginary ‘family state’ and tried to 
make Japanese citizens believe the mirage as the reality (Gluck 1985; Iida 2002; 
Maruyama 1963c; McVeigh 2004; Stronach 1995). For the Meiji leaders, Japan was 
a beautiful and peaceful nation headed by the emperor. Japanese people were said to 
possess unusual qualities of being modest, disciplined and hardworking, and 
dedicated to the nation. Furthermore, there were supposed to be no conflicts in 
Japanese society, neither between employers and employees nor between family 
members and community members. All Japanese should know how to reach 
consensus without much arguments, since they should know what the best were for 
themselves and others.
Through this myth, the Japanese authority could mobilise its people for national 
goals such as economic development, a strong military, the cultivation of technology, 
while promoting frugality, an ideal family figure, and desirable roles for men, 
women and children and obedience to superior figures in the public interest. This 
strategy was in fact very effective in pre-war Japan. Because Japan’s modernisation 
was inspired by the wealth and power of leading modem states, most Japanese were 
fascinated by the ‘ideas of modernity -  progress, science, and rationality’ until 
recently (Garon 1994: 350). Moreover, modernisation was essential to the nation’s 
survival. Therefore, an individual tended to feel guilty or shamed if he/she behaved 
or thought differently from the orthodoxy of Japan’s national polity (the public 
interest).
78
Maintaining a nation (which is still implicitly symbolised by the emperor15) as a sole 
public concept, Japanese society still struggle to form the public interest as a 
collective interest. The quest for the nation’s sovereignty has resulted in the state’s 
dominance over all aspects of society: politics, the market, civil society and personal 
life. If individuals were considered to be pursuing their own private interests 
irrelevant to the state interest, they were often punished by the authority and scorned 
by members of the society in the past. This notion still survives in contemporary 
Japan.
However, no society is conflict-free. In particular, the principle of a liberal economy 
is to encourage everyone to act freely in pursuit of his/her own happiness. Modem 
Western planning progressed through struggles to build the public interest out of 
conflicts in liberal democracies. Therefore, the study of the public interest in 
planning will help the understanding of Japan’s planning development toward a 
liberal democracy. The next chapter details the inception of Japan’s nation-building 
and planning system which has had significant influence on the discourse of the 
public interest and the objectives of planning in modem Japan.
15 In 2000, former Prime Minister Mori Yoshiro told members of Shin/o Seiji Renmei, a group of 
lawmakers promoting the Shinto religion, that he had been "active in getting people to understand 
clearly that Japan is a divine nation [land o f the gods] with the Emperor at its centre". Asian Times 
Online. 2005. God's country? You must be kidding, Mori-san [Internet News]. Asia Times Online Co., 




Chapter Three: Building a Nation-State: The Origins of Japanese 
Planning System, 1868-1945
While modem planning systems in Western liberal economies have evolved 
gradually as a response to the growth of capitalism, the Japanese planning system 
stemmed from the Meiji Restoration in the late nineteenth century. Therefore, it is 
crucial to understand what triggered the regime change in 1868 and why the new 
Japanese government had to force modernisation with such an impetus. This 
historical development determined the nature the public interest and planning in 
modem Japan.
This chapter explains the development of Japan as a modem state and its planning 
system in the period between 1868 and 1945. From Meiji Restoration to the end of 
the Second World War, this period is divided into three eras as Meiji (1868-1912), 
Taisho (1912-1926) and Showa (1926-1945), each of which represents the reigning 
emperor’s name. Although the Showa era continued until the death of Emperor 
Hirohito in 1989, this chapter deals only with the pre-war years, as the post-war 
Showa era had a different political regime. Section 3.1 shows the unique origins of 
the Japanese modem state and its impacts on planning development by giving a 
detailed account of the motivation behind the Meiji Restoration and Japan’s 
strategies for modernisation. Section 3.2 describes the inception of Japan’s planning 
system and social problems arising from rapid urbanisation. Section 3.3 examines 
the characteristics of Japan’s planning system in the pre-war period, and explores 
why these characteristics emerged. Section 3.4 investigates the impacts of the 
ideologies of the public interest in Japan’s pre-war planning policy on spatial use. 
Section 3.5 summarises how the nature of Japan’s modernisation affected the
formation of the public interest in Japan’s planning system and the society.
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3.1 Early Nation-State Building
Meiji Restoration against the Imperialist Order
In 1853, four fleets from the United States appeared off the coast of Uraga, near 
Tokyo. The Japanese called them ‘the black ships’ with surprise and fear. 
Commodore Matthew Perry, on a mission from the US president, asked the Japanese 
government16 to comply with a request to sign a treaty with the US. For over 215 
years, Bakufu (shogunal government) had no trade partnerships with foreign 
countries except for the Netherlands and China in Nagasaki17 to avoid influences of 
Christian liberalism, which might have endangered the legitimacy of the exploitative 
feudal administration in Japan. However, faced with the obvious superiority of the 
US’s military power, Bakufu did not have any choice but to accept the demands from 
the US and agreed on a peace treaty in the following year. Japan also settled the 
same treaties with the UK (1854) and Russia (1857). In 1858, Bakufu finally signed 
commercial trade treaties with the US, the Netherlands, the UK, Russia and France. 
In these commercial treaties, Japan was not treated as an equal partner to the Western 
nation-states but was forced to accept disadvantageous trade terms. This was 
legitimised by Japan’s lack of modem institutions which complied with international 
laws. Japan had again to agree to this disadvantageous position in the face of well- 
equipped modem armies of these Western countries.
16 The administration of Tokugawa Bakufu (1600-1868) at the time of Perry’s visit. It was led by 
Shogun (the emperor’s a military deputy, but a de facto  ruler of Japan ). Tokugawa Ieyasu’s 
descendants successively held Shogun’s positions.
17 Nagasaki is the prefecture of southern periphery of Japan. Foreign trade under the Tokugawa 
Bakufu was limited to a small island called Dejima in Nagasaki in order to control commoners’ 
contacts with foreigners.
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At the time of Perry’s visit, the power of Bakufu had been already weakened after 
250 years of Shogun regime. Having suppressed progressive intellectuals who had 
information about foreign countries, Bakufu was entirely powerless against Western 
modernised armies. Moreover, Bakufu did not have a modem administration under 
the rule of law to establish equal diplomatic and economic relations with Western 
nations. Although the purported interest of these Western countries was trade with 
Japan, their real ambition was obvious given their activities in Asia in the nineteenth 
century. Indeed, then British ambassador to Japan, Sir Rutherford Alcock (1809- 
1897), clearly stated that the UK had an aim to designate Japan as an outpost against 
Russia (Alcock 1863). Alleging to protect foreign residents in their settlements in 
Japan from anti-foreign terrorism, the UK and France posted soldiers in Yokohama 
(a port near Tokyo) since 1863, which exceeded more than 1,200 troops at one stage 
(Inoue 1965). Furthermore, they demanded that Bakufu should finance and build the 
necessary accommodations and other facilities for their soldiers (Inoue 1965). With 
the establishment of the foreign settlements under the extraterritoriality, Japan was a 
‘quasi-colonised’ country. In short, under threat of colonisation by Western nations, 
Japan’s domestic governance came into further volatility.
This situation provoked fierce protests among the feudal establishment {samurai and 
aristocrats) in Japan, which was captured in the slogan ‘sonno jydi (Honour the 
emperor, expel the barbarians)’ (Tipton 2001). At the beginning, the hostility was 
focused on foreign residents in Japan, but later the strong discontent was directed 
towards the incompetence of Tokugawa regime to manage national security. The 
anti-foreign movement was then transformed into a movement of political discontent, 
aiming to replace Bakufu with a new regime (Ikegami 1996).
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However, unlike the bourgeois revolutions in Europe, the regime change in Japan 
was not initiated by suppressed peasants or strengthened merchants. Although 
continuous peasants’ riots and the development of a quasi-capitalist economic system 
in the late Tokugawa period had severely shaken the political order of the feudal 
system in Japan, neither peasants nor rich merchants had sufficient power to organise 
their resources to initiate a popular revolution (Beasley 1995). Instead, the 
Tokugawa Bakufu was overthrown by the lower class samurai together with a 
coalition of the wealthiest city merchants in the form of a non-violent coup d’etat in 
1868 (Norman and Dower 1975). During this period, the UK predicted the inevitable 
downfall of the Japanese old order (Alcock 1863). Judging that a revolution from 
above would least threaten its imperial capitalist order in Asia, the UK chose to 
support these revolutionists and offered financial and military help in exchange for 
concessions in Japan (Inoue 1965). However, well informed about the puppet 
government in China under the British control, the Japanese revolutionists did not 
accept this offer (ibid.). Here, the new political regime started to build Japan as a 
modem nation-state against Western imperialism.
Creating the capitalist economy
The fate of modem Japan was significantly affected by the unique characteristics of 
the Meiji revolution. Thrown into the international arena at the height of Western 
imperialism, the primary objective of the new government was to preserve national 
security and economic independence. The first step for the new government was to 
create a modem public administration, in particular a modem army, and to establish a 
capitalist economy to finance it. The urgency of the task was keenly felt by the new 
political leaders in Japan, who had witnessed other Asian countries falling under the
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control of Western imperialism. In order to create national wealth and establish a 
modem army in the shortest period of time, there were not many options available to 
new leaders other than importing Western technologies and incubating modem 
industries.
However, Japan faced serious impediments in reaching these objectives. First, it did 
not have any modem technologies due to the prolonged seclusion period. Second, it 
did not have rich natural resources to create industrial products. Third, it also lacked 
capital and skilled labour, which were essential to establish a capitalist production 
mode. Finally, Japan was seriously handicapped to accumulate national wealth due 
to the unequal trade treaties inherited from the Tokugawa rule (Beasley 1995). For 
instance, the lack of autonomous tariffs gave foreign firms handsome profits while 
preventing the Japanese export industry from gaining decent returns (ibid). 
Furthermore, the Western nations’ extraterritorial rights in Japan shadowed the 
nation’s sovereignty (Spaulding and University of Michigan. Center for Japanese 
Studies 1967). Therefore, the ultimate objectives of the new Japan converged into 
two slogans: fukoku kydhei (Enrich the country, strengthen the military)’ to preserve 
national security, and ’bunmei kaika (Civilisation and enlightenment)’ to revise the 
unequal treaties. The Japanese leaders believed that by accomplishing these tasks, 
they would lead Japan to become a modem strong state.
In the project of modem nation-state building, the Meiji government implemented a 
series of reforms to enhance the process. Taxation was one of them. In order to 
initiate a modem capitalist economy, the Meiji government funded primary capital 
for entrepreneurs through heavy taxes on farmland, through the implementation of 
the 1873 Land Tax Revision (Chiso Kaisei). The land tax represented more than 80
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percent of government revenues in 1875-1879 (Norman and Woods 2000: 77). 
While the Meiji Restoration freed peasants from feudal restrictions on mobility18, 
finding other jobs was not a real option for most peasants in the early Meiji era, as 
the industrial revolution had not yet started in Japan (Dore 1984). This in effect 
meant that the social condition of peasants was more or less the same as before the 
Restoration.
In fact, the tax levy on farmers was much heavier than in the pre-Restoration period. 
The Meiji government levied monetary taxes on land19 instead of crops as in the past, 
based on the price of land (Dore 1984). This was quite a burden on tenant farmers 
and small-scale farmers who did not have a ready access to the market to make 
decent profits (Yazaki 1968: 279). In contrast, the former feudal lords and the land 
gentry benefited from this revision by collecting high farm rents from their tenants 
(Dore 1984; Norman and Woods 2000; Smethurst 1986). Some of the gentry class 
used the surplus profits to set up small- to medium-sized businesses (Yazaki 1968: 
279). Unlike in England, these landowners did not seek profits from large-scale 
farming but preferred to remain as land gentry because of the excessive profits from 
farm rents (Norman and Woods 2000). The exploitation of tenant farmers and their 
persistent poverty was considered to be a major cause for the social and economic 
crisis in later years (Brown 1955: Ch.9; Dore 1984: Ch.5; Smethurst and University 
of California. Center for Japanese and Korean Studies 1974).
18 Before the Restoration, peasants as a hereditary class were neither allowed to leave their farmland 
nor sell and subdivide their properties to others under the strict class system. The new government 
abolished the existing class system and gave property right to those who could claim land ownership.
19 The taxation rate was three percent of the land price.
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As seen above, the way the initial producer capital was created was very different 
from that of Anglo-Saxon capitalism. Moreover, the manner in which capital was 
accumulated in the hands of producers was a key issue in interpreting the governance 
of contemporary Japan. This unusual beginning of capitalism in Japan has shadowed 
the development of the pre-war economy. Although the government supported 
conglomerates to enlarge the capacity of industrial production, genuine 
entrepreneurship did not develop much in pre-war Japan. Lucrative income was 
guaranteed by high farm rents, and the wealthy land gentry were not willing to take 
risks by setting up modem firms; instead, they kept relying on profits produced from 
farmland (Norman and Dower 1975). This system created the idea that land itself 
creates substantial profits in Japanese society.
In addition to the plight of farmers in the pre-war period, environmental pollution 
under the state’s industrial policy was already an issue in the Meiji era. The Ashio 
Copper Mine contamination, for example, became a serious pollution problem in the 
1890s (Notehelfer 1998). Nonetheless, the Ashio contamination along with the 
Minamata Disease (organic mercury poisoning) and the Itai-Itai Disease (cadmium 
poisoning), both originating in pre-war times, did not attract much attention until in 
the 1970s. In the case of the Ashio contamination, the company did not take the 
responsibility for the real damage caused by pollution until in 1974 when a 
settlement was reached outside the court (Ui and United Nations University 1992).
These cases tell that Japan’s economic growth as a prime national interest was 
achieved at the sacrifice of its people. The rigid bureaucratism had long failed to 
admit these catastrophes caused by the negligence of the polluters as well as the 
responsibility of authorities that ignored the evidence of the serious pollution. The
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history of the Japanese planning system has to be understood within this context of 
Japan’s industrialisation process.
3.2 The Origins of the Japanese Planning System
Enlightenment for survival
Being as a developmental state, Meiji leaders eagerly promoted two things: political/ 
economic reforms and cultural borrowing from the West. The Meiji oligarchy 
regarded those reforms, represented by the slogan ‘Civilisation and enlightenment’, 
as essential in order to repeal the unequal treaties and protect the nation (Beasley 
1995; Tipton 2001). However, the phrase ‘wakon yosai (Japanese sprit, Western 
technology)’ represents the ambivalent attitude of the Meiji authorities towards 
modernisation (Nakayama 1984). While the Meiji government aggressively 
imported Western technologies, it did tailor these new imports to their needs. Thus, 
even if the styles and systems which Japanese authority created appeared to be 
Western, their purposes and objectives were often quite different from the original 
ones. This rhetoric was also seen in the import of modem planning system to Japan 
from the West.
In order to demonstrate ‘modernity’ to the Great Power, one of the prime purposes of 
Japanese planning became remodelling feudal cities, especially the capital city of 
Japan, into a ‘modem’ one. The members of the Iwakura Mission (1871-3) were 
impressed by the civilisation of the Western cities which they had visited, and were 
convinced that those cities were the vehicle of industrialisation as well, as the 
materialisation of their national wealth. In England, they saw a forest of factory 
chimneys emitting smoke in big cities and regarded them as proof of England’s
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economic prosperity (Kume, Healey, and Tsuzuki 2002). In France, they were 
impressed by the beauty of Paris, which Georges-Eugene Haussmann20 had 
remodelled from a crowded medieval city into a city with wide streets, broad vistas, 
parks, and avenues radiating from focal points (Kume, Healey, and Tsuzuki 2002). 
On the other hand, they were also aware that the prosperity of European nations had 
started after 1800 and that the current wealth was only realised in the last forty years 
or so (Kume, Healey, and Tsuzuki 2002). Therefore, the Japanese new leaders 
assumed that if they followed the right path, Japan could catch up with the Western 
level of civilisation in the not so long future.
In this context, the ‘Civilisation and enlightenment’ slogan was enormously 
influential in forming the values and objectives of planning. The visual image and 
technology of the Western enlightenment determined the path of Japanese planning 
development. The ultimate objectives of city planning in Japan became twofold: (1) 
building industrial infrastructures and (2) making well-designed city centres 
consisting of boulevards, parks, theatres and public and commercial facilities built by 
bricks and stone. The Japanese officials believed that they could materialise 
Westem-style cities as well as its wealth if Japan learnt Westem-style architecture 
and civil engineering.
The government first introduced this remodelling of cities towards modernisation in 
Tokyo, the new capital city of Japan. The first railway line opened between Tokyo 
(Shinbashi) and Yokohama in 1872. Then, the Ginza Brick Quarter (1872-1877), a 
commercial and residential area consisting of 1,400 two-story Westem-style brick 
buildings, was constructed by the central government (Tokyo. Metropolitan
20 French civic official and city planner, 1809-1891
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Government: 24). There was also a grand plan for the centralization of the 
Government Office District in Hibiya (1885-1890) with a new National Diet Building 
under the initiative of the Foreign Minister, Inoue Kaoru (1835-1915) (Tokyo. 
Metropolitan Government: 8-9). However, the plan was abandoned in 1890 and only 
a couple of buildings were constructed based on this plan. Mitsubishi Company also 
planned Mitsubishi Red-Brick Street, known as First Street, London (today’s 
Marunouchi business area) in 1890 (Tokyo. Metropolitan Government: 10-11). It 
was a new office district with British-style four-story red brick buildings and gas-lit 
streets in an area adjacent to what is now Tokyo Station (built in 1914) (Cybriwsky 
1998). The plan was almost completed around 1915 and became one of the most 
thriving business districts in Japan. Through these experiences, constructing new 
blocks of town and infrastructures became synonymous to city planning in Japan.
While these development plans were the authority’s vision for a modem capital city, 
there was an obstacle to materialise this plan. In addition to some technological 
problems, Meiji officials considered the presence of a large number of the urban poor 
in the immediate vicinity of the wealthy areas in Tokyo as undesirable; thus, they 
believed it necessary to remove the urban poor to the outskirt of the city (Ishida 
1987a; McCormack 2002). The elite, as well as the commoners who saw themselves 
as ‘decent citizens’, supported this opinion in the early Meiji era (McCormack 2002). 
When a fire destroyed more than 2,000 buildings in a slum in the vicinity of the 
Ginza Brick Quarter in 1881, the then Tokyo governor, Matsuda Michiyuki (1839- 
1889), claimed that the destroyed area should be redeveloped to prevent the ‘filthy 
and unsightly’ people from re-inhabiting (McCormack 2002:259). McCormack 
expressed this as follows:
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The aim [of the redevelopment], in the words of a Tokyo prefecture 
official named Ito Masanobu, was to rid the city of the ‘doss -houses’
(kichinyado) inhabited by Tittle people’ {shomiri) and, by building 
‘regular houses’ (jinjyd no kaoku) that ‘good people’ (rydmin) would 
inhabit, to transform the area and render it a ‘regular town’ (ippan no 
machinami). As for the former low class residents, the future head of the 
Mainichi Shinbun [newspaper], Numa Morikazu (1843-1890), declared 
that laws were necessary to force them to move to the city outskirts, 
where it was normal for poor people to reside (McCormack 2002: 259).
Against this background, the remodelling of Tokyo’s city centre was wholly 
dedicated to the upper class. Although the Japanese government was zealous to 
realise their vision of a modem Tokyo in the early Meiji era, its ambition was only 
partially materialised due to financial constraints as well as the physical limitations 
of the designated areas which were quickly built up.
On the other hand, compared with other latecomers of modernisation, Japan was 
successful in the construction of infrastructures, especially for industrial use. By 
1877, the rail networks linking Tokyo, Osaka and Kyoto were connected with their 
nearest ports, Yokohama and Kobe (Beasley 1995: 104). The construction of the 
main trunk routes connecting these three important cities were also completed by 
1889 (Beasley 1995: 104). There are two main factors which aided this swift 
transition from feudal society. First, the government formed a national infrastructure 
development plan according to the identified geographical strategy devised for 
economic development (core and periphery), now often called kokudo keikaku 
(national land planning) (Hanes 1997: 491-495). The origin of kokudo keikaku can 
be traced back to the period immediately after the Restoration, when the Meiji 
government conducted many geographical surveys to build railways and ports 
(Hanes 1997: 491).
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Second, the state set aside special financial resources for building industrial 
infrastructures as a national priority. The Japanese postal savings system was set up 
in 1875, channelling household savings to governmental funds in order to finance 
large-scale infrastructure development projects (Cargill and Yoshino 2002). Later, 
resources from public pensions and life insurance reserves were also added to these 
funds. This special financial source from zaisei toyushi (The Fiscal Investment and 
Loan Programme, FLIP) worked advantageously to the state, as the government was 
able to pool large amounts of capital without much constraint from the national 
budget. This hidden national budget enabled Japan to construct many necessary 
infrastructures for industrial production without raising tax burdens.
Industrialisation and urban growth
Although modem planning in Japan started as the construction of Westem-style 
monumental city centres, it became apparent that the nation needed a land-use 
control system along with its industrialisation, as was the case in Western countries. 
Japan’s rapid industrialisation was accompanied with unprecedented urban growth. 
While state-led industrialisation was a pull-factor toward urban industrial jobs which 
flourished from the mid Meiji era, there was also a push-factor that made the 
working class population migrate from villages to cities. The 1873 Land Tax 
Revision had an impact on agricultural land-use similar to the impact of the 
enclosure movement in England. While the new government relied on tax revenues 
from farmland, agricultural products were not highly priced and the crops were 
unstable (Dore 1984). Furthermore, the new government denied the rights of farmers 
to communal land which had previously been used for fertilisers’ fodder and fuels 
(Dore 1984; Yazaki 1968). As a consequence, some small farmland owners could
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not keep up with tax payments in the form of cash. Thus, an increasing number of 
farmers sold their land, and then became tenant farmers for large landlords (Dore 
1984; Norman and Dower 1975; Yazaki 1968). Then, rents for tenant farmers leapt 
to approximately 50 percent of crop yields (Yazaki 1968). This drove some 
members of the impoverished farmers’ households to cities to supplement household 
incomes.
In fact, the urbanisation during this period in Japan was much faster than in Western 
countries (Norman and Dower 1975; Wilkinson 1965; Yazaki 1968). As a latecomer 
to industrialisation, it was easier for Japan to copy technologies such as transport 
which enhanced the formation of industries and enabled the migrant population to 
reside outside city centres (Wilkinson 1965). The population growth was 
concentrated in the Tokai Pacific Belt (Tokaidd) region, a coastal area between 
Tokyo and Osaka. Having been an established travel route even before the Meiji 
Restoration, this area had already possessed adequate infrastructures such as 
highways and post stations so that the region was suitable for the agglomerations of 
the urban population (Traganou 2003: 173). The Tokai Pacific Belt extended to the 
south of Japan, Kyushu, as the government created steel and mining firms in this 
region. Industrialisation brought factories, labour and houses to cities along the 
Tokai Pacific Belt, in particular to the capital city of Tokyo. For example, while the 
population in Tokyo was estimated between 600,000 and 700,000 around 1868, it 
reached some seven millions in 1940 (Tokyo. Metropolitan Government 1994: 14).
Whilst the urban population was concentrated in relatively small areas of central 
cities during the first three decades of the Meiji era, the available land quickly 
disappeared as industrialisation proceeded. Between 1897 and 1920, the suburban
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population increased by 183 percent, whereas the central and inner urban population 
grew by 94 percent (Yazaki 1968: 451). To accommodate the growing population, 
urban areas had to expand outwards. The introduction of electric trains and 
streetcars to Japan together with the swift expansion of their networks to suburbs 
enabled the rapid urbanisation. The development of the public transport network, 
which was implemented by both public and private sectors, became feasible by the 
Tokyo City-Ward Reform Ordinance (TCRO, Tokyo Shiku Kaisei Jorei) in 1888, and 
similar ordinances enacted in other cities.
TCRO is the first formal planning initiative to provide public goods in Meiji Japan. 
A water work survey in 1876 preceded a port construction project in 1880 and the 
TCRO (Tokyo. Metropolitan Government 1993: 24) The major achievements of the 
TCRO were the construction of 32 parks, seven canals, waterworks and sewage 
systems as well as the improvement of 123 roadways up to 1919 (Tokyo. 
Metropolitan Government 1993: 24). The widening of roads was largely 
implemented by collecting development charges from railway companies 
(Koshizawa 1991). Although public authorities constructed some mass transit 
infrastructures, many private companies also built rail and tram routes in Japanese 
cities during this time.
91However, during this period of fast urbanisation , both housing construction and 
infrastructure developments were completely unregulated. This means that the 
quality of housing as well as the provision of physical and social infrastructures
21 The populations of the six large cities in Japan increased by more than 250 percent between 1897 
and 1920 as the following figures show (Yazaki 1968: 391):
Year Tokyo Osaka Kyoto Kobe Yokohama Nagoya
1897 1,330,000 750,000 330,000 190,000 190,000 250,000
1920 3,350,000 1,760,000 700,000 640,000 570,000 610,000.
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necessary for urban life was grossly neglected by the government. Housing shortage 
became especially acute around 1920 (Honma 1987). A newspaper in 1921 reported 
a survey by the Home Ministry, showing that the shortage of housing in large cities 
had reached to 122,821 units (Honma 1987: 35).
Most major railway companies took advantage of this situation, and initiated a large- 
scale housing development (Honma 1987; Ishida 1987a). When the companies 
planned a new railway line, they bought large plots of land nearby hub stations. 
Then, they built new suburb communities for mainly middle- and upper-class 
citizens with retail stores and even amusement parks (Hirano 1999; Sand 2003). 
Some of the suburb communities built during this period, which imitated the Garden 
Suburbs in England, were fairly well designed and are now regarded as high profile 
residential areas in Japan (Koshizawa 1991).
However, in most cases, small-sized developers built cheap, tiny and low-quality 
wooden detached houses and row houses in suburbs (Honma 1987; Mosk 2001; 
Yazaki 1968). The majority of these houses were not very different from the wooden 
row houses built in the Edo period (Feaver and Webb 1992; Yazaki 1968). 
Moreover, many of these developments were undertaken without any consideration 
of basic infrastructures, such as roads and sewage (Ishida 1987a). In the worst cases, 
houses were built in the middle of farmland without access to any proper roads, 
making the developed areas in this manner resemble labyrinths (Ishida 1987a: 110- 
111).
Not only was housing constructed without adequate infrastructures, but also house
prices skyrocketed in big cities. For example, the neighbourhood of Hiratsuka/Ebara,
located about six kilometres from the city centre of Tokyo, experienced an increase
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in land value of 498.5 percent during the 1910s (Bestor 1989: 56-8). Between 1900 
and 1940, the land value of this area increased by 2,673 percent (Bestor 1989: 56-8). 
In contrast, during the same period, the value of paddy fields dropped to 75 percent 
of their 1900 value in the same areas (Bestor 1989: 56-8). The ratio of residential 
land area in the same communities increased from 8.8 percent in 1900 to 40.9 
percent in 1930, and reached 96.4 percent in 1940 (Bestor 1989: 56-8). Although the 
government tried to make this land conversion more streamlined by introducing the 
Cultivable Land Reorganisation Act (Kochi Seiri Ho) in 1909, it soon became 
apparent that Japan needed more comprehensive planning laws to control urban 
growth.
Emergence of urban problems
In addition to these land-use defects that resulted from rapid urbanisation, there were 
also rising social problems that were common to industrial economies. In Tokyo, 
while a small number of newly emerged middle-class residents were able to move to 
relatively well-built houses in the hilly suburbs of the Western part of the city 
(Honma 1987; Sand 2003), the majority of the working class population was forced 
to live in the poor quality tenement houses in the inner city areas, which were close 
to factories built along a river in the Eastern Tokyo area (Yazaki 1968). In fact, the 
working classes ended up inhabiting shanties whose individual unit size was only 7.5 
square metres, and 15 to 20 households had to share a toilet (Yokoyama 1949). The 
living condition like this was also observed in other major cities. In Osaka, about 
34.9 percent of the housing stock in 1920-24 consisted of dark tenement houses 
(Mosk 2001: 226-228). According to Sydney and Beatrice Webb (English socialist 
activists and the founders of the London School of Economics, 1859-1947; 1858-
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1943), who visited Osaka in 1911, the conditions of the slums in the city were as bad 
as in London (Feaver and Webb 1992: 72-4).
Nonetheless, an improvement of living condition for the urban poor in pre-war Japan 
was not as a pressing issue to the government as it was in the West. First, slums in 
Japan had relatively better hygiene levels compared to Western counterparts. For 
example, human waste in Japanese cities was systematically collected for the use of a 
fertiliser for farming since the Edo period (Hanley 1997). Bathing in hot tubs was a 
common practice for the Japanese, and neighbours shared the cleaning of streets 
(Hanley 1997). In addition, Japanese wooden houses had more ventilation than 
Western brick houses. The Webbs wrote about the less offensive smells in Osaka’s 
slums, claiming the better hygienic practices of Japanese commoners (Feaver and 
Webb 1992: 72). While the government had to rebuild the water supply systems in 
the aftermath of the cholera epidemic brought by Westerners, which killed 105,000 
people across Japan in 1879, and nearly 110,000 in 1886 (McCormack 2002: 260), 
apart from this, strong planning initiatives for public health improvement never 
materialised in pre-war Japanese cities.
Second, landlords and zaibatsu owners, who held the most powerful positions in pre­
war Japan, did not easily give concessions to the government in planning initiatives 
(e.g. contributing their land and money to common facilities for new developments) 
in the absence of any immediate threats or benefits to them. In 1906, 0.5 percent of 
the residential landowners in Tokyo’s 15 wards owned more than 23 percent of 
residential land in the area (Hatate 1992: 109). The largest plots were owned by 
Mitsubishi Company and its founder (the Iwasaki family), Mitsui Company and its 
owners (the Yasuda family), and some ex-feudal land lords (ibid). Those landowners
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who possessed the land adjacent to urban fringes benefited most from rapid urban 
expansion. In this scenario, any planning regulation would have resulted in their 
losing vast sums of profit.
Third, there was relatively less social disorder among the Japanese urban poor in the 
early Meiji period than in Western industrial society. Prior to the prominence of 
urban violence, the British upper and middle classes tried to reform the working class 
for ‘acceptable’ behaviour through charity, poor relief and moral education (Addams 
1893; Bosanquet 1984; Hill 1883). While these attempts failed in England, the moral 
education of the poor was very successful in Japan (Garon 1997; Gluck 1985; 
Goodman 1998).
Learning from the precedent in West, the Japanese government fully took advantage 
of the remaining feudal order and even reinvented tradition in order to control its 
commoners (Tu 1996; Vlastos 1998). Paternalism was transplanted into industrial 
relations. The ideas of self-help, hard work, thrift and saving were strongly taught at 
ethics courses in elementary schools (Garon 1997; Gluck 1985). As a consequence, 
people were very ashamed to apply for the state assistance. The Webbs were 
surprised to learn that the number of welfare applications was extremely small in 
Osaka; the expenditure was only 50 yen (£5) per day, which fed some 500 families 
(Feaver and Webb 1992: 73). In this situation, if someone failed economically, it 
was considered that the person did not act in accordance with the moral conduct of 
Japanese society (Garon 1997; Pyle 1973; Pyle 1974).
The most important task of the government regarding welfare was how officials or
volunteers could persuade the lower class to give up their reliance on welfare
assistance and to rehabilitate the morals of those who had failed (Garon 1997;
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Goodman 1998). The value of family and mutual help in the community were 
emphasised in times of economic hardship (Garon 1997; Goodman 1998). The 
government acted strongly to coordinate efforts from the rich to help the poor in 
order to minimise state relief for the impoverished (Garon 1997). Submission to the 
authority and the perseverance of a vertical order in human relationships greatly 
hindered the development of social citizenship in pre-war Japan.
Fourth, industrial workers, who were potential political actors toward the 
improvement of their social conditions, were still a minority in Japan. In 1919, 58 
percent of the households in Japan were engaged in agriculture only (Norman and 
Woods 2000: 158). Furthermore, in time of recession, industrial workers went back 
. to the countryside as cheap labourers because agriculture was still labour intensive in 
Japan (Norman and Woods 2000; Totten 1966). Besides, more than half of the 
industrial workforce of pre-war Japan was young women, who worked for the textile 
industry and were locked up in the companies’ dormitories (Hunter 1992; Tipton 
2001: 96). Those female factory workers could hardly join labour movements, so 
that overall union membership never reached more than 8 percent of the industrial 
labour force (Tipton 2001: 101). Therefore, the government did not have to make 
significant concession to control recurrent social disorders which could have been 
caused by the unemployed urban masses, as was the case in Western industrial cities 
(Totten 1966).
Nevertheless, in the early twentieth century, the Japanese government could not 
resist the rising demands for political and social citizenship of the working classes, as 
skilled male workers of heavy industries joined urban protests (Tipton 2001: 101). 
These movements were also fuelled by the rise of socialism and communism ideas
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against the backdrop of deepening worldwide depressions. The period between 1905 
and 1940 has been termed as the age of ‘imperial democracy’ by Andrew Gordon 
(Gordon 1991), when Japanese commoners vigorously demanded the government for 
citizenship rights.
The 1905 Hibiya Riots started as a mass rally around Hibiya Park in Tokyo to 
express the public’s discontent about the conditions of Russia’s surrender in the 
Russo-Japanese War (1905). Despite the victory at the cost of mobilising a million 
men and 100,000 deaths in the war (Pyle 1973: 56), the economic gains were limited 
and the living conditions of commoners did not improve after the war. The political 
rally turned into a riot, and urban crowds violently attacked government institutions, 
street cars, offices and newspaper companies (Gordon 1991). 300 buildings were 
burnt down during this incident (Tokyo. Metropolitan Government 1994: 13). 
Another major disruption was the Rice Riots of 1918, which were provoked by a 
sharp increase in rice prices, spread all over Japan, involving thousands of 
commoners. During this period, tenant [farmers’] movements also intensified in the 
countryside (Dore 1984; Hane 2003; Smethurst 1986).
However, suppressive regulations and brutal police power curbed the public 
discontent. First, Article 17 of the Public Peace Police Law {Chian Keisatsu Ho) of 
1900 in effect banned labour organisations and strike activities (Totten 1966: 22). In 
1901, the government dissolved the Social Democratic Party (Shakai Minshuto), 
which was calling for more egalitarian society by the abolition of classes, private 
capital and land ownership (Yazaki 1968: 406). When labour disputes still continued 
and the movements for universal suffrage grew, the state finally introduced universal 
male suffrage in 1925. However, there was a serious setback to this achievement. In
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the same year, the parliament passed the Peace Preservation Act (Chian Iji Ho) to 
outlaw organising associations against kokutai (national polity) and the idea of 
private properties (Tipton 2001: 97) A 1928 revision of the Act even introduced 
capital punishment against those who dared to attack kokutai (Tipton 2001: 97). 
These thought controls escalated to the expansion of the Special Higher Police 
(Tokko). From that time onwards, ultra nationalism in Japan became the backbone of 
its totalitarian regime as well as the drive to build Japan’s Empire in Asia to 
overcome economic problems at home (Maruyama 1963a). The strong police power 
for controlling violence and social democracy in cities could be counted as the fifth 
reason for the underdevelopment of citizenship rights in Japan’s planning policy.
Creating the statutory planning system
Facing physical and social problems caused by the rapid urban growth, the central 
government had to enact the City Planning Act and the Urban Building Standard Act 
in 1919. During this period, the government was concerned about how to provide 
necessary facilities along with the rapid suburbanisation. In the early Meiji era, the 
government could supply necessary public goods for remodelling Japan’s feudal 
cities into modem ones using assets from the Edo period (Koshizawa 1991). For 
example, many large parks were the conversion of private gardens of former feudal 
lords (ibid). The existing roads were widened by the TCRO. However, 
suburbanisation required more roads, open spaces, water, sewage and other 
infrastructures. The Home Ministry, which was solely in charge of planning in pre­
war Japan, also raised issues of building controls and affordable housing (Honma 
1987; Ishida 1987a; Koshizawa 1991).
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Japanese planners in the early twentieth century were as equally alarmed as British 
planners by the consequences of uncontrolled urban growth. Nonetheless, Japan 
lacked strong drive to solve these urban problems. Mori Ogai, who had studied 
public health in Germany in the nineteenth century, attempted to incorporate health 
concerns into the building regulation code for the TCRO (Ishida 1987b). However, 
his recommendations to improve public health by regulating housing and urban 
environment were never incorporated into any planning regulations in the pre-war 
era while the reason why his proposal was rejected is not clear. While urban health 
problems were the impetus for the development of early town planning in England 
(Hawtree 1981), attempts to remedy these problems played a very minor part in 
Japan’s planning history.
There was also no sense of urgency among Japanese planners to take rigorous policy 
measures for social housing concerns. The Home Ministry also planned to set up 
cooperative building societies and housing associations, modelled on European 
versions, in an effort to increase affordable housing through subsidies to these 
organisations (Honma 1987). The 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake in Tokyo provided 
an opportunity for such experiments. The earthquake directly destroyed 128,000 
houses and damaged another 126,000 units (Tokyo. Metropolitan Government 1993: 
32). Furthermore, the fire caused by the earthquake destroyed another 447,000 
houses (ibid). The total number of causalities reached 3.4 million (ibid). Dojunkai 
(1924-1941), the first housing association in Japan under the umbrella of the Home 
Ministry , planned to build 8,545 model houses for the victims (Honma 1987: 77). 
In particular, learnt form emerging modem architecture styles in the West, it
22 The financial resource came from citizens’ donation to earthquake victims (Ishida 1987a: 166).
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constructed 2,501 housing units of concrete apartment blocks, which were the first of 
this type of modem housing developments in Japan (Ishida 1987a: 167). However, 
other social housing plans during this period failed due to a lack of finance (Honma 
1987).
Despite the enactment of the City Planning Act and the Urban Building Standard Act, 
the regulations were far too weak to control undesirable land-use. The City Planning 
Act only designated three zoning areas: residential, industrial and commercial areas. 
While the zoning regulations listed types of buildings that could be built in a 
designated zoning area, any types of buildings could be built within an industrial 
zoning area while the Act designated this zoning area for large-scale, dangerous and 
sanitary problematic factories (Ishida 1987a). Another problem was that the City 
Planning Act and the Urban Building Standard Act did not regulate all land areas in 
terms of zoning controls (ibid). Non-regulated areas were called shiraji chiiki (blank 
zoning area). In 1925, As a result, the combined amount of industrial zoning areas 
and shiraji chiiki occupied 40.7 percent of Tokyo’s city planning areas and 54.9 
percent of Osaka’s (Ishida 1987a: 135). In short, the large amount of land that 
remained unaffected by the zoning laws seriously limited the effectiveness of zoning 
controls in pre-war Japan.
Other land use control schemes were the regulation of building lines and land 
readjustment. The control of building lines, modelled on the German system, 
stipulated that any constructed building had to be within 2.7 meters distance from the 
building line (Ishida 1987a: 138). The government expected that by the designation 
of building lines, new housing would be automatically accompanied by road 
development (Ishida 1987a). However, roads were not spontaneously built and
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vacant land that was expected to be transformed into roads simply remained 
untouched (Ishida 1987a: 142). Without a comprehensive planning scheme, it 
proved impossible to provide the necessary infrastructures for new developments.
In contrast, the land readjustment scheme, which originated from the reorganisation 
of arable land, became a major tool for land-use control in Japan. During the pre-war 
period, arable land reorganisation was more popular than land readjustment because 
of the government’s low interest loans and subsidies to arable land readjustment 
projects (Ishida 1987a). The scheme was later transferred to residential 
developments. In contemporary Japan, approximately one-third of all the urban 
areas have been developed using this scheme (Sorensen 1999: 2335). Under this 
method, while landowners had to contribute parts o f their land holdings to provide 
roads, parks, other public spaces and reserve land, the sale of the reserve land was 
used to cover the administration and construction of public facilities (Sorensen 1999: 
2354). Because the area developed by this scheme was equipped with the necessary 
urban infrastructures, the value of land within the area increased, and the landowners 
could benefit from rising values of their land holdings, even though their property 
sizes became reduced due to their contribution to public space (Sorensen 1999: 2334). 
The Japanese government considered this system as a reasonable and cost-effective 
way to prevent uncontrolled urban sprawl and promote efficiency in land-use.
Nonetheless, this planning method has its flaws. First of all, it was not mandatory 
for landowners at urban fringes to use this scheme to convert their farmland for 
urban use. Second, land readjustment could be an extremely time-consuming and 
complicated process, requiring coordination and negotiations among landowners 
(Koshizawa 1991; Sorensen 1999). Its difficulty was shown in the reconstruction
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processes of the 1923 Great Kanto Earthquake as well as the 1995 Great Hanshin 
Earthquake lately, which proceeded very slowly without strong leadership 
(Koshizawa 1991). Third, because of practical reasons, land readjustment areas were 
relatively small, so that the areas remained as if they were ‘islands’ in large sea of 
urban sprawl (Sorensen 1999: 2355). Finally, the core problem was related to the 
different attitude of Japanese planners to urban sprawls from their Western 
counterparts (Sorensen 1999: 2356). Even today, Japanese planners tend to accept 
urban growth, as far as basic infrastructures are provided (Sorensen 1999: 2356- 
2357).
Japanese planners did not succeed in constructing the idea of planning as 
comprehensive development controls; instead, they ended up promoting individual 
infrastructure constructions. Furthermore, it failed to secure financial resources by 
levying betterment tax or development costs on the beneficiaries of developments 
(Ishida 1987a). This failure left negative assets for the large-scale urbanisation in 
post-war Japan. Since Japan’s construction of transport networks and 
industrialisation proceeded at a fast rate, the failure to charge development gains 
became an incentive to land owners for further outwards development. Landlords 
greatly benefited by letting houses on their land at higher rents if they lived near the 
fringes of urban centres. Uncontrolled developments took a heavy toll on the quality 
of urban life in Japan. The construction of the infrastructures became extremely 
costly to the public bodies because of spiralling land prices. The deteriorated 
aesthetic standard of landscape and the environmental destruction also became 
serious issues.
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Nevertheless, the government’s unenthusiastic attitude towards development controls 
and social housing was changed markedly once Japan started ‘The Fifteen Year War’ 
(1930-1945) in Asia. In the 1930s, the Japanese government conducted planning 
policies that were similar to the British ones. With the progression of the Second 
World War, the Japanese government promoted the production of war supplies by 
increasing the number of factories and expanding existing production capacity 
(Honma 1987: 88-121). Accordingly, demand for housing for the working class 
increased and the government responded to this call with a series of new housing 
policies (ibid). These new regulations, and policies included the Poor Housing 
Improvement Act (1927), the Rent Control Act (1939), a three-year Housing 
Provision Plan for the Working Class (1939), the Housing Corporation Act (1941) 
and the revision of both the Housing Tenancy Act and the Land Tenancy Act (1941) 
(Honma 1987: 88-90). Above all, the Housing Tenancy Act was revised to protect 
the families of soldiers who went to fight for the war.
Furthermore, a number of regional plans for Tokyo Metropolitan Region were 
drafted during this period. The plans included the Kanto National Land Plan (1936) 
and the Tokyo Green Space Plan (1939), which incorporated a greenbelt zone to 
prevent uncontrolled urban growth (Tokyo. Metropolitan Government 1994: 36). 
The plans were originally inspired by the 1924 city planning conference held in 
Amsterdam. However, they slowly developed into the Imperial City Plan to prepare 
for bomb attacks after the outbreak of the war (Tokyo. Metropolitan Government 
1994: 36-39).
These regional plans for Tokyo are significant in the history of Japanese planning for 
a number of reasons (Koshizawa 1991: Ch.4). First, they were the first act of
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metropolitan or regional planning with comprehensive master plans in Japan (ibid). 
Second, for the first time, parks and open spaces became the major objective of 
urban planning, as the plans materialised large open spaces in the hill side of Tokyo 
(ibid). The peculiar condition of the war made it possible for the Japanese 
government to take control over strong private land interests for ‘a collective 
interest’. However, this first initiative of comprehensive planning under Japan’s 
totalitarian regime did not last for a long time. Later on, these plans were all 
abandoned, and planning in Japan again ended up serving small groups of politically 
powerful people after Japan’s surrender (see Chapter 4 and 5).
3.3 Characteristics of the Pre-war Planning System
The peculiar conditions of Japans’ modernisation shaped three distinctive 
characteristics of Japanese planning. This section will explain each of them in detail.
Planning as technology
The most salient feature of Japanese planning since modernisation was the 
dominance of technology. On their visit to Europe and the USA, Meiji leaders were 
struck by grand urban design and solid structures of brick and stone buildings in 
nineteenth century Western cities (Kume, Healey, and Tsuzuki 2002). They were 
also overwhelmed by these nations’ industrial infrastructures, especially by transport 
and communication such as railways, roads, bridges and ports (ibid). A detailed 
description of these infrastructures can be found in the diary of the ambassadors of 
the Iwakura Mission (ibid). The Japanese leaders readily understood the importance 
of industrial infrastructures as a major vehicle for industrialisation so that they were 
determined to implant necessary technologies to Japan. While urban planning, as a
tool of comprehensive control of land use, was slow to emerge in pre-war Japan, the 
construction of industrial infrastructures was immediately implemented by the state 
without hesitation.
In the process of building modem cities, civil engineers and architects, who created 
powerful symbols of Japan’s modernisation, took a cmcial position among Japanese 
planning professionals (Special Editorial Committee for 50th Anniversary Special 
Issue of City Planning Review 2001b). They established professional bodies and 
passed on their skills to the next generations through education at universities (ibid). 
Thus they shaped Japan’s planning culture and safeguarded their influence on 
planning decision-making. Furthermore, these two types of professionals, many of 
whom have been hired by the Japanese government and large firms (Special Editorial 
Committee for 50th Anniversary Special Issue of City Planning Review 2001a), have 
acted as a strong interest group to promote the construction of new buildings and 
infrastructures. This is an important reason why technologies and architecture 
designs have had a central position in Japanese planning policy.
Although Japan is now known as an economy in which the development of science 
and technology plays a central role, the Japanese concept of modem science and 
technology is not similar to that of the West. This conceptual discrepancy between 
Japan and the West can partly explain the unique nature of Japanese planning. In 
Meiji Japan, there was no distinction between science and technology (Bartholomew 
1989; Maruyama 1996; Nakayama 1984). In nineteenth century Europe, science and 
technology was distinguished as ideas and practice (Maruyama 1996; Nakayama 
1984). In contrast, at the initial stage of modernisation in Japan, both science and 
technology was imported from the West and was regarded equally as a tool for
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economic growth (Nakayama 1984). However, the most striking aspect of the way 
in which Japan learnt modem Western science was that it did not experience the 
paradigm shift from the old to the new (Barshay 1988; Maruyama 1996; Nakayama 
1984). The emergence of new science in the West in the modem age was usually 
accompanied by the notion of ‘creative destruction’. The Enlightenment broke up 
the feudal and often Christian dominated tradition in science (Hall and Gieben 1992). 
Subsequently, science transformed Western society into one wherein an individual 
could make free decisions based on his (but generally not her) own rationality. Japan 
completely lacked this process.
In Japan, new science was built following the tradition of wakon yosai (Japanese 
spirit, Western technology) watchword. Modem science and technology was 
brought to Japan without its original ideologies and philosophies (Nakayama 1984). 
Furthermore, not only did the government exclusively own and control modem 
science and technology, but also its advocates were the traditional ruling class, 
samurai, who had lost their occupations after the Meiji Restoration, but not their 
political power (Burks 1985; Nakayama 1984; Spaulding and University of Michigan. 
Center for Japanese Studies 1967). Whereas individuals or private enterprises in the 
West largely developed modem science and technology (Nakayama 1984), the 
selected borrowing by which modem science and technology was transplanted to 
Japan determined the path of modem science in this country.
By cutting off philosophy from science, the development of science in Japan was 
seriously conditioned. The Japanese government concentrated on the development 
of technologies and practical sciences, which were not related to values, morals and 
ideas (Maruyama 1996). The government’s monopoly in new science and
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technology resulted in the tendency of a lack of democracy and even suppression of 
freedom in research and development in science in Japan (Bartholomew 1989). This 
feudalistic tradition has still continued in the contemporary Japanese academia, 
wherein the strong seniority system, pervading factionalism and persisting 
apprenticeship has obstructed new research and development (Bartholomew 1989; 
Castells 1998). Moreover, as technicians or scientists were supervised by 
bureaucracy, which was predominantly consisted of graduates from the Department 
of Law of the Imperial University (now the University of Tokyo), the status of 
scientists and technicians was subordinated within the hierarchy of Japanese 
government (Bartholomew 1989). Therefore, science as a tool to bring fairness 
based on reasons was significantly ignored in policy decision-making in Japan.
On the whole, while technology was an integral part of the Japanese planning system, 
the status of engineers was low in the Meiji social hierarchy. The inferior position of 
planners as engineers in the Japanese government can explain why the Home 
Ministry failed to make substantial achievements in pre-war planning policy-making, 
despite their extensive knowledge about the development of Western planning 
systems. Most proposals from the Home Ministry were rejected by the Ministry of 
Finance (Fujimori 1990; Ishida 1987a; Koshizawa 1991).
Strong preference for hardware technology in planning is still prevalent in 
contemporary Japan. Research of the institutional context of Japanese planning 
reveals that planning education at Japanese universities still has strong orientation 
towards architecture and engineering and only a few social science-based courses 
exist (Masser and Yorisaki 1994; Special Editorial Committee for 50th Anniversary 
Special Issue of City Planning Review 2001b). Moreover, there is a tendency among
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social science courses on planning to put an emphasis on mathematical rational 
models in planning decision-making. The lack of planning courses that deal with the 
political and administrative context reflects the tradition of Japanese planning, where 
politics and ideologies are separated from its planning policy-making. Accordingly, 
planning in Japan came to be considered as mere strategies that a small number of 
professionals have solely decided.
The monopoly of ‘rational’ science and technology, owned by the Japanese authority 
and firms, also meant the exclusion of the general public from planning decision­
making processes. Not only were citizens prevented from participating in planning 
processes, but also they lacked any practical knowledge about what was going on 
and how their localities would be affected by planning policies, because there were 
few planning professionals outside the central government or firms. Therefore, 
planning outcomes were inevitably authoritative and capitalistic in the pre-war 
period.
Planning for capitalist development
While the Japanese authority made efforts to create Western-like urban design in city 
centres in order to demonstrate its modernity, the objectives of planning were 
absolutely focused on creating industrial infrastructures (Mosk 2001: 231-41). The 
city planning documents prepared by Osaka City Council show that the financial 
resources of Osaka’s city planning were thoroughly dedicated to construction 
projects, in particular that of road building in the pre-war time (Mosk 2001:240). 
The plan was divided into piecemeal projects and was spectacularly lacking in ‘grand 
design, overriding vision and rationale, articulation of a set of ethical or aesthetic 
concerns’ (Mosk 2001: 239).
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This same aspect could be found in the introduction of the TCRO (Ishida 1987a). 
Although slum clearance and the regulation of fireproof buildings were discussed in 
the committee of the TCRO, the main issues were the construction of roads and the 
Tokyo port. The TCRO did not include any development controls (Fujimori 1990; 
Tokyo. Metropolitan Government 1994). The origin of Japanese city planning exists 
in how the government can introduce modem infrastructures such as motorways into 
former castle towns like Tokyo and Osaka (Ishida 1987a; Koshizawa 1991; Mosk 
2001).
The manner in which land-ownership was identified under the new regime is another 
important legacy of Meiji planning policy to post-war Japan. Landlords had an 
incentive to increase land value by converting their land-use to more profitable ones 
as there were virtually no restrictions on land-use conversions from farm to 
residential use and residential to factory/office use in pre-war Japan. When the 
urgent task of the government was to promote capitalism, there seemed to be no 
encouragement for the government to tighten land-use controls. Furthermore, these 
landlords, who often turned to be small business owners, came to acquire greater 
political power as major supporters of the newly formed Liberal Party (Norman and 
Dower 1975). Therefore, the Japanese Liberal Party, while calling for democracy, 
had agrarian and feudal tradition in its inception (Norman and Dower 1975). While 
these landowners made up the mainstream of Japan’s politics in the pre-war time in 
the still largely agrarian society, the urban working class was marginalised in the 
political arena. Accordingly, policy measures stimulating redistribution of individual 
gains through planning remained very weak in pre-war Japan.
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Planning under absolutism
The last unique feature of modem Japanese planning in the pre-war time was that 
planning was conducted under harsh absolutism. In the early nineteenth century, 
European cities experienced a number of urban protests, which were brutally 
suppressed by the use of police and military powers (Benevolo 1967; Jones 1976). 
When European establishments realised that they could no longer oppress the 
continuous uprisings of the urban masses by means of force, the elite started to take 
initiatives of improving urban slum conditions as a way of reconciliation with the 
urban poor (Ashworth 1954; Hall 1996a; Jones 1976). Thus, the development of 
planning policies in Western liberal economies has been strongly connected with the 
formation of social/urban policy. Because many top bureaucrats studied in Europe, 
the Japanese government was fully aware of the effects of industrialisation on society 
(Burks 1985; Kume, Healey, and Tsuzuki 2002; Pyle 1974). Accordingly, after the 
opening of the parliament, the Japanese government banned freedom of assembly 
and intervened in the freedom of speech by means of censorship (Mitchell 1998).
However, what the establishment was most concerned with was the development of 
the consciousness of deprivation among the working class (Pyle 1974). Kanai 
Nobum (Professor of Law at the Imperial University, 1865-1933) and Kuwata 
Kumazo (1868-1932) were the pioneers of Japanese social policy which was 
distinctive from the Western ones (Pyle 1974: 139). During his study in Europe, 
Kanai judged that British and German’s social protests did not happen because of the 
severity of material deprivation of the working class, but instead resulted from the 
working class’s political consciousness of being exploited by capitalists (Pyle 1974: 
143)
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Based on this understanding, although the Japanese government took some welfare 
measures to combat rising urban problems in later years, the nature of Japanese 
social policy was very different from its German equivalent. While the Japanese 
authority introduced the similar ideology of the ‘paternalistic welfare state’ to that in 
Germany, it practically conducted alternative social policy which emphasised the 
prevention o f social rebellion (Garon 1997; Pyle 1973; Pyle 1974). In fact, the 
Nihon Shakai Seisaku Gakkai (Japanese Social Policy Association) was the first 
professional organisation for Japanese economists to promote economic development, 
and their research very much influenced the bureaucracy between the late 1890s and 
the 1930 (Marshall 1977: 82-85; Pyle 1974: 141).
Considering that Japanese industrialisation had just started, Kanai judged that Japan 
did not need a generous social policy like in Germany where social unrest was rooted 
in industrialisation and the rise of social democracy movements (Pyle 1973; Pyle 
1974). Instead, Kanai initiated preventive actions towards social unrest and labour 
movements in Japan (Pyle 1974). He urged that the authority should make the 
working class focus on pursuing their own interests, introduce thought guidance and 
education not to let the urban poor being aware of class consciousness, and 
simultaneously promote nationalism to encourage the sense of unity among people 
(Garon 1997; Goodman 1998; Pyle 1973; Pyle 1974). Thus, it is not surprising that 
the first labour organisation in Japan, Yuaikai (Friendship Society) was formed in 
1912 as a mutual aid society among workers (Totten 1966). Influenced by the 
government’s social policy, it never had the character of a real labour union (ibid).
As the evolution of this social and urban policy significantly affected the nature of 
Japanese industrial and social relations, the path of modem urban planning was
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inevitably influenced. Social and urban policy in pre-war Japan was not oriented 
towards the improvement of living standards for humanitarian and ethical reasons. It 
was solely dedicated to suppress the sense of deprivation among the poor (Garon 
1997; Goodman 1998; Pyle 1974). Under the strong government control of 
ideologies, if there existed some welfare measures in planning and housing policy, 
they were treated as benevolence from the above (Garon 1997; Goodman 1998; Pyle 
1974). This had important ramifications for the development of Japanese planning, 
as to why the poor housing standard and urban environment was neglected in the pre­
war time.
Furthermore, planning decisions were exclusively in the hands of the central 
government of Japan under the 1919 City Planning Act (Ishida 1987a). Before the 
enforcement of this act, there were a number of local initiatives to improve 
environments, in particular in established cities like Osaka (Hanes 2002; Sorensen 
2001). However, as the Meiji oligarchy worried that local autonomy under 
increasing social problems would result in obstructing ‘the national interest’, the 
state authority strictly controlled municipal affairs through finance, election system 
and the local administration (Hane 2003; Pyle 1973). For example, the state 
appointed a prefectural governor from the Home Ministry. Furthermore, the central 
bureaucracy strengthened the link with the local establishments (notably businesses 
and landlords) as executives of local assemblies and then controlled the local 
population through patron-client relationships (e.g. landlords and tenant farmers) in 
the pre-war Japanese society (Garon 1994; Garon 1997; Gluck 1985; Pyle 1973). 
The clientelism between the central government and the local elite resulted in 
weakening local democracy (Tokyo. Metropolitan Government 1993).
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Related to this development, another significant characteristic of modem Japanese 
planning is the lack of recognition of social life in space. In Western liberal 
economies, public spaces as well as urban design increasingly came to be identified 
as the (democratic) public realm (Brain 1997; Madanipour 1996; Madanipour 2003; 
Worpole 2000). In the absolute state era, prominent architectures and public spaces 
had been considered to represent a monarch’s power and wealth (Brain 1997). 
However, as democracy progressed, the political power was delegated to the 
bourgeois class, and then diffused to the working class population (Brain 1997; 
Worpole 2000). The reinterpretation of public spaces and urban designs in Western 
nation-states reflected this conceptual development of democracy and society (Gehl 
1996a; Gehl and Gemzaee 1996b; Mitchell 2003; Worpole 2000). This 
transformation was typically illustrated by the development of open spaces in Europe 
(Van Rooijen 2000; Worpole 2000).
In Meiji Japan however, the imported Westem-style architecture was seen as mere 
technology to demonstrate ‘modem Japan’ (Coaldrake 1996; Tokyo. Metropolitan 
Government 1993; Tokyo. Metropolitan Government 1994). This modernity was 
also to demonstrate the power of the absolute state with ‘enlightened monarchy’ 
(Coaldrake 1996). Furthermore, Meiji architects did not learn how individual 
architectures had to coexist with their surrounding environments. Japan’s existing 
built environments were something which architects rejected as being pre-modem 
(Coaldrake 1996; Fujimori 1990).
Nonetheless, the idea of modernisation contradicted national tradition in modem 
Japan so that the Japanese elite relentlessly worked to create Japanese imagery that 
fitted their ideal. First, the Japanese authority gave a new status to a number of
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historic sites to worship or commemorate ‘the nation’s ancient tradition’ (Fujitani 
1993). The representation of those sites was in fact often reinvented to enhance the 
myth of the Imperial Family and Shinto after the Meiji Restoration (ibid). Second, 
the Japanese authorities campaigned for the values of Japanese tradition and its 
‘unique’ culture in everyday life. For example, Shiga Shigetaka, Japan’s naturalist 
(1863-1927) boasted the Japanese ‘distinctive’ nature and geography as a part of 
Japan’s nationalism in his Nihon Fukeiron (Japanese Landscape, 1894) (Gavin 2000). 
Shiga’s argument of Japanese people’s ‘love of nature’, in particular of rural Japan 
later developed by Yanagita Kunio (1875-1962, the founder of Japanese Folklore 
Studies) which idealised the virtue of communitarian village life in Japan 
(Hashimoto 1998). The Japanese authorities took full advantage of these 
intellectuals’ thoughts to promote nationalism and to preserve pre-modem values of 
agrarian life in the Japanese mind, against emerging liberalism in urban Japan (Gavin 
2000; Hashimoto 1998; Robertson 1998; Scheiner 1998).
Although the meaning of ‘public’ as a nation was materialised in individual pieces of 
pre-war architecture (Coaldrake 1996; Fujimori 1990), the public realm as social life 
was not truly represented either by new public spaces or urban design (Fujimori 
1990; Schulz 2003; Seidensticker 1983). On the other hand, Japan’s rural landscape 
was increasingly used to advance the authority’s vision of social life although the 
government in fact did not protect them through planning. Simultaneously in 
modem Japanese cities, vibrant social space quickly disappeared and became being 
marginalised as the new authority’s spatial development took over those spaces 
(Cybriwsky 1998; Jinnai 1994; Seidensticker 1983; Waley 1991).
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3.4 The Public Interest in Japan’s Pre-war Planning Policy 
The absence of the public sphere as political community
On closer examination of the characteristics of pre-war planning in Japan, there are 
no references to planning for ‘people’. As a matter of fact, a Japanese word for ‘the 
people’ (jinmiri) did not exist in early Meiji Japan until Nakae Chomin (philosopher, 
1847-1901) introduced Rousseau’s ideas about the people and human rights from 
France (Iokibe 1999: 56). This also applied to the term ‘society’, for which the 
equivalent Japanese word shakai was also created in the same period (Yoshida 1999: 
26). While Hanna Pitkin argues that the creation of collective identity plays an 
important role in claiming a stake in political discourses (Pitkin 1972), the lack of 
vocabulary like ‘the people’ indicates how hard it was to cultivate the idea of 
democracy and citizenship in Meiji Japan. Although Japanese advocates for 
democracy imported relevant words and ideas from the West, the authority made 
various efforts to suppress democratic ideas by using police power, censorship, 
thought controls and regulations forbidding the freedom of assembly (Gluck 1985; 
Gordon 1991; Najita, Koschmann, and Joint Committee on Japanese Studies 1982; 
Totten 1966). The oppression made it almost impossible for ordinary Japanese 
people to create a common identity to participate in politics.
)
Learned from the history of Western liberal economies, the Meiji authority deeply
feared the emergence of ‘the public’ as autonomous citizens. In Japan’s
modernisation process, legitimacy was a key in building a modem nation-state
(Silberman 1982). To abolish the Shogun regime in a justifiable manner, the
restoration of the Imperial household and Shinto were necessary to create the image
of a sovereign state (Gluck 1985; Gordon 2003; Hane 2001). At the beginning of the
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Meiji era, the oligarchy had no immediate plans to introduce a parliament to Japan. 
Although both internal and external pressures did lead to the creation of the 
parliament and the cabinet system, this newly formed democratic system did not 
produce democratic machinery: instead, it renewed the emperor’s bureaucracy in 
Japan (Gordon 1991; Silberman 1982). In this system, civilian bureaucrats and the 
military administered on behalf of the emperor as the ruler of the sovereign state, 
holding no direct responsibility to the people who were ruled (Gordon 1991; Tsuji 
1952).
A day after the Meiji Constitution was promulgated in 1889, the then prime minister, 
Kuroda Kiyotaka (1840-1900) made a speech to governors as follows:
While appearance of political parties is a requirement under the present 
condition, the government should always take a definite direction, stand 
aloof outside political parties and act as neutrally and fairly. (Kaneko 
1999: 10)
What this meant was that as political parties were associations which simply 
followed their own benefits and interests, the government should not be concerned 
with those vested interests. Therefore, only the bureaucracy who was insulated from 
those private interests was able to act in the public interest (Kaneko 1999). This is 
exactly the same message that Yamagata Aritomo voiced concerning ‘the supreme 
principles of justices and the public interest’ (See Chapter 2).
The legitimacy of the Meiji administration, however, was far from being secure after 
the Restoration (Gluck 1985; Silberman 1982). The majority of the Meiji oligarchy 
came from a lower stratum of samurai and they simply held the executive office by 
replacing the Shogun regime (Silberman 1982). The bureaucracy worked hard to 
gain political legitimacy by acquiring expertise and academic qualifications, creating
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a hierarchy of those academic institutions and making laws and orders for the 
appropriate conducts of policy-making (Silberman 1982; Spaulding and University 
of Michigan. Center for Japanese Studies 1967). The irony is that by establishing the 
rule of legitimacy for governance, the Japanese bureaucracy could not prevent other 
interests such as political parties, business organisations, and social groups from 
participating in policy-making processes, provided that they fulfilled the 
requirements to be legitimate (Gluck 1985; Kaneko 1999; Norman and Woods 2000; 
Silberman 1982). As a result, although the public interest in Japan’s policy-making 
appeared to be solely determined by the bureaucracy, it ended up serving exclusive 
private interests which had a ‘legitimate’ access to influence policy-making (ibid). 
This contradiction is a reason why there is an argument among academics whether 
Japan is a strong or weak state (Calder 1988; Johnson 1982; McKean 1993; Vogel 
1979).
The role of the state in the market economy
What was the role of the state in planning in relation to the market in Japan? In 1916 
thirty-seven farmers in Osaka filed a lawsuit against a nearby factory for causing air
O'Xpollution by emission of sulphuric and sulphurous acid gas . In this Osaka Alkali 
case, the farmers demanded compensation from the polluter for damage to their crops. 
While the District Court judgement acknowledged negligence of the factory which 
did not implement sufficient measures to prevent the pollution, the Supreme Court 
dismissed the plaintiffs claim after the appeal. The court ruled that the factory was 
equipped with a facility to prevent air pollution in compliance with government
23 1994c. Judgement upon Osaka Alkali Case. In Jurist'. Daishinin (the Former Supreme Court of 
Japan).
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regulations. The air pollution occurred despite these preventive measures: therefore 
the court ruled that the defendant was not guilty and should be exempted from 
paying compensation to the farmers. This meant that as long as a person obeyed the 
law, the result of his/her behaviour, even though it was harmful to other people, 
he/she had no responsibility for the consequence. Accordingly, the pollution caused 
by the factory was not considered to be against the public interest.
In fact, until the introduction of the ‘no-fault liability (mukashitsu sekininY rule in 
1972 (see Chapter 7), which is to punish those who caused pollution, and to grant 
victims the right for compensation, this [liability for] negligence principle in Japan’s 
tort law had long been an obstacle for solving serious environmental hazards which 
endangered many people’s lives. The Osaka Alkali case can be compared with the 
established principle of ‘nuisance’ in Britain’s Fletcher v. Rylands case in 1866 
(McAuslan 1975), in which the court gave an injunction for the planned development, 
reasoning its possible damage to the neighbourhood environment against the public 
interest despite the previous authorisation to the development. In the judgement of 
the Osaka Alkali case, the victims and their rights were thoroughly excluded from the 
decision of what was in the pubic interest, since only the state represented ‘public’.
The lack of social life in public space
The absence of ‘public’ as social life in the built environment in Meiji Japan was
well described in the event of the opening of Hibiya Park, the first Westem-style
park in Tokyo (Yoshida 1999: 26-9). Since there had been no Japanese word
equivalent to ‘park’, it was first called yiien (pleasure grounds or amusement parks),
then renamed as koen (public/official gardens) (ibid). At the opening day of Hibiya
Park in 1903, because the police banned eating and drinking as well as street
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performance inside the park, the general public bought foods and refreshments at the 
hundreds of open-air stalls and celebrated its opening with street performers ‘outside 
the park’(Yoshida 1999: 27). In this context, that ‘Hibiya Park was not a public 
garden but literally an official garden’ (ibid).
The supremacy of the state as ‘public’ in the built environment was also well 
illustrated by the construction of the Ginza Brick Quarter and the Government Office 
Concentration Plan. As previously explained, these government plans did not 
consider the existing residents’ rights to continue living in the same area. Instead, 
the development plans justified removing the urban poor from the city centre of 
Tokyo. Regarding the design of the new Government Office District in Hibiya, 
Inoue Kaoru, the Foreign Minister, asked foreign architects ‘to see the city of Tokyo 
as if it were the frontier (Tokyo shigai o mirukoto kaitakuchi o mirugagotokuy for 
making a plan (Fujimori 1990: 255) . This meant that the architects responsible for 
this plan did not have to pay any attention to the surrounding environment of the 
development, as the plan should only satisfy the need of the state authority.
The domestic and public domain
The spatially most deprived group during Japan’s early industrialisation was women. 
Although the authority and elite defined that the role of Japanese women should be a 
homemaker, female factory workers occupied more than 70 percent of its workforce 
in 1910-14 (Norman and Woods 2000: 152). Young girls from poor farming villages 
were also sold to cities or even abroad as prostitutes to support their families in pre­
war Japan (Hane 2003: 207-225). A common experience for these women was that 
their employers locked them up in housing of notoriously poor conditions (Hane
2003; Hunter 1992). Even respected women of the upper classes did not have the
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freedom of movements as they were barred from public spaces like streets and cafes, 
in particular political venues such as the parliament building (Mackie 2002), 
Women’s bodies were considered to be in the public (state) domain to serve the 
nation’s economic and ideological development (Tipton 2001: 61).
The subordination of women’s needs to the objectives of the state was seen in pre­
war Japanese planning policy. Housing and urban environment was never designed 
to reflect women’s views, in particular of low social status. Instead, while 
commercial developments, in particular department stores in metropolitan areas, 
catered for the consumption of upper-and middle-class housewives (Hirano 1999; 
Young 1999), many working class women had to live either in shanties or 
employers’ accommodation (Hane 2003; Hunter 1992). Furthermore, the authority’s 
campaigns for thrift living and household management targeting women further 
suppressed the needs of poor women for better quality of life (Garon 1997; Pyle 
1973). The state’s domination of the private life prevented Japanese women from 
being conscious about their citizenship rights which could be improved through 
planning and social policy in the public interest.
3.5 Conclusion
It can be said that the origins of Japan’s developmental state were firmly formed
from experiences in the Meiji era. Despite Japan’s image as a family state in
harmony, its pre-war history was shadowed by continuous oppression of peasant
uprisings, labour movements, freedom of speech, freely cooperating organisations
and any other challenges to the authority (Hane 2003; Najita, Koschmann, and Joint
Committee on Japanese Studies 1982; Norman and Woods 2000). Moreover, the
state consciously used education, the media and even civil society organisations to
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guide, convince and influence the behaviour of its citizens for achieving economic 
development and armament as a national goal (Garon 1997; Garon 2003; Marshall 
1977; Pyle 1973; Pyle 1974). In this sense, pre-war Japan can be regarded as a 
continuation of quasi-feudal political regime with modem institutions.
In pre-war Japan, despite the materialisation of male universal suffrage in 1925, there 
were no opportunities for citizens to contest the definition of ‘public’, since the 
emperor who embodied ‘public’ was a living God and its bureaucrats were the 
emperor’s servants under its political regime. Japanese people had neither the right 
to know and participate in planning policy-making nor were they allowed to 
challenge the decisions of the authority unless the land in dispute was their own 
property. Therefore, according to Dahl’s ‘polyarchy theory’ (Dahl 1971), there was 
no democracy in pre-war planning system.
However, at the same time, people were given nearly complete freedom when it 
came to the use of their own land. In this regard, whereas the planning of individual 
land was an absolute ‘private’ matter, hence not in the ‘public’ domain, overall 
planning existed exclusively in the domain of ‘public’ institutions, which effectively 
meant the authority in Japan. This demarcation between public and private in the 
ideology of Japanese planning made the system incompetent and unfair, because the 
success of planning is determined by recognising the collective will and materialising 
it in the built environment. The failure to identify the public interest other than the 
national interest in Japan’s pre-war planning system resulted in the absence of 
‘sociable’ and ‘common’ notions in the built environment that ordinary Japanese 
citizens experience even today.
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Chapter Four: Japanese Planning in the Reconstruction Era, 1945- 
1955
The defeat in the Pacific War in 1945 brought drastic changes to Japanese society. 
As a consequence of the unconditional surrender, Japan was forced to accept 
sweeping institutional reforms under the direction of the Supreme Command[er] for 
the Allied Powers (SCAP). SCAP believed that flaws in Japan’s political institutions, 
as well as its economic and social inequality led the nation to invade overseas 
territories. Thus, these reforms first aimed to overhaul Japan’s totalitarian regime, 
and then introduced a liberal democracy to Japan without military powers. SCAP 
also intended to eradicate the class inequality in Japan, which was believed to be at 
the root of Japan’s social problems. Accordingly, the 1946 Constitution of Japan 
declared a strong commitment to pacifism, the creation of an egalitarian society and 
promised new opportunities for its citizens.
SCAP’s reforms had far-reaching impacts on post-war Japan. The 1946 Constitution 
of Japan, which was drafted by SCAP members, has not been revised at all up to 
present. The reforms built the foundation of democracy, liberal economy and 
citizenship development in post-war Japan. The concept of ‘public’ and the public 
interest in politics and policy-making should have been considerable affected by all- 
encompassing restructuring of the nation’s political regime. Nonetheless, despite the 
positive effects of the reforms, they did not affect the existing planning framework in 
Japan. This chapter will analyse the impacts of SCAP reforms, which were led by 
the US government, on the ideologies of the public interest in post-war Japan and 
examine their influences on Japan’s planning culture.
125
Section 4.1 discusses the unprecedented social reforms in Japan initiated by the US 
reformers. Section 4.2 examines the features of Japan’s reconstruction plan and the 
reasons why the plan failed to a considerable extent. Section 4.3 further investigates 
politics behind the reconstruction and its implications for the development of post­
war planning culture. Section 4.4 looks at the origin of the Japanese post-war 
planning model, which was strongly linked with the state-led economic planning. 
This section also analyses the role of planners and institutions, which determined the 
objectives of planning policy. Section 4.5 assesses the extent to which Japan’s 
capitulation and the subsequent SCAP’s reforms have impacted on the discourse on 
the public interest and the concept of planning today.
4.1 The Democratisation of Japan
15th August 1945 is a historical day for modem Japan. The radio broadcast by 
Emperor Hirohito (1901-89) announced Japan’s capitulation in the war against China 
and the Allied Powers. Subsequently, the USA-led SCAP occupied Japan for its 
post-war reforms, and after the lift of the occupation, the USA became an ally of 
Japan for its national security24. Because of this alliance, the USA has strongly 
influenced Japan’s international as well as domestic policies since 1945.
According to the Basic Initial Post-Surrender Directive to the Supreme Commander 
for the Allied Powers for the Occupation and Control of Japan (8 November 1945), 
the objectives for the reforms were as follows:
the abolition of militarism and ultra-nationalism in all their forms; the 
disarmament and demilitarisation of Japan, with continuing control over 
Japan’s capacity to make war; the strengthening of democratic tendencies
24 The arrangement was confirmed under the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1951 and is still in 
operation today.
and processes in governmental, economic and social institutions; and the 
encouragement and support of liberal political tendencies in Japan, 
(Martin and Institute of Pacific Relations. International Secretariat. 1948:
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After removing whole military capacity of Japan, SCAP initiated extensive reforms 
of political, economic, cultural and welfare institutions. As a result, multi-party 
politics, including the reinstatement of the formerly banned Japanese Communist 
Party (JCP) and the newly formed Japanese Socialist Party (JSP), became the rule for 
democracy in post-war Japan. To fulfil these objectives, all Japanese citizens aged 
20 and over were given suffrage and all members of the Lower House and the Upper 
House became representatives chosen by voters.
These political reforms together with other reforms created the foundation of post­
war Japan. Administrative and economic reforms were considered to be important to 
enhance liberty, equality and social justice. For this agenda, E. H. Norman’s Japan's 
Emergence as a Modern State (1941), which described the plight of peasants as the 
price paid for Japan’s pre-war industrialization, had a significant influence over the 
US-led reforms which aimed to build democracy and an egalitarian society in post­
war Japan25. SCAP considered that the ideologies and practices of the key 
institutions in Japan were the vehicles of the authoritarian state and thus needed the 
overhaul of the whole pre-war institutions in order to achieve their goals. The 
reforms included those in local government systems, industrial relations, civil
25 A Canadian diplomat and historian, Norman’s life and death has considerable implications for the 
development of post-war democracy in Japan. His works were particularly influential to the agrarian 
land reforms and other liberal SCAP-led reforms. However, because of his humanitarian approach 
and sympathy toward pre-war communist members, he was later under suspicion as a communist spy 
under the US’s McCarthyism. Eventually, he committed suicide in 1957 in protest of the allegations 
that he was a communist. See Bowen, Roger W. 1986. Innocence is not enough: the life and death o f  
Herbert Norman. Vancouver: Douglas & McIntyre.
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services, tax mechanism, the dissolution of business conglomerates and agrarian land 
reform.
The cultural reforms were another important element in the efforts to eliminate 
militarism and promote democracy in post-war Japan. Ever since the Meiji 
Restoration in 1868, the Japanese authority had created the myth of the divinity of 
the emperor in order to unite Japanese citizens against the Western-dominated 
imperialist order (Brown 1955; Gluck 1985; Iida 2002; Passin 1982). The education 
system, the media and Shinto had also played important roles in the enhancement of 
ultra-nationalism (Brown 1955; Gluck 1985; Iida 2002; Kasza 1988; Passin 1982). 
Especially, the educational reforms required structural and drastic changes, which 
necessitated the rewriting of the existing textbooks and curriculum. Because the 
censorship of the media and propaganda orchestrated by the state in pre-war Japan in 
the end allowed its military to invade Asia (Huffman 1997; Kasza 1988), SCAP also 
intervened in this area. Shinto lost its status of the state religion, as well as official 
and financial sponsorship from the state (Takemae, Ricketts, and Swann 2002). The 
Imperial Rescript was made void (Takemae, Ricketts, and Swann 2002: 372).
The highest achievement of SCAP was the creation of the 1946 Constitution of Japan. 
The new Constitution renounces the pre-war imperial state, replacing the emperor as 
the sacred ruler with the democratic machinery, which is solely based on the will of 
voters. The Constitution transformed the emperor’s status to that of a symbol of 
Japanese citizens without any political power. It also declares eternal pacifism by 
rejecting any from of military institutions or powers. Furthermore, the Constitution 
ensures political and civil freedoms, equality among people, and basic human rights 
to a minimum standard of cultured life. Therefore, it does not only promise civil
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liberty for the Japanese but also, for the first time in its history, the Constitution 
secures social citizenship. The 1946 Constitution of Japan and SCAP reforms can be 
seen as the manifestation of the idealism in American democracy, promoted by the 
New Deal generation (Cohen and Passin 1987; Dower 1999; Ward et al. 1987).
However, the legacies left by SCAP reforms were not all beneficial to the 
development of Japanese post-war democracy. Some claim that the incomplete 
modernisation of Japan was rooted in the shortcomings of SCAP’s post-war reforms 
(Dower 1999; Takemae 1987; Takemae, Ricketts, and Swann 2002). First of all, the 
dual governance during the US occupation period diluted the essence of the post-war 
reforms. Due to the language barrier, the Allied Powers were only able to govern 
Japan indirectly through the Japanese government. As a result, they were unable to 
undermine the pre-war authoritarian institutions completely (Dower 1999; Takemae, 
Ricketts, and Swann 2002). This is in marked contrast with Germany, which did not 
have a civilian government between May 1945 and 1949 until the Constitution of the 
Federal Republic of Germany was created (FRG) in 1949 (Merkl 1963). In the 
absence of a civilian government, and also because of the East-West tension within 
its territory, the FRG was able to wipe out effectively ‘above-parties ideology of the 
authoritarian state’ (ibid), and subsequently established itself as a successful liberal 
democracy among Western capitalist regimes (Pulzer 1995). This did not happen in 
Japan, as the Japanese bureaucracy weakened the impacts of important reforms by 
changing the wordings of the original English concepts of the Constitution into the 
Japanese translations (Dower 1999: Ch. 13). This was especially the case with 
human rights issues, power distribution among government organisations and issues 
involving the central-local government relationship (Stockwin 1982: Ch. 10; 
Takemae, Ricketts, and Swann 2002).
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Second, the perseverance of the Imperial Family and the continuous reign of 
Emperor Hirohito from the pre-war years onwards had significant effects in post-war 
Japan. Although the Emperor was stripped of his political powers by the new 
Constitution, it allowed the sense of the continuity from the past among Japanese 
population. In fact, to promote patriarchy and nationalism, the conservatives often 
used the name and the existence of the emperor (Gluck 1993; Yoshino 1992). This 
still causes outcries from former Japanese colonies in Asia and overshadows the 
newborn Japan.
Finally, the most crucial failure was the unsuccessful attempt to rehabilitate political 
parties immediately after the war. Overwhelmed by the popularity of the left (Oppler 
1976: Ch. 16), SCAP changed its original policy of promoting liberal politics, and 
instead started to suppress the socialist-inspired labour movements. Especially after 
the outbreak of the Koran War (1950-1953), the USA reversed its occupation policy 
in Japan against the rising power of the communist block in Asia (Oppler 1976: 
Ch. 16).
The allied forces suppressed Japan’s left in several ways which will be explained at 
the end of this chapter. But the most detrimental factor to the development of 
Japanese democracy was the control of the freedom of speech by SCAP. Censorship, 
which first had been intended to remove ultra-nationalism, became an important tool 
to eliminate communist/socialist ideologies in the media in the late occupation period 
(Dower 1999: Ch. 14; Krauss 2000: 88-97; Pharr 1996a). This also encouraged the 
Japanese media to conduct self-censorship, which hindered the fair development of 
civil society to activate the public sphere in post-war Japan (Feldman 1993; Krauss 
2000; Pharr and Krauss 1996b). SCAP also purged individuals who advocated
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particular ideologies from organisations. Initially, they targeted persons who had 
promoted wars and anti-democratic political/economic regime. Later on, SCAP 
shifted its focus on the leaders of labour movements and proponents of left wing 
ideas in the media. As a result of this purge, nearly 20,000 people lost their jobs for 
supporting communism, which considerably weakened the power of 
communist/socialist parties, labour movements and the left wing media campaigns in 
post-war Japan (Allinson 2004: 55).
As discussed in the later sections, the legacies of the US occupation highly 
influenced the post-war planning development in Japan. With regard to Japan’s 
international relations, the alliance with the USA established the ‘San Francisco 
System’, in which Japan signed the peace treaty in San Francisco in 1951 with forty- 
eight nations, but not with the USSR and China. San Francisco System cemented 
Japan’s position as a member of the capitalist block against the communist block in 
the new international order of the Cold War. In this order, Japan’s role became 
strengthening its capitalist economy in Asia where the US wanted to eliminate 
communist influences in the region. Simultaneously, the US occupation helped to 
ascertain so-called ‘the 1955 System’ for the next sixty years, which secured the 
hegemony of Japan’s conservative and business elites led by the Liberal Democratic 
Party (LDP) and the bureaucracy around 1955 (Hane 2001). The two established 
structures flaming Japan’s international and domestic politics had a significant effect 
on both its discourse on the public interest and planning development thereafter in 
Japan.
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4.2 The Failure of Japan’s Post-war Reconstruction
The war damage in Japan was extensive and far-reaching. Almost nine million 
people were without a home before the end of the war (Dower 1999: 47-48). 
According to the Construction Ministry, the shortage of housing immediately after 
the war was 4.2 million units (Ishida 1987a: 210). The destruction of Japanese cities 
was particularly grim:
Sixty-six major cities, including Hiroshima and Nagasaki, had been 
heavily bombed, destroying 40 percent of these urban areas overall and 
rendering around 30 percent of their populations homeless. In Tokyo, the 
largest metropolis, 65 percent of all residences were destroyed. In Osaka 
and Nagoya, the country’s second and third largest cities, the figures 
were 57 and 89 percent (Dower 1999: 45-46).
Despite the severity of the war destruction, SCAP was very indifferent to Japan’s 
reconstruction (Ohmoto 1991: 158). There was an instruction by the US government 
that the Supreme Commander did not have obligation to maintain any particular 
standard of living for the Japanese 26(United States. Department of State 1969). As a 
result, even several years after the war, millions of Japanese suffered from hunger 
and thousands of them died of starvation27 (Dower 1993: 228; Tipton 2001: 144). 
No financial support or professional advice was available from SCAP for the
Oftreconstruction plan . The entire responsibility for the post-war reconstruction was 
left to the Japanese government.
26 Report by the State-War-Navy Coordinating Subcommittee for the Far East. Policy With Respect 
to Relief in Japan, SWNCC 107/1, Washington, 1 October 1945, p731
27 In contrast, Germany received substantial financial assistance under the Marshall Plan. This plan 
was implemented to counter communist challenges in Europe.
Stem, Susan. 2006. Marshall Plan 1947-1997: a German view German Embassy's Department for 
Press. Information and Public Affairs, 2006 [cited 16 February 2006]. Available from 
http://www.germany-info.org/relaunch/culture/history/marshall.html.
28 In Germany, German, French and American planners offered advice for the German reconstruction 
plans (Diefendorf, 2003: 220-222).
132
Uncompleted reconstruction plans
Japanese planners, particularly in Tokyo led by Ishikawa Hideaki (1893-1955), had 
already prepared a post-war reconstruction plan for cities prior to Japan’s surrender, 
as they believed that cities would play a key role for Japan’s development in future 
(Koshizawa 1991). The War Damage Rehabilitation Agency of Japan (WDRA, 
sensai fukkdin) was set up in December 1945 and Kobayashi Ichizo (1873-1957), 
who had been the president of Hankyu Railway Company and had successfully 
developed some of the first garden suburbs in Japan, was appointed as its director. 
The Basic Policies of War Damage Rehabilitation Plan, approved in the parliament 
on 30th December 1945, was comprehensive, including measures to geographically 
redistribute the population and industries over the big conurbations areas, using 
detailed regional plans. (Koshizawa 1991; Tiratsoo 2002: 49).
The reconstruction plan also included guidelines on design, designating road width 
and provisions for open spaces (Tiratsoo 2002: 49). For example, the width of 
arterial roads was set to be no less than 50 meters in big cities (ibid). The Tokyo 
1946 Reconstruction Plan also proposed seven 100 meters-width roads to make up a 
ring road system around the capital city (Koshizawa 1991). It even incorporated a 
green belt idea to prevent the further urban sprawl of unplanned development in 
Tokyo (Koshizawa 1991; Tokyo. Metropolitan Government 1994: 56). The Tokyo 
plan was influenced by the 1943 Abercrombie’s Greater London Plan, remodelling 
Japan’s capital city into a more desirable urban form (Tokyo. Metropolitan 
Government 1994: 56).
Notwithstanding the initiatives, those Japanese planners could not materialise their
initial reconstruction ideas. Although a number of local cities like Nagoya, Sendai
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and Hiroshima were partly successful in building boulevards under the leadership of 
their mayors, the majority of 115 war-damaged cities failed to follow the original 
reconstruction plans (Japan. Ministry of Construction 1954: 9). The Tokyo War 
Damage Rehabilitation Plan was never fully implemented, and its projects only 
resulted in small land adjustment programs, notably in front of railroad stations 
(Koshizawa 1991: 224). It is also noted that although the majority of blitzed cities 
outside Tokyo was able to build a number of arterial roads in the city centre, even 
these cities were not successful in building green belts and parks, ending up with 
only 10 percent provision of the original targets (Sorensen 2002: 162). The lack of 
orchestrated efforts for reconstruction took a heavy toll on planning development in 
post-war Japan.
The non-existence of a new statutory planning framework
Although the failure of the reconstruction plan was often explained by a lack of 
financial resources (Koshizawa 1991; Tokyo. Metropolitan Government 1994), an 
ultimate reason for its failure can be found in the absence of effective legal 
enforcement tools which are essential to materialise such an ambitious plan. Even 
though there were various land-use controls, no new planning laws were created until 
1968. The Land Policy Section of the Land Bureau of the WDRA had a temporary 
nationalisation plan of land parcels which were designated for urban development, 
under the condition that the state would issue interest-bearing certificates to the 
landowners and sell the land parcels back to the original owners after the designated 
areas were to be redeveloped by the government through the land adjustment scheme 
(Ishida 2003; Ohmoto 1991). However, the Finance Ministry rejected this idea in
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March of 1946, reasoning that there were no financial resources to carry out this plan 
(ibid).
In 1947, under the short-lived coalition government (May 1947-March 1948) led by 
a JSP leader, the staff of the Land Policy Section drafted a bill for urban land law, 
modelled on the 1947 British Town and Country Planning Act. This bill aimed to 
control the value of urban land according to land-use plans (Ishida 2003; Ohmoto 
2000). The planners of the Land Bureau believed that this bill would pass in 
parliament when the radical agricultural land reforms would be implemented 
(Ohmoto 1991). However, the bill was not even discussed in parliament, because the 
officials of the Land Bureau expected disapproval of cabinet members, many of 
whom would see it as too radical for Japan (Ohmoto 1991). Thus, two attempts to 
temporarily nationalize development rights failed to materialise.
There was another attempt to amend the 1919 City Planning Act in response to the 
recommendations of the Shoup Mission, which emphasised the importance of 
autonomy of the local tax system in order to promote local self-government in Japan 
(Steiner 1954). In pre-war Japan, the Home Ministry had controlled planning. In 
order to promote democracy in Japan, the Mission considered it necessary to hand 
over the jurisdiction of planning to local governments, by strengthening the financial 
power of municipalities (ibid). However, this suggestion was not implemented either. 
Although the Construction Standard Act (Kenchiku Kijun Ho) was amended in 1950 
to act as a building code, the 1919 City Planning Act was not altered duly30 (Ishida
29 Ishida believed that the draft was never finalised so that it was not submitted to the parliament 
(Ishida, 2003: 37).
30 According to Ishida, it is still not clear why the amendment of the 1919 City Planning Act failed.
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1987a). Accordingly, post-war planning was conducted within the old statutory 
framework up to 1968.
To reconstruct severely damaged cities, a solid statutory foundation is essential, as 
reconstruction requires extensive restrictions of property rights (Diefendorf 2003: 
220). Furthermore, the failure in creating a new planning framework also meant that 
the central bureaucracy, in particular civil engineering experts, continued to exercise 
strong control over planning at the municipality level (Ishimaru 2003: 93). Within 
this context, the continuation of the old planning framework in Japan put three 
structural constraints on its reconstruction. First, local governments had no statutory 
or financial power to implement effective development controls. Second, local needs 
tended to be ignored because of the centralisation of planning management. Finally, 
as planning expertise remained in central government, only a small number of 
planning professionals worked for local governments to lead reconstruction plans. In 
the next section, I examine how the absence of local planning power affected Japan’s 
post-war reconstruction.
The lack of local autonomy in planning
The lack of local initiatives appears to be one of the major explanations for the 
failure of Japan’s reconstruction plan. In pre-war Japan, the level of local autonomy 
was very limited31; the Home Ministry was responsible for planning and housing 
policy as a national matter. Because SCAP considered the Home Ministry as the 
central organ of Japan’s authoritarian state, it stripped the Ministry of its power by 
means of the 1946 Constitution and the 1947 Local Autonomy Law. However, when
31 For example, prefectural governors, mayors and local public servants were appointed by central 
government.
Japanese bureaucrats translated the draft of the Constitution from English into 
Japanese, they diluted the original intention of SCAP by replacing words, by which 
the central bureaucracy still could exercise its power (Dower 1999: Ch. 13; Takemae, 
Ricketts, and Swann 2002).
In pre-war years, a political scientist, Minobe Tatsukichi (1873-1948), argued that in 
theory the power of local authority was delegated from the nation-state, so that the 
role of the local government was merely as a national agent (Takemae, Ricketts, and 
Swann 2002: 302-303). This ideology had a strong influence on the development of 
local autonomy in Japan. The central bureaucracy firmly resisted delegating 
planning power to local government, as recommended by SCAP (Steiner 1954). The 
major reasons for the objection put forward by the central bureaucracy were the 
following: (1) a lack of human resources in local administrations; (2) the 
decentralisation of planning to municipalities would be insufficient unless regional 
plans are provided; (3) local politicians might obstruct the objectives of planning 
(Ishida 2003: 36). However, these deficiencies of local governments are the impacts 
of centralisation of planning power in pre-war Japan. Failing to establish local 
autonomy, planning affairs became increasingly integrated into national long-term 
economic development plans and separated from the other important planning issues 
that localities may be confronted with.
The absence of housing reconstruction initiatives
Another explanation for the uncompleted reconstruction is the attitude of Japanese
planners towards the coordination of land-use and housing. This is also related to the
ideologies of the Japanese establishment about the role of the state to its citizenry.
While Japanese planners had already started to create the War Damage
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Rehabilitation Plan prior to Japan’s surrender, this plan failed to include a housing 
reconstruction plan (Ohmoto 1991: 149). In 1980, when Professor Ohmoto Keino 
interviewed Ohashi Takeo, who was Director of Planning of the WDRA in 1945, and 
asked him why the WDRA did not have the bureau of housing, Ohashi answered as 
follows:
Ohmoto: The war destructed cities; it means that people’s home were
destroyed. Although great many civilians suffered from the loss of 
housing, was there no state initiative for housing reconstruction at the 
time of formation of the War Damage Rehabilitation Agency?
Ohashi: There was no plan for housing.
Ohmoto'. When civilians lost homes by the bombing, did the 
government see it as individuals’ responsibility to rebuild their own 
homes?
Ohashi'. During the period, everybody managed to do so. When 
people were able to build homes on their own, they picked up burnt 
galvanised iron boards, which were available everywhere, and used them 
for building houses. Some converted trench buildings into homes. 
National politics did not cover to that extent; (because) the situations 
were different on localities. It should be the matter of local 
administrations.
(Ohmoto 1991: 149-150)
This dialogue well illustrates the ideology of self-help, which permeated pre-war
education and welfare policies in Japan. Although Ohashi claimed that the Welfare
Ministry should have been responsible for providing housing for the homeless, there
were no sufficient welfare benefits to cover such a large number of the homeless in
Japan during this period. Instead, the Japanese government urged thrift and hard
work to make people thrive and care for themselves .
32 This ideology is reflected in Emperor Hirohito’s statement during the food crisis on 24th May 
1946: ‘I hope that everyone will carry out the beautiful tradition of our country, namely the family 
state, in coping with the situation, forgetting individual selfish desires and striving ahead on the path 
of reconstructing the country.’ (Dower 1999: 264). The LDP’s policy chief, Kamei Shizuka used the 
same phrase ‘beautiful tradition of our country’ regarding children taking care of their parents when
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In addition to this, Kawashima Hiroshi, who was in charge of drafting the Public- 
Operated Housing Law (Kdei Jutaku Ho) in 1951 at the Construction Ministry , 
explained the role of public housing as follows, when he was questioned why it did 
not target at the most needed:
Ignoring the poor... It was the choice to be made. There was a big 
shortage of housing; we had to tackle it anyway. If we had ignored the 
people who were able to contribute to Japan’s reconstruction and given 
the priority to people who would just be baggage [a burden for the state], 
that reconstruction would not go anywhere. Public housing should exist 
to support households which could contribute to Japan’s reconstruction 
in the future, shouldn’t it? (Ohmoto 1991: 275-276; translated by 
Waswo 2002: 53)
The role of Japan’s public housing was very different from that in Western Europe 
and the USA. Its main aim was to provide housing for ‘wage earners of the middle 
and lower classes who need their homes’ (Japan. Ministry of Construction. Housing 
Bureau 1953: 20). Although the Housing Bureau set rents lower than the market 
price34 (Japan. Ministry of Construction. Housing Bureau 1953), the rents were still 
too high for citizens in low income groups during the reconstruction period. After a 
struggle between the Construction Ministry and the Welfare Ministry about who was 
responsible for public housing, the Construction Ministry was given responsibility to 
consolidate housing policy administration (Ohmoto 1991). As a result, the housing 
issue became separated from social policy in Japan, and the goal of housing policy
he opposed to the introduction of the Long Term Care Insurance Law (2000) in 1999. Osawa, Mari. 
2005. Comparative social policy systems from a gender perspective. Social Science Japan Journal 
31:9-13., p.12.
33 The War Damage Rehabilitation Board merged with the Public Works Bureau of the Home 
Ministry as the Construction Board (became the Construction Ministry in the same year) after the 
Home Ministry was dismantled in 1948.
34 The central government usually subsidises half the construction cost of public-operated housing 
built by local governments. The rent was calculated in such a way that the part of the expenses borne 
by the local government could be repaid over a long period (Japan. Ministry of Construction. 1953: 
22).
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shifted to the production of a sufficient number of housing units through the market 
mechanism (Honma 1987; Waswo 2002).
Furthermore, as the Public-Operated Housing Law was only introduced in 1951, the 
reconstruction of individual homes immediately after the war was virtually left to the 
market. The government report, Seven Years’ Housing in Japan 1945-52 shows that 
more than three million dwelling units had been constructed in 1945-1951 (Japan. 
Ministry of Construction. Housing Bureau 1953). Of these units, 77 percent was 
privately financed and only 23 percent was publicly financed (Japan. Ministry of 
Construction. Housing Bureau 1953: 8). The first White Paper on Construction in 
Japan published in 1949 accepts that approximately 70 percent of 1,120,000 housing 
units built in urban areas in the period between August 1945 and March 1949 were 
estimated to have been built by individuals that either possessed substantial wealth or
<3 r
had benefited from hyper inflation following Japan’s surrender (Honma 1987: 132).
Nonetheless, it should be noted that even state-financed housing constructed during 
1945-51 was not in reality affordable. Sixteen and a half percent of publicly 
financed dwellings were funded by means of long-term loans to individuals from the 
Housing Loan Corporation (HLC; Jutaku Kinyu Koko), which was established in 
1950 (Japan. Ministry of Construction. Housing Bureau 1953: 7). A further 10.5 
percent of the government-aided housing was built for workers in coalmine and other 
industries (Japan. Ministry of Construction. Housing Bureau 1953: 7). In fact, the 
HLC was formed to stimulate housing construction in the private sector, when the 
housing market stagnated because of the hyper-inflation (Honma 1987: 137-138;
35 This implies that people who benefited from post-war inflations were often black market profiteers 
(Waswo 2002: 50).
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Waswo 2002). The HLC’s main objective was to ‘finance the middle class in need 
of housing’ (Japan. Ministry of Construction. Housing Bureau 1953: 24), targeting at 
the people in the above average income range (Waswo 2002).
The above statistics on housing contrast starkly with the experiences of British post­
war housing construction, where only 18 percent of housing units was built by the 
private sector in the same period of 1945-51 (Ashworth 1957: 41). Even so, Japan’s 
housing statistics for April 1952 indicated that the nation still had a shortage of 3.2 
million dwellings (Japan. Ministry of Construction. Housing Bureau 1953: 10). This 
led the Japanese government to take further steps towards the supply of housing, 
establishing the Japan Housing Corporation (JHC, Nihon Jiitaku Kodan) in 1955. 
However, the target of the JHC was again ‘the middle class’ (Waswo 2002). 
Furthermore, the effect of its housing supply remained insignificant compared to the 
provision by the private sector (Honma 1987). As a result, the majority of the post­
war housing supply, in particular for the growing urban population and the poor, 
ended up falling under the responsibility of private developers.
Neglected citizens
Facing an unprecedented challenge, what was absent from Japan’s reconstruction
process was the voice of ordinary people. As described earlier, Japan’s
reconstruction plan looked magnificent on paper. However, although the plan had
boulevards and plazas, no attention was paid to mushrooming black (illegal) markets
in front of railway stations, shanties in open spaces (Hasegawa 2003: 76-79; Tiratsoo
2002: 54), nor was there consideration for the need for actual housing to
accommodate the huge number of homeless people. In the situation of sheer
destitution and starvation in the period immediately after the war, it was shelters
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what citizens needed most. However, Japanese planners were so out of touch with 
the reality of reconstruction.
Although both the Japanese media and planners had acknowledged the importance of 
a comprehensive reconstruction plan (Tiratsoo 2002: 49-51), planners did not gain 
enough support, neither from the administration nor from the general public (Ishida 
1987a: 227-233; Tiratsoo 2002: 52-56, 94-95). There is a view, however, that 
planners failed to acknowledge the merits of educating people about the necessity of 
planning (Sorensen 2002: 338; Tiratsoo 2002: 54-56, 94-95). Councillors could have 
acted on the behalf of local residents during this period; however, they did not take 
initiatives, given that the Home Ministry and Local Town Planning Committee 
(LTPC) still controlled planning policies since pre-war times (Tiratsoo 2002). The 
central bureaucracy doubted not only the ability of local governments in formulating 
plans, but also questioned the capacity of citizens to participate in planning, as they 
believed that ordinary Japanese citizens had ‘extremely low cultural standards’ to 
accommodate democracy (Tiratsoo 2002: 54). As a result, there were no extensive 
open debates with the public on how Japanese cities should be rebuilt.
Despite SCAP’s ambitious post-war reforms in Japan, the reconstruction plan did not 
produce any considerable improvements in the war-torn Japanese cities. There was 
no system to take account of what citizens wanted for reconstruction. Instead, 
dramatic shifts in Japan’s politics in the wake of the war shaped the concepts of the 
public interest and planning culture, which has had pervasive influence on post-war 
planning policies in Japan. The next section looks at politics immediately after the
36 The structure and role of the pre-war LTPC is very similar to the contemporary City Planning 
Council in Japan. Each LTPC consisted of officials and councillors from municipal and prefectural 
governments, academics and business elites in the area (Tiratsoo, 2002: 54). It served directly under a 
prefectural governor and thus bypassed the local assembly when authorising planning decisions.
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war to explore why the public interest was never discussed in the process of the 
reconstruction plan in Japan.
4.3 Politics of Post-war Reconstruction
While there were financial and institutional difficulties about Japan’s reconstruction 
plans, the important issue was why citizens did not dispute the public interest in its 
reconstruction planning. As discussed so far, Japanese people had to endure 
immeasurable hardship in the wake of the war although they were given civil, 
political and social citizenship to challenge unjust planning policies. The major 
reason lies in Japan’s domestic politics which was significantly affected by the US’s 
international relations during the occupation period. Because of this change, despite 
positive effects of SCAP reforms on Japanese society, not all of them worked to 
transform the public interest discourse and planning policy in Japan into more 
democratic one. This section discusses Japan’s political economy during the 
reconstruction era, which structured subsequent planning development and the public 
interest discourse.
The elite and reconstruction
Instead of focusing on the reconstruction of destructed cities and housing, the 
government reconstruction efforts were exclusively concentrated on the 
rehabilitation of industries. The priority was clearly stated in Seven Years ’ Housing 
in Japan 1945-52 by the Construction Ministry as follows:
With 2.650,000 units damaged and burnt down, the urban dwelling 
standard became wretchedly low. In the cities, construction of housing 
on a large scale was an immediate need.
For Japan’s reconstruction and economic recovery, it was necessary, first 
of all, to consider the rehabilitation of the demolished key industries.
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In order to attain this objective with insufficient funds and materials, a 
strict rationing system was necessary. Construction of non-essential and 
non-urgent building was restricted in 1947, with a view to securing the 
rehabilitation of factories and, secondarily, the construction of dwellings.
As a matter of fact, however, the number of houses built was limited 
because of the small quantity of materials allocated for housing 
construction, and the floor area per unit was restricted to 40 square 
meters (Japan. Ministry of Construction. Housing Bureau 1953: 7).
In fact, as much as 20 percent of the national budget was allocated to industry-related 
expenditures in 1946 (Tabb 1995: 175).
While the state concentrated on the recovery of industries, Kobayashi Ichiz5 of the 
WDRA firmly believed that the private sector should be responsible for the efficient 
supply of required housing (Kobayashi 1946). Even so, Kobayashi considered the 
need to temporarily nationalise urban land for reconstruction, as he learnt difficulties 
of planning without land-use controls from his previous experiences with railway 
construction (Kobayashi 1946).
Kobayashi also insisted that the local government should take an initiative for the 
reconstruction of war-damaged areas, because conditions and needs for 
reconstruction differed between localities (Asahi Shimbun 1945). He claimed that 
planning should not be conducted by the central government bureaucracy as was the 
case in pre-war Japan, but through the initiatives of citizens and local leadership 
(Kobayashi 1946). However, with little planning expertise within local governments 
(Ohmoto 1991) and the dissolution of the Home Ministry, no government bodies 
could organise appropriate planning projects in this crucial period for reconstruction.
Moreover, the then Prime Minister, Yoshida Shigeru (1878-1967), was 
unsympathetic to the homeless, commenting on housing reconstruction as follows:
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Even a badger makes a hole to sleep there. So, citizens should manage to 
find their own homes. The state has no responsibility for housing 
(Ohama 1994a: 238).
Kobayashi’s strong commitment to the private sector and Yoshida’s arrogance as a 
conservative leader reveals the underlying attitudes and beliefs that explain the lack 
of state initiatives for Japan’s reconstruction planning. However, it was political 
economy which prevented planning from being more accountable to its citizenry as 
explained in the next section.
The rise and fall of civil society
What made it possible for the pre-war Japanese planning system to survive without 
any amendments until 1968? This can be partly explained by the lack of counter 
forces, which would have challenged the objective of Japanese planning. In fact, 
Japan’s civil society had already been ripe for social democracy in the 1920s (Dore 
1984; Gordon 1991; Smethurst 1986). Social movements, which demanded full 
citizenship of industrial workers, tenant farmers, women and minorities, forced the 
government and firms to pledge social reforms (Hane 2001: 224-234). Although the 
active social movements were suppressed by the subsequent rise of militarism (Dore 
1984; Hane 2001; Smethurst and University of California. Center for Japanese and 
Korean Studies 1974), their spirit was revived again immediately after the war, 
facing harsh living conditions brought upon the population by the surrender. Food 
shortage was still severe in May 1946. Agricultural production was disrupted during 
the war, because the food rationing machinery did not work properly. As a result, 
there were rumours that 10 million Japanese would starve to death that year (Iokibe 
1997). Hyper inflation continuously decreased the value of Yen, having a grim
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impact on real wages and savings of people. The consequences of the prolonged war 
were particularly savage for Japanese commoners.
Against this background, mass demonstrations grew immediately after the surrender 
(Oppler 1976: Ch. 16). On 1st May 1946, the first May Day after World War II, half 
million Japanese gathered at the Imperial Plaza in Tokyo; the number of participants 
amounted to at least 1.25 million in other major cities (Dower 1999: 261). The then 
Prime Minister Yoshida recalled that ‘Japan was submerged under a sea of red flags’ 
(Yoshida 1961: 75). On 19th May 1946, quarter million gathered again and 
demanded food, calling it ‘Food May Day’. Yoshida referred to the demonstrators as 
a ‘mob’ (Yoshida 1961: 226). In the same year, labour disputes intensified and there 
were 622 labour strikes (Ishikawa 1995: 37). Yoshida named the leaders of the 
labour movements as ‘mob’ again in a radio broadcast on New Year Day of 1947, 
caused public outrage (Ishikawa 1995: 37).
The idea of a revolution from below spread among the Japanese working class during 
this period. On 21st January 1947, six million workers prepared for a general strike 
(Cohen and Passin 1987: 285). However, the revival of Japanese civil society, the 
vigour of freedom of speech in the early occupation period, was seriously curtailed 
after the series of mass demonstrations in Japanese cities. What surprised Japanese 
people was that General Mac Arthur, who led SCAP reforms and therefore was very 
popular among Japanese commoners (Dower 1999), warned about the mass protests 
as follows:
the growing tendency towards mass violence and physical processes of 
intimidation, under organized leadership, present a grave menace to the 
future development of Japan (Dower 1999: 265).
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This lessened the pressures for the Japanese government to take vigorous actions for 
strengthening social citizenship which could have been materialised by 
reconstruction planning. This in particular applied to the provision of public housing, 
which was primary concerns for European states immediately after the war 
(Ashworth 1957; Harloe 1995). Limiting labour rights and the discouragement of 
left-wing ideas in Japan as imposed by SCAP, significantly hampered the subsequent 
development of Japanese civil society (Dower 1999; Oppler 1976: Ch. 16).
Agricultural land reforms
The agrarian land reforms are considered to be ‘one of the most ambitious and 
successful programmes’ in the promotion of economic democracy in post-war Japan 
(Takemae, Ricketts, and Swann 2002: 339). The agrarian landlord class was seen 
as ’parasites’, benefiting from the hard work of tenant farmers by charging extremely 
high tenancy rates in pre-war Japan (Dore 1984; Kawagoe 1992). Because SCAP 
believed that economic inequality made Japan being a totalitarian regime (Dore 
1984), the reform of the tenancy system was SCAP’s prime strategy to wipe out the 
root of Japan’s ‘vice’. The reforms successfully transferred nearly 70 to 80 percent 
of village landlords’ farmland to its former cultivators (Kawagoe 1992: 195). 
Farmland under tenancy decreased from roughly 46 percent in 1941 to only 9 percent 
by 1955 (Kawagoe 1992: 195-196). The land reforms and the revision of the tax 
system37, which introduced high progressive income tax rates, increased the 
purchasing power of commoners and thus created a large domestic market in Japan.
37 A new tax system was in force as of 1 August 1953, based on the Recommendation of the Shoup 
Mission. The highest national income tax bracket became 65 percent. This progressive tax system 
was a major reason for Japan’s egalitarian income distribution up to the 1970s. Afterwards, Japan’s 
tax rate became less progressive by gradually lowering tax rate for high-income earners.
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Thus the reforms significantly lifted the majority of the Japanese out of poverty and 
formed the foundation of egalitarian society in post-war Japan.
However, the success of the agrarian land reforms inadvertently contributed to 
taming the previously radical tenant farmers who had demanding full citizenship to 
the state (Dore 1984; Hane 2003; Smethurst 1986). Whereas the urban population 
played a leading role in establishing social democracy and advancing citizenship in 
twentieth century Europe (Geary 1981; Hinton 1983), it would have been the 
previously exploited tenant farmers who could have been at the forefront of such 
social movements in Japan. In 1945, the rural population still represented 72.4 
percent of the population in Japan (Japan. Ministry of Construction 1954: 2). 
Nonetheless, when the discontent of the rural population was pacified by the success 
of the agrarian land reforms, Japan’s relatively small urban population was unable to 
gather sufficient strength to challenge the absence of effective reconstruction 
planning, especially given the constraints onto labour rights, SCAP’s censorship of 
left-wing media and the persecution of left wing individuals (Allinson 2004; Dower 
1999; Takemae, Ricketts, and Swann 2002). Thus the land reforms hardly 
contributed to improve the living condition of city dwellers.
Prime Minister Yoshida’s words accurately explain the trade-off between the land 
reforms and social democracy in the reconstruction period as follows:
The population in the rural districts had in the meantime remained 
relatively calm in the face of the mounting unrest in the cities, and gave 
the impression on eyeing the burgeoning agitation in the urban areas with 
distrust and disapproval. One does not care to think what would have 
happened had events taken another course and if the farmers had made 
common cause with the city crowds. Again if at that time the 
Government had failed to carry out a thorough agricultural land reform, 
and aroused discontent in the rural areas, the result would have been 
incalculable (Yoshida 1961: 200).
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Indeed, the farming population turned to be the major supporters of the conservative 
LDP in later years.
Renewed conservative regime
Despite SCAP’s original intent, politics in contemporary Japan seem to be far 
removed from and not in the interest of ordinary people. For example, a 1978 poll 
conducted by Asahi newspaper poll showed that 63 percent of Japanese citizens 
eligible to vote regarded politics as irrelevant, not close to them (Chapman 1991: 
148). A 1996 International Social Survey Programme about the role of the 
government revealed that almost 67 percent of the Japanese respondents disagreed 
with the statement that politicians tried to keep promises which they had made during 
the elections; in fact, 47 percent of the Japanese respondent answered ‘strongly 
disagree’ (Zentralarchiv fuer Empirische Sozialforschung 2000: 86). Furthermore, in 
the same survey, 73 percent of the Japanese respondents indicated that they believed 
that even the best politician was unable to have much impact on society because of 
the way government operated and 44 percent ‘strongly agreed’ with this statement 
(Zentralarchiv fuer Empirische Sozialforschung 2000: 78). While political apathy is 
a growing phenomenon, common in many mature democracies (Palma 1970), the 
level of indifference, disappointment and even aversion to politicians and the 
political system in Japan is highly significant, compared to situations in other states 
(Richardson 1997: 22-26). As such, Japanese people’s view on politics is very much 
at odds with the objective of SCAP reforms to cultivate democracy in post-war 
Japan.
However, party politics in Japan was in fact remarkably revitalised by SCAP reforms
immediately after the war, following a long period of ideological suppression during
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the pre-war and inter-war period (Dower 1999; Stockwin 1982; Takemae, Ricketts, 
and Swann 2002). As a result of growing political activities, the first national 
election after the surrender in April 1946 was a remarkable success: a total of 257 
parties participated in the elections, in which 39 women gained seats for the first time 
in parliament (Takemae, Ricketts, and Swann 2002 263-265). Furthermore, the 
Socialists won 92 seats, the Cooperatives obtained 14 seats, and a further 83 
independent candidates became the member of the parliament (MP) in this election 
(Takemae, Ricketts, and Swann 2002: 265). In addition, grassroots political 
activities -  civil society - also revitalised after the war (Dower 1999: 240-244; 
Yamamoto 2004). Ordinary people such as students, housewives, nurses and 
teachers spontaneously formed associations to claim their demands for building ‘a 
democratic society’ (ibid). People actively engaged in discussions of politics in 
newspapers and on the radio (Dower 1999: 242-244). Japan’s democracy entered 
into a completely new era.
However, as the Cold War tension rose, the growing popularity of left-wing
ideologies, in particular those of the socialist and communist parties in the wake of
the war, were seen as a threat by the US and the conservative elite (Allinson 2004;
Dower 1999; Takemae, Ricketts, and Swann 2002). This concern resulted in
banning ‘door-to-door campaigning, signature drives, polling, providing food or
drink, mass meetings, parades, unscheduled speeches, multiple campaign vehicles,
and candidate produced literatures’ for election campaigns (Hrebenar 1992: 47).
Furthermore, the period for election campaigns was shortened to only 15 days
(Chapman 1991: 153). Such tight controls over election campaigns originated from a
law enacted in 1924 when the Japanese authorities were alarmed by small radical
socialist parties (Hrebenar 1992). As a consequence of these controls, election
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campaigns became one of the most tightly regulated areas in post-war Japan (Park 
2000: 122) as well as the most restrictive in the democratic world (Hrebenar 1992: 
47-49).
Furthermore, after the Korean War, the USA became responsible for Japan’s national 
security, and started supporting the LDP by providing financial assistance, running 
media campaigns and offering intelligence in order to weaken challenges from the 
left (Schaller 1997; Takemae, Ricketts, and Swann 2002)38. The USA also 
strengthened the power of the bureaucracy and the zaibatsu. For example, the MITI 
was created in 1949 to ease Japan’s re-entry to the world market, and the US 
recommended Japan to weaken the government’s control of zaibatsu (Takemae, 
Ricketts, and Swann 2002: 469). These policy changes not only brought back the 
power of bureaucracy and zaibatsu, but strengthen the old power’s influence in 
policy-making in the absence of military institutions (Johnson 1982; Takemae, 
Ricketts, and Swann 2002).
Besides, deeply divided within the parties over ideological positioning, both the 
socialist and the communist party failed to convince Japanese voters of their ability 
to formulate effective policies in the process of Japan’s reconstruction (Berton 1992: 
118-123; Stockwin 1992: 88-93). This also gradually alienated ordinary Japanese 
citizens, in particular urban voters, from politics. On the other hand, the farming 
population came to exert a significant influence on policy-making in post-war Japan 
(McCormack 2001: Ch.3; Richardson 1997: 155-162). The LDP won over this 
majority group adopting populist policies in Japan’s national politics (Calder 1988;
38 For example, the Central Intelligence Agency offered 2 to 10 million US Dollars a year to LDP 
funds in the 1950 and 60s (Schaller 1997: 136).
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Pempel 1982). As a result, with the support of business interests (both large firms 
and small businesses), the LDP can maintain the hegemony in post-war Japan for 
next sixty years (ibid).
The conservative rule supported by the rural population had significant implication 
on Japan’s post-war planning policies. The MPs from rural constituencies were able 
to ‘buy’ their electorates, by promising public works (infrastructure development 
projects) to economically lagging peripheries (Igarashi and Ogawa 1997; Woodall 
1996). Such planning decisions were often made and coordinated between MPs, 
businesses (mainly construction firms) and some fairly well organised interest groups, 
such as farmers’ co-operatives, all within the framework of national economic 
development (Calder 1988: Ch.6; McCormack 2001: Ch.l; Mulgan 2002; Woodall 
1996). Farmers in urban fringes also successfully defended their interests against 
land-use controls and higher landholding tax by using their political bargaining 
power (Calder 1988: 406-410; Hebbert and Nakai 1988). Their successful lobbying 
in the end made many planning control tools became virtually ineffective (Hebbert 
1994; Hebbert and Nakai 1988).
Although SCAP reforms created the basis of a new ‘pluralist’ regime in post-war 
Japan by empowering commoners, the electorates who failed forming a strong 
interest group became increasingly marginalised in policy-making. While the 
working classes were able to participate policy-making debates through labour 
unions (Garon and Mochizuki 1993b), minorities and women did not succeed in 
promoting their interests effectively in parliament debate (Upham 1993b). The 
condition also applied to urban voters, whose interests would often require 
sophisticated policy coordination such as regulating land-use and mitigating social
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changes along with urbanisation. Therefore, urban voters could not influence 
planning policy-making to a satisfactory degree. This resulted in confining the 
debate about the pubic interest in planning to specific concerns of powerful interest 
groups.
4.4 The Development of Japan’s Post-War Planning Model
The Idea o f  Comprehensive Development (Sogo Kaihatsu no Koso, 1954), published 
by the predecessor of the Economic Planning Agency (Keizai Shingi-cho Keikaku- 
bu), for the first time combined national spatial plans with its long-term economic 
development plans, which became the framework of Japan’s post-war planning 
model (Shimokobe 1994; Sogo Kenkyu Kaihatsu Kiko 1996). Although the 
Comprehensive National Land Development Law came into effect in 1950 for post­
war reconstruction, the original reconstruction plans based on this law were only 
partially materialised. However, the central government vigorously implemented 
long term economic development plans during this period. The Idea o f  
Comprehensive Development set the target of GNP for 1965 aiming the full 
employment of all Japanese working population, then detailed necessary 
infrastructures such as industrial production facilities, ports, railways, roads, 
communication networks to reach this goal (Shimokobe 1994). This economic 
growth centred infrastructure planning re-defined the role of planners and land-use 
planning in Japan.
Re-emergence of the post-war developmental state
Although the Idea of Comprehensive Development did not detail spatial planning, 
two economic plans, the New Long-Run Economic Plan (Shin Choki Keizai Keikaku,
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1958-62) and the Plan to Double Individual Income (Shotoku Baizo Keikaku, 1960- 
70) underpinned Japan’s growth-pole economic development plans which aimed to 
concentrate strategic (heavy and chemical) industries and necessary infrastructures in 
the Pacific Belt region (Sogo Kenkyii Kaihatsu Kiko 1996). Based on these plans, the 
Ministries of Construction, Transport, Industry and Trade, and Agriculture all 
implemented some form of planning policy to enhance economic development. 
While the Home Ministry had coordinated planning policy to a certain extent in pre­
war times, during the post-war period, there was little exchange or cooperation 
between the ministries (Shindo 1995: 110-112; Woodall 1996: 63-67). In reality, 
these ministries were in competition for budgets in order to increase their own power 
in the administration (Haley 1995: 94-96; Muramatsu 1994) so that they 
independently planned numerous infrastructure developments, which were often 
overlapping projects (Igarashi and Ogawa 1997).
Local governments also fiercely competed with each other for national funds
throughout post-war years, in an attempt to seek economic prosperity for their
territories (Ohno, Sasaki, and Nakayama 1991; Samuels 1983). Here again, there
was little cooperation for infrastructure development projects except for the central
government-led regional development plans (Samuels 1983). In these project-led
planning procedures, a vertical relationship between central and local government
was maintained (Igarashi and Ogawa 1997; Ohno, Sasaki, and Nakayama 1991).
The ministries in the central government commanded a strong control over local
governments regarding the contents of planning projects, using both legal and
financial means (Samuels 1983; Steiner 1965). With such strong central government
controls, not only did local governments possess little autonomy or discretion about
planning policy decisions, but also local residents had little information or
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participation of planning policy-making. Instead, a limited number of politicians and 
interest groups had exclusive access to planning information, through their dense 
informal networks and connections with government officials (Calder 1988: Ch.6 & 
9; McCormack 2001; Woodall 1996). Those who had privileged access to policy 
decisions intervened, guided and even dominated the planning policy-making 
process and strongly influenced on the goals of planning policies in post-war Japan 
(Calder 1988: Ch.6 & 9; McCormack 2001; Woodall 1996).
More often than not, those planning projects or policy changes involved large 
construction projects which offered huge profits to constructions industries, 
developers, building material suppliers, architects, civil engineers, planning 
consultants and banks (Babb 2000; Igarashi and Ogawa 1993; McCormack 2001: 
Ch.l & 2; Woodall 1996). For those who benefited from this developmental state 
machinery, planning policy based on land-use controls, the disclosure of planning 
information, and citizen participation spoiled their monetary gains. Because of this 
interest group politics, post-war Japanese planning ended up a plethora of unrelated 
development projects initiated by ministries, local governments and government 
agencies.
The dominance of the central government in planning policy-making was also seen 
essential to the elite bureaucrats of ministries, as they firmly believed that national 
economic development was Japan’s ultimate goal as a nation with no military and 
natural resources (Castells 1992; Johnson 1982). Moreover, these central 
bureaucrats were in favour of more business involvement in planning out of concern 
for their personal careers in later years (Woodall 1996: Ch.2). As the number of top 
positions in central bureaucracy is limited, they needed to consider moving to
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government agencies or private firms as their alternative career development options 
(the behaviour is called amakudari, literally means the descendant from the heaven) 
(Colignon and Usui 2003; Inoki 1995) Firms and governmental agencies which 
benefited from spatial development projects often welcomed those former elite 
bureaucrats as executives since this liaison strengthened their link with the 
government (Woodall 1996: 67-78).
Contributions to local economies generated from development projects were also 
important to members of parliament and councillors (Babb 2000; Schlesinger 1997; 
Woodall 1996: Ch.3). Construction projects brought profit to local businesses and 
created employment, which put politicians in a powerful position to obtain votes, in 
particular in the regions where the economy lagged (Babb 2000; Calder 1988: Ch.6; 
Johnson 1986; McCormack 2001: Ch.l & 2; Schlesinger 1997). As a result, a strong 
growth coalition regime was formed centred around planning policy in the early 
post-war period, which has resisted changes up until now (Johnson 1986).
The birth of post-war planning institutions
The foundation of Japan’s post-war spatial planning dates back to the reconstruction 
era when its planning institutions, goals and relevant laws were established. First, 
whereas local governments play a minor role in planning policy-making, central 
ministries and special purpose public companies play key roles. These public 
companies are either public corporations or mixed public-private enterprises. Kddan 
(public companies), which had been set up ‘for rationing materials and products’ 
during wartime (Johnson 1982: 179), built industrial infrastructures modelling on a 
communist-type command economy in post-war years. The Fiscal Investment and
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the Loan Programme (FLIP) supplied funds to the kodan through government 
finance institutions.
Japan created numerous public companies to facilitate infrastructure development to 
enhance industrialisation (Johnson 1978). Prominent among those were the Nihon 
Doro Kodan (the Japan Highway Public Corporation) and the Nihon Toshi Seibi 
Kodan (the Housing and Urban Development Corporation), which implemented land 
developments under the supervision of the former Construction Ministry. Other 
ministries also founded a significant number of public companies to support 
development. Many public or quasi-public financial institutions such as Nihon 
Kaihatsu Ginko (the Japan Development Bank), Nor in Chukin (the central financial 
institution for agricultural, forestry and fishing co-operatives), Shoko Chukin (a 
special corporation for helping small businesses) and Yubinkyoku (the post office) 
also offered finance to developers. The public sector played a leading role in 
changing the nature of Japan’s built environment through these public companies.
In the process of creating public companies for the construction of infrastructures, 
the government strengthened the power of public companies in land acquisitions 
(Watanabe 1988). In the same manner, public companies implemented planning 
development projects such as urban regeneration, new town developments and the 
creation of New Industrial Cities (NIC) (Alden 1984; Ishida 1987a), and they 
sometimes bypassed local governments’ planning controls.
39 The FLIP manages public funds which are collected through government credit programmes such as 
postal savings and public pensions. Its origins date back to the Meiji era, when it served to 
supplement the poor tax base in pre-war Japan. The FLIP’S impact on public finance is substantial; its 
size amounting to 8 percent of GDP in 1999 (Ishi 2000: 282).
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Second, the objectives of national land use plans, in particular in early post-war years, 
served exclusively technocrat-led economic development plans. As Shimokobe 
admitted in later years, it was difficult to make national land use plans in Japan 
without the framework of ten-years economic development plans such as the Plan to 
Double Individual Income (Shimokobe 1994). Within the national spatial 
development plan, the government also facilitated three megalopolis regional 
development plans (i.e. the 1958 National Capital Region Development Plan). These 
plans designated industrial development areas in the Pacific Belt region, and 
connected these growth poles by motorways and high-speed train networks 
(Shimokobe 1994; Sogo Kenkyii Kaihatsu Kiko 1996). The idea was incorporated 
into the first Comprehensive National Development Plans (CNDP, Zenkoku Sogo 
Kaihatsu Keikaku) in 1962, followed by a second and a third one in 1969 and 1977 
{Sogo Kenkyu Kaihatsu Kiko 1996). The CNDPs also produced economic demand 
for construction-related industries by implementing infrastructure building 
programmes. Until today, five CNDPs were formulated to support Japan’s long-term 
industrial development after the war.
Finally, the distinctive origins and features of post-war planning development 
resulted in the complexity of Japanese planning legal framework. While the 1919 
City Planning Act remained unchanged until 1968, more than two hundreds planning 
related laws were added and attached to the core City Planning Act40 (Igarashi and 
Ogawa 1993). All these planning-related laws were enacted when development 
projects were designed, or specific purpose public companies were established.
40 These included such as the 1950 Comprehensive National Land Development Law and the 1956 
National Capital Region Development Law (Shutoken Seibi Ho) as upper tiers laws and the 1954 Land 
Readjustment Act (Tochi Kukaku Seiri Ho), the 1969 Urban Regeneration Act (Toshi Saikaihatsu Ho), 
and 1952 Road Act {D5ro Ho) as lower tiers laws (Igarashi 1993: 14 -17).
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The role of planners in the developmental state
Despite the utmost importance of national spatial planning in Japan’s developmental 
state, the status of planners in the government was very low or not clearly identified 
in the administration in early post-war years. In the 50th Anniversary Special Issue o f  
City Planning Review: Fifty Years o f the City Planning Institute o f  Japan 1951-2002, 
the Chief Editor, Niitani Yoji described his experience of working as a planner in the 
Construction Ministry in the 1950s as follows:
When I told an executive official in the Planning Bureau that I would like 
to work in the Bureau, he asked me, ‘Why do you want to work for the 
Planning Bureau? You could apply for a position of the Road Bureau or 
the River Bureau. Then you could be promoted to Vice Minister or 
Bureau Chief of the Ministry. If you work for the Planning Bureau, the 
highest position you could achieve would be just a chief of sections and 
thus are more likely to forego a successful career within the Ministry. Is 
it all right for you? You should consider it well.’ Nevertheless, I 
answered, ‘I would like to work as a planner even if this means that I 
have to give up a successful career.’ Certainly, this was the condition of 
planners in Japan in the 1950s whose status was not only lower than 
other administrative officers but even lower than technical officers who 
specialised in road construction and river maintenance41 (Niitani 2001a:
29).
In fact, students who were trained as planners had a hard time getting jobs not only in 
the public administration, but also in the private sector, because developers preferred 
hiring graduates who were either trained as civil engineers or architects, but not 
‘generalists’ like planners (Niitani 2001b). Above all, until very recently the 
professional status of planners was not firmly identified in Japan.
41 Among Japanese bureaucrats, ‘administrative officials’ or ‘generalists’ (jimukan) are better off than 
‘technical officials’ or ‘specialists’ (gikan) when it comes to career path prospects. (Johnson 1982: 58- 
62). As explained in Chapter 3, technological knowledge was not highly valued in the career 
development of bureaucracy, in spite of its importance to Japanese economic development. See also 
Nakayama (1984).
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According to Niitani, there were three reasons for the low status of Japanese planners. 
First of all, there were very few city planning courses available at Japanese 
universities until up to the 1960s42 (Niitani 2001a). Second, only the public 
administration was able to offer jobs to professional planners, but the posts were 
limited to national and prefectural or relatively large city governments (Niitani 
2001a). However, another important reason for planners’ low status in Japan was 
due to the redirection of Japan’s planning policy around the 1950s. As Niitani 
described that the War Damage Rehabilitation Plan projects had been curtailed by 
1950; then the budget for of the public works became increasingly spent on river 
administration and road construction, in particular after the start of Five-Year Road 
Improvement and Management Programme in 1954 (Niitani 2001a). Thus, the 
planning policy changes during this time also explain as the third reason why the role 
of planners as a coordinator of land-use has not been established in post-war Japan.
4.5 Conclusion
How have the wars, the post-war reforms and the reconstruction affected the 
subsequent development of planning and the discourse on the public interest in 
Japan? The unique nature of SCAP reforms left a distinctive imprint on Japan’s 
political, economic and social landscape. First of all, during the late US occupation 
period, the leadership of the central bureaucracy in policy-making was strengthened; 
the state’s close relationship with businesses was encouraged. The economic 
bureaucracy’s long-term economic development plans, based on infrastructure
42 The City Planning Institute of Japan (CPIJ) even submitted a petition to the relevant ministries, 
asking for the establishment of an institute of urban planning and new schools of urban planning to 
train planning professionals, because its members believed that planning in Japan was far behind from 
one in Europe and the US. As a result, the Department of Urban Engineering was founded at the 
University of Tokyo in 1962, representing Japan’s first planning school. (Niitani 2001b: 30).
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development, had a powerful impact on spatial planning in post-war Japan 
(Shimokobe 1994). The Japanese redefined the concept of economic development as 
a mean to accomplish pacifism, democracy and egalitarian society (Castells 2000; 
Johnson 1982). This belief allowed Japanese people to depart from the Japan’s 
disgraceful past. As a consequence, the discourse of economic development as the 
public interest was strongly built into post-war Japanese society.
Second, the US intervention to Japan’s politics and social movements in the late 
occupation period weakened fair development of the public sphere in the nation. 
While party politics, election campaigns and labour movements all represent 
important ingredients towards the creation of democracy, undermining the election 
campaign procedure and the US-led anti-left initiatives seriously conditioned the 
progress of Japan’s post-war democratic system. Furthermore, the infringement on 
the freedom of speech through SCAP’s censorship and the Japanese media’s self­
censorship also weakened the foundations of Japan’s liberal democracy. The 
continued reign of the Showa Emperor also contributed to the acceptance of 
authoritarian culture of pre-war Japan, thus diluted the strength of post-war 
democracy (Dower 1999: Ch. 11; Gluck 1993).
The formation of the Self-Defence Forces (jieitai) during the Korean War, which 
strongly militated against the principle of Article 9 of the Constitution43, also resulted 
in the creation of the division between of tatemae (official, public or principal) and 
honne (informal, private and real) in politics and policy-making in Japan. This
43 Chapter II Renunciation of War, Article 9 contains the following declaration: ‘Aspiring sincerely to 
an international peace based on justice and order, the Japanese people forever renounce the war as a 
sovereign right of the nation and the threat or use of force as means of settling international disputes. 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph, land, sea and air forces, as well as other 
war potential, will never be maintained. The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognised.
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division undermined the authority of the Constitution and thus the establishment of 
the rule of law in post-war Japan (Henderson 1968; Hook aild McCormack 2001; 
Stockwin 1982: Ch. 10). Although SCAP reforms did significantly contribute to the 
development of Japan as a modem state, the reforms were not completely successful 
in constructing a liberal democracy as they did not lead to the meaningful 
construction of the public sphere in Japan as an open political community. As a 
consequence, Japanese citizens were unable to establish the concept of the public 
interest as a common interest in planning policy-making.
Third, Japan’s reconstmction planning also failed to incorporate the idea of social 
life as the public life. Despite of the magnitude of the war destructions, as well as 
the dynamic social changes in the wake of the war, there were only small movements 
aiming to preserve collective memoirs of the war for its victims in public spaces 
during the reconstmction period. While there were strong national movements and 
international cooperation to conserve the imprint of the tragedies caused by the 
atomic bomb in Hiroshima44 (Ishimaru 2003), there were only a small number of 
public monuments to commemorate the millions of victims of the war in Japan. This 
was partly due to the censorship implemented by SCAP, which restrained the public 
display of grievance for war destructions and death (Dower 1999: 413-419; Trefalt 
2002). Although vivid memoirs of the war dead in the Japanese mind supported its 
strong peace movements for quite some time after the war (Yamamoto 2004), these 
feelings seem to have faded away as time has gone by in the absence of sufficient 
physical and visual symbols dedicated to remembering the war tragedies. Japanese
44 Hiroshima is famous for its Peace Memorial Park with its 100-metre road and Peace Memorial 
Museum, designed by Tange Kenzo (1913-2005), one of Japan’s most famous modernist architects.
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planners failed in materialising such strong public sentiment of the time in the urban 
design.
Furthermore, it is even questionable whether Japanese planners were aware of 
necessities of such public spaces (Cybriwsky 1998; Shelton 1998). The post-war 
reconstruction was a significant opportunity for planners to demonstrate how a 
spatial plan could represent the nation’s past failure and people’s hope for future. In 
Europe, citizens were actively involved in the debate on how post-war 
reconstructions should be managed, whether to conserve heritages or build a 
completely new modem city (Cherry 1996; Diefendorf 1993; Donnison and Soto 
1980; Tiratsoo 2002). Although public participation in reconstmction plans in the 
UK was limited to comments to planning blue prints (Tiratsoo 2002: 10), German 
citizens had opportunities to incorporate their views into reconstmction design 
through various grassroots organisations (Diefendorf 1993: Ch. 9). The absence of 
such efforts in reconstmction planning in Japan reduced the power of spatial forms to 
mere design matters imposed by planners. This subsequently resulted in alienating 
ordinary citizens from participating in the creation of sociable spaces in Japan.
Finally, despite the impressive advancements of women’s rights as endorsed by the 
Constitution, the boundary of the ‘public-private’ domains in post-war Japan did not 
change very much from pre-war times. In post-war years, women were active both 
in formal and informal politics. The Constitution gave all adult Japanese women 
suffrage and the right to stand for elections. Furthermore, Japanese women 
significantly contributed to grassroots political activities such as peace movements in 
immediate post-years (Yamamoto 2004). Nonetheless, the number of female MPs 
was only substantial in the first national election after the war. Subsequently, the
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number of female politicians has continued to remain very small, both in the national 
and local assemblies.
The status of women in public domains such as in the workplace has improved very 
little, even sixty years after the Constitution declared the equal status of women and 
men in both the public and private realms. Moreover, women did not succeed in 
organising their interests as pressure groups to improve the quality of life such as 
housing during the construction era. Even the most controversial fact for women’s 
citizenship and the use of public space during the occupation period was that 
Japanese government opened ‘special official brothels’ (Tokushu Ian Shisetsu), the 
Recreation and Amusement Association where Japanese women served for the US 
occupying forces (Mackie 2003: 136-138). Such an affair symbolised the defect of 
the post-war reforms in empowering Japanese women both in public and private 
domains. This dichotomy between the public face (the Constitution) and private 
practice (reality) in gender relations also represented disillusionment in Japan’s post­
war liberal democracy. The failure in establishing women’s citizenship represents 
oppressions and the exclusion of other voices from planning policy-making in post­
war Japan.
While the demilitarisation and other post-war reforms provided promising 
foundations for Japan’s modem state, the limitations in the implementation left 
negative legacies in planning and discourse on the public interest. Not only did the 
reforms fail to transform the ideologies and institutions of Japan’s planning, they also 
reinforced the power of economic bureaucracy and businesses that deployed 
planning as a tool for economic development. The ways in which the notion of
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‘public’ was constructed during the US occupation also influenced the Japanese idea 
that ‘public’ is irrelevant with people’s lives and needs.
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Chapter Five: Planning for the Economic Miracle, 1955-2007
The period between 1955 and 1973 in Japan is often referred to as the age of 
‘economic miracle’ (Beasley 1995: Ch. 15). While Japan’s spectacular economic 
growth during this period attracted attention from all over the world, its downside 
also became apparent in the late 1960s. The Minamata pollution case informed the 
world for the first time of the tragic human cost of Japan’s economic success. 
However, pollution was only a small part of the social problems that accompanied 
Japan’s rapid economic growth. As Japan’s economic planning was tightly linked 
with spatial planning (see Chapter 4), the social cost of the economic miracle often 
appeared as negative externalities on land-use.
The purpose of this chapter is first, to describe how the idea of ‘comprehensive 
development’ proposed by the economic bureaucracy materialised as spatial planning 
in post-war Japan. Then I will discuss its impacts on the society. Section 5.1 details 
the underpinning of post-war Japanese planning as a combination of national long­
term economic development plans and spatial strategies. While this strategy created 
post-war economic success, it also resulted in a variety of market failures. Section 
5.2 examines these negative impacts of this planning strategy, with special attention 
to its environmental impact. Section 5.3 turns the attention to social movements as 
citizens’ protests against policy failures regarding environmental protection, giving a 
detailed account of the rise of autonomous civil society. Section 5.4 looks at policy 
responses to these growing citizens’ movements. Then Section 5.5 evaluates the 
impacts of these policy measures. Section 5.6 analyses ‘novel’ planning strategies of 
deregulation and private-public partnerships, which were initiated in response to 
foreign pressures as well as the emerging global economy. These new planning
policies caused excessive developments and land speculation. Combined with the 
failure in monetary policies, this situation led to the ‘bubble economy’ where the 
price of assets (in particular land) far exceeded its realistic values. The final section 
summarises planning policy development in post-war Japan from the viewpoint of 
the public interest. The narratives of Japan’s post-war planning history will provide 
contextual backgrounds for the institutional and conceptual analysis of the public 
interest presented in later chapters.
5.1 Spatial Strategies for the Economic Miracle
In order to materialise the target of economic growth for post-war reconstruction, the 
Japanese government designated key industries and their locations in national spatial 
plans. Public companies created industrial infrastructures for strategic locations, 
serving those key industries such as iron, steel, shipbuilding, oil-refinement, 
petrochemical production and machinery (Komhauser 1976: 125-133). The plans 
were to enhance the production capacity of these industries by concentrating them on 
the Pacific Belt region, which already had hosted an agglomeration of these 
companies from the pre-war period (Komhauser 1976; Sorensen 2002: 176-178). 
This growth-pole development plan became the standard recipe of Japanese national 
land planning policy (kokudo keikaku) in order to achieve ‘balanced’ national 
economic growth.
Furthermore, the state outlined three Metropolitan Regional Plans for Tokyo (1956), 
Nagoya (1966) and Osaka (1963) to promote the development of these key regions. 
Although the objectives of the national and regional plans changed over time in 
response to environmental and social problems, their central theme remained the 
pursuit of ‘economic development’.
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Moreover, in order to enhance the competitive advantage of the whole Japanese 
economy, the central bureaucracy planned to improve underperformed sectors in 
Japan’s dual economic structure in the early 1960s. Thus, the agricultural sector, 
which then still occupied more than 30 percent of Japan’s labour force, was one of 
the targeted sectors (Watanabe 1988). In order to increase the productivity of the 
agricultural sector, the central government implemented a policy to reduce the 
farming population to less than 10 percent of the labour force, by encouraging small- 
scale farmers to find jobs in industrial sectors through the 1961 B asic Law on 
Agriculture (Watanabe 1988).
When the Pacific Belt Region Development Plan successfully attracted strategic 
industries and labour to the designated urban areas on the Pacific coast, the decline of 
rural areas and diseconomies of urbanisation became apparent. Japan’s ruling 
conservative party (LDP), which relied heavily on voters in rural areas, pressed the 
public administration to alter the polarising income inequality between urban and 
rural areas (Shimokobe 1994; Sorensen 2002). As a result of this lobbying, the first 
Comprehensive National Development Plan (CNDP) was formulated in 1962 to 
address problems associated with this unbalanced development.
In an attempt to decentralise industries and control urban growth, the first CNDP 
planned to build ‘development centres’ of various scales in peripheral regions in 
order to attract industries, connecting these development centres to existing 
megalopolises with transport and communication networks. As a result, fifteen New 
Industrial Cities (NICs) were designated as development centres. However, the 
effect of these NICs was undermined, when six Special Areas for Industrial
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Concentration were designated in the Pacific Belt in 1964 in response to business 
lobbying (Sorensen 2002).
In fact, despite the objectives of the CNDP, the government kept investing heavily in 
the Pacific Belt region until the late 1960s (Glickman 1979). During the 1960s, the 
government implemented numerous urban development projects, new town housing 
projects in urban fringes, and the construction of transport infrastructures in Tokyo, 
Osaka and Nagoya. These developments completely changed the cityscapes of 
Japan’s megalopolises (Ishida 1987a; Sorensen 2002; Tokyo. Metropolitan 
Government 1994). Subsequently, regional inequality rose and urban problems 
deepened in the 1960s.
5.2 Impacts of Planning Development from 1955
Under the seemingly flourishing corporatist regime, there were groups of people who 
were excluded from Japan’s official version of affluent, egalitarian and democratic 
post-war utopia; the minorities, women workers and pollution victims were left 
behind from the nation’s prosperity (Upham 1993b). In fact, their quality of life and 
livelihoods were adversely affected by the nation’s ‘economic success’. Rapid 
spatial transformation along with industrialisation changed the way of life of 
Japanese people. As Japan’s post-war planning policy was designed for economic 
development, these people who did not benefit from Japan’s prosperity tended to 
carry the severest social cost of environmental changes. This section explains how 
the spatial strategies of Japan’s developmental state had negative impacts on the 
quality of life of its citizens.
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Uncontrolled urbanisation
While large amounts of public money were invested in the construction of road 
networks, ports, land reclamations and industrial water on the Pacific Belt region to 
attract industrial complexes, the rural population continuously migrated into the 
designated urban areas as industrial labour force. Although Japan’s urbanisation 
started in the nineteenth century, the scale and speed of rural to urban migration 
during this period of rapid economic growth far exceeded that of the previous periods. 
Between 1950 and 1970, Japan’s urban population swelled from 37.4 percent to 83.2 
percent45 (Davis 1969). Although the central government had a spatial plan for 
economic development, neither the ministries nor the local governments had detailed 
master plans for housing, life-related infrastructure provisions or specific financial 
arrangements to cope with the influx of such large migration into cities. As a result, 
the immense urbanisation occurred without appropriate development controls and 
plans for necessary service provision.
A major problem associated with this intense urbanisation was ever-increasing land 
prices, both in metropolitan areas and urban fringes. In addition, while the major 
three (residential, industrial and commercial) land price indexes continued to 
increase up to 1991, it was the residential land price of the six major metropolitan 
areas (Tokyo 23 wards, Yokohama, Nagoya, Kyoto, Osaka and Kobe) that soared the 
most in 1955-1991. It experienced a staggering 210-fold increase in value between 
1955 and 1997, while nominal GDP rose by 60-fold (Japan. National Land Agency 
1998: 94). The first wave of land inflation occurred in 1961, when the annual
45 Davis’s data for 1970 is based on estimate and uses the different sources.
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increase of land prices reached 42 percent, following the implementation of the 
National Income Doubling Plan in 1960 (Hebbert and Nakai 1988: 16).
Soaring land prices made it impossible for both the public and the private sectors to 
supply affordable housing with adequate facilities and infrastructures. This was 
inevitable because the 1919 City Planning Act did not oblige developers to provide 
even minimum infrastructures such as roads and sewages (Ohshio 1967: 64). The 
flaw with the law was such that even defect housing units were traded in the market 
under the existing planning law. In the end, the government had to provide 
necessary infrastructure to serve those ‘unfit’ housing at greater cost in later days 
(Ohshio 1967). As a result, those existing ‘better-serviced’ housing became 
expensive so that new residential developments with substandard housing units 
continued to expand further outward in search for cheap land.
Substandard housing stock
One of the most serious consequences of the absence of effective planning policies
during the era of Japan’s rapid economic growth was the accumulation of an
inadequate standard of housing stock, especially in urban areas. As explained in
Chapter 4, post-war housing reconstruction was almost entirely left to the market,
while approximately 11 million people migrated from rural to metropolitan
prefectures between 1950 and 1975 (Sorensen 2002: 174). As an effect of this, the
population of the Tokyo Metropolitan Region swelled from 13.28 million to 18.86
million just within a decade from 1955 (Tokyo. Metropolitan Government 1994: 57).
This large urban migration occurred without much planning controls and public
housing provision; thus, the newly settled young working population was only
accommodated in ‘substandard, barrack-like wooden apartments’(ibid). More than
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60 percent of all the new housing units built in Tokyo between 1961 and 1965 can be 
classified as this type of housing, forming the ‘ Cheap Wooden Apartment Belt’ (ibid). 
As a result, despite the increasing affluence of the nation in 1973, more than 30 
percent of the national housing stock was below minimum standards (Japan. Housing 
and Urban Development Corporation and Building Center of Japan 1992).
This inadequate housing stock in Japanese metropolitan areas did not completely 
disappear in the late twentieth century. Even in 1993, 319,000 housing units (7.8 
percent) did not meet the nation’s minimum housing standards, and only 40.5 percent 
of all housing units in Japan satisfied the nation’s targeted housing standards (Japan. 
Statistics Bureau 1999). The situation was worse in Tokyo. The 1993 Housing 
Survey o f  Japan showed that 15.5 percent of Tokyo’s housing stock was below 
minimum standards, and only 25.8 percent of housing in Tokyo satisfied the nation’s 
targeted housing standards (Tokyo. Metropolitan Government 1998: 27). The 
current large stock of poor housing, described as ‘densely populated wooden 
apartment buildings with extremely poor sanitary facilities and high earthquake and 
fire risks constructed side by side’ by a government report (Tokyo. Metropolitan 
Government 1994: 57), indicates persisting planning problems in many Japanese 
inner city areas.
Insufficient life-related infrastructures
Another major problem associated with Japan’s rapid urbanisation was insufficient
life-related infrastructures. This happened because the 1919 City Planning Act
lacked a development permission system and did not oblige developers to provide
adequate infrastructures. After all, Japan’s local governments ended up supplying
required infrastructures for the growing urban population, without the appropriate
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financial resources. Water, sewage, parks, schools and hospitals were all in short 
supply in these newly developed residential areas, which sprawled continuously 
outwards from the existing urban areas.
To overcome this flaw of the 1919 City Planning Act, some local governments in 
growing regions started demanding financial contributions from developers, in order 
to finance the necessary life-related infrastructures in exchange for granting building 
confirmation46 for residential developments. However, Japan’s national government 
gave guidance that local ordinances should not be ‘against national laws’. The 
guidance was interpreted as those local ordinances should not enforce stricter 
planning and environment controls than national laws (Harada 2001: 104; Harano 
1984). As a result, local governments had no other option than relying on voluntary 
agreements with developers (Takuchi Kaihatsu Shidd Y o ko f1 to control residential 
development (Chiba 1984; Harada 2001: 95-96; Kusumoto 1984). While the 1968 
City Planning Act introduced a development permission system, its effectiveness has 
been minimal (See Chapter 6). Therefore, the local autonomy about development 
control has continued to be an issue in Japanese planning.
Insufficient life-related infrastructures are a direct consequence of the
Comprehensive National Economic Development policies on land-use. In fact,
throughout the post-war years, despite huge public investment in industrial 
infrastructures, only a small budget was allocated to housing or life-related 
infrastructure development (Miyamoto 1998). While the national government
46 In Japan, the procedure for obtaining building confirmation is separated from development 
(planning) permission, since two different government commissions grant permits. See Chapter 6 and 
7 for more details.
47 Its origin was formed by Kawasaki City, adjacent to Tokyo in 1965 and the name ‘yoko’ was first 
used by Kawanishi City, neighbouring Osaka in 1967 (Harada 2001: 131-132).
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allocated 34.5 percent of the long-term public investment budget at the prefecture 
level to roads, harbours, airports, and industrial related infrastructures between 1959 
and 1964 (36.6 percent in 1965-1970), they allocated only 20.1 percent in 1959-1964 
(and 26.8 percent in 1965-1970) for planning, housing, residential land development, 
environment, water, sewage, and social welfare facilities (Miyamoto 1998: 169-173). 
While the national government redressed this imbalance in recent years, the 
government has still been criticised for spending too much on unnecessary public 
works relating industrial infrastructure building (Igarashi and Ogawa 1993; Igarashi 
and Ogawa 1997; Kerr 2001; Miyamoto 1998).
Pollution and environmental crisis
The most serious impact caused by Japan’s national land-use plans during the post­
war years was environmental hazards, some of which actually escalated to kill many 
people. Intensive industrial land use in the Pacific Belt region, encouraged by the 
government’s agglomeration policy, increased the levels of congestion and pollution. 
While pollution in urban areas was rather a market failure due to industrial areas’ 
proximities to residential areas, national land development policies, such as NICs, 
spread pollution towards the state’s designated industrial sites in rural regions.
Minamata Disease (mercury poisoning) and Itai-Itai Disease (cadmium poisoning)
are the most well known pollution cases of water contamination in Japan, caused by
highly poisonous chemical discharges from factories in rural areas. An increase in
bronchial ailments since 1959 in Yokkaichi City, where the earliest petrochemical
complexes were built, became known as Yokkaichi Asthma. These prominent
pollution cases turned out to be key environment litigation in post-war Japan. The
extensive national and international media coverage provoked the rise of citizens’
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movements in the nation. This resulted in the promulgation of the Basic Law for 
Environmental Pollution Control (Kogai Taisaku Kihon Ho) in 1967.
Except for the toxic pollution cases mentioned above, the most notable planning 
policy failure was nuisance such as noise, vibration and air pollution caused by 
Japan’s transport policy. While infrastructure building was the core strategy of 
Japan’s developmental state, its construction was carried out without any 
coordination of land-use. Development control measures such as environmental 
impact assessments on neighbouring residential areas were absent. Motorways, 
airports and train networks in Japanese urban areas were built within surprising 
proximity to residences without adequate public consultation.
The major transport networks were constructed under event-led development projects 
such as the 1964 Tokyo Olympics, the 1970 Osaka World Exposition and the 1972 
Sapporo Winter Olympics within a relatively short term. To prepare for those 
national projects and to implement the programmes of the CNDP, the Tokyo 
Expressway Public Corporation (Shuto Kosoku Doro Kodan) and the Hanshin 
Superhighway Corporation (.Hanshin Kosoku Doro Kodan) were founded for 
highway constructions (1959 and 1962 respectively). Besides, the first Bullet Train 
(shinkansen) between Tokyo and Osaka was built just before the opening of the 
Tokyo Olympics.
Facing difficulties to secure appropriate land for transport infrastructures in built-up
areas, those public enterprises constructed highways and high-speed railways at the
sacrifice of local amenities and even the residents’ health. In Tokyo, the elevated
expressways were built over existing roads, parks, river and canals (Koshizawa
1991). Likewise, in Osaka and Kobe the elevated expressways were also built in the
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same manner. One of them was constructed over the busy National Route 43 which 
is closely lined with residential developments between Osaka and Kobe. The 
construction of the elevated expressway over the National Route 43, as well as the 
operation of the bullet train in a residential area in Nagoya became environment 
litigation later as detailed in the following chapters.
Furthermore, intense urbanisation without effective planning controls led to chaotic 
land-use in many urban areas. In addition to the proliferation of urban sprawl 
without essential infrastructures, detached houses and high-rise apartments, tall 
office buildings and large-scale retail stores were often built next to each other, 
sometimes in farmland in urban fringes. Consequently, these conditions caused 
disputes between neighbours about sunlight, noise, odours, traffic and views. Open 
spaces and roads were not sufficiently supplied in Japan’s built-up areas. Moreover, 
dilapidated wooden apartments in inner cities have often remained untouched while 
the socially marginalised have continued living there. These dilapidated buildings 
became safety hazards in the event of fires and earthquakes as the 1995 Hanshin 
Awaji Earthquake proved it. The poor quality of urban life despite rising affluence 
in Japan outraged urban voters in the 1960s and 1970s. As a result, urban and 
regional problems turned out to be a major political arena of Japan during this period.
5.3 Citizens’ Movements -  In Search of the Public Interest
The pursuit of environmental justice
The cost of Japan’s economic success was recognised among Japanese citizens as 
early as the 1960s. The 1919 City Planning Act did not have any mitigating effect on 
the intensified land-use of urban Japan during the era of rapid economic growth. The
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consequences of this uncontrolled land-use and the lack of environmental protection 
apparently endangered the health and even the lives of residents from the early 1950s. 
In July 1970, 55 percent of the respondents of a newspaper poll answered that they 
suffered from some form of pollution (McKean 1981: 19). The government 
officially admitted that more than 73,000 persons could be classified as pollution 
victims and hundreds had already died from pollution by January 1979 (McKean 
1981:20).
While the state was ineffective or even ignorant of the mounting environmental crisis 
and urban problems in the early post-war years, it was citizens, many of whom 
became victims of pollution, who forced changes in Japan’s planning policy. These 
citizens had to fight against the state and industries in order to protect their lives, 
especially from serious environmental problems. Minamata Disease, Yokkaichi 
Asthma, Itai-Itai Disease in Toyama prefecture, and the second Minamata Disease in 
Niigata prefecture developed into the ‘Big Four’ pollution litigation in Japan. The 
final result of the Big Four pollution cases altered Japan’s environmental policy and 
also influenced Japanese peoples’ ideas on economic development, local politics and 
planning policy-making (Kojima and Institute of Developing Economies 1995; 
McKean 1981; Tsuru 1999).
Despite the litigation’s positive impacts on subsequent development of Japan’s 
environmental policy-making, the pollution victims of the Big Four cases had a long 
way to go before they received full compensation and recognition from the polluters 
and the state (George 2001; McKean 1981; Upham 1987). Even in the presence of 
abundant evidence showing the link between the deaths or crippled health of the 
victims and the actions of the polluters, the Japanese government (and the scientists
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who represented the state) dismissed this link for quite a long time, arguing that there 
was insufficient scientific evidence to prove causation (George 2001; Ogano 1995; 
Tsuru 1999; Upham 1987).
In the Minamata’s mercury pollution case, the Japanese government formally 
admitted that organic mercury emitted from the Chisso plant was the cause of the 
Minamata Disease in 1968, fifteen years after the disease had first been recognised 
by scientists and locals (Upham 1987). Before a faction of the Minamata patients 
group won in court to receive compensation for their damage in 1969, victims had 
been encouraged to enter a mediation process by the government-led mediation 
committee to receive small sums of money in the form of sympathy payments 
(mimaikin), even for the death of their family members (George 2001; Tsuru 1999; 
Upham 1987). Once the victims had received the money, this shattered their chances 
to pursue further legal actions against Chisso (Upham 1987). After a 43 years’ 
struggle, the Minamata's case was finally settled out of court in 1996. However, 
although both the former president and factory manager of Chisso were found guilty 
of negligent homicide in 1988 in the Supreme Court, the legal responsibility of the 
central and prefectural governments has not yet been identified in the Japanese court 
(George 2001: 266-267; Watanabe 1988; Yoshikawa 1997).
The rise of citizens’ movements
The discovery of serious pollution cases inspired Japanese citizens to act for justice
and the protection of their local environment as defending their human rights. In
1973, there were at least 3,000 jiimin undo (residents’ movements) that mobilised
residents for local concerns such as planning development disputes, protest against
pollution and demands for better public facilities (Kano 1970: 279). In addition, an
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estimated 10,000 disputes were led by those protest groups in the same year (Kano 
1970: 279). Finally, the victims of the pollution cases set up associations to demand 
compensation in court for their injuries.
Furthermore, having learnt from the previous pollution cases, residents who were 
likely to be affected by proposed industrial developments, organised protest groups 
and started fighting for their right to be informed about local environmental changes. 
They also demanded participation in planning policy-making. Social movements 
involved in environmental politics in the 1960s and the 1970s are classified into two 
groups: the first group, which acts demanding compensation is labelled as 
compensation movements,; while the second group, which protests against possible 
development, is named as environmental protection movements (Avenell 2006; 
Barrett and Therivel 1990; Lewis 1980). The Mishima-Numazu Movement in 1963- 
64 is the first residents’ movement in Japan succeeded in stopping the construction of 
an oil and chemical plant complex in its vicinity (Krauss and Simcock 1980; Lewis 
1980). Moreover, since the organisers of the Mishima-Numazu Movement 
consciously used the word shimin undo (citizens’ movement) instead of residents’ 
movement (Krauss and Simcock 1980), they helped to construct a new paradigm of 
‘the public’ in post-war Japan. Thereafter, Japan’s environmental movements 
expanded nationwide to various forms of social movements towards the 1970s.
While the Big Four pollution cases represented the evident failure of the 
government’s emission control of Japanese industries, more common pollution 
problems were caused by the lack of appropriate planning controls despite Japan’s 
mass urban migration and high population density in the metropolitan areas 
(Sorensen 2002). The complaints of urban residents were mainly about noise,
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vibrations, ground subsidence (mostly due to industrial use of underground water), 
the blockage of sunlight caused by the construction of nearby tall buildings, odours, 
air pollution due to motorisation, and overhead electric power transmission lines 
suspended by poles in dense urban areas. These complaints often developed into 
residents’ protest movements (McKean 1981). Some cases were also brought to 
court to stop new developments.
Some residents started actions beyond the protection of the existing quality of life in 
their communities: they advocated the improvement of the community environment 
by demanding physical and social infrastructures that were absent in their 
communities (Ishida 1987a). The infrastructures requested by the residents were 
playgrounds and parks, libraries, schools, nurseries, sewage systems, paved roads 
and disaster prevention systems (Ishida 1987a: 300). Due to rapid urban sprawl and 
the serious defects of Japan’s planning system, these essential facilities were neither 
properly provided by developers nor the government. Moreover, residents’ 
movements further progressed into the demand of the right to participate in the plan- 
making process. Since the 1919 City Planning Act did not include any article about 
the consultation of residents, the movements led the state to reconsider the existing 
planning laws.
The reason why citizens’ movements grew in this period was related to changes in 
the international and domestic political economy in the late 1960s. First of all, it was 
linked to worldwide social movements such as the US civil right movement. The 
experiences of Japan’s previous citizens’ movements against the renewal of the 
Security Treaty with the USA in the late 1950s also helped to form the foundation of 
environmental movements (Krauss and Simcock 1980). Second, the growth of the
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information society, in particular represented by the expansion of television networks, 
made ordinary Japanese citizens recognise the plight of the pollution victims with 
vivid visual images (George 2001). The media also informed the Japanese 
population of the explosion of global political movements during this era.
Third, there was growing affluence among Japanese citizens. Japan’s rapid 
economic growth, together with ever more egalitarian income distribution through its 
high-progressive tax system, enabled ordinary Japanese citizens to own television
A Q
sets (George 2001). Fourth, the rise of citizen movements in Japan proved that 
Japan’s democracy reached another stage in its development. In fact, Japan’s 
citizens’ movements led to the rise of opposition parties in local politics by electing 
independent and progressive mayors or governors amidst the ‘conservative paradise’ 
of Japanese politics during the late 1960s and 1970s (Steiner, Krauss, and Flanagan 
1980). Marxist academics were also active during this era to encourage local 
autonomy and citizens’ movements (Avenell 2006; Barrett and Therivel 1990; 
Barshay 2004; Ui and United Nations University 1992). They gave ideological 
support to newly elected left-wing mayors and governors (Barshay 2004; Kersten 
and Williams 2006; Miyamoto 1969) and developed new ideas, such as the notion of 
the ‘civil minimum’ (the minimum standard for quality life) claimed by Professor 
Matsushita Keiichi (Matsushita 1971; Tokyo. Metropolitan Government 1968). As 
in the case of the first British Planning Act in 1909, Japan’s civil society succeeded 
in mobilising politics to change its statutory planning system.
48 Whereas only 15 percent of non-farm urban households had televisions in 1958, its ownership leapt 
to over 90 percent of all households in 1970. (George 2002: 171).
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5.4 The 1968 City Planning Act
In response to mounting problems due to the rapid urbanisation of the 1960s, the 
1919 City Planning Act was replaced with the 1968 City Planning Act. The 1950 
Building Standard Law was also revised in 1970. While the revision of the two 
planning laws was aimed at restricting further unplanned new developments in 
mainly urban fringes, the Urban Redevelopment Law (Toshi Saikaihatsu Ho) was 
introduced in 1969 to improve built-up areas. These three laws came to consist of 
Japan’s core planning control laws, often referred to as toshi sanpd (three laws on 
urban development) in Japan.
According to Ohshio Yoichiro, the former chief of the City Planning Section of the 
City Bureau of the Construction Ministry, who drafted the bill of the 1968 City 
Planning Act, there were four main objectives in the revision of the 1919 City 
Planning Act: (1) to control the urban sprawl, (2) to strengthen the 
comprehensiveness of urban panning, (3) to obtain coordination between urban 
planning and regional planning, and (4) to rationalise urban planning actors and 
procedures (Ohshio 1967; Ohshio 1975). Against this background, there was 
optimism about tackling urban problems until the early 1970s, as the government 
expected that the 1968 Planning Act and the new CNDP in 1969 would solve the 
defects of the existing planning system (Sorensen 2002).
New land-use control measures
The main planning control tools implemented by the 1968 Planning Act were 
threefold. First, City Planning Areas (CPAs) was divided into two areas: 
Urbanisation Promotion Areas (UPAs) where developments and urbanisation are
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encouraged and Urbanisation Control Areas (UCAs) where in principle no 
development is permitted. As the boundaries were made by lines on maps, it was 
referred to as senbiki (line-drawing) in Japanese. The second tool was the 
introduction of a more detailed zoning system, increasing the previous four zoning 
categories into eight. The third one was the implementation of a development 
permission system for certain types of developments. If these planning control tools 
had been exercised in a proper manner, they could have had quite an effect on the 
land-use control of Japanese burgeoning cities during this period. However, because 
of the continuous politicisation of the implementation of the 1968 Planning Act, the 
new tools had little impact on the progress of urban sprawl in Japan.
First of all, the idea of UP As and CPAs did not work very well. The UPAs covered 
too large areas, extending to underdeveloped areas so that strict planning controls 
applied to UCAs were not implemented in existing urban fringes (Hebbert 1994; 
Hebbert and Nakai 1988; Ishida 1987a; Sorensen 2002). The cause for over- 
designation of UPAs was understood to be the result of the intense lobbying of 
farmers, farm organisations and landowners (Hebbert 1994; Hebbert and Nakai 1988; 
Sorensen 2002). Moreover, except for the outer metropolitan areas, many 
municipalities were not even required to divide the CPA into UPAs and UCAs until 
it was considered necessary. The undivided CPAs, UCAs and areas not included in 
CPAs are called shiraji chiiki (blank area), meaning that the areas did not belong to 
any zoning categories so that no zoning controls apply to this area. In 1999, 
undivided CPAs made 11.6 percent of the national land area, amounting to about half 
of all CPAs (Sorensen 2002: 240). Because of these defects of the UPA/UCA, the 
new Act did not function to fulfil its original purpose.
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In addition, as the name of the City Planning Act suggests, the legal power of the Act 
did not cover rural areas (Hebbert and Nakai 1988: 35). While the CPAs represented 
only 26 percent of Japan’s national land in 1996 (Sorensen 2002: 246), developments 
outside the CPAs (a part of shiraji chiiki) were virtually unregulated and did not 
require a development permission until 2001. It should be noted that many 
development occurred outside the CPAs, even within National Parks. In particular 
this was the case of resort development in which the government took the initiative 
in the 1980s (Ohno, Sasaki, and Nakayama 1991).
Second, the new eight zoning categories were not sophisticated enough to prevent 
heterogeneous land-uses, so that the environmental problems associated with mixed 
land use remained. Under the new zoning system, building structures were 
controlled by floor area ratios (FAR) and coverage ratios of individual sites. The 
problem was that these ratios were generally set much higher than necessary within 
most of the zoning categories, owing to lobbying from the real estate and 
construction industries (Igarashi and Ogawa 1993; Ishida 1987a). Therefore, the new 
zoning system had little effect to mitigate the problem of noise, sunlight, odour, and 
air pollution in inner-city areas.
Third, there were various loopholes which undermined the development permission 
system of the new planning act. The definition of the development was too narrow 
to include many types of development. It exempted the development of 1,000 square 
metres or less within UPAs, thus allowing small-scale development (so called mini 
kaihatsu) (Ishida 1987a; Sorensen 2002). Within blank areas, any development 
permission was unnecessary until 1974 and development of less than 3,000 square 
metres did not require permission until revisions were made in 2003. Moreover,
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because the FAR in blank areas was 400 percent until 2000, many sprawl 
development took place in this area (Igarashi and Ogawa 1993). Unlike the 
discretionary powers of local planning authorities exercised under the British 
planning permission system, local planning authorities in Japan must grant a 
development permission to applicants as far as they complied with the criteria of the 
City Planning Act, even though these criteria did not cover extensive facilities that 
might be necessary for the development (Hebbert and Nakai 1988: 37).
Local autonomy in planning
Three other objectives of the 1968 City Planning Act proposed by the government 
(Ohshio 1975) turned out to be highly questionable in terms of the public interest. 
To strengthen the comprehensiveness and integrity of urban planning, the state 
placed the City Planning Act under the tier of National Land Development Laws 
controlled by the ministries. The major acts governing the City Planning Act are as 
follows:
Comprehensive National Land Development Act (1950)
National Land Use Planning Act (1974)
National Capital Region Development Act (1956)
Kinki Region Development Act (1963)
Chubu Region Development Act (1966)
Rural Development Act (1965)
New Industrial City Construction Promotion Act (1962)
Rural Area Industrial Development Promotion Act (1971)
Industrial Relocation Promotion Act (1972)
Special Area Industrial Development Promotion Act (1964)
Pollution Control Basic Act (1967)
Source: (Ohama 1994b: 183)
185
The Comprehensive National Land Development Act (Kokudo Sogo Kaihatsu Ho) 
and The National Land Use Planning Act (Kokudo Riyd Keikaku Ho) are the most 
important in the list. Then, the three metropolitan regional plans such as the National 
Capital Region Development Act (Shutoken Seibi Ho) follow. The National Land 
Development Act is the oldest act about national land planning. Under this act, 
however, only CNDPs and Special Area Comprehensive Development Plans 
(Tokutei Chiiki Sogo Kaihatsu Keikaku) were formulated, while the Comprehensive 
Prefecture Development Plan and Comprehensive Local Development Plans have 
never been prepared so far by the central government (Ohama 1994b). The 
remaining acts in the list which the 1968 Planning Act should comply with are all 
about development programs, except for the Pollution Control Basic Act (Kogai 
Taisaku Kihon Ho). The CNDPs, the National Land Use Plans and the three regional 
development plans have provided the guidelines on the allocation of available 
resources (human and natural) for developments in each region and the creation of 
necessary physical infrastructures to accommodate industry and population growth.
Those plans are not legally binding to control actual land-use and local planning 
(Ohama 1994b). Instead, the acts and plans became the basis for obtaining budgets 
for construction projects such as motorways, airports, industrial parks, new industrial 
cities and new town developments. In addition, while the making of a national land- 
use plan was compulsory, making prefectural plans and local plans was only optional 
under the National Land Use Planning Act49 (Ohama 1994b). As the infrastructure 
building projects were largely implemented independently by public corporations, 
the projects often lacked coordination with local planning needs or even with
49 The municipal and prefectural master plan system became compulsory by the amendament of the 
1968 City Planning Act in 1992 and 2000
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Regional Plans50 (Ishida 1987a; Sorensen 2002). Without a legally binding master 
plan system, those development projects, which acquired funding through the upper 
tier of National Land Laws, were often put before local planning concerns.
Although the 1968 City Planning Act stipulates that the ultimate responsibility of 
city planning belongs to municipalities, the control of the ministries was 
strengthened through the requirement for authorisation of governors and ministers to 
city planning decisions such as the designation of UPAs and zoning changes 
(Igarashi and Ogawa 1993; Ohama 1994a; Sorensen 2002). Moreover, although the 
designation of UPAs and zoning changes are fundamental planning tools of 
municipalities, the criteria to determine how those areas and categories should be 
allocated have been tightly controlled by ministries through the 1968 City Planning 
Act, governmental orders, and prefectural and ministerial circulars (Hebbert and 
Nakai 1988; Igarashi and Ogawa 1993). While the 1968 City Planning Act made 
conduct a City Planning Basic Survey every five years as a statutory duty, the local 
planning criteria were continuously revised under ministries’ guidance, which often 
advised the deregulations of land-use controls (Igarashi and Ogawa 1993).
Public participation
As part of the rationalisation of planning actors and procedures, the 1968 City 
Planning Act introduced public participation system so that the public became able to 
express their opinions in written form as well as attend public hearings. However, 
the system was heavily criticised for its ineffectiveness and hypocrisy (Igarashi and 
Ogawa 1993; Ishida 1977; Ishida 1987a; Sorensen 2002; Sumida 1977). First of all,
50 The projects of the Japan Housing Corporation (JHC) were often built in green field sites, far from 
city centres, so that in same cases they were in conflict with local planning policy that aimed to 
contain urban sprawl (Ishida 1987a: 268-269).
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public hearings were called for only when the local or prefectural government 
considered them necessary (Igarashi and Ogawa 1993; Ishida 1977; Sumida 1977). 
As a result, in many cases, public hearings were only limited to major changes of 
local planning, such as the reviews of overall zoning areas, UPA designation 
amendments and re-examination of road networks (Sumida 1977).
Second, public participation in planning was too narrowly defined by both urban 
planning laws and the circulars of the Urban Planning Bureau of the Construction 
Ministry (Igarashi and Ogawa 1993; Ishida 1977; Sumida 1977). These circulars 
instructed that, in order to reflect the overall views of residents, only selected 
speakers from stakeholders were allowed to speak in public hearings (Sumida 1977). 
Moreover, the speakers were not allowed to ask questions to committee members in 
public hearings, while committee members could ask questions to the speakers 
(Ishida 1977). As a result, any form of discussion in these public hearings was 
impossible, resulting in a one-way communication (Ishida 1977; Sumida 1977).
Third, the public hearings were only held at the last stage of planning (Ishida 1977; 
Sumida 1977). Proposed plans were only displayed two weeks for public viewing. 
As a consequence, even when the public suggested any amendments to the proposed 
plans, it was rare that such recommendations were reflected in the plans at the final 
stage of planning decision (Ishida 1977).
Finally, there was no stipulation in the Act about how public opinions should be
incorporated into local plans (Sumida 1977). Therefore, although the public were
able to express their concerns on local planning matters in the form of public
hearings and written suggestions, no guarantee was made about whether public
opinion would be inputted into local planning (Sumida 1977). As Ohshio explained,
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the article of public participation was added to ‘prevent residents from complaining 
about not being informed’ (Ohshio 1975: 68). Because of the very limited scope of 
public participation in plan-making, public opinions could have little impact on 
planning future.
In the end, despite its revision, the 1968 City Planning Act did little to improve 
existing planning problems. Intense lobbying from landowners subverted the 
measures for development control in the Act. The central bureaucracy did not 
surrender their power over land-use controls and kept a tight rein on local autonomy 
and public participation. At the same time, the idea of ‘comprehensive national 
economic development’ continued to work through numerous long-term spatial 
development plans, the projects of public companies, and special laws materialising 
specific projects. In fact, the planning crisis further deepened after the promulgation 
of the 1968 City Planning Act, to which we now turn.
5.5 The Failure of Growth Pole Development
In response to the failure of the first CNDP, the second CNDP was formulated in 
1969. The second CNDP further promoted investment in high-speed transport 
networks and the relocation of industries to peripheral regions. This vision was 
emphasised more vigorously by the prime minister of Japan in 1972-74, Tanaka 
Kakuei (1918-93), in his Building a New Japan: a Plan for Remodelling the 
Japanese Archipelago (Tanaka 1973). In the preface to this book, Tanaka endorsed 
his plan as follows:
Public opinion calls for the simultaneous solution of overcrowding and 
under population to live in comfort in a beautiful land of affluence and 
security. To achieve these ends, we must boldly reverse this torrential 
urban concentration and direct our national energy and surplus economic
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strength to remodelling the entire archipelago. Disparity between urban 
and rural areas, between the prosperous Pacific coast and the stagnating 
Japan Sea coast, can surely be eliminated by using levers such as 
relocating industries, making them more knowledge intensive, 
constructing super-express railways and trunk expressways throughout 
the nation, and creating nationwide information and communication 
networks (Tanaka 1973: iv).
Bom in a poor rural family in Niigata, on the Japan Sea Coast, Tanaka moved to 
Tokyo and, by the age of 19, founded his own construction firm. He gained a seat at 
the lower house of the Diet in 1947 and held two ministerial posts as well as serving 
as secretary-general of LDP twice (1965-66, 1968-71). His most significant 
influence in post-war planning was to establish a strong connection between the 
construction industry and planning policy (Babb 2000; Johnson 1986; Woodall 1996). 
He laid the foundations of pork-barrel politics in post-war Japan based on the 
oyabun-kobun (father-child) relationship, which has been ubiquitous in Japanese 
society from the mafia to the corporate world (Babb 2000; Johnson 1986; 
Schlesinger 1997). This liaison extended to connect MPs, councillors, bureaucrats 
and businesses for construction projects. Not only did he leave the legacy of ‘the 
construction state’ that promotes public works regardless of their necessities for the 
sake of economic growth (Johnson 1986; Schlesinger 1997; Woodall 1996), but his 
vision also made land prices of planned areas soar. Tanaka himself established 
‘ghost’ real estate companies under his mistress’s name to trade land that had been 
designated for state-led development, such as reclamation projects, bullet-train right- 
of-way and government-built power plants (Johnson 1986: 8-9). And later on, he 
earned profits by selling the land back to the government (Johnson 1986).
Land speculation soon became prominent among corporations, in particular to those 
who had access to governments’ inside information. As a result, the average national 
land price increased by 30.9 percent between 1972 and 1973 (Igarashi and Ogawa
1993: 77). Land speculation was most intense in Japan’s six major cities, where land 
prices rose by 42.5 percent in the year of 1973, while they had already increased 
annually by 20 percent in the late 1960s (Ishikawa 1995:130). Land speculation 
spread further to rural Japan, in the expectation that Tanaka’s development plans 
would be successfully implemented. However, the boom ended when Japan’s rapid 
economic growth era stagnated following the 1973 worldwide oil crisis.
Ironically, Tanaka’s plan was formulated when the golden age of the ‘Japanese 
Miracle’ was drawing to a close. Japan’s economic policy had reached a turning 
point in the early 1970s, following criticism of Japan’s export-led economic growth 
from the EEC and the US (Sargent 1973). In response to these attacks, Tanaka’s 
plan was intended to expand economic growth towards more backward regions of 
Japan and to stimulate domestic consumption, rather than the production for export. 
Since its core idea was the same as the growth-pole development in the Pacific Belt 
region, Tanaka’s plan promoted the relocation of some industrial complexes to rural 
areas by building the transport network. After all, the relocation of industries was 
not so successful and pollution was exported to the designated rural areas.
Japanese economy was severely hit by two-digit inflation, caused by the 1973 Oil 
Embargo and the subsequent global depression. GDP growth between 1974 and 
1979 slowed down to an average of 3.6 percent, in comparison to previous two-digit 
growth. Furthermore, Tanaka’s money politics, which included making profits from 
land speculation, was made public by a journalist, Tachibana Takashi in the 
November 1974 issue of Bungei Shunju magazine51. Tanaka resigned as prime
51 Tachibaba Takashi ‘Research on Tanaka Kakuei: his money and power politics (Tanaka Kakuei 
Kenkyu: sono Kinmyaku to Jinmyaku)\
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minister in December 1974 and he was arrested in 1976 under the allegation of 
having accepted 500 million Yen from the US Lockheed Martin Corporation, which 
aimed to sell aircrafts to Japan’s All Nippon Airways (ANA). As the political and 
economic climate dramatically changed in the early 1970s, the second CNDP and 
Tanaka’s vision to resolve uneven development completely failed. Despite its 
achievement, Japan’s post-war growth pole development strategy resulted in the 
degeneration of both urban and rural environment and the legacy of money politics 
involving regional and urban planning.
5.6 Planning policy in the global economy
The 1973 oil shock was a turning point in the post-war period of Japan. Although 
the era of Japan’s high GDP growth abruptly ended, the nation’s economy survived 
throughout the 1970s and 1980s, maintaining an annual GDP growth rate between 4 
to 5 percent (Gordon 2003: 298-301). The continued economic growth was owed to 
the lean management of the manufacturing sector and its shift from the reliance on 
the chemical and steel industries to high technology industries, which specialised in 
electronics, machineries and automobiles (Cemy 2001; Oizumi 1994). While a 
renowned ‘lean production’ or ‘just-in-time production’ system made the Japanese 
manufacturing sector globally competitive, it caused trade frictions with the US and 
Europe, because of Japan’s reliance on export sales to these countries. Furthermore, 
the sector’s global sales strategy resulted in changes in Japan’s financial sector, 
which had long been the heart of its state-led economic development (Cemy 2001).
Whilst leading industrial economies such as the US and UK suffered from prolonged
recessions in transition to a post-industrial economy, Japan’s robust economy
developed into the subject of academic inquiries. The Teaming from Japan’ boom
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boosted Japan’s national pride and encouraged Japanese to search the national 
identity. Overcoming a series of challenges, Japan emerged as an economic 
superpower in the 1980s. As a result, many Japanese became very much conscious 
about the nation’s affluence (Kelly 1993; Tipton 2001: Ch. 12), although the fruits of 
its economic success were not in reality shared by the whole population (Chubachi 
and Taira 1976; Ono and Watanabe 1976; Upham 1993b).
Whereas the public seemed to be content with the status quo, the international 
economy again forced changes to the existing conditions of Japanese society. The 
newly emerged global economy altered Japanese economy, politics and society. 
Inevitably, it changed Japan’s planning system, too. Japan’s planning policy that 
responded to globalisation had far more impacts on its citizens than any other 
countries’ policy: the rise and collapse of the bubble economy. The following 
section explains these social changes and their influences on Japan’s planning policy.
Ideological shift in the affluent society
To understand Japan’s politics, society and planning after 1973, there were two 
important intellectual and ideological shifts from the 1970s: First, a change in the 
US’s policy towards Japan affected Japanese intellectuals’ discourse on Japanese 
identity and society. Up to the 1950s, to defy communist influences in Asia, the US 
covertly obstructed activities of radical leftist movements in Japan and gave funding 
to the LDP through CIA operations (Gordon 2003: 289; Pempel 1998: 101). 
However, countering strong anti-US sentiments in Japan, which escalated in the 
1960s during the US-Japan security crisis, the US appointed Harvard Professor 
Edwin O. Reischauer, a historian of Japan, as Ambassador to Japan in 1961 and
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promoted the portrayal of successful Japan through academic studies such as Japan 
as Number One (Gordon 2003: 289; Vogel 1979).
These academic works inspired Japanese intellectuals to develop nihonjinron (the 
theories on Japanese uniqueness). This body of literature more or less stresses the 
uniqueness of Japanese culture, which values group harmony and consensus, as the 
reason for its outstanding achievements (Kumon 1992; Umehara 1990; Umesao, 
Befu, and Kreiner 1984). This discourse eased conflicts between the US and Japan, 
unions and employers, and the left and the right, which had coloured Japanese 
politics in the previous period. Simultaneously, a picture painted of Japan as 
conflict-free society resulted in undermining the power of labour unions, the left- 
wing parties and social movements to challenge the status quo in Japanese politics 
and society.
Second, as a reaction to the failure of opposition politics against conservative 
hegemony, a new wave of Japanese intellectuals started to criticise progressive 
modernist ideas that had been the academic mainstream in the 1960s and early 1970s. 
Two philosophers, Yoshimoto Takaaki and Takeuchi Yoshimi, spearheaded the 
criticism against the modernists’ view of politics such as Maruyama’s as a bourgeois 
democracy, and proposed a notion of a ‘bottom up democracy’, based on individual 
happiness and interests as an alternative to the state-centred public sphere (Barshay 
2004; Iida 2002). However, in his In Theory o f the Mass Image (Masu Imege Ron, 
1984) and other works in the 1980s, Yoshimoto wrongly believed that the emergence 
of Japan’s strong consumerism led to the independence of the masses, free from the 
guidance of the state’s elite (Iida 2002: 185).
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However, while the role of the mass media is believed to offer opportunities for 
public debate (Habermas 1997), the modem mass media, in particular Japan’s, has 
downside which manipulates and subverts people’s desires, opinions and virtually 
their everyday life influenced by strong consumerism (Ivy 1993; Kelly 1993; Moeran 
1996; Skov and Moeran 1995). Indeed, it was the media who spread the idea of 
‘ichioku so churyu (100 million Japanese all belong to the middle-class)’ among the 
Japanese in the 1970s.
From the mid-1970s, a post-modernist perception of civilisation appealed to the new 
generation of Japanese intellectuals as well as to the public, who started appreciating 
the material affluence of the successful national economy (Iida 2002; Ivy 1993). 
Japanese people believed economic equality and homogeneity within society, which 
was exaggerated by the mass media (Kelly 1993; Painter 1996; Vlastos 1998), was 
the secret of ‘the success’ of Japan although its income inequality actually started to 
widen since the 1970s (Tachibanaki 1998). Cultural essentialism of the nation as a 
commune, and the perception that everyone was happy with reality, silenced the 
public’s discontents about planning policies which had peaked in the early 1970s.
Conservative hegemony
Japanese society’s contentment with the status quo also resulted in a decline in the
political power of the opposition parties. Popular support for the JSP and JCP had
been already decreasing since the 1950s as a result of poor leadership, ideological
divisions within the parties and the lack of electoral support (Christensen 2000: Ch.
6). In particular, the JSP, which had heavily relied on labour unions for its electoral
support, lost its political basis along with the decline in the rate of union membership
(Stockwin 1999). In contrast, the LDP had been capable of accommodating changes
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in the political environment in post-war years. Not only the LDP made a coalition 
with big businesses, but they also gained political support from small businesses and 
farmers (Calder 1988; Pempel 1982). Facing labour protests in the 1950s and the 
1960s, the LDP was swift to seek solutions in state welfare (Garon and Mochizuki 
1993b; Pempel 1982). All these factors weakened the ability of opposition parties to 
propose an alternative policy against conservative politics.
In this political climate, active environmental movements in the previous period also 
began losing their momentum (Avenell 2006; Mason 1999). In addition to the 
decline of oppositions’ political power in national politics, there were also other key 
factors for this change. First, the oil crisis in the early 1970s suddenly reminded the 
Japanese of their nation’s susceptibility to a shortage of natural resources (Gordon 
2003: 287-288). This renewed awareness encouraged both the state and businesses 
to search for technological innovations in order to reduce emissions and increase 
energy efficiency. Furthermore, as Japan’s industrial production bases started 
moving to overseas (Dicken 2003) and environmental regulations became tightened, 
public concerns about environmental issues lost the immediacy in the 1980s (Mason 
1999).
Second, although the progressive coalitions succeeded in winning local elections in 
urban areas in the early 1970s, their triumphs were short-lived. Newly elected chief 
executives did succeed in stopping key development projects that many local 
residents opposed to (Johnson and Nissan Institute of Japanese Studies 2000: Ch. 5; 
Steiner, Krauss, and Flanagan 1980). Nonetheless, despite their pledge to improve 
the quality of urban life, the majority of progressive executives failed to deliver 
policies proposed in their manifestos. In essence, the level of local governments’
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autonomy, as well as the size of their financial resources, was too weak to materialise 
these proposals. On the other hand, the LDP succeeded in promoting controversial 
development projects in rural areas, claiming to help those declining rural economies. 
They could exercise strong bargaining power, taking advantage of old community 
ties and abundant compensation funds to win over the rural electorate (Lesbirel 
1998).
Once immediate environmental dangers such as pollution were eased, urban citizens 
very much lost interest in national and local politics on planning, as they were aware 
of their limited influence in policy-making. The failure of citizens’ protests against 
the renewal of the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960 and 1970 as well as the 
Vietnam War also strengthened a sense of disillusion with national politics during 
this period. These events reinforced the increase in political apathy among the 
Japanese population.
Pressure on an economic superpower
In the 1980s, it was apparent that the production mode of the leading world economy 
transformed from Fordism to post-Fordism: a globally flexible mode of production 
and consumption (Amin 1995; Jessop 1991). Since substantial production capacities 
moved outside national boundaries (Dicken 2003), many advanced economies 
suffered from the loss of manufacturing jobs within their territories (Amin 1995; 
Jessop 1991). This economic restructuring led to a depression in those leading 
industrialised nations as the economy took time to adjust to structural changes. 
Whereas some geographically advantageous cities in the West thrived as 
global/world cities based on the knowledge and service economy (Knox and Taylor
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1995; Newman and Thomley 2004; Sassen 2001), Japanese economy appeared to be 
relatively unaffected by the process of economic restructuring during this period.
Discontents of the USA and Europe with the Japanese government about Japan’s 
large current surplus in trade mounted in the 1980s (Johnson 1987; Nester 1993; 
Packard 1987). The Japanese Yen’s relatively low value against other currencies 
also contributed to reinforcing the trade imbalance between Japan and other 
advanced economies, in particular with the US. As a result, the US establishment 
started to believe that Japan’s trade protectionism and low domestic demand was the 
main causes of the trade imbalance between the two nations (Johnson 1987). Thus, 
both the USA and Europe urged Japan to increase its domestic demand and reduce 
the exports to them.
In order to resolve this ‘Japan problem’, representatives of leading economies 
implemented interventions in the world financial market and demanded Japan to take 
vigorous actions in terms of market liberalisation and deregulation. First, the G-5 
nations (France, West Germany, Japan, the USA and the UK) agreed to devalue the 
US Dollar against the Deutsche Mark and the Japanese Yen under the Plaza Accord 
in September 1985. The value of the Japanese Yen against the US Dollar nearly 
doubled within two years. As a consequence, it became much easier for Japanese 
firms to raise capital in overseas markets compared to the previous period. This 
resulted in reducing the role of Japanese banks further, which had predominantly 
supplied cash for industries before.
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Second, under intense pressure from the US, the Japanese government published the 
Maekawa Report (Japan. Kokusai Kyochono tameno Keizai Kozo Chosei 
Kenkyukai 1986) in April 1986, which concluded that Japan had to increase domestic 
demand and rely less on the export income by implementing ‘structural changes’ 
(Ishi 2000; Noguchi 1994:65-67). The US further pressed Japan to implement 
specific deregulation measures through bilateral negotiations such as the U.S.-Japan 
Structural Impediment Initiative (SII) that started in 1989. The changes in the 
market environment and pressure to increase domestic demand created the specific 
conditions of Japanese economy, which affected planning policy development in 
following years.
The rise of neo-liberalism and planning policy
After the LDP established its hegemony in the late 1970s, the government had to face 
accumulated debts (Ito 1996; Suzuki 1999). First, this was due to the LDP’s policy 
to expand social welfare budgets to win votes against opposition parties in the 
previous period (Calder 1988; McCormack 2001; Suzuki 1999). Second, the state 
also implemented more public work projects to stimulate investment against the 
slowdown of the economy (Igarashi and Ogawa 1997; McCormack 2001). Third, the 
demographic structure changed due to the aging of the population (Ishi 2000: Ch. 10). 
In the early 1980s, the budgetary deficit continued to expand so that the pressures for 
reducing government expenditure became compelling (Ishi 2000: Ch.6; Ito 1996). 
As a consequence, rinchd (the Provisional Administrative Reform Committee) 
undertook two consecutive administrative reforms until the mid-1980s. A variety of
52 Prime Minister Nakasone asked an advisory group to address issues concerning the structural 
changes of the Japanese economy in response to the US pressure. The report was named after the 
former governor of the Bank of Japan, Maekawa Haruo.
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state expenditures were cut under this scheme, in particular welfare expenditures. 
The most notable achievement of the reform was the privatisation of Japan National
c'y
Railway (JNR) and the Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation 
(NTT) (Ito 1996).
Another shift related to the rise of neo-liberal policies in Japan during the 1980s is 
the emergence of the so-called minkatsu (‘minkan katsuryoku no katsuyd utilising 
the ability o f  private enterprises) policy for economic development. Although a set 
of minkatsu policies undertaken during the Prime Minister Nakasone regime (1982- 
87) is often regarded as an equivalent of smaller government, deregulation, 
privatisation and public-private partnerships as those initiated under the Thatcher or 
Reagan regimes, the policy applied only to limited practices, notably urban 
developments (Iio 1993). In reality, the core of the minkatsu policy was promoting 
land development to stimulate the stagnated economy by selectively deregulating 
land-use controls and giving incentives to developers (Anchordoguy 1992; 
Hayakawa and Hirayama 1991; Iio 1993; Oizumi 1994). Therefore, minkatsu did not 
differ from the planning policy in which the government assisted land developments 
in the previous period.
Moreover, the targeted urban areas for minkatsu were selected not because they 
suffered from long under-investment like US or British inner cities in the 1980s, but 
because the land-use in these areas was considered ineffective by the business elites 
and central bureaucracy due to the presence of detached houses and small shops
53 As the JNR had one of the strongest labour unions in Japan, the privatisation in effect further 
weakened the position of the left in policy-making.
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(Tochi Mondai Kondankai 1983)54. Therefore, new guidelines suggested by the 
Construction Ministry were ‘reviewing Category I Exclusive Residential Zone areas 
(restricted to low-rise dwelling only) and other zoning areas for allowing high-and- 
medium-rise buildings, redressing the excesses of municipal governments’ voluntary 
development control agreements with developers (takuchi kaihatsu shidd yoko) and 
selling public land for urban regeneration and quality (which often implies luxury in 
Japan) high-rise housing’ (Japan. Construction Ministry 1983). The Maekawa 
Report also proposed these same deregulation measures and incentives to developers 
in order to boost ‘domestic demand’. The Maekawa Report argued that these 
strategies were to control a rise in land price and increase a number of high-rise 
housing units in the inner cities of metropolitan areas to enable office and housing 
locations closer as well as strengthen the role of cities (Japan. Kokusai Kydchono 
tameno Keizai Kozo Chosei Kenkyukai 1986). The set of urban policies during this 
period was called urban renaissance.
Minkatsu policy did not just end in urban development, but it also extended to rural 
areas. Whereas the Fourth Comprehensive National Development Plan (yonzenso) 
underlined the importance of Tokyo as a global financial centre (Japan. National 
Land Agency 1987), the government proposed the Act on the Development of 
Comprehensive Resort Areas (The Resort Act) in May 1987 to advance leisure 
industries in rural areas to improve the quality o f  life and enhance local economic 
development (Japan. Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport 2003a). Under 
this Act, many rural municipalities set up ‘third sector’ organisations (dai san sector 
hdjin: a private-public partnership company) to ‘utilise private sector’s vitality’ for
54 The committee was chaired by the National Land Agency. The report was first published on 20th 
April 1983.
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developing leisure facilities such as golf/ski grounds, luxury hotels and theme parks 
with central government subsidies. Based on this Act, 712 municipalities have basic 
plans of resort development projects, and the whole planned area consists of 17.5 
percent of Japan’s total land area up to present (Japan. Ministry of Land 
Infrastructure and Transport 2003a: 4).
The reason why the minkatsu policies were heavily focused on spatial development 
proposals was related to the series of strategies recommended by the committees of 
the Construction Ministry, well before Nakasone’s administration took power 
{Jichitai Mondai Kenkyusho 1983; Otake 1993). In fact, the Construction Ministry’s 
initiatives were a result of intense lobbying from the Japan Project-Industry Council 
(JAPIC), which was set up in 1979 by Japan’s traditional big businesses in steel and 
construction industries, trade companies and banks (Hayakawa and Hirayama 1991; 
Igarashi and Ogawa 1993; Iio 1993; Oizumi 1994; Otake 1993). During the low 
growth period of the late 1970s, these well-established industries lost investment 
opportunities within the nation so that they were seeking for potential development 
projects and support from the government. The old vested interests seized 
opportunities when the US strongly pressed Japan to increase domestic consumption 
and Japan itself was shifting towards a post-industrial economy based on service 
provision.
The bubble economy and its impacts
The emergence of the bubble economy was the consequence of the Japanese
government’s macroeconomic mismanagement as well as the market’s speculative
investment during the late 1980s (Ishi 2000; Noguchi 1994; Oizumi 1994). As a
result of the incremental financial market liberalisation since the early 1980s, many
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Japanese manufacturing firms started to raise funds by issuing stocks and bonds 
rather than bank loans (Cemy 2001; Noguchi 1994; Oizumi 1994; Suzuki 2006). 
This forced Japanese financial institutions to find different borrowers other than the 
big companies or manufacturing sectors (Cemy 2001; Noguchi 1994; Oizumi 1994; 
Suzuki 2006). Simultaneously, the government increased the money supply with a 
low official discount rate to stimulate domestic demand (Okina, Shirakawa, and 
Shiratsuka 2000: 289-292). Since the government encouraged spatial development 
by minkatsu policy in the post-Fordist economy, much of these loans went to the real 
estate industry (Dehesh and Pugh 1999; Hayakawa and Hirayama 1991; Noguchi 
1994; Oizumi 1994).
The mixture of the economic conditions and the policy provisions with abundant 
cheap loans and incentives from the government induced overheated speculation in 
land development. In 1990, land prices were 3.3 times higher than those in 1985 
(Ishi 2000: 77). The boom started from the commercial areas of the big cities, and 
then spread to residential areas and smaller cities. As a result, Japan’s total stock of 
property value in 1990 reached nearly four times the value of the total property stock 
in the US (Wood 1992: 8) and consisted of roughly 20 percent of the world’s wealth 
in 1991 (Dehesh and Pugh 1999: 147).
In addition to financial and monetary policies, weak development controls, further 
deregulation and incentives by minkatsu policy facilitated this vast increase in land 
value. Policies promoting ‘effective land-use’ in urban areas resulted in the 
demolition of detached houses and small shops to be replaced by large-scale office, 
retail and residential developments. The profits generated by these conversions were 
extraordinary, as the floor space possibly increased 20-30 fold, thus land value
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skyrocketed. Real estate companies carried on seeking potential development sites 
and bought up these areas for future speculation. Since these inner-city sites were in 
many cases non-vacant plots, some developers pressurised the existing residents to 
move out, even by hiring gangs (jiageya: land shark) to intimidate them (Hill 2003a; 
Hill 2003b; Kaplan and Dubro 2003). Furthermore, land prices increased in those 
resort development areas as well.
Another serious consequence of the minkatsu policy was its impact on both urban 
and rural environment. Large-scale office and shopping developments tore apart 
shitamachi, Japan’s working class neighbourhoods in metropolitan areas. Kyoto, 
Japan’s cultural capital was not an exception of this change. Despite protests from 
the city’s Buddhist temples and the general public, a plan for remodelling the Kyoto 
Hotel from a 31 metre tall building to a 60 metres high one was permitted in 1992 
with a new deregulated building code 55(Igarashi and Ogawa 1993: 6-7). In one 
Kyoto’s machiya (traditional wooden house) neighbourhood, 220 units out of 240 
houses disappeared within a four- to five-year period since the late 1980s, as land 
speculators attempted to vacant a land plot for high-rise buildings along with the 
renewal of the nearby Kyoto Station building56 (Igarashi and Ogawa 1993: 9-10).
The designated resort development areas also suffered from the destruction of nature 
and landscape (McCormack 2001: Ch.2; Ohno, Sasaki, and Nakayama 1991). 
Employing the Resort Act provisions, 111 golf grounds and 95 ski grounds have
55 See also 1992a. The case of Kyoto Buddhism Association - judgement upon the request for an 
injunction of the building construction destructive to historical cityscape. In Hanrei Jiho: Kyoto 
District Court, Japan.
56 The design of the new Kyoto Station was also heavily criticised for its impact on the landscape. 
Because of its massive size, the building stands like a big wall in the centre of the city. Moreover, 
department stores and hotels occupy more than 95 percent of the floor space of the station building 
(Buck 2000; Igarashi and Ogawa 1993: 7-8).
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been built so far (Japan. Ministry of Land Infrastructure and Transport 2003a: 5). In 
1990, 18 golf grounds were planned within the areas of national and quasi-national 
parks (Ohno, Sasaki, and Nakayama 1991: 14). Since minkatsu efforts were very 
much concentrated on land development, the collapse of the bubble economy not 
only hit the nation’s financial industry but also the foundations of citizens’ everyday 
life.
In 1989, it became obvious that Japan’s economy was overheated (Okina, Shirakawa, 
and Shiratsuka 2000). In particular, the public and media strongly criticised the 
government for spiralling land prices, blaming their inaction against ‘land fever’ 
(Noguchi 1994). Responding to this criticism, the central government introduced 
two schemes to control the increase in land value. In large cities, the Land 
Transaction Surveillance System began in 1987 to keep a close watch on land prices 
in surveillance areas and for land larger than 2,000 square metres (Japan. National 
Land Agency 1995: 205-209; Noguchi 1994: 301). In April 1990, the Ministry of 
Finance (MOF) introduced restrictions on loans for the real estate industry by asking 
financial institutions to limit the growth of those loans lower than the increase of 
their total balance of loans (Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito 1997: 109; Noguchi 1994: 
303). The MOF also increased capital gain taxes on land transactions and 
inheritance taxes in relation to landholdings (Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito 1997: 109). 
Although the achievements of the transaction surveillance system in curving the land 
price surge was questionable, the restriction of loans to real estate companies and 
other tax measures started to show some effects on land price stabilisation (Cargill, 
Hutchison, and Ito 1997; Noguchi 1994).
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*A far more powerful impact on the market was a change in macro economic policy. 
The Bank of Japan finally decided to increase the official discount rate from 2.5 to 
3.25 percent in May 1989, and subsequently gradually increased it up to 6 percent in 
August 1990 (Noguchi 1994: 303; Okina, Shirakawa, and Shiratsuka 2000). Finally, 
both stock and land prices started to fall in 1990. However, the drop was too sharp 
for the Japanese economy to absorb its immediate shocks (Okina, Shirakawa, and 
Shiratsuka 2000). The Nikkei Index of the Tokyo Stock Exchange Market reached 
38,915 Yen at the end of 1989 and fell to 14,309 Yen by August 1992 (Yamamura 
1997: 291). Land prices also plunged very quickly. The land value index of the 
highest price lot of the six large cities was 545.1 in March 1990 compared to 100 in 
March 2000 (Japan Real Estate Institute 2005). It dropped to 210.8 in March 1995 
and then further reduced to 86.6 in September 2005 (Japan Real Estate Institute 
2005). The bubble economy collapsed and its impacts were far more powerful than 
the government had predicted.
The collapse of the bubble economy ended the era of Japan as an economic 
superpower. An economic depression caused by the overinvestment that took place 
during the bubble era prolonged for more than a decade (Maswood 2002; Yoshikawa, 
LTCB International Library Trust, and Kokusai Bunka Kaikan 2002). Furthermore, 
the crisis of Japan’s financial sector exposed the limitations of Japan’s state protected 
financial market, as well as the lack of ‘a check and balance system for corporate 
behaviour from outsiders (Hill 2003a; Kaplan and Dubro 2003; Suzuki 2006; Wood 
1992). The huge accumulation of bad loans in Japan’s financial sector revealed 
precisely ‘the unregulated sides’ of the Japanese economy (Krawczyk 2006; Suzuki 
2006; Wood 1992).
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The burst of the Japanese economic bubble also exposed serious defects in the 
nation’s developmental state ideology when it was applied to planning policy 
(Anchordoguy 1992; Igarashi and Ogawa 1993; Iio 1993; Oizumi 1994; Yamamura 
1992). After numerous real estate developers and housing loan companies went 
bankrupt (Cargill, Hutchison, and Ito 1997; Dehesh and Pugh 1999), many 
development projects halted abruptly so that vacant land plots were left everywhere 
in Japan, and remained untouched for quite a while. This applies particularly to the 
minkatsu-sponsored resort development projects in rural areas. In January 2002, 
only 23.8 percent of the original resort development plans since 1987 were 
completed or under construction (Japan. Ministry of Land Infrastructure and 
Transport 2003a: 4).
Furthermore, while the third sector companies planned and implemented the majority
of urban and resort development projects during the bubble era, quite a number of
those companies went bankrupt as well (Asahi Shimbun 1999: 17). By the end of
March 2004, 36.8 percent of those companies still being in operation were in debt
(Japan. Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2005: 13). In fact, the real
financial problems of the third sector were far worse than their balance sheets, since
they continued to receive funds from the government to supplement losses
(Fukasawa 2005; Japan. Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2005: 23-
25). Both the central and local governments also suffered from the accumulated
deficit because they continued issuing bonds during the bubble economy to finance
development projects and other public works (Asahi Shimbun 1999: 9-16; Japan.
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2004b: 17-18). Along with the
demographic changes of Japanese society, welfare expenditures continued to be a
target of the budget reduction since the 1980s (Takahashi 1997; Tsukada 2002). The
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financial crisis of the public sector together with the prolonged depression has 
created a growing sense of despair among the Japanese population.
The quality of life in post-modern Japan
Starting in the 1970s, Japan’s architecture entered a new era. While Japanese 
architects followed a strong modernist tradition in urban design since 1868, post­
modern philosophy penetrated into its mainstream architecture fashion. New 
confidence felt by Japanese architects was also the reflection of the nation’s 
economic power and technological innovations as well as the international 
recognition of Japan’s long-standing tradition of design (Knabe and Noennig 1999; 
Shinohara 1971; Stewart 1987). A pioneer of Japanese post-modern architecture, 
Shinohara Kazuo proclaimed as follows:
Nevertheless, as I had foreseen, in five or six years, the house did in fact 
become a work of art in many cases. It is no longer necessary to disguise 
one’s believe that a house is a kind of spatial creation based on a 
criticism of civilisation and not something, like large general buildings or 
urban plans, that participates directly in society as a product. We may 
now be frank because conditions for freedom in our work have developed 
(Shinohara 1971: 81).
However, unlike in the West where the freedom of design has increasingly become 
restrained with public consultation (Punter 1999), modem Japanese architects have 
long enjoyed great autonomy (Marshall 2002: 2). Shinohara implied that architects 
in Japan could experiment with any form of design, regardless any given spatial
t
context. This rationalisation of artistic liberty in architecture and urban design 
further created chaos in Japanese landscape, and broke up community cohesion 
during the bubble economy.
In addition to traditional public works such as road constmction, the government
promoted developing leisure and tourism for the realisation of ‘Seikatsu Taikoku
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(Making Japan a great place to live)’ in response to the trade friction and the rise of 
post-industrial economy, both of which pressed the Japanese government to boost 
domestic demand by increasing leisure time and facilities (Buntrock 2002: 128-147; 
Japan. Economic Planning Agency 1995; McCormack 2001). The government and 
businesses also use the slogan of globalisation to increase office space, shopping 
malls and luxury apartments in urban areas for ‘the service-oriented 24-hour 
economy’ (Tokyo. Metropolitan Government 1993: 54). While both the state-led 
industrialisation and the intense urbanisation had already taken its heavy toll on the 
townscape of Japan, the nation’s urban policy since the 1980s significantly changed 
the psychology of land-use (Clammer 1997; McCormack 2001 Ch.2; Nute 2004). It 
was not aimed at promoting industrialisation this time, but at enhancing service 
production and consumption related with spaces modelled on the development of 
other global cities (Edwards 2002; Newman and Thomley 2004; Sassen 2001).
During this period, the government budget was also lavishly spent on the 
construction of concert halls and cultural centres designed by leading architects 
(Buntrock 2002). While according to the yearbook of Japan Architect, 1,257 public 
culture centres already existed all over Japan in 1997, three new magnificent public 
halls opened in Tokyo in the same year, at the cost of $1.36 billion, $620 million, 
and $165 million respectively (Buntrock 2002: 137). As a consequence, in the 1990s, 
public works constituted 40 to 70 percent of the total construction investment in 
Japan (Buntrock 2002: 131). The epitome of this phenomenon was the mushrooming 
construction of theme parks across the country (Buck 2000; McCormack 2001: 97-
57 The word originates from ‘Seikatsu Taikoku Gokanen Keikaku (‘The Five-Year Plan for Making 
Japan a Great Place to Live’), issued in June 1992 by the Economic Council under the cabinet of 
Miyazawa Kiichi.
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101). Here, the discourse on quality of life was used to justify more developments 
pursued by interest groups.
The irony was that, although the government, business sector and architects made a 
catchword out of ‘culture’ to improve the quality of life in Japan in the 1980s and 
1990s, it was precisely during this period that old yet distinctive buildings of cultural 
importance were relentlessly destructed. The beautiful townscape of wooden 
machiya in Kyoto, which survived the bombing in the Second World War, almost 
disappeared due to successive development (Igarashi and Ogawa 1993). Many 
wooden buildings were demolished during this period as some architects and 
bureaucrats claimed that they would not survive for a long time anyway (Kerr 2001). 
Many Victorian-style as well as Art Deco brick and stone buildings from the pre-war 
period were also pulled down for regeneration. The Architectural Institute of Japan 
(Nihon Kenchiku Gakkai) listed 13,000 historical monuments in 1980, of which one- 
third has vanished since then (Kerr 2001: 173). The reinforced commodification of 
land by Japan’s planning policy in the global economy had a disastrous impact on the 
built environment in Japan.
Despite these changes on Japan’s townscapes, quite a few architects and planners 
rationalised the chaos as a consequence derived from ‘Asian values’ and praised its 
‘potentials’ [to create something for the better] (Buck 2000; Knabe and Noennig 
1999; Lim 1998). Some of the most celebrated Japanese architects expressed their 
views as follows:
Isozaki Arata: This ‘cycle-oriented’ life [of buildings] is derived from
Japanese thinking or Oriental thinking as a whole (Knabe and Noennig
1999: 111).
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Ando Tadao: Well, I consider chaos as being something which possesses 
dynamic life (Buck 2000: 152).
Takamatsu Shin: I don’t think of chaos as confusion to be thrown into 
disorder, but as an order, as an open system (Buck 2000: 140).
On the contrary, many citizens became quite dissatisfied with the townscape in Japan. 
In a 2004 Public Opinion Survey on Housing conducted by the Cabinet Office, only
9.6 percent of the respondents considered that the townscape in Japan was ‘fine’ 
(22.6 percent told ‘satisfactory’) compared to European cities (Japan. Public 
Relations Office. Minister's Secretariat. Cabinet Office 2004). Back in 1998, when 
the impact of excessive development during the bubble economy was apparent, 48 
percent replied that Japan’s townscape was not ‘good’ (Japan. Public Relations 
Office. Minister's Secretariat. Cabinet Office 2004). Furthermore, 61 percent of the 
respondents answered that living in residential areas with stricter development 
controls was appealing (Japan. Public Relations Office. Minister's Secretariat. 
Cabinet Office 2004). The clash of opinions between planning professionals and the 
general public about urban design exposes that Japan’s planning failed to include 
citizens’ views into planning as the public interest representing social life.
5.7 Conclusion
Japan’s planning policy in its long ‘post-war’ period exhibited both positive and 
negative aspects regarding the role of the state. First, Japan overcame its limitations 
of being a resource-scarce nation for industrialisation by implementing the 
comprehensive national spatial development plans. Afterwards, Japan successfully 
transformed itself as one of the most technologically advanced economies in the 
world by building effective transport networks and concentrating key industries at 
strategic locations. The collaboration between the state, businesses and society
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appeared to be effective in achieving national wealth in the public interest. However, 
the government’s overemphasis on economic development in planning overlooked 
the negative externalities produced by the market economy.
In addition, planning policy that was implemented to solve existing problems often 
resulted in further exacerbation of the environmental conditions. Japan’s post-war 
planning policy, based on national and regional economic development plans, ended 
up not only aggravating the negative effects of uneven development, but also 
diffusing environmental degradation to rural areas. The public interest of Japanese 
planning as ‘economic growth’ fundamentally contradicted the essence of the public 
interest in Western planning as ‘development control’ to reduce the social risks that 
accompany capitalism (Ashworth 1954; Benevolo 1967; Hall 1996a). 
Notwithstanding the environmental cost, Japan’s spatial planning was once effective 
to increase the output of the Japanese economy at least up to the 1960s.
However, when Japan’s industrialisation matured, the state-led spatial economic 
planning lost its advantages and began to show the downside of the cooperation 
between the state and the market. Thus, it is not surprising that when neo-liberals 
promoted their worldview, which planning policy could enhance Japan’s 
participation into a global and post-industrial economy, it was the Japanese planning 
policy that tore down the foundations of Japanese society - communities. The 
collapse of Japan’s bubble economy illustrated well the limitations of a self-regulated 
market ideology and its planning policy which focused solely on economic 
development.
Second, another problem of post-war Japanese planning is how the public sphere as a
political community has been structured in Japan. As the central government has
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almost exclusively gripped Japan’s planning policy, stakeholders who are able to 
influence planning decisions have been extremely limited, both in number and in 
diversity. The numerous political scandals involving convicted ministers, MPs, local 
government executives, top business leaders and mobs in connection with 
development projects (Hill 2003a; Kaplan and Dubro 2003; Schlesinger 1997) 
exemplifies the failure of Japan’s pluralism in planning policy-making (Calder 1988: 
Ch. 6,9). As to be explained in Chapter 6 and 7, ordinary citizens have had little 
access to information and opportunities in planning policy-making throughout post­
war years.
Citizens’ movements in the 1960s and 70s attempted to challenge Japan’s ‘iron 
triangle of the public sphere’ (politicians, bureaucrats and businesses), which was 
prevalent in its planning policy-making. Japan’s civil society demonstrated 
capacities and potentials in building an alternative model of the public interest in 
planning development (Avenell 2006; Ishida 1987a; Krauss and Simcock 1980; 
McKean 1981). Besides, during this era, the media and left-wing academics 
provided intellectual support to citizens’ movements (Matsushita 1971; Miyamoto 
1969; Ui and United Nations University 1992). Some local governments also 
responded to citizens’ demands and showed the ability to do so (Stockwin 1982; 
Tokyo. Metropolitan Government 1968).
Despite their influences on policy-making, Japan’s NPOs experienced considerable 
setbacks in the 1980s, and still face many obstacles towards having an active role in 
planning (Mason 1999; Pharr and Schwartz 2003). Once Japan achieved material 
affluence and overcame pollution problems, citizens’ movements seemed to lose 
impetus (Avenell 2006; Mason 1999). The marginalisation of the left in politics, as
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well as Japanese intellectuals’ discourse on post-modernism as cultural relativism, 
could be blamed for shrinking citizens’ movements (Kersten and Williams 2006; 
Pharr and Schwartz 2003). The Japanese media, which has been immersed in strong 
consumerism (Ashkenazi and Clammer 2000; Iida 2002; Skov and Moeran 1995), 
also appeared to lose its power to face market control (Pharr and Krauss 1996b; 
Westney 1996). While Japan’s NPOs seem to have revived again after the 1995 
Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake (Hirata 2002; Yamamoto 1999a), Japan’s civil society 
still has considerable challenges ahead towards the task of building a new paradigm 
of the public interest in planning (Pharr and Schwartz 2003).
Third, Japan’s post-war planning has been ignorant regarding the aspect of social life 
in urban design because the discourse of the public realm has been rarely constructed 
as common or social life in Japan. In addition, a number of Japan’s long-established 
social spaces, such as riverfronts and even rivers, disappeared due to factory 
development and the construction of highways (Jinnai 2001; Komhauser 1976; 
Koshizawa 1991). Although Japanese architects have long been generously 
supported by public sector initiatives (Buntrock 2002), the projects they carried out 
were in many cases just to boost national pride (e.g. Olympics, expositions) or to 
support economic development projects. For this reason, those works seldom 
represented communities where their works were built, even though local 
governments often financed such projects (Buntrock 2002; Knabe and Noennig 
1999; Nute 2004).
Moreover, the rise of strong consumerism in Japan made Japanese pieces of 
architecture increasingly corresponded to market symbols, and thus the concept of 
their design was reduced to more or less that of consumer products, which
214
emphasised differentiation rather than cohesion with indigenous environments. Such 
conditions resulted in a situation where pieces of architecture compete with each 
other. As a consequence, Japan’s urban design became very chaotic in post-war 
years (Buck 2000; Knabe and Noennig 1999).
In contrast to the urban chaos, Japan’s public spaces, which were built with 
regenerations and new towns, are spotless, but utilitarian and almost lifeless (Shelton 
1998: 168). This appearance reflects Japan’s strong modernist principles of 
scientific rationality in planning orthodoxy (Marshall 2002: 44; Masser and Yorisaki
1994). Observers also claim that many new public spaces of waterfront development 
projects, which were designed to symbolise the ‘new urban life in the global city’, 
have been almost deserted (Cybriwsky 1999; Marshall 2002: Ch. 3 & 4). This also 
contradicts the conventional belief that the high population density together with the 
topography of Japanese cities resulted in the lack of public spaces within them. 
Although a number of public spaces were created in the post-war period, they do not 
seem to respond to the needs of users, and this is because there were not sufficient 
public consultations in the Japanese planning system. As such, the absence of 
‘public as social life’ deprived citizens of the sense of a community.
Fourth, in relation to accessibility and participation issues in planning policy-making, 
women’s voices have hardly been incorporated into Japan’s post-war planning. 
Spatial exclusion of women from the public domain seems to have persisted in 
contemporary Japan. Japanese cities have continued to expand outwards and
ro
commuting times have become longer (Tokyo. Metropolitan Government 1998:
58 48.4 percent of the daytime population of Tokyo’s 23 special wards comes from outside this 
administrative area.
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147). Whereas male workers are expected to work long hours, female workers are 
expected to quit their jobs after the birth of their first child and to become full time 
housewives (Imamura 1987). Many housewives in suburban areas are isolated at 
home with inconvenient access to nurseries, shopping facilities, doctors and other 
public facilities (Nihon Keizai Shimbun 2005: 13-16).
Japanese cities have also not been designed very well for children and the elderly 
(Nihon Keizai Shimbun 1996). There are few open spaces, day care centres, elderly 
homes and recreation facilities that match with residents’ needs (Tokyo. 
Metropolitan Government 1998). Japan’s typical narrow streets are not divided for 
pedestrians and cars. Many streets are not well lit, and electric light poles and 
bicycles occupy pavements whose surfaces are not always smooth. Women are 
worse off by these conditions, as they dominantly engage in non-paid work as carers 
and also live longer than men. These facts explain that not only women were 
excluded from voicing their opinions in planning policy-making processes (Ueno
1995), but also few female professionals, academics and civil servants worked to 
promote an alternative view of the public interest in planning (Koito 2004).
Whereas post-war Japan experienced significant transformations in its political, 
economic and social life, the concept of the public interest in planning hardly 
changed from the Meiji period. Despite implementing many policy reforms, why did 
Japan’s planning principles remain unaffected? To answer this question, Chapter 6 
concentrates on the analysis of Japan’s planning institutions, and Chapter 7 provides 




Chapter Six: Japan’s Planning Institutions and the Public Interest
While the public interest in planning was treated as moral obligation which planners 
have to comply with in post-war UK (Campbell and Marshall 2000; Campbell and 
Marshall 2002; Faludi 1973; Howe 1992; Ward 1994), there are three stages of 
planning policy implementation in which the public interest is discussed: first, at the 
legislature branch, second at the administrative branch, and third at the judicial 
branch. However, Japanese planning history detailed in Part 2 revealed that the role 
of its planners was different from the British one, and its planning policy seemed to 
develop, regarding the public interest with nothing more than economic growth. The 
purpose of this chapter is to find out why the concept of the public interest in 
Japanese planning system did not work to protect citizen’s interests as public goods 
through the examination of its institutions at the three stages of planning 
implementation.
Reviewing the planning history in Britain, the concept of the public interest was first 
identified in court in the name of ‘nuisance’ (McAuslan 1975; McAuslan 1980). 
Thereafter, the British planning system grew by incorporating the public interest idea 
into new legislation (Hall 1996a; Ward 1994). Likewise, along with the 
development of democracy in the twentieth century, Western capitalist states not 
only had to mediate market failures in land-use, but also they came under growing 
pressure to provide more public goods such as social housing, open spaces and good 
urban design; all in the public interest (Cherry 1996; Hall 1996a; Ward 1994). 
Finally, disagreeing with the technocrats’ discourse on the public interest in planning, 
citizens started to demand direct participation in planning policy-making by claiming 
an alternative concept of the public interest from below (Barlow 1995; Friedmann
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1973; Hague and McCourt 1974; Hall 1996b). As such, the concept of the public 
interest served as a vehicle to mobilise Western planning systems.
In contrast to the development in the West, there has been noteworthy absence of 
discussions concerning what the public interest of planning should be at legislature 
and administrative branches in Japan. In addition, Japanese courts have also been 
reluctant to broaden the concept of the public interest in planning59. I would argue 
that the lack of open dialogues about the public interest in Japan’s planning system 
has contributed to relative low levels of quality of urban life in Japan.
This chapter explores why the concept of the public interest has failed to take 
account of citizens’ concerns for built environments in Japan and why the situation 
has remained unchanged. Section 6.1 and 6.2 examines institutional problems which 
precluded many citizens from representing their opinions as the public interest in 
Japanese planning system through analysing the nation’s legislative and 
administrative procedures. Section 6.3 investigates Japan’s judicial review system 
when citizens challenge the concept of the public interest of proposed developments. 
Section 6.4 summarises the findings from the analysis in this chapter and leads to the 
more detailed investigation in the following chapter as to how the public interest in 
planning has been interpreted through the study of prominent court cases in Japan.
6.1 The Legislation Process and the Public Interest
One of the most distinctive features of Japanese planning is that statute laws and 
central government orders have determined the future of the built environment. This 
is in sharp contrast to the cases of many Western countries where local governments’
59 This reluctance will be fully explored in Chapter 7.
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master plans, ordinances and initiatives matter most in shaping local land-use (Hall 
1996a). Furthermore, statute planning laws and national spatial planning in Japan 
have often not been aimed at land-use controls; instead, they are designed to provide 
frameworks for economic development as detailed in Chapter 5. In addition, as I 
explain later in this chapter, statute laws take precedence over local ordinances and 
community interests, limiting local governments’ autonomy to implement their own 
visions about spatial plans. Given the importance of statute planning laws and state- 
led development projects in Japan, it is important to understand how actual statute 
planning laws have been formed and why a diversity of opinions have not been 
incorporated into legislation sufficiently in Japan.
The effect of one-party dominance in parliament
First of all, as explained in previous two chapters, Japan’s post-war planning 
development has been conditioned by the long-term political structure of one-party 
dominance in parliament. The major supporters of the LDP have been big and small 
businesses and farmers so that the needs of urban dwellers tended to be weighed less 
in Japanese politics. In the period of rapid urbanisation, there were neither adequate 
housing policies nor planning policies that sufficiently dealt with the large influx of 
migration into metropolitan areas. The provision of housing was left almost 
completely to the market60. There were no coordinated efforts to provide adequate 
infrastructures for these urban developments. As a result of the government’s 
indifference to the provision of affordable housing, housing prices in Japan’s 
metropolitan areas have been significantly high throughout post-war years. Also, the
60 In 1998, rented public housing only accounted for 8 percent in the three largest metropolitan areas 
(Japan. Housing Policy Division of Housing Bureau of The Ministry of Land Infrastructure and 
Transport, 2003 :12)
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quality of housing and urban environments is far below other OECD countries61. 
Regardless of the pressing urban problems, the government has been unsuccessful in 
enforcing laws to curb the freedom of land-use as the ruling LDP has relied on the 
votes of landowners of farmland and businesses in urban areas.
The reason why urban voters have not been able to influence urban policy-making is 
twofold. First, there has been an imbalance in the distribution of voting weights 
between the urban and rural electorate (Horiuchi and Saito 2003). Although there 
was substantial migration from rural to urban areas, the government has not made 
sufficient efforts to correct this imbalance. The use of the old distribution of voting 
weights means that the weight of urban votes is lower than their population share, 
which favours the rural population. Second, the central government mostly controls 
planning and housing policy under the influences of fierce lobbying activities from 
powerful interest groups (mainly business organisations and farmers’ cooperatives). 
Therefore, it is almost impossible for urban dwellers to change unfavourable 
conditions without giving more planning powers to local governments. The present 
situation has acted as a strong obstacle to introduce new legislation that favours the 
urban electorate in parliament.
Weak civil society
In comparison to other advanced democracies, the role of civil society in planning 
legislation has been very limited in Japan (Cherry 1996; Hallett 1988; Pennington 
2000). Although the concept of civil society is contestable (Hall 1995; Schwartz 
2003; Taylor 1997), free associations consist of integral components of civil society
61 See chapter 1.
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in Western liberal democracies. Civil society can also be seen as a part of the public 
sphere of a political community (Habermas 1997). In principle, civil society is 
considered to be autonomous from both the market and the state (Habermas 1997).
One can argue that many free associations have existed in post-war Japan. Indeed, 
some organisations, such as business associations, agricultural associations and trade 
unions, have been actively involved in politics and heavily influenced policy-making 
in Japan. However, these associations can be better described as ‘interest groups’ 
who try to persuade the state to enact certain legislation and policy in favour of their 
own economic interests (Park 2000). These resourceful associations in Japan are 
often identified as business interest groups such as Nippon Keidanren (Nippon Keizai 
Dantai Rengdkai, Japan Business Federation). These key interest groups are very 
different from the associations of ‘authentic’ civil society, which can be described as 
‘self-organized, voluntary, democratically structured, tolerant, and civic-minded as 
well as autonomous from the state’ (Schwartz 2003:33). Therefore, although 
commercial and professional associations did play important roles concerning 
planning legislation in Japan (Hanayama 1986; Igarashi 2003b; Igarashi and Ogawa 
1993; McCormack 2001; Samuels 1983), the role of ‘civil associations’ 62 has 
remained limited.
Another distinctive feature of civil associations in Japan is their close links to the 
state. Major civil associations in Japan, which were founded during pre-war times, 
have still maintained the characteristics of state-sponsored organisations. For
62 In his theory of social capital, Robert Putnam distinguishes between civil associations (networks of 
civil engagement which should be primary ‘horizontal’, and which members’ power and status are 
equal) and ‘vertical networks’ (which rely on patron-client relations). Putnam, Robert D. 1993. 
Social capital and institutional success. In Making democracy work: civic traditions in modern Italy, 
edited by R. D. Putnam, R. Leonardi and R. Nanetti. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press.
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example, Agricultural Cooperatives (Ndkyd) and the Women’s Christian Temperance 
Union (Nihon Kirisutokyd Fujin Kydfukai) were both mobilised to promote the 
government sponsored Local Improvement Movement (chihd kairyo undo) 
between 1906 and 1918 (Garon 1994; Pyle 1973). Contemporary neighbourhood 
associations in Japan (chdnai-kai, jichi-kai or tonari-gumi) originated from the 
nation’s total war era, when the Home Ministry ordered to create of new 
neighbourhood associations (Evans 2001; Garon 2003). These were to replace the 
old ones to strengthen war-dejected communities and mobilise them effectively for 
the war (Garon 2003).
In fact, the pre-war pattern of civil society development in Japan, in which the state 
shaped the goals and practices of civil organisations, seems to have remained in post­
war years (Evans 2002; Garon 2003; Pekkanen 2003). Even consumer protest 
movements in the 1960s, though independently organised by associations such as 
Shufu Rengdkai (the Housewives' Federation), ended up cooperating fully with 
government and business representatives rather than campaigning for their goals 
(Maclachlan 2003). This cooperative and vertical relationship between the state and 
civil associations is also found in welfare provisions in pre-war and contemporary 
Japan (Estevez-Abe 2003; Garon 1997). This attitude seems to reflect state-society 
relationships in Japan. As I explained in Chapter 3, a word for ‘society’ did not exist 
in the early Meiji period and there is still a tendency to equate society to the state in 
contemporary Japan.
63 The idea of the Garden City was introduced together with the Port Sunlight Village and Boumville 
development by the Home Ministry as a strategy to make this campaign successful. (Ishida 1987: 
177-78)
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The Japanese tend to connect their own identity to that of the state as well (Befu 
1998; Iida 2002; Maruyama and Morris 1963; Stronach 1995). This is seen as an 
important reason why Japanese citizens were easily organised for the totalitarian 
regime and passionately supported economic nationalism in post-war years (Garon 
1997; Iida 2002; Maruyama and Morris 1963; McVeigh 2004). The public sphere or 
democracy cannot be constructed without autonomous citizens whose identities are 
separated from the state. The underlying problem facing civil society in Japan is that 
the concept of citizenship, which can make civil society viable, has not been 
established among its citizens.
Although citizenship is a central element of democracy, there has been much 
confusion about the meaning of citizenship and civil society when these concepts 
were imported to Japan. The concept of citizenship is derived from the ancient 
Roman/Greek traditions of politics. In the European medieval age, it was understood 
to represent a contract between citizens and city-states (Riesenberg 1992). When the 
idea of civil society and citizenship attracted intellectual attention in the late 
twentieth century, it was discussed in relation to eighteenth century European 
bourgeoisie civil society where the liberal elite succeeded in eliminating the absolute 
power of monarchies and installed the nation-state through the parliament as an 
institution representing citizens’ wills (Habermas 1987). From these ideas, some 
Japanese intellectuals have interpreted that citizens (shimin) are those who are 
willing to undertake duties and responsibilities for the nation-state in exchange for 
citizenship [rights] (shiminken) (Saeki 1997; Willis 2002; Yagi 2001). Thus, they 
claim that Japanese people who only assert their rights through citizens’ movements
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without serving to the state are ‘private people’64, not citizens (Hasegawa 2001; 
Saeki 1997; Yagi 2001).
As these Japanese academics believe, the concept of citizenship in Europe originally 
applied to a limited part of the population in society. However, this has changed. In 
contemporary democratic states, individual rights have always defined the idea of 
citizenship (McNeely 1998: 9). Japanese citizens are all entitled to civil, political 
and social citizenship under the 1946 Constitution. Nonetheless, because Of the 
strong suppression of citizenship rights before 1945 and more invisible cultural 
oppression in the name of ‘nationalism’65 in post-war Japan, many Japanese citizens 
were prevented from having a strong sense of citizenship (Befu 1998; Garon 2003; 
McVeigh 2004; Stronach 1995; Wolferen 1988).
The role of the Japanese media
With regard to the public sphere, the media has played a central role in contemporary 
society to shape what the public interest entails. Compared to other advanced 
economies, Japan’s news media is in fact highly developed and influential. The
64 ‘Private people’ is also referred to as ‘shimin’. In Japanese, the term citizens (shimin) are translated 
literally as ‘city people’. Saeki (1997) criticises the contemporary notion of citizens in Japan as those 
who are opposed to state policies but ignorant to their responsibilities to the state.
65 Saeki (1997) wrote Chapter 5 tSokoku no tameni shinu to iukoto (death for the sake of the nation)’ 
in his book ‘Shimintowa Dareka (Who are citizens?)’ to explain that citizens [in the old Europe] are 
those who dare to die for the nation in case of war in return for citizenship. Saeki’s disapproval of 
Japanese ‘citizens’ in the post-war period implicitly comes from the fact that the Japanese are 
exempted from this duty because of Japan’s renunciation of war under the Constitution. A similar 
type of criticism to the notion of ‘shimin’ is reflected in the antagonism towards the three Japanese 
hostages captured in Iraq in April 2004. One was a freelance journalist and two of them were NGO 
activists (shimin unddka). These members of left-wing citizen movements are often referred to as 
‘professional] shimin’ in contemporary Japan. Egged on by the conservative Japanese media 
coverage, the public gave them the cold shoulder on their return to Japan, believing that the 
government should not have been carrying the responsibility for their safety, as they stayed in Iraq 
despite the government’s prohibition to travel there. McCurry, Justin. 2005. Charity ends at home: 
the outpouring o f compassion fo r the Japanese citizens captured in Iraq has ended abruptly following 
their release [Tokyo dispatch]. Guardian News and Media Limited, 20 April 2004 [cited 22 June 
2005]. Available from http://www.guardian.co.Uk/elsewhere/journalist/story/0,, 1196028,00.html.
225
circulation of newspapers per 1,000 persons reached 653.5 copies in 2002, in 
comparison with 402.4 copies in the U.K and 269.2 copies in the US (World 
Associations of Newspapers 2003). Also, the NHK (.Nihon Hoso Kydkai, Japan 
Broadcasting Corporation), had a budget of 673.8 billion Yen for 2003/4 (Japan 
Broadcasting Corporation 2004), making it one of the largest public broadcasting 
systems in the world. Moreover, because the social contacts of average citizens are 
relatively limited to their community and work circles in Japan, people tend to rely 
on information provided by the media on how to behave in various social situations 
(Feldman 1993). In this context, with its sheer size and single official language, the 
Japanese media has an enormous influence in shaping public opinions and values.
Despite its potential to stimulate discussions on the public interest in state affairs, the 
Japanese media has not satisfactorily fulfilled this role as generally expected by the 
public in the modem state. Although the freedom of speech is fully guaranteed by 
the Constitution, the Japanese media still has a legacy of suppression from state- 
sponsorship, state control and self-censorship in pre-war time (Farley 1996) and 
during the US’s occupation period (Dower 1999). Consequently, the mainstream 
news media tends to constrain itself to be non-partisan, impartial and neutral 
(Feldman 1993). In addition, they have not provided sufficient coverage of sensitive 
topics such as ultra right-wing activists, religions, the Imperial family and Japan’s 
two million former outcasts called burakumin66 (Farley 1996).
66 Burakumin are Japan’s social minority group who used to be engaged in ‘dirty’ works under the 
term of Buddhism and Shinto such as killing animals and making leather goods during the feudal 
period. Although they gained the legal citizenship status equal with other Japanese in 1871, 
discriminations towards them continued in modem Japan. Many of them still live in socially 
segregated neighbourhoods {hisabetsu buraku) and excluded from the mainstream society. Su-lan 
Reber, Emily A. 1999. Buraku Mondai in Japan: historical and modem perspectives and directions for 
the future. Harvard Human Rights Journal 12 (Spring):297-360.
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This self-restraint of the media has been enhanced by the existence of press clubs 
which exclusively control news sources and the activities of journalists. These so- 
called ‘information cartels’ have severely crippled the role of the media as an integral 
part of the public sphere in post-war Japan (Freeman 2003). These cartels have 
forced journalists to rely on information provided by the state, thus weakening the 
media’s political audit function, limiting its agenda-setting role, marginalising non­
mainstream media and homogenising news and opinions (Freeman 2003). As a 
result, the Japanese media has received serious criticism for its lack of diversity in 
coverage, even masking the reality of Japanese politics (Farley 1996; Krauss 1996; 
Westney 1996).
Furthermore, with the growing commercialisation of the mass media in 
contemporary society, Japanese media’s support for businesses and its narrow scope 
of coverage have sometimes led commentators to dismiss the possible negative 
impacts of development projects and new planning legislation on the quality of life 
of citizens (Groth 1996; Igarashi 2003b; Igarashi and Ogawa 1993). For example, 
very little attention was given to Prime Minister Koizumi’s Urban Renaissance 
Projects (Japan. Urban Renaissance Headquarters 2002) after the collapse of the 
bubble economy, although the projects further undermined the development control 
of metropolitan areas (Igarashi 2003b). In consequence, Japanese media has 
unintentionally helped the establishment to exercise the third dimension of power, as 
Lukes describes as follows:
is it not the supreme and most insidious exercise of power to prevent 
people, to whatever degree, from having grievances by shaping their 
perceptions, cognitions and preference in such a way that they accept 
their role in the existing order of things, either because they can see or 
imagine no alternative to it, or because they see it as natural and
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unchangeable, or because they value it as divinely ordained and 
beneficial (Lukes 1974:24)?
Considering the potentially significant influences of the media on agenda setting in
politics, this relative indifference or bias of the Japanese press towards planning
matters has weakened citizens’ awareness concerning the public interest in planning
policy-making.
Underdeveloped policy community
Corresponding to its environment of civil society, there is no Japanese equivalent to 
the open ‘policy community’ that exists in advanced Western democracies 
(Nakamura 2000). A policy community here means academics, the researchers of 
think tanks and NPOs who have capacities to conduct research and offer policy 
options to the public. In Nakamura’s view,
in the interest of greater policy pluralism the promotion of more open
and transparent policy debates with a diversity of actors, wider 
dissemination of policy information and establishment of higher 
education in policy research is essential to improve the current policy­
making process in Japan (Nakamura 2000: 42).
As she points out, the majority of think tanks in Japan are private profit-making 
institutions, and are often subsidiaries of conglomerates that conduct contract-based 
research for the government. As a result, their research may suffer from problems of 
accountability and the disclosure of information (Nakamura 2000).
Similarly, academics in Japan have played a minor role in policy-making. There has 
been a long tradition of political neutrality (Nakayama 1984; Nakayama 1991), or 
even ‘aloofness from vulgarity of the state affairs’ (Tsurutani 1986: 103), among 
Japanese academics in their research topics. Consequently, virtually no academic 
institutions specialised in policy research until very recently. Likewise, planning
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education in Japan has also offered little with regard to the analysis of planning law 
and public administration as explained in Chapter 3 (Masser and Yorisaki 1994: 118- 
122).
On the other hand, during the pre-war period, mainstream Japanese academics, in 
particular those who from the Department of Law of the University of Tokyo who 
were regarded as presenting authoritarian views about policy-making, enjoyed high 
social status (Barshay 1988; Marshall 1977; Pyle 1974). Their opinions were solely 
focused on national economic development, and thus contributed to exclude anti- 
nationalistic views (Barshay 1988; Marshall 1977; Pyle 1974). Their pre-eminence 
in Japan’s policy-making is still visible from their presence in exclusive policy
(\ Hadvisory councils (shingikai) . Combined with the lack of debates on planning 
policy in the press, the absence of an open policy community has further prevented 
the public interest from being democratically constructed in Japan’s planning policy­
making.
The dominance of central bureaucracy over policy-making
With weak civil society and the underdeveloped policy community, the bureaucracy 
(in particular the central bureaucracy) has dominated post-war planning policy­
making process in Japan. As I explained earlier, the central bureaucracy has not 
been insulated from influences of politicians and strong interest groups. More 
accurately, central bureaucracy, MPs and strong interest groups have operated in a 
situation of co-dependency when it comes to planning policy-making. (Igarashi and 
Ogawa 1993; McCormack 2001; Woodall 1996). The central bureaucracy has
67 These will be discussed in the following section.
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performed a core function in the so-called ‘iron triangle’ of Japan’s policy-making, 
by controlling the legislation process from the drawing up of bills (Igarashi and 
Ogawa 1995; Pempel 1974) to guiding the outcomes of the reports from policy 
advisory councils (Noguchi 1993; Pempel 1974; Tsurutani 1986).
The function of policy advisory councils are said to exist to incorporate experts’ 
knowledge and the views of various interested parties into legislation in the public 
interest. There were 237 national policy advisory councils in 1975 although the 
number was dropped to 103 in 2004 after the Central Government Reform in 2001 
(Japan. Gender Equality Bureau. The Cabinet Office 2004a). However, the 
bureaucracies’ exclusive choice of discussion topics (Noguchi 1993; Pempel 1974), 
the expected role of academics in policy-making (Noguchi 1993; Tsurutani 1986), 
the lack of independent research staffs of advisory councils (Pempel 1974) and the 
fact that the council members predominantly consist of (ex) bureaucrats (Pempel 
1974) and business interests, all seem to distort this intended purpose of representing 
the public interest. In fact, specific interest groups which are likely to oppose the 
authority’s views have been mostly excluded from or underrepresented in policy 
advisory councils (Harari 1990: 145).
Particularly influential policy advisory councils in post-war Japan have been the Tax
/TO
Commission (Zeisei Chdsakai) and the Economic Council (Keizai Shingikai) . The 
opinions of the members of these councils have been highly influential, because of 
their leading positions in the fields of business and academia. For example, the 
members of the last Economic Council in 2000 were dominated by the presidents of
68 The Economic Council was dissolved after the Economic Planning Agency was dismantled 
following the Central Government Reform in 2001. The function of the Council was divided into a 
number of councils and then moved under the supervision of the Cabinet Office.
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large companies such as Toyota Motors, Hitachi, Ishikawajima Harima Heavy 
Industries, Fuji Xerox, Nippon Life Insurance, Nihon Keizai Shimbun and 
Ndrinchukin Bank (Norin Chuo Kinko). These companies usually hold large parcels 
of land in major cities in Japan. The Tax Commission has produced many reports 
which have also been in favour of industries (Johnson 1990: 49). Following their 
recommendations, tax rates have been revised frequently in Japan. Although the 
proposals from these Councils can be challenged in parliament, it has been rare that 
their recommendations are overruled (Johnson 1990: 50).
Restrictions on local planning regulations
While the central bureaucracy has been in charge of the strong development-oriented 
planning policy, local governments has only weak authority in the enactment of local 
planning ordinances. Growing suburban areas have experienced financial difficulties 
for providing life and social infrastructures for new residential developments, as 
national planning laws do not include any form of development charges or planning 
gains for new developments. As I explain fully in Chapter 7, regardless of these 
flaws, local governments are not allowed to enforce stricter planning controls on 
developments by local ordinances.
Moreover, as for municipalities that contain natural or historical assets, there are 
problems when they wish to protect their special environmental qualities, as national 
planning laws have failed to include regulations on the control of landscape and 
visual amenities except for the four Japanese old cultural cities and areas where 
designated to protect townscape under the City Planning Act69. Although local
69 This changed in June 2004, when the Landscape Act (Keikan Ho) was promulgated.
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governments are also not able to protect those local community interests as the public 
interest by local ordinances, local authorities cannot impose voluntary development 
agreements on developer either. Legal cases examined in Chapter 7 show that those 
informal planning controls exercised by local authorities were powerless when 
developers resisted such agreements in court.
Poor female representation in policy-making
The most significant obstacle to incorporate women’s views in Japanese planning in 
the public interest is their low level of representation in its policy decision-making 
processes. The ratio of female parliament members in Japan (at the House of 
Representatives) in 2002 was a mere 7.3 percent, compared to Sweden’s 45.3 percent 
and the UK’s 17.9 percent (Japan. Gender Equality Bureau. The Cabinet Office 
2004b: 1). Similarly, the participation of female members in local assemblies was 
also only 7 percent in 2002 (Japan. Gender Equality Bureau. The Cabinet Office 
2004b). Women's participation in national policy advisory councils and committees 
has progressed under the government recommendation. From about 2 percent in 
1974, the share of female members in these councils reached over 28 percent in 2004 
(Japan. Gender Equality Bureau. The Cabinet Office 2004a: 2).
Despite the poor level of female representation in policy-making, women have 
generally shown more interest in politics compared to men in Japan. For instance, 
the voting rate among women has been higher than among men throughout post-war 
years (Japan. Gender Equality Bureau. The Cabinet Office 2003: 11). Furthermore, 
women in fact have been very enthusiastic in participating in the activities of non­
profit organisations in post-war Japan (Habe 1998; Lam 1999; LeBlanc 1999;
Yamamoto 2004). A couple of surveys conducted in the 1990s suggest that 70 to 80
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percent of Japan’s voluntary labour force is female (Habe 1998). Considering 
Japanese women’s interest in public affairs, there seems to be significant institutional 
and cultural barriers for women to voice their opinions in politics in post-war Japan.
Another constraint to include the female view in planning is that women are still 
underrepresented in professions that can shape the vision of public policies. For 
instance, the number of female researchers in Japan is still small, as its ratio was 11.6 
percent in 2004 (Japan. Ministry of Education Culture Sports Science and 
Technology 2005: 51). Moreover, the share of female national government 
employees of all public employees in Japan was about 20.2 percent 1999; in 
comparison, this figure was 49.1 percent in the UK and 53 percent in the Philippines 
(Japan. Gender Equality Bureau. The Cabinet Office 2003: 12).
A further striking example of the poor presence of women in policy-making is 
provided by the share of females in managerial positions in national government: in 
Japan, this percentage was meagre 1.4 percent in 1999, which differs greatly from 
the UK’s 17.2 percent, the Philippines’ 34.8 percent and Sweden’s 51 percent (Japan. 
Gender Equality Bureau. The Cabinet Office 2003: 12). Females are also 
underrepresented at managerial posts in local governments, as the ratio of female 
executives was 4.5 percent in prefectural governments and 5.9 percent in cabinet- 
order designated cities (Japan. Gender Equality Bureau. The Cabinet Office 2003: 
34). These statistics clearly show the under-representation of females at strategic 
levels of Japan’s policy administrations, which indicates that female viewpoints will 
not be easily integrated into planning legislation.
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6.2 Planning Administration and the Public Interest
This section explores constraints that have prevented citizens’ opinions, in particular 
those of local residents, from being represented as the public interest in Japan’s 
planning administration. Major limitations are the values of planning professionals, 
the relationship between the different tiers of governments, and planners’ roles in 
Japan’s planning governance. Most importantly, there is no mechanism to guarantee 
citizens’ views being integrated into the implementation of proposed plans. The 
section explains why such problems arouse.
The ethics of Japanese planners
Japanese planners, unlike in the Western planning model (Campbell and Marshall 
2000; Thomas and Healey 1991; Wachs 1985), are not very much mindful of the 
public interest as a professional code. This seems related with an identity and roles 
as a planner in public administrations in Japan. There are three reasons for the 
relative weak position of planners in Japanese administrative bodies. Those factors 
appear to have resulted in the underdevelopment of professional ethics in planning. 
First, urban and regional planning has yet to be recognised as an independent policy 
science. There is still a strong tradition to see planning as a part of technology-based 
sciences, including civil engineering, architecture, landscape design and construction. 
A survey conducted by the City Planning Institute of Japan (CPIJ) in 2001 shows 
that the final degree of 78 percent of CPU’s members falls in these ‘technology’ 
categories (Special Editorial Committee for 50th Anniversary Special Issue of City 
Planning Review 2001a: 146). Furthermore, although the graduates of ‘urban or
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7 0social engineering’ programmes at Japanese universities comprise 11.5 percent of 
the CPU’s ordinary members (Special Editorial Committee for 50th Anniversary 
Special Issue of City Planning Review 2001b: 146), those programmes have rarely 
addressed administrative issues in planning implementations or the ethics of planners 
(Masser and Yorisaki 1994: 118-122).
Second, the career path of planners at either the central or local government is 
ambiguous. The Japanese government generally hires planning technocrats for jobs 
which are specified for civil engineers or architects, not for planners. This can be 
seen from the finding that only 9 percent of recent planning graduates work for either 
the central or local governments, whereas 37 percent work in construction and real 
estate and further 12 percent in think tanks and consultancies (Special Editorial 
Committee for 50th Anniversary Special Issue of City Planning Review 2001b: 161). 
In essence, the survey illustrates that planning has not been identified as an 
independent policy area in Japan: instead, it is viewed as a by-product of carrying out 
construction and development projects.
Third, as discussed in Chapter 4 and 5, Japan’s planning policy-making was 
propelled by MITI’s economic development plans. The initiatives of ministries and 
public companies followed the grand design of national economic development. 
Considering the institutional settings surrounding planning, the role of planning and 
planners in Japan is very different from Western models. Japanese planning has a 
strong orientation towards the provision of physical infrastructures in support of 
economic growth rather than the control of land-use by planners of the public sector. 
In addition, the private sector, in particular construction and real estate firms, has a
70 These programmes are equivalent to Western planning school programmes.
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strong influence on Japanese planning policy, because their employees constitute 
core members of Japan’s planning professional bodies. In this environment, it is 
difficult to develop a Western planning model, where planners would execute 
development control in the public interest.
The absence of local master plans
In addition to weak development controls in Japan’s planning system, there was no 
mandated master planning system at the prefectural and municipal levels until 
recently. As a result, it was very difficult for the general public to know about future 
land-uses and what types of developments were planned in specific sites. Land-use 
planning maps simply display the boundaries of the City Planning Area, the UP As, 
the UCAs and different zoning areas. As zoning control has not been sophisticated
71enough to fully control different land-uses in Japan , any development was allowed, 
as long as it complied with zoning controls and the Building Standards Act.
Furthermore, the National Land Use Plan (kokudo riyd keikaku) only designates five 
types of land uses -  urban use (city planning areas), agricultural promotion, forest, 
national parks and natural conservation areas, which are decided by individual 
ministers (Sorensen 2002). In the same manner, CNDPs and other Metropolitan 
Region Development Plans merely present guidelines where particular types of 
development should be carried out. In the absence of any master planning system up 
to 1992, there was no proper regional and urban planning system that stipulated land- 
use plans, but only state-led development plans were implemented without much 
consultation with local residents (Watanabe 1990). Ultimately, both the state and the
71 There were only eight zoning categories until 1992.
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general public have long understood urban and regional planning as meaning 
‘development’. In this context, planning has existed in the sphere of the national 
interest. The major planning decisions are the responsibility of ministries, public 
companies and private-public partnership companies, and are far removed from local 
and community interests.
Restricted local planning autonomy
In addition to the subordination of local ordinances to national planning laws, local 
planning administration is tightly controlled by the central government as well. 
Local governments have little freedom in their local planning decisions, as they are 
expected to perform the tasks that are delegated by central bureaucracy72. Most 
planning decisions require the approval of governors and ministers (Igarashi and 
Ogawa 1993). Moreover, as explained in the section of the implementation of the 
1968 City Planning Act, day-to-day operations of local planning decisions are strictly 
controlled by means of central government’s ordinances and ministerial circulars or 
communications (tsutatsu). Although circulars are a very simple form of
administrative guidance, they are powerful enough to change or distort the original 
intention of the laws (Pempel 1974). Local planning officers are obliged to adhere to 
the technical interpretations of planning laws endorsed by these additional directives.
Besides the ministries’ quasi-legal controls of local planning practices, Japan’s 
central bureaucracy is directly able to carry out planning development projects and 
interfere in local planning policy through two other ways. One is through local
72 These tasks are called kikan inin jimu.
73 In Japan, ordinances are categorised into cabinet (seirei) and ministerial (shdrei). The ordinances 
are intended to give directions how to deal with non-political and technical matters of the 
implementation of laws (Pempel, 1974).
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branch offices (desaki kikan) of the central government, and the other is through 
special public companies (tokushu hdjiri), as mentioned before (Samuels 1983; 
Steiner 1965). The existence of local branch offices is the residue of Japan’s pre-war 
local government system, when the Home Ministry controlled local governments 
through appointed governors at prefectural level (Steiner 1965). The functions of 
local government offices often overlap with the ones of prefectures, so that the 
continuation of the system has resulted in the obstruction of local autonomy (Steiner 
1965). Special public companies, often established for infrastructure developments, 
even bypass the jurisdiction of local planning controls. Again, the creation of 
numerous special purpose public companies has led to further undermining of local 
planning power.
Insufficient local funding for planning
Financial controls by central government are also a barrier for local planning 
autonomy. Approximately 30 percent of Japan’s local government revenue has come 
from local tax. In 2002, local government tax and user fees for government facilities 
consisted of 34.4 percent and 16.3 percent of the local government revenue 
respectively (Japan. Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2004a). Local 
bond and subsidies made up of the rest of the local government revenue (14.5 percent 
and 24.7 percent correspondingly); however their use is tightly controlled by central 
government (Japan. Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2004a).
Subsidies (hojokin) to local governments can broadly be divided into two categories.
The general local allocation tax (chihd kofu zei) is allocated according to basic local
needs and its distribution is linked with major national taxes. Therefore, there is no
further control from the central government for its use (Steiner 1965). In contrast,
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specific subsidies (tokutei hojokin) and the national treasury disbursements (kokko 
shishutsukin) are allocated to local governments to complete specific project in either 
the joint interest of local and national governments or only in the national interest 
(Steiner 1965: 284). For the fiscal year of 2002, 16.1 percent of prefectural 
government revenues in Japan came from the national treasury disbursements (Japan. 
Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications 2004b: 5).
Japanese central government can exert a great influence on local planning matters 
through those specific subsidies. In fact, nearly 40 percent of the specific subsidies 
were allocated for physical infrastructure building projects, so called kokyo jigyd 
(direct translation is public works) until recently. For a long time, special subsidies 
allocated to local governments for the construction of infrastructures were larger than 
subsidies for welfare benefits or for compulsory education. Although this has 
changed somewhat in recent years, infrastructure still represents a large share (31.9 
percent in 2002) of total local government special subsidies (Japan. Ministry of 
Internal Affairs and Communications 2004a: 466).
The shortage of knowledge in local planning authorities
The lack of planning knowledge in local governments hinders local planning
i
autonomy in Japan. It is widely accepted that since the TCRO in 1888, Japan’s
planning system has been shaped through the successive importation of Western
planning techniques and ideas (Seta 2003; Watanabe 2003). Benefiting from elite-
centred training programmes since Meiji era, central bureaucrats have developed
professional knowledge in public administration and gave guidance to local civil
servants (Burks 1985; Japan. National Personnel Authority 2003). While Japanese
planning schools rarely offer courses about public management, central bureaucrats
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have had more opportunities to gain advanced knowledge of public administration by 
studying at international graduate schools and participating in internship programmes 
at Western government bodies and international organisations74.
Japan’s central bureaucrats, business elites who work for profit-making think tanks 
and developers have continuously imported advanced planning techniques from the 
West. Britain’s Garden Cities, New Towns, Enterprise Zones, Private Finance 
Initiatives (PFIs) and the US’s transfer of development right (TDR) were all 
introduced to Japan and integrated into its planning system in certain forms, which 
were not necessarily the same as the original ones. These planning innovations have 
been handed down to local governments from the ministries through new legislation. 
Consequently, planners working in local government often end up merely executing 
these new planning techniques, under tight specifications laid down by the ministries 
through new laws.
In addition to the fact that the central ministries derive power from their supervising 
position, they can also influence local planning policy through the transfer of 
personnel. There is an established system in Japan in which elite central bureaucrats 
occupy some important posts in local governments for some years during their career 
paths. This exercise reinforces the vertical relationship between central and local 
governments and encourages local civil servants to seek advice from upper tiers of 
governments (Samuels 1983; Steiner 1965).
74 Since the Meiji Restoration, Japan’s elite bureaucrats have been sent to abroad to study advanced 
Western science and technology. This tradition has continued as the Japanese central government has 
established various training programme abroad for its career bureaucrats. For example, from 1966 to 
2002, 1,658 bureaucrats studied in graduate schools in the USA (1,208) England (230), and other 
Western countries (Japan. National Personnel Authority 2004) while this type of training is not 
usually available to local government workers in Japan.
240
Moreover, it appears that the training and career path of planners in Japan is flawed: 
local governments are short of adequate human resources - planning professionals. 
One of the findings from the 2001 CPIJ survey mentioned earlier is that local 
government employees account for only 13.4 percent of ordinary members of the 
CPIJ (Special Editorial Committee for 50th Anniversary Special Issue of City 
Planning Review 2001a: 57). In comparison, local government employees consist of 
65 percent of the corporate membership of the Britain’s Royal Town Planning 
Institute (RTPI) in 1988 (Masser and Yorisaki 1994: 116)75. In contrast to the weak 
representation of local planning officers in the CPIJ, the same 2001 CPIJ survey 
shows that 41.6 percent of the members of the CPIJ work in the private sector as 
planning consultant or developers (Special Editorial Committee for 50th Anniversary 
Special Issue of City Planning Review 2001a: 57). Furthermore, the survey also 
indicates that 57 percent of the members live in the Greater Tokyo region (ibid). 
These figures imply that local governments often have to rely on Tokyo-based 
private firms for planning policy-making, research and practices. Those profiles of 
Japanese planning professionals also reflect that burgeoning urban developments and 
regeneration in the 1960s and 1970s created a demand for planning consultants in the 
private sector (Ishida 1987a). However, such outsourcing of planning functions by 
local authorities limits the capacity of local initiatives and compromises 
accountability to local citizens in Japan.
75 Although this finding is for the 1980s, the situation is likely to remain more or less the same due to 
the fact that local authorities still dominated 80 percent of planning posts being offered in 2000-2002 
in the recent survey of the RTPI. The Royal Town Planning Institute. 2001. Report on questionnaire 
survey of RTPI new members - January 2000 to January 2001. London: The Royal Town Planning 
Institute.
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Limited public participation in planning
There have been few opportunities for the public to participate in Japan’s planning 
policy-making. First, there is still significant lack of transparency in planning 
processes, although the recent introduction of the master-planning system at the 
municipal level in 1993 and at the prefectural level in 2001, as well as the 
enforcement of the Law on Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs in 
2001, has enhanced accessibility to planning decision-making. Before the enactment 
of the information disclosure law at the national level, the right to the access to 
information held by local authorities was only secured by local government 
ordinances. The first information disclosure ordinance in Japan was enacted in 1982. 
Subsequently, the majority of local government bodies enacted similar ordinances 
within the following twenty years (Miki 2001). However, despite these recent 
developments in information disclosure, there have been still considerable limitations 
for citizens to access government information in the past (See Chapter 7).
Limited accessibility to local government information lies in the procedures of these 
ordinances. Local authorities have often rejected requests from citizens for 
information disclosure about development projects, reasoning that business 
confidentiality (of developers and construction companies) needed to be protected or 
that plans were still in a process of decision-making (Matsui 1996). Until very 
recently, the minutes of the City Planning Councils (toshi keikaku shingikai) who 
authorise final city planning decisions have often been inaccessible to the public 
(Igarashi 1980; Matsui 1996). The meetings of City Planning Councils were also in 
principle held behind closed doors because authorities claimed that disclosure would 
prevent Council members from free discussion (ibid). As the descriptions of the
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restrictions to information disclosure under the Law Concerning Access to 
Information Held by Administrative Organs are similar to these information 
disclosure ordinances, there have been concerns that the new national law would not 
change the current level of transparency of planning decisions in Japan.
Second, although recent government policy seems to encourage public participation 
in planning , current practices would need an adequate system to integrate public 
opinions into final planning decision-making. After the enactment of the 1968 City 
Planning Act, at least the public has been given opportunities to express its opinions 
on final draft plans, during a two-week public inspection period. However, as also 
mentioned in Chapter 5, there are mainly three problems with public participation in 
planning, as identified by recent research by the Policy Research Institute for Land, 
Infrastructure and Transport as follows (Yori and Shibata 2003: 37-41):
1. The role of local assemblies in plan preparation is not stipulated in the City 
Planning Act
2. Holding public hearings in plan preparation is not prescribed by the Act, and 
the timing of hearings is often set too late to allow for public involvements
3. The act does not stipulate how public opinions should be included into final 
plans
These limitations have made the impacts of public participation on final plans 
uncertain.
Third, the current mainstream format of citizen participation in planning, which is 
endorsed by the state as a model of community planning, would also need substantial 
adjustments to include broader views of residents. A community planning idea,
76 Communication No. 94 (25 June, 1993) issued by Director of the Urban Bureau of The Ministry of 
Construction ‘About basic principles of local planning’ (Shi-Chd-Son no Toshi Keikaku ni kansuru 
Kihon Hoshin ni tuite) encourages municipalities to fully inform residents o f future plans and ask their 
opinions on local plans.
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which is often referred to as ‘machi-zukuri (literally, town making)’, became popular 
among planners following the rise of citizens’ movements in the late 1960s. It is 
considered to be based on citizens’ initiatives to improve environment, local 
economies and social welfare, as some inner-city communities suffer from pollution, 
loss of business vitality or rapid changes in population. (Sorensen 2002). However, 
despite the positive image attached to machi-zukuri, there is another type of machi- 
zukuri format which is not necessarily based on active community initiatives (Evans 
2002).
Since the introduction of the district plan system {chiku keikaku) in 1980 that was 
designed to promote redevelopment in inner-city areas (Evans 2002; Sorensen 2002: 
308-9), the Ministry has actively authorized ‘official’ machi-zukuri bodies, called 
‘machi-zukuri kydgikai (community planning council)’. The government also used 
this format to reconstruct the communities which were severely damaged after the 
1995 Hanshin Awaji Earthquake (Evans 2002). In many localities in Japan, citizen 
participation or alternative plan proposals to local planning authorities are only
7 7accepted through these official machi-zukuri kydgikai .
However, these machi-zukuri kydgikai, which are often based on ‘authorised’ 
neighbourhood associations, have not been fully as autonomous and democratic as 
they purported to be (Evans 2001; Garon 2003; Pyle 1971; Pyle 1973). Much in the 
similar way as the neighbourhood associations in pre-war times (see Chapter 3), 
official machi-zukuri kydgikai are sometimes expected to act as if they were part of 
the state organisations. Following the public recognition of the power of the
77 The government introduced the system which allows developers, NPOs and those who have the 
right to hold large tracts of land to propose development plans to local authorities by the amendment 
of the City Planning Act in 2002.
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voluntary sector in the aftermath of the 1995 Hanshin Awaji Earthquake (Imada
2002), now machi-zukuri is widely praised and encouraged as a formula to promote 
citizen-based democratic community building (Hayashi and Ito 2000; Nakazawa 
2003; Ueno 1995). However, immediately after the 1995 Hanshin Awaji Earthquake, 
the Kobe City Council set up an official machi-zukuri kydgikai, in order to counter 
an alternative reconstruction plan which was proposed by autonomous resident 
associations in the heavily damaged Rokkomichi district (Evans 2002).
Therefore, there is a caveat to a machi-zukuri strategy which becomes clear when 
one considers what ‘consensus’ has meant in Japan’s history. In the past, the 
Japanese elite cultivated the idea of seeing organisations, communities and even the 
nation as if it were a family, in order to suppress opposition to them (Garon 1997; 
Gluck 1985; Maruyama and Morris 1963). Within a family there should be no 
conflict, as every member has to obey the patriarch (Eisenstadt and Ben-Ari 1990; 
Upham 1987). The same rhetoric has been widely used in Japan to manage conflicts 
in industrial relations (Shalev 1990). If the government encourages public 
participation in planning without giving enough opportunities to citizens to come up 
with alternative proposals and express disagreement, public participation is simply 
reduced to a way for the government to claim that a decision is based on a consensus, 
even though the government covertly orchestrated an agreement by manipulating 
citizens to obey the hierarchy (or even by tacit intimidation) in the name of social 
harmony. Thus, the current format of machi-zukuri needs to be carefully assessed for 
its efficacy as democratic citizen participation.
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The role of the City Planning Council
Finally, the role and purpose of the City Planning Council seems to be another 
impediment to incorporating the public interest in Japanese planning policy. As 
explained before, the role of local assemblies has not been stipulated by means of 
law. Instead, the City Planning Council, organised at the prefectural level, authorises 
planning decisions. With the amendment of the City Planning Act in 2000, 
municipalities are now able to set up their own City Planning Council. However, 
there are two problems associated with the authorisations of planning decisions given 
by the City Planning Council.
The first issue is the accountability of its members to local citizens. Japan’s City 
Planning Council system originates from the enactment of the 1888 TCRO to carry 
out a road improvement project in Tokyo in the name of the local governor under the 
supervision of the Home Ministry (Igarashi 1980). The committee was set up and its 
committee members were appointed and directed by the Home Minister (Igarashi 
1980). The format of the City Planning Council at prefectural level succeeded this 
arrangement. Until 2000, it was under the supervision of a governor, and the 
members were elected by the prefectural government. Under the new rule, the City 
Planning Council at the municipality level now only needs an approval of prefectures. 
However, it does not have to include representatives of residents. According to 
research conducted by the CPIJ in 2003, out of 246 municipalities questioned, 144 
municipalities appointed residents to the City Planning Council (Study Group for the 
City Planning Council. The City Planning Institute of Japan. Kyushu Branch 2004). 
Even so, the number of residents only ranged between one to four persons per 
council (ibid).
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Second, there is a problem of transparency in its decision-making process. Since the 
1995 Supreme Court judgement on information disclosure of the construction of
no
Aigawa Dam and the enactment of the national information disclosure law in 2001, 
the minutes of the council meetings are more open to the public than in previous 
periods. However, prior to this Supreme Court judgment, the court mostly dismissed 
requests for disclosure of council meeting minutes. Furthermore, the CPU’s research 
also demonstrates that the level of information disclosure of the City Planning 
Council has remained insufficient. Only 6 percent of the municipalities answered 
that they published the minutes of the City Council meetings in print or on their web 
sites, further 54 percent would release the minutes only upon request (Study Group 
for the City Planning Council. The City Planning Institute of Japan. Kyushu Branch 
2004: 23-24). Furthermore, more than 28 percent of municipalities did not disclose 
the list of Council members (ibid: 22). Even the municipalities which would release 
the list of the Planning Council members take an action only on demand (57.7 
percent) or following formal application using the information disclosure law (46.5 
percent) (ibid). Because of this confidentiality and the selection of its members, 
there is no guarantee that City Planning Councils would check the legitimacy of 
planning decisions as an independent party in the public interest.
6.3 The Court and the Public Interest in Planning
In the West, the creation of planning laws and the development of planning 
administration increased the power of public authorities. Simultaneously, the 
exercise of planning power has increasingly become challenged by citizens - by 
means of public inquiries and judicial review -  to assess whether government
78 Judgment at the First Petty Bench of the Supreme Court on 27 April (Matsui 1996).
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decisions comply with the public interest. By citizens’ challenges to government 
decisions, the concept of the public interest has been continuously redefined and thus 
has had impacts on planning policy development in the West (Cullingworth and 
Nadin 2000; Haar 1959; Purdue 1999). In Japan, judicial review plays a particularly 
important role in this respect, as there are no other opportunities for citizens to 
challenge formally the legitimacy of proposed plans. However, despite its 
significance, the judicial review system has not influenced the existing discourse of 
Japanese planning. This section explains the reasons for its ineffectiveness.
6.3.1 The Judicial Review System and the Public Interest
The growth of the judicial review system in democracies
Initially, in the U.K., the 1947 Town and Country Planning Act only gave statutory 
rights to applicants of planning permissions to contest decisions of planning 
authorities. However, third parties are now able to challenge the legality of planning 
decisions in court by means of an application for judicial review (JAR) which 
assesses whether the government’s practice fully satisfies (intended) statutory 
obligations (Purdue 1999). Later on, the statutory basis for the right to challenge 
planning decisions by means of judicial review was secured by Section 31 of the 
Supreme Court Act in 1981 in the U.K. (Purdue 1999). Judicial review in 
democracies has grown in the second half of the twentieth century, as it has worked 
as an audit of the democratic procedures of public administrations, and thus has 
contributed to increase the accountability of governments’ actions to citizens 
(Ginsburg 2003; Scheltema 1997). Planning is one of public policies to be contested 
whether the exercises of authorities are fully in the public interest as required in 
liberal democracies.
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Underdevelopment o f the Japanese judicial review system
In Japan, although a judicial review system has existed since the introduction of the 
administrative litigation system in 1890 (Zhang 1997), it has contributed little to the 
re-examination of the exercise of the power of authorities until today. First, Japan’s 
judicial review system has remained inactive compared to other, democracies, as 
there have been few administrative litigation cases. For instance, in 1999 the number
70of newly filed administrative litigations cases submitted to Administrative Courts 
in Germany and France amounted to 190,946 and 120,567 respectively (Supreme 
Court of Japan 2002). In contrast, the number of new administrative litigation cases 
filed in Japanese District Courts and High Courts in 2000 only came to 2,014 (ibid). 
Although the number of administrative cases has gradually increased over the last 
fifteen years, the paucity of administrative litigation in Japan contrasts starkly with 
other advanced democracies.
Second, in addition to the paucity of administrative litigation, there is a slim chance 
for plaintiffs to win cases against the government. In 2000, the number of judgments 
in which plaintiffs won or partly won at the High Court or District Courts was 338, 
out of a total of 1,500 administrative litigation cases (ibid). However, looking only 
at non-tax-related cases, the government won 93 percent of all administrative 
litigation cases in 1993 (Ramseyer and Rasmusen 2003: 83). With very few 
litigation cases and a slight chance for plaintiffs to be successful, Japanese authorities 
have held significant power over implementing policy which could be 
disadvantageous for certain groups of people (Kobayakawa 1997). As a result, the
79 Unlike the U.K. and the U.S.A, the legal system of Japan, Germany and France does not require an 
application of judicial review (JAR).
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judicial review system has hardly affected the discourse on the public interest in 
Japanese planning even in post-war years.
6.3.2 The Paucity of Administrative Litigation in Japan
There are several reasons why the number of administrative litigation cases has been 
very small in Japan. This section will examine a couple of reasons why this is so.
Legal culture
First of all, some claim that it is a matter of culture: Japanese citizens avoid litigation. 
An extreme view of this model is that the prevention of conflicts and the construction 
of consensus within ‘traditional communities’ has been very important in Japan, so 
that citizens are likely to consider litigation only as a last resort for conflict 
resolution (Kawashima 1963). This ‘nonlitigiousness’ of the Japanese is often cited 
as a reason for the efficiency of the economy, in comparison to the ‘litigious’ 
American society (Kagan 2001; Lohr 1982).
However, there is also the recognition that it may reflect Japan’s intangible social 
control system which intends to preserve the vertical social order which originated in 
the feudal era (Haley 1992; Kawashima 1963; Upham 1987). Extending this line of 
thought, some argue that the modem state of Japan continues to govern society by 
purporting consensus among interested parties, within the framework of the 
authoritarian state (Haley 1992; Shalev 1990; Upham 1987; Vlastos 1998; Wolferen 
1988). This has led to the creation of legal culture that even the most serious 
pollution victims of Minamata Disease felt ashamed of claiming their damage as 
they believed that their demands would destroy social harmony within the 
community or the nation (George 2001; Upham 1987). In fact, there was hostility
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from the community towards the victims of Minamata (who were mostly poor 
fishermen’s’ families), as many community members worked for the polluter’s 
factory (George 2001; Upham 1987). As many other victims of pollution and unsafe 
medicines experienced the same stigma, Japan’s legal culture has significantly 
contributed to the paucity of litigation.
Limited capacity of legal institutions
Another explanation for the Japanese ‘nonlitigiousness’ points to the institutional 
capacity of the legal system. While some claim that there is an institutional 
arrangement and social capital to settle disputes outside of court in Japan 
(Kawashima 1963; West 2002), there is a problem of accessibility to the overall 
judicial system. Japan’s total number of legal professionals is still quite small for an 
advanced economy. In 1997, there were approximately 6,300 persons per legal 
professional in Japan. This contrasts strongly with approximately 290 in the United 
States, 710 in Britain and 740 in Germany (Japan. The Justice System Reform 
Council 2001). Furthermore, it must be noted that Japanese judges prefer 
conciliation to litigation, so that they often recommend extra-judicial review of 
reconcilement to litigants (Kawashima 1963). Therefore, it can be said that the 
supply of litigation services is insufficient in contemporary Japan.
Prolonged judicial review settlement
The shortage of lawyers, in particular those specialised in judicial review, and the 
absence of specific rules on the time span for judicial review, means that lawsuit 
proceedings of administrative cases tend to prolong to such an extent that citizens 
tend to avoid judicial review further. For example, in 1993, while 53 percent of all
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judicial review cases of the first instance in the district courts concluded within a 
year, more than 11 percent of the cases took longer than three years to reach a ruling 
(Supreme Court of Japan 2003a). Moreover, 23 percent of the cases that failed to 
receive a judgement within the year were withdrawn by the plaintiffs subsequently 
(ibid). It takes much longer for a case to be appealed to the Supreme Court. During 
2003, while 413 judicial review cases were settled in the Supreme Court, only 16 
cases (3.8 percent) reach conclusion within a year from their filing to the District 
Court as the first instance (Supreme Court of Japan 2003b). 56.7 percent of the 
judicial review cases settled in the Supreme Court in 2003 took more than three years 
to finalise, and 19.1 percent needed more than seven years (ibid).
Accessibility to the judicial review system
Although the culture and the institutional capacity of the legal system offer good 
explanations for the paucity of administrative litigation in Japan, they do not fully 
account for the reality of its judicial review system. While the number of newly 
accepted judicial review cases in Japan has been around 1,000 cases each year from 
1951 to up to the mid 1990s, more cases were filed in the immediate post-war years 
(around 2,500 cases) and certain years of the late 1960s and the 1970s during the 
peak of citizens’ movements (Supreme Court of Japan 2002). On the contrary, the 
whole number of civil suits accepted in 2003 came to 1,351,510 cases, almost 400 
times more than judicial review cases (Supreme Court of Japan 2003c). Therefore, 
although Japan’s legal culture and its institutional capacity contributes to the paucity 
of judicial review cases, there can also be other factors that discourage judicial 
review in Japan.
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The problems related with Japan’s judicial review system have been articulated by 
the Consultation Group on Administrative Litigation of the Justice System Reform 
Council which was set up by the Koizumi Cabinet in 1999. According to the 
minutes of the meetings of the Consultation Group on Administrative Litigation, 
there are inherent problems with both the Administrative Case Litigation Law and 
the Administrative Litigation Procedure Act (ALPA). Central issues are classified in 
Recommendations o f  the Justice .System Reform Council -  fo r a justice system to 
support Japan in the 21st century as follows (Japan. The Justice System Reform 
Council 2001):
• Existence of reviewable administrative action
• Predominant status of administrative agencies over the court
• Unclear definition of exercises of authoritative power
• Strict legal standing
• Insufficient remedies against an unlawful/illegal administrative 
action
• Time limitation on filing suits
As will be further explained later, these defects are all detrimental to citizens seeking 
to challenge planning decisions.
6.3.3 Planning and Access to the Judicial Review System
This section details the central defects of the ALPA in planning litigation for 
Japanese citizens. As explained below, the major problem is related to various 
restrictions on the use of the judicial review system in planning litigation in Japan.
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Narrow interpretation o f reviewable administrative actions
An impediment in using the system can be referred to as ‘the ripeness of the cases’ 
{sosho no seijukusei), which is an important requirement for a plaintiff to bring any 
case before the court. It is especially a problem when a member of the public in 
disputing a planning decision, as the Japanese court’s current interpretation of ALP A 
is that a planning decision is not yet an administrative action. Its principle is that, 
unless an administrative action does not affect citizen’s rights and interests, a legal 
challenge against the authority’s action is invalid. Therefore, although the decisions 
of administrative bodies are likely to cause damage to citizen’s rights and interests 
after the decisions are duly exercised, the court cannot quash the (unlawful or illegal) 
administrative decisions, until actual effects on citizens’ legal right and interest are 
incurred.
For example, the Supreme Court dismissed the appeal by a group of citizens 
demanding the annulment of the building plan for a waste incineration facility in 
Tokushima City on the basis that the plan was not in compliance with Article 6 of the 
Cleaning A ct80. The judiciary argued that the bill for the ordinance of the 
construction plan of the waste incineration facility which was submitted to the local 
assembly did not yet constitute ‘an exercise of authoritative public power’; therefore, 
the act remained an internal procedure within an administrative body. The court 
explained why (unlawful) administrative decisions were not immediately quashed as 
follows:
An administrative agency’s action is based on laws whose purpose is to
maintain and promote the public welfare. These actions are done by
80 1962b. Judgement upon the request of the annulment of the ordinance for the construction of the 
waste incineration facility. In Minshu\ Supreme Court of Japan, the First Petty Bench.
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legitimate administrative agencies for the matters deeply related with the 
public interest. Accordingly, although there is a need to execute such 
administrative actions effectively and efficiently, on the other hand to 
give remedies to citizens whose rights and interests are violated by the 
administrative actions, considering such special effects of administrative 
actions, even if they are illegal, administrative actions are presumed to be 
legally effective until they are revoked by legitimate administrative 
bodies who hold the rights to do so. The remedies for citizens whose 
rights and interests are injured by administrative actions will be given 
based on a specific stipulation not by a civil suit81.
The court has traditionally used this strict principle in most of its decisions on 
planning matters such as land-use zoning changes , the basic plan for building a
Ol 04
New Industrial City and urban redevelopment projects .
Dominant status of administrative agencies over the court and citizens
The advantageous position of the Japanese authority against plaintiffs in the judicial 
review system has been the rule for a long time. The Justice System Reform Council 
describes it in their recommendation as follows:
As a problem inherent in the current system of administrative litigation 
procedures, administrative agencies are granted a predominant status (in 
the form of judicial non-intervention into political judgments, respect of 
administrative agencies' primary judgment, the central role given to 
revocation suits, etc.), based on trust in administrative agencies and 
recognition of the limits of judicial power, and, as a consequence, 
\kdkoku] appeal does not fully perform its originally intended function 
(Japan. The Justice System Reform Council 2001: Ch. 2, Part 9).
This strong status of Japan’s public administration against citizens’ legal challenge in 
court considerably undermined the principle of the rule of law which is stipulated by 
the 1946 Constitution. While Japan’s Constitution lays down the high ideal of liberal
81 Ibid.
82 1978b. Judgement upon the annulment of the designation of the zoning areas of Morioka City Plan. 
In Minshii: The Supreme Court of Japan, the First Petty Branch.
83 1977b. Judgement upon the request for the cancellation of the basic plan of the number eight district
of Ohita New Industrial City. In Gydshu: Ohita District Court, Japan.
841962a. Judgement upon the request for the annulment of the land readjustment plan. In Minshii'. The
Supreme Court of Japan, Grand Bench.
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democracy, subordinating the role of the judiciary to the public administration has 
made redressing the governments’ actions extremely difficult. This flawed 
interpretation of the relationship between the executive government and laws has 
undercut Japan’s post-war justice system.
Furthermore, although often planning decisions cannot be the subject of legal 
challenges for its maturity, even after illegal administrative actions were duly 
exercised, the action cannot be revoked, because the court claims that it could have 
been cancelled at the stage of planning. For example, there is a case where an 
affected citizen challenged the development permission for a golf ground on the 
basis that it had faults in the procedure of its development permission process, 
including the failure not to comply with local planning agreements, the Forest Act
Of o z
and the National Land Use Act . As previously ruled at the Supreme Court , the 
court dismissed the challenge, reasoning that the plaintiff had lost legal standing after 
the completion of the golf ground. The court explained that the permission was 
simply the procedure whether the development complied with relevant laws and 
orders. Although the public administration wrongly issued the development 
permission for unlawful development, the court claimed that the permission’s legal 
effect disappeared after the completion of the planned development. The court ruled 
that even if the development permission was an error, the Construction Minister or a 
governor could have issued an order to rectify the unlawful actions of the developer. 
In addition, the court also declared that even if the development permission would be
85 1990. Judgement upon the request for the cancellation of the development permission for a golf 
ground. In Gydshu: Gifu District Court, Japan.
6 1991. Judgement upon the request for the cancellation of the development permission after the 
development was completed. In Minshii: The Supreme Court of Japan.
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annulled, the law does not oblige government to issue such an order correcting the 
errors of the initial development permission.
Moreover, the Japanese court has traditionally rejected the right of neighbours (the 
third party right), which could be affected by authorised development permissions. 
Neighbours are generally not allowed to challenge planning permissions on the 
grounds that either planning decisions are not ‘mature’ enough to infringe their 
legally protected rights and interests, or neighbours do not have legal standing or 
sufficient interests to sue. During Japan’s era of environment movements in the 
1960s and the 1970s, certain environmental rights had become secured as personal 
rights in court mainly through civil suits. Environmental rights against nuisances 
such as noise, vibration, odours, the blockage of sunlight and views, ventilation, air 
and water pollution gradually became legally protected to a certain extent as a result 
of prolonged campaigns and legal challenges. The right to sunshine or day lighting 
(,nisshoken) 87 is one of the most successful achievements won by environmental 
litigation in post-war Japan (Igarashi 1980; Sawai and Shiomi 1972). Nonetheless, 
when a developer is the state or a state agency, or when a plan is already authorised 
by the state, it remains difficult for citizens to challenge these plans, because of 
special privileges given to Japan’s administrative agencies over citizens as stipulated 
in ALPA.
In the case of the Tokushima City waste incineration site, the neighbours argued that 
the Tokushima City Council had not conducted an environmental impact assessment, 
failed to consider alternative locations and did not consult with the residents,
87 Because of Japan’s weak planning controls, it is very common that high-rise buildings and low-rise 
residences existed side by side. The condition caused that newly erected high-rise buildings blocked 
sunlight towards low-rise residences. Many city residents complained about the situation after many 
high-rise buildings were constructed in low-rise residential areas since the early 1960s.
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although the facility was likely to cause various pollutions in the neighbourhood . 
The court ruled that even though the facility would cause damage to the 
neighbourhood, the City Council was not obliged to comply with the desirable 
preceding procedures (environment impact assessment and consultation with the 
residents), as there was no legal enforcement stipulated by laws related to the
OQ
development . The court concluded that, in the absence of prescribed procedures, 
the erection of the facility was not illegal, although the City Council was blamed for 
not dealing with such problems beforehand. As a consequence of such reasoning, 
development permissions are seldom repealed in Japan, even in the case where a 
development plan has serious defects90.
Unclear definition of the exercise of authoritative power
Although the exercise of authoritative power is technically and theoretically defined 
in ALP A, it is unclear what exactly constitutes an exercise of authoritative power in 
Japan’s litigation. While a quasi-legislative act like planning is often excluded from 
legal challenges based on the rigid understanding of the legal effects of authoritative 
power, its definition can be problematical when a quasi-govemmental agency carries 
out planning-related projects. For example, the Supreme Court overturned the ruling 
of the Osaka High Court in the Osaka International Airport noise pollution case91, in 
which the High Court had acknowledged the private management of the airport
88 1977a. Judgement upon the case of Tokushima City waste incineration site. In Shomu Geppo: 
Takamatsu High Court, Japan.
89 Environmental Impact Assessment Law was enforced in 1999 in Japan.
90The court did not annul the unlawful development permission to the developer who did not provide 
adequate roads required by the City Planning Act upon the request of neighbouring residents. 1999. 
Judgement upon the request for the cancellation of the development permission when the development 
does not comply with the City Planning Act. In Gydshu: Yokohama District Court, Japan.
91 1981b. Judgement upon the injunction of night flights at Osaka International Airport. In Minshii: 
The Supreme Court of Japan, Grand Bench.
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facility (see more details in Chapter 7) . The private management of the airport 
meant that the plaintiffs could stop the flights during the night (from 21:00 to 7:00) 
and would have the right to sue for future damages through a civil suit. The Supreme 
Court concluded however that the public airport’s operation in its entirety was an 
activity which constituted an exercise of the authoritative power. This meant that the 
management of the airport could not be challenged independently by a civil suit. The 
plaintiffs’ request was dismissed on the ground that the airport’s operation for public 
use could only be disputed by judicial review in the Supreme Court.
In contrast to the Osaka International Airport case, in the litigation of noise pollution 
and vibration from the Nagoya Bullet Train (,shinkansen), the court argued that the 
powers of the Transport Ministry and Japan National Railway (JNR, a public 
company at the time of the suit) over the operation of the national railway network 
could be separated93. Nevertheless, although the court accepted that the plaintiffs 
could dispute the operation of the national rail in a civil suit, the court rejected the 
injunction demand because the operation of bullet trains as fast and safe transport is 
‘highly in the public interest’. As seen here, the procedures of ALP A worked against 
citizens that challenged development plans or the operations of public transports, 
since those rulings required the plaintiffs to know beforehand whether operations of 
[quasi-] public companies could be named as ‘an exercise of authoritative power’. 
Since more privatisation schemes of public utilities and facilities have progressed 
nowadays in Japan, it could be very unfair for the court to dismiss a plaintiff for not 
‘choosing’ the correct form of suit.
92 Before this Supreme Court’s judgement, the court had argued that the operation of a public airport 
could be separated between the management of airport facilities under the control of civil law and the 
public administration of aviation under the jurisdiction of public law.




The most serious obstacle to the public to use judicial review in Japan is that both 
ALPA and the court employ a strict definition of legal standing to sue (sufficient 
interest). As explained so far, Japan’s planning controls are weak despite its intense 
urbanisation, which means that there have been many instances where new 
developments are likely to be detrimental to the environment. Furthermore, as 
Japan’s planning system still lacks transparency and opportunities for citizens to 
object plans at the stage of public inquiries, there have been various cases where 
many residents, interest groups and the users of public facilities opposed final plans 
in court. However, the court has traditionally held the opinion that a legal right 
means the right protected by the stipulation under laws. The principle has led to the 
situation that third party rights in planning are denied.
While the court has recently relaxed these strict conditions of legal standing, the 
situation in Japan remains far different from the expansion of third party interests in 
planning of Western democracies (Barclay 2002; Deimann and Dyssli 1995; Purdue 
1999). The underlying notion of this rigidity is the domination of the public sphere 
by the state and its bureaucracy in Japan, in which only state institutions are able to 
protect and promote the public interest against (selfish) private interests94. Therefore, 
even if there have been serious errors in state agencies’ actions in relation to the 
public interest, and even ‘injury in fact (occurred)’ to the right of citizens, plaintiffs’ 
challenges to the state have often been dismissed in court, on the basis that they did 
not fulfil ‘sufficient interests for remedies’ (See more detail in Chapter 7).
94 This idea will be examined in Chapter 7 by analysing prominent planning litigation in Japan.
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There are three distinctive ways in which the Japanese court dismissed judicial 
review cases based on reasons of legal standing. First, the court adopts the strict rule 
that a plaintiff should hold legal interests which are protected by the statute at the 
time of the execution of authorities’ actions. Under this rule, so called environmental 
rights or personal rights are seen as merely reflex interests (hansyateki rieki), which 
are not individual rights protected under the statute; instead, they result in benefits to 
unanimous people as a consequence of the operations of public laws. Accordingly, 
the courts have tended to dismiss plaintiffs’ pleas seeking for remedies related to loss 
of local amenities95 and historic assets96, inaccessibility to public facilities97, or
Q O
adversely affected built environment by zoning changes caused by planning 
changes.
The court’s attitude to the rights of citizens in relation to their local environment is 
clearly explained in the judgement upon the injunction of the construction of the 
Hanshin Expressway99 in which a group of residents intended to stop further 
pollution from the addition of an express motorway to the national route as follows:
Since an individual’s benefit derived from the so-called ‘local 
environment’ is not yet to be accepted as a legal interest in civil laws, the 
residents are not allowed to demand [the court] to protect their interests 
in relation to the local environment which is not directly relevant to their 
residences.
95 1974b. Judgement upon the request for the injunction of the construction of a harbour on Nagahama 
beach. In Gydshu: Matsuyama District Court, Japan, 1978a. Hibiya Park case - environmental 
conservation of visual amenities of the park. In Hanrei Jiho: Tokyo High Court, Japan.
96 1983a. Iba historic site case - the standing of a local research group seeking for the conservation. In 
Hanrei Jiho: The Supreme Court of Japan, the Third Petty Bench.
97 1970. Judgement upon the request for the annulment and cancellation of the change of the local 
railway route. In Gydshu: Tokyo District Court, Japan.
98 1978b. Judgement upon the annulment of the designation of the zoning areas of Morioka City Plan. 
In Minshii: The Supreme Court of Japan, the First Petty Branch.
99 1972. Hanshin Expressway case - judgement upon the injunction on the construction of the highway 
to prevent pollutions. In Hanrei Jiho: Amagasaski Branch Office, Kobe District Court, Japan.
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The second way to limit the legal standing is related to the concept of ‘the ripeness of 
the case’ as previously explained, in which the court rejected the legal standing of 
neighbours who argued that development permissions100 or building confirmations101 
in their vicinities were not in compliance with the laws. Although the court accepted 
flaws in administrative procedures, the legal standing was not given on the ground 
that the plaintiffs’ rights were not yet violated by the state granting authorisation to 
developers. The court argued that authorisation was only to ensure whether 
applications complied with the relevant law102. The court believes that any errors 
related to illegal development plans should be corrected by appropriate public 
agencies so that such an act does not infringe upon the rights of third parties.
Third, the court sometimes would not accept the legal standing of citizens who 
request remedies and future compensation from the government because o f the 
public interest o f  the government's act. This means that although the court admitted 
that a state agency’s negligence led to serious injuries to citizens’ rights, and thus 
ordered the state to pay compensation for the past injury, the victims’ demands for 
future compensation were dismissed on the ground of the public interest, in which 
governments acts were righteous even with such flaws. In the case of traffic control 
of the National Route 43 and Hanshin Expressway, this is expressed as follows:
On the other hand, while those motorways are in highly in the public
interest and considering that there is no alternative motorway available,
100 1990. Judgement upon the request for the cancellation of the development permission for a golf 
ground. In Gydshu: Gifu District Court, Japan, 1991. Judgement upon the request for the cancellation 
of the development permission after the development was completed. In Minshii: The Supreme Court 
of Japan, 1999. Judgement upon the request for the cancellation of the development permission when 
the development does not comply with the City Planning Act. In Gydshu: Yokohama District Court, 
Japan.
101 1981a. Judgement upon the appeal for the annulment o f the building confirmation by Building 
Standard Act. In Gydshu: Tokyo High Court, Japan.
102 This means for example that building confirmation under the Building Standard Act does not have 
to ensure whether the building meets the requirements listed in the City Planning Act.
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the plaintiffs’ injuries are regarded not yet to exceed the limit of 
tolerance which is generally required in the life [in Japanese society] in 
relation to the prohibiting order [of limiting the traffic of these 
motorways]103
It is clear that there are many obstructions for Japanese citizens to take the state to 
court to seek justice in planning-related matters. Recently, several leading
judgements 104 have quashed governments’ development permissions of 
environmentally harmful plans, urging the Ministry of Land, Infrastructures and 
Transport (MLIT) to reconsider their citizen participation strategy (Yori and Shibata
2003). This shows the potential that judicial review could make Japan’s planning 
policy more accountable to citizens. However, the defects of Japan’s judicial review 
system are severely hampering the mobilisation of Japan’s planning discourse. 
Furthermore, the conditions surrounding Japan’s judicial review system explain that 
the ideas of planning based on the developmental state regime are not easily 
challenged or changed, unless the principle of the rule of law is established in 
contemporary Japan as detailed in the following chapters.
6.4 Conclusion
The public interest has played a central role in contesting the legitimacy of planning 
policy in the West. However, in Japan, until recently the concept of the public 
interest was seldom discussed at any level of policy-making. At all levels of policy­
making, there are legacies of Japan’s peculiar modernisation under the 
developmental state model. At the legislature stage, party politics and fair elections
103 1986. Judgement upon the emission and noise control of the National Route 43. In Hanrei Jiho: 
Osaka High Court, Japan.
104 1994b. Judgement upon on the request for the cancellation the development permission of the 
elevation of the Odakyu railway junction. In Gydshu: Tokyo District Court, Japan, 1997. Judgement 
upon the request for the cancellation of the Meguro Park project plan. In Kakyusai Shuyd Hanketsu 
Joho (Lower court prominent judgements)'. Tokyo District Court, Japan.
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have been undermined by inadequate political reforms and the US’s cold war policy 
in Japan, which has reduced the influences of the opposition politics against the 
conservative hegemony. The public sphere remained underdeveloped by suppression, 
censorship, manipulation and propaganda promoted by the government and 
establishment. The open discussion about what the public interest constitutes has 
been carefully avoided by means of subtle social control, in particular under the 
disguise of Japan’s tradition and culture.
Most of all, the idea of planning has been constructed by very small number of 
stakeholders - ministries, businesses and professionals. Other groups, notably 
women, have not had opportunities to voice their concerns in planning policy­
making. At the administrative stage, local autonomy in planning has not been 
secured. The practice of information disclosure and citizen participation in planning 
has just started recently. Finally, the opportunity of legal challenges as the last resort 
to protect collective interests as the public interest has been severely restricted so far. 
In essence, the Japanese elite have been able to decide exclusively what the public 
interest should be in planning policy-making. It is only recently that the concept of 
public interest has come under scrutiny at various levels of planning policy-making.
Although the ideologies of planning and the public interest in Japan is hard to assess, 
citizens’ challenges to governments’ planning decisions in court since the 1960s 
exposed the ideas of the public interest which Japan’s public administrations have 
relied on, as well as what the true objectives of its planning policy have been. 
Because planning legislation and policy statements tend to obscure the reality of the 
public interest in planning, it is worthwhile examining the discourse on the public 
interest in Japan’s planning litigation. For this reason, the next chapter explores
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prominent planning litigation cases, showing how the concept of the public interest 
has been understood in the practices of Japanese planning and how the concept has 
shaped Japan’s planning policy which is sharply different from Western liberal states. 
The discrepancy between the discourse on the public interest in Western liberal 
democracies and Japan will reveal the roles of its planning, as well as the relationship 
between individuals and the state in contemporary Japan.
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Chapter Seven: The Use of the Public Interest in Planning Court 
Cases
Reflecting the fundamentally different origins of the modem state and planning from 
the West, discourse on the public interest in planning have developed in a distinctive 
manner in Japan. This chapter examines the discourse on the public interest in 
Japanese planning in court by analysing leading cases in relation to its planning 
culture explored in Part 2. The concept of the public interest was obscure in Japan’s 
planning policy statements such as CNDPs. Moreover, as examined in Chapter 6, 
the institutions which involve planning decisions in Japan were not successful in 
materialising the public interest as common interests. In particular, the public 
participation procedure in Japan failed in encouraging debate on the public interest of 
proposed plans. Citizens who were largely excluded from the policy-making process 
tried to redress the situations by filing litigation cases against governments’ planning 
decisions. Because legal challenge in court was the only opportunities in which 
citizens could formally dispute the public interest in planning, planning/environment 
litigation is one of the most useful materials to investigate what the state considers 
about the public interest in planning in practice in Japan. A caveat here is that the 
government and the judiciary has not been completely separated in exercising power 
in Japan as the analysis of this chapter highlights this problem later.
The concept of the public interest, which is prescribed by planning laws and the
Constitution, became a key word for Japanese citizens to challenge planning
decisions and seek social justice in Japan’s post-war democracy. However, the
discourse on the public interest employed by the Japanese judiciary was significantly
different from the interpretation by those who challenged the public administration.
The Japanese judiciary regards public and private interests as the state versus
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individuals, based on the legal orthodoxy developed from Meiji Japan. Therefore, 
the public interest was rarely interpreted as the interests of local communities or 
social interests in Japan’s judicial review. This rigid interpretation by the court made 
it very difficult for Japanese citizens to dispute the public interest of planning
i
projects through judicial review. In order to avoid the risk that a court would dismiss 
their claims on grounds of the absence of legal standing (see Chapter 6) in judicial 
review, citizens often had to use civil suits instead, to ensure that their claims are 
heard. Paradoxically, this strategy of resident groups resulted in further widening the 
discrepancy between the concepts of public and private interests in both the judicial 
system and political thinking in Japan.
The cases analysed in this chapter are one of the most disputed case about the public
interest and planning controls in Japan (see Chapter 1). The selection is also to
identify the impacts of Japan’s developmental state ideologies (see Chapter 2) on the
discourse on the public interest in its planning practice. Thus, I first investigate the
cases which examine a relationship between economic development and the public
interest. Second, I look at the planning/environment litigation which reveals Japan’s
authoritarian state ideology in interpreting the public interest in planning. The
analysis of Chapter 6 already identified Japan’s authoritarian state ideology of its
planning institutions, which appears in the practise of the central-local government
relationship, transparency, citizen participation. I investigate the planning litigation
in which citizens challenged the fairness of the planning decision-making process,
first to protect their health, and then the quality of social life in later years. Under the
civil law principle, the Japanese court relies on precedents in interpreting statute
provisions, and thus, major opinions in court are unlikely to change radically in the
short term. This means that the introduction of new philosophies to planning policy
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often accompanies the amendment or creation of statutes as was the case with 
pollution control in the 1970s and landscape control in the early millennium.
There are three important issues for understanding the concept of legal justice in 
Japan. First, the majority of statutes have been drafted by the ministry bureaucrats 
(Ginsburg 2001; Johnson 1995; Pempel 1974). This is partly due to the staff 
shortage and the lack of expertises in drafting bills on the legislators’ side (Ginsburg 
2001: 592). A large number of bills105 were initiated by ministries with the 
assistance of policy advisory committees, which were also under the close 
supervision of the ministry bureaucrats. In the past, the vast majority of these bills 
were generally accepted in the parliament without much resistance under the one- 
party dominance in Japan. Furthermore, the interpretation of the statutes is very 
much under control of the central bureaucracy. In Japan, articles of statutes tend to 
Stipulate only the basic rules, leaving the details of specific rules to be given in the 
form of cabinet and ministerial ordinances as well as tsutatsu (communications) 
(Pempel 1974; Young 1984). Administrative guidance such as communications, 
however, does not have full-fledged legal status, and as such, it is generally excluded 
from judicial review in Japan (Young 1984: 933).
Second, the Constitution of Japan was drafted under the initiative of US post-war 
reformers. It is one of the most advanced constitutions in modem democracies, 
assuring the principles of civil, political and social citizenship. However, because of 
its ‘foreign’ origins and high ideals for democracy, articles of the Constitution do not 
sit comfortably with Japan’s civil code, which has its origin in the authoritarian Meiji
105 Throughout post-war years, more than 80 percent of statutes were made by cabinet proposals 
(Ramseyer 1993: 135).
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regime. These two legal cultures sometimes competed in court. The cases discussed 
in this chapter also reveal the disparity between Japan’s judicial orthodoxy (the 
developmental state) and the Constitution of Japan (the modem state) with regard to 
the ideas about citizenship.
Third, it is often pointed out that the rule of law is absent in Japan (Haley 1992; 
Johnson 1995; Ramseyer and Rosenbluth 1993; Wolferen 1988). Japan’s modem 
laws and its court system were initiated in a time of foreign threats in the nineteenth 
century. The Meiji government rushed to install a legal system to overcome 
problems with the unequal treaties and extraterritoriality (Spaulding and University 
of Michigan. Center for Japanese Studies 1967). Although the Meiji elite understood 
the importance of laws in a modem administration, they did not fully comprehend 
the legitimacy of laws that could be challenged in court (Haley 1992; Spaulding and 
University of Michigan. Center for Japanese Studies 1967). As a consequence, laws 
exist in Japan to rule people and society but the principle of reviewing the 
accountability of the actions of law-making and law-enforcing institutions was not 
properly introduced into modem Japan (Haley 1992; Wolferen 1988).
The goal of this chapter is to examine planning litigation, and analyse how conflicts 
over the public interest have been resolved in two different political and legal 
cultures in post-war Japan. Section 7.1 looks at citizens’ challenges to the discourse 
of Japanese planning for capitalist development. The cases deal with the conflict 
between development projects and human rights in relation to the concept of legally 
protected interests. Section 7.2 investigates the dimension of the authoritarian state 
in planning culture in Japan. The analysis focuses on the relationship between 
central and local government as well as the government and civil society in Japan’s
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planning policy-making. Section 7.3 discusses the role of the court in Japanese 
planning in comparison to British planning, in particular regarding the introduction 
of new planning philosophies. Section 7.4 summarises the court’s interpretations of 
the public interest in planning and discusses their impacts on Japanese planning 
development in the past.
7.1 The Dominance of Development Priorities in Legal Cases
One of the most significant features of the Japanese planning system is its strong 
orientation towards economic development. Although Japan’s City Planning Act is 
supposed to protect safety, public health and amenity, Japanese planning laws are 
fundamentally weak in satisfying even minimal requirements of protecting the 
quality of life against externalities of the market in land-use. National level planning 
laws and ministerial guidance, which binds actual planning practices at local levels, 
are mainly designed to promote economic development (see Chapter 5 and 6). As a 
consequence, there exists underlying contradiction between the national planning 
framework and the basic principles of the City Planning Act regarding the 
implementation of development control on the local environment. Moreover, 
property rights, in particular the right to develop land, is strongly protected by the 
civil code, which originated in the Meiji administration to collect land tax. As 
explained in Chapter 3, land tax represented the major source of revenue for the 
Meiji government to support industrialisation. The right to develop land was further 
reinforced by the agrarian land reform, which was carried out during the US 
occupation period.
Because of the strong rights to develop land and the legally binding national planning
framework to promote economic development, the development control under the
270
City Planning Act was further undermined to accommodate large-scale developments 
that were considered to serve ‘the public interest’. Facing health threats and 
environmental hazards, Japanese citizens disputed the legitimacy of planning 
decisions that seemed to be in contradiction with the objectives of the City Planning 
Act, or violate basic human rights that are guaranteed under the Constitution of Japan. 
In this process, the public interest in the Japanese planning system was examined 
against the ideology of the developmental state.
Noise pollution of the Osaka International Airport Case
The judgement upon noise pollution of the Osaka International Airport is one of the 
most cited cases about the public interest in infrastructure planning in Japan. The 
Osaka International Airport (now the It ami Airport, used for mostly domestic 
flights) started as a small local airport for single-engine planes in 1936. It was 
enlarged further during the early post-war years for US military use. After the right 
to control aviation finally returned to the Japanese government in 1958, the Transport 
Ministry decided to turn the Osaka Airport into an international airport and started to 
consult with local governments. While business communities in Osaka and Kobe 
were enthusiastic about building an international airport in Kansai region, residents 
in the area strongly opposed to the proposed plan because of its smaller-than- 
standard size (304 ha)106 and the proximity to residential areas (Tsuru 1999)107. The 
protest was fierce. When the voting for the airport expansion was held in Itami City
106 The airport has only two short runways (1,828 and 3,000 metre-long against a standard 4,000 
metre-long runway) for jet planes. When jet planes use an inland airport as in the case of the former 
Osaka International Airport, its recommended size for noise protection should be an area size of 
6,400 hectares (Tsuru 1999: 109).
107 The Osaka International Airport is located in the rapidly developed suburban communities of Itami, 
Ikeda and Toyonaka cities.
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assembly on 5th April 1962, as many as 900 policemen had to protect the assembly 
building against protesting citizens (Tsuru 1999: 108).
Once the international airport started operating, over 42,000 households were 
exposed to noise at the level of 85 WECPNL108 (Tsuru 1999: 109), which was 
considered to be very close to the tolerance limit (Igarashi 1988). Testimony109 
submitted by Terai Hisayoshi, the Civil Aviation Bureau Chief of the Transport 
Ministry, to the Transport Committee of the House of Representatives in 1974 
further revealed that 179,000 households were exposed to noise levels of more than 
75 WECPNL110. At a residence occupied by one of the plaintiffs, the noise level 
reached between 100 and 110 phons111 (more than 95 WECPNL), when jumbo jets
119started using the B runway of the airport from the 5th of February 1970 onwards . 
In March 1970, according to evidence submitted to the Supreme Court, the number 
of airplanes which took off and landed at the Osaka International Airport amounted 
to 367 (including 165 jet planes) on the day of examination.
After negotiations with the government failed, 264 residents filed a civil suit in the 
Osaka District Court in 1969 (Gresser, Fujikura, and Morishima 1981: 164). They 
tried to halt night flights based on personal and environmental rights and to obtain
108 WECPNL = Weighted Equivalent Continuous Perceived Noise Level (as defined by the 
International Civil Aviation Organization).
109 The National Diet Library of Japan. 2004. The 9th sitting on 26 February 1974, the debate o f the 
Transport Committee, the 72nd Diet session, the House o f Representative o f  Japan [Full-text 
database]. The National Diet Library of Japan,, 1974 [cited 2 July 2004]. Available from 
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/SENTAKU/syugiin/072/0290/main.html.
110 The current limit of environmental standard for aircraft noise in Japan must be under 70 WECPNL 
in (exclusively) residential areas, and 75 WECPNL in mixed-use residential areas as defined by 
Environmental Agency in 1993.
111 Phon = a unit of measurement of noise level used in Japan until November 1993. 100 to 110 phons 
of noise is equivalent to 100 to 110 dB (decibel = a unit of sound pressure level) , which represent a 
sound level ranging from the sound of a chain saw to the sound of a rock drill or a car horn. 
Prolonged exposure to a noise level of over 90dB is considered to be damaging to auditory nerves.
112 1981b. Judgement upon the injunction of night flights at Osaka International Airport. In Minshii'. 
The Supreme Court of Japan, Grand Bench.
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compensation for damage in the past as well as in the future. The judgment of the 
Osaka District Court 113 (27th Feb 1974) partly accepted the first two issues, but 
entirely dismissed compensation for future damage. A year later, the judgment of the 
Osaka High Court114 (27th November 1975) accepted nearly all claims of the 
residents. The government appealed to the Supreme Court in 1976. In this suit, the 
principle of ‘the public interest’ was examined in relation to the state’s planning 
decision against the plaintiffs’ human rights.
The Supreme Court ruling, which was finally handed down in 1981, contained the 
following four main points. First, it rejected the request for injunction to prevent all 
night flights at a public airport by means of a civil suit. Second, it admitted that the 
erection of the airport had been illegal, and that the mode of its usage created a risk 
to cause a certain level of damage to the users and third parties. Third, it dismissed 
compensation for the plaintiffs who had moved into the area after aircraft pollution 
problems had already been extensively reported. Finally, it rejected compensation 
for future damage on grounds of difficulties in assessing the degree of damage, 
although the ruling acknowledged that continuing use of the defective airport was 
illegal.
The ruling of the Supreme Court was severely criticised. The most serious criticism 
was that the court rejected the legal standing of the plaintiffs to request the injunction 
of night flights by means of a civil suit (tojisha sosho), because the court believed 
that the operation of the airport constituted the exercise of ‘authoritative power’ (See 
Chapter 6). Therefore, the case should have been challenged by means of judicial
113 1969. Judgement upon the injunction of night flights at Osaka International Airport. In Minshu'. 
The Osaka District Court, Japan.
114 1974a. Judgement upon the injunction of night flights at Osaka International Airport. In Minshii'. 
The Osaka High Court, Japan.
273
review of administrative acts such as an ‘appeal-type suit (kokoku sosho)\ However, 
the Supreme Court did not clarify whether the plaintiffs could bring this case in the 
form of judicial review. The Supreme Court further claimed that, by giving an order 
to the Transport Ministry (to stop night flights), the High Court ruling was in 
violation of the doctrine of the separation of the three branches of the state powers as 
stipulated in the Constitution. The Supreme Court argued that since there were other 
countermeasures against noise pollution, it must be at the Transport Minister’s 
discretion to decide which one(s) the Ministry would use against the pollution. For 
this reason, the Supreme Court overruled the Osaka High Court’s judgement.
The further controversial point in this ruling was the court’s interpretation of the 
public interest in relation to the plaintiffs’ rights and the illegality of the action of the 
state. The plaintiffs argued that the operation of night flights at the airport was 
illegal, because it violated personal and environmental rights based on Articles 13 
and 25 of the Constitution that guarantee ‘the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of 
happiness’ and ‘the right to maintain minimum standards of wholesome and cultural 
living’ respectively. However, the ruling of the Supreme Court did not examine this 
matter and simply maintained that the illegality of the airport operation must be 
assessed in relation to the public interest based on the following premise:
.. while the damage experienced by the appellants exceeds the tolerance 
limit in social life in general [in Japan], considering the public interest of 
this airport, even when the damage exceeds such limit, [the court must 
assess the case] on the condition that the victims have to endure a certain 
higher level of tolerance due to its public necessity.....
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court acknowledged serious errors in the planning of the 
airport, which was too small for the massive use of jet planes and too close to 
residential areas in the absence of effective countermeasures for noise pollution.
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Moreover, the Court admitted that there was an imbalance between the benefits that 
the residents in the neighbourhood received from the airport and the damage caused 
by its operation; this danger was too large to justify the claim that the existence of 
the airport was in the public interest.
Although the Supreme Court acknowledged the illegality of the airport operation and 
thus ordered the state to compensate the victims for past damage, Judges Kurimoto 
Kazuo, Fujisaki Banri, Motoyama Toru and Yokoi Daizo expressed an opinion 
different from the majority of Judges:
Incidentally, when projects carried out on behalf of the state cause 
injuries to third parties, injuries beyond the tolerance limit alone do not 
make the projects illegal although such claims can be valid in application 
to private business in general. The tolerance limit must be considered 
according to the nature and content of the public interest (kokvosei) of the 
state’s project. When the state’s project in question is in the public 
interest to a high extent, the tolerance limit must be raised accordingly.
When injuries to third parties caused by the state’s project that is highly 
in the public interest are non-property injuries, such as psychological 
pain or obstructions to life as the Osaka High Court judgement in this 
case acknowledged, it would be appropriate to conclude that the demand 
for compensation for such damage must not be allowed in principle 
because the damage is considered to be within the tolerance limit. Only 
when injuries are serious enough to have caused physical damage can the 
conclusion be upheld that these injuries have exceeded the tolerance limit.
After all, the modem state has various responsibilities in the achievement 
of many objectives for the public; in order to achieve these objectives, 
the state itself carries out projects when it deems necessary. As citizens 
benefit from these state projects either directly or indirectly, in 
comparison with the benefits citizens receive as said, it would be 
inevitable that citizens are requested to accept certain levels of sacrifice 
caused by the state’s projects which are highly in the public interest 
(underlined by the author).
As this minority opinion suggests, even in a serious noise pollution case as the Osaka 
International Airport, Japanese citizens can be expected to accept severe 
infringements of their human rights, sometimes even without compensation, in the 
name of the public interest. Then, how was the concept of the public interest
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{kokyosei) interpreted in the noise pollution case of the Osaka International Airport? 
The ruling explained as follows:
..the public interest {kokyosei) or the necessity of the public benefit (koeki 
jydno hitsuydsei) claimed in this case is the necessity of high-speed 
public transport by aircraft. In modem society, considering an increasing 
demand for speedy movement, especially in the area of economic 
activities, it is obvious that air transport is highly in the public interest. 
Moreover, as this airport occupies an important position in both domestic 
and international air routes, it is apparent that the public demand for its 
use is very high. The High Court ruling did not deny this fact.
It is clear that the public interest in this case equalled the demand for air transport, 
especially for economic development, and failed to include the large number of 
residents that were affected by severe noise pollution. In contrast, the demand by 
citizens for peaceful nights and compensation was considered as a private interest.
As a result of political intervention, the stoppage of night flights was accomplished 
and the monetary value of compensation to the victims was raised from 700 million 
Yen to 1.3 billion Yen in an ‘amicable settlement’ outside of court115 (Tsuru 1999: 
113). After the settlement, various countermeasures to the noise pollution of the 
Osaka International Airport were taken, including subsidies to the residents to 
soundproof their homes and the relocation of severely affected residents to other 
areas. The efforts to reduce the severe aircraft noise at the Osaka International 
Airport culminated in the construction of a new international airport, the Kansai 
International Airport (opened in 1994), which is located on a manmade island off the 
Osaka Bay and therefore considerably free from noise pollution problems. In this 
sense, the litigation of the Osaka International Airport contributed to prompt the
115 The victims originally asked 5.5 billion Yen (Tsuru 1999: 113).
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government to take more serious precautions against environmental hazards in 
infrastructure planning.
Despite its positive impact on future planning in Japan, the Osaka International 
Airport case negated the advancement of the discourse on the public interest in 
Japanese planning for rigorously safeguarding citizens’ human rights. First, the 
ruling demonstrated the serious defect of Japan’s legal authority against the principle 
of the rule of law in the modem state. The Constitution of Japan declares the role of 
the judiciary as follows:
Article 76.3: All judges shall be independent in the exercise of their
conscience and shall be bound only by this Constitution and the laws.
Article 81: The Supreme Court is the court of the last resort with
power to determine the constitutionality of any law, order, regulation or 
official act.
As confirmed here, the court must be independent from other branches of state 
powers to ensure social justice in the modem state. Without a mechanism to 
challenge the acts of the state’s law-making and law-enforcing institutions by means 
of judicial controls in reviewing their compliance with principles of legal rules, the 
state would simply become an absolute state (Haley 1992: 40-41). Judicial 
independence does not mean that the court must not interfere with the executive 
power as the judges of the Osaka International Airport case argued. On the contrary, 
the Japanese court is vested with powers to remedy the errors of the state’s actions. 
The rule of law in the modem state is only maintained by guaranteeing citizens’ 
rights to challenge the legitimacy of existing law, order, regulation and official acts 
in court (Bellamy 2005; Clark 1999; Shklar 1987). Therefore, considering the 
importance of the rule of law to protect citizens from arbitrary state power in the 
modem state (Bellamy 2005; Wolferen 1988: Ch.8), the ruling of the Osaka
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International Airport case may represent a serious violation of the Constitution, by 
maintaining the judiciary’s non-intervention principle to the executive power.
Second, the ruling rejected the legal standing of the plaintiffs on the grounds that the 
form of litigation was incorrect. As explained in Chapter 6, because the legal 
standing of third parties injudicial review was often rejected in Japan, the plaintiffs 
chose to file a civil suit to secure their legal standing against injuries. By denying the 
legal standing of the plaintiffs simply because of the technical reason as stated, the 
Supreme Court ruling of the Osaka International Airport case sounded like a 
warning to Japanese citizens who brought similar injunction suits during this period 
(Tsuru 1999: 112). The Supreme Court judgement discouraged Japanese citizens 
from challenging the state’s actions.
Third, the Supreme Court ruling dismissed the pressing opportunity to interrogate the 
public interest in planning in relation to Articles 13 and 25 of the Constitution, which 
embrace citizenship rights in a modem democracy. In this context, what the public 
interest stands for must be equated to a principle for materialising fair society, not 
simply equal to the state’s interests. The public interest in the modem state must be 
determined through due process, if many interests conflict with each other in public 
policy-making. While the plaintiffs claimed that noise pollution surrounding the 
Osaka International Airport violated their personal and environmental rights, the 
extent of the injuries endured by the plaintiffs can be described as a serious threat to 
public health and safety. As the modem planning system in the West initially 
emerged to protect public health in the public interest (Hall 1996a; McAuslan 1975), 
the ignorance of the Supreme Court on the protection of public health can be seen as 
an antithesis to modem planning development.
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Finally, by adhering to the theory of tolerance limits, the Supreme Court belittled the 
concept of the public interest. The theory of tolerance limits was proposed by 
Professor Nomura Yoshihiro, who argues that injuries by pollution must be assessed 
by weighing various factors and balancing competing interests surrounding pollution 
cases, irrespective of the intention or fault on the side of polluters (Ogano 1995: 116- 
7). This theory was helpful for pollution victims to overcome the burden of proving 
faults or negligence of polluters, as it had been difficult under the Japanese civil code 
to make polluters liable without proof of their negligence, at least until the 
establishment of the doctrine of no-fault liability (mukashitsu sekinin) in Japan’s 
environmental litigation in the late 1960s116.
However, the theory of tolerance limits has a serious flaw when it is applied to 
matters involving the public interest of governments’ projects. As the minor opinion 
of the Supreme Court judges of the Osaka International Airport case reveals, the 
public interest of governments’ projects could be misused without serious 
examination of competing interests in disputed cases. Governments could simply 
claim that the objectives of their projects are highly in the public interest so that 
inconvenient outcomes caused by the projects might be dismissed. If only the state 
can decide what the public interest should be about a disputed case without giving 
affected parties an appropriate opportunity of consultation nor granting them a right 
to challenge the government decisions, the concept of the public interest becomes a 
void notion in a modem democracy. As a result, tolerance limits can easily be raised 
according to the degree of ‘the public interest’ which governments consider 
‘appropriate’. In this sense, the theory of tolerance limits can no longer be a valid
116 See the discussion of Osaka Alkali case in Chapter 3.
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doctrine to promote public welfare in planning. Therefore, there is a need to 
establish concrete principles to examine what the public interest in planning is in 
relation to laws and the Constitution, and set out rules about how to define the public 
interest in future planning in Japan and who are entitled to participate in planning 
policy-making.
The Hanshin Expressway and the National Route 43 Case
Environmental citizen movements in the 1960s and the 1970s and subsequent 
environmental litigation resulted in the enforcement of the 1968 City Planning Act, 
creation of new environmental laws and changes in legal theory to protect pollution 
victims. However, despite these developments and increased awareness of citizen’s 
rights about the environment, the court’s definition of the public interest in planning/ 
environmental litigation has hardly changed in post-war Japan. The 1995 Supreme 
Court’s ruling of the air and noise pollution case of the Hanshin Expressway (HE) 
and the National Route (NR) 43 reflected the same interpretation of the meaning of 
the public interest as in the Osaka International Airport case, imposing ‘tolerance’ 
upon the victims by dismissing the residents’ rights to pursue a ‘healthy and pleasant 
living environment’.
In the early 1970s, a resident group living in an area within 85 metres from the NR43 
suffered from a level of noise pollution with a median value of around 70 to 80 
phons. (dB)117, vibration and air pollution, all as a result of more than 90,000 
vehicles using this route. When the state started to construct the HE and connect it to 
the NR 43 in the form of an elevated motorway in October 1971, a resident group
117 This noise level (70-80dB) ranges from the sound of telephone rings and vacuum cleaner to the 
sound in computer printing room and an alarm clock at two feet.
280
applied to the Kobe District Court for an injunction to prevent the construction of the 
HE118. The residents cited their personal and environmental rights as grounds for the 
request. Although the court did not accept that residents had the right to ask for the 
protection of their ‘local environment’ (See Chapter 6), it did acknowledge their 
rights to protection against unlawful disturbance to their ‘residential environment’, 
including sunlight, ventilation, quietness, view, clean air, privacy and 
comfortableness. Although the court rejected the injunction request from the 
residents, it ordered the Hanshin Expressway Public Corporation (HEPC) not to 
aggravate the residential environment further by limiting the number of vehicles 
using the HE and the NR 43 to less than 150,000 per day and to monitor noise levels 
that exceeded environmental standards.
Nevertheless, the pollution levels caused by the HE and NR remained far higher than 
the designated environmental standards. As a consequence, the resident group sued 
the state and the HEPC in 1986, demanding compensation for damage and an 
injunction to restrain an excessive use of the routes, claiming that the motorways 
destroyed the local environment (destruction of the townscape) and the residents’ 
healthy and pleasant life by causing sleep deprivation, a disruption of normal life or 
damage to mental health. The Osaka High Court acknowledged the damage to 
residents who lived within 20 metres from the motorways as well as to those who 
experienced noise levels exceeding the tolerance limit. While the High Court 
ordered the defendants to pay compensation for past damage, it rejected any future 
compensation. Also, the injunction request was denied based on the argument that
i)8 1 9 7 2 . Hanshin Expressway case - judgement upon the injunction on the construction of the 
highway to prevent pollutions. In Hanrei Jihd: Amagasaski Branch Office, Kobe District Court, Japan.
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‘the motorways are highly in the public interest’119 (See Chapter 6). The case went
to the Supreme Court to seek an injunction to prevent an excessive use of the routes.
The residents insisted that there was a serious misjudgement in the interpretation of
the public interest by the High Court, arguing as follows:
In short, without defining the density of NOx to affect human health, the 
High Court judged that the air pollution caused by exhaust gas from the 
motorways in this case was not serious enough to be considered as 
affecting the residents’ health, and thus, the appellants’ damage caused 
by noise, exhaust gas and so on from these motorways were judged as 
mere obstruction for normal life. Furthermore, although the appellants 
did not request to stop the use of the motorways completely, the High 
Court ruled that with an increase in the number o f vehicles using these 
motorways, its growing demand made the motorways to be in the public 
interest. However, the High Court ruling which dismissed the injunction 
request for excessive use arguing that there was no alternative motorway, 
contained a misinterpretation of the statutes about the assessment of the 
tolerance limit by not complying with the due process of collecting 
adequate proof and examining past cases, as well as making the error of 
judgements without sufficient reasons 12°.
Despite those counterarguments, the Supreme Court upheld the decision of the High
Court and dismissed the plaintiffs appeal for the injunction, arguing as follows:
The High Court acknowledged the infringement that the traffic noises 
have penetrated into the [appellants’] living spaces almost all day, thus 
having disrupted the appellants’ sleep, conversations, telephone 
conversations, pleasure of having a happy home, television and radio 
reception, as well as created the situation where the accumulation of the 
factors above has affected their mental health. The High Court also 
accepted that the residents who live within 20 metres from the 
motorways have suffered from additional nuisances such as dirt on the 
washing caused by floating particles from automobile exhaust gas. On 
the other hand, the High Court also lawfully recognised that the 
motorways have contributed significantly to interregional transport, 
mainly in the logistics of industrial materials, and its contribution has 
risen further along with an increase in both car ownership and the share 
of car transport in domestic passenger and freight transport. On balance, 
the High Court judged that while the extent of the appellants’ present and
119 1986. Judgement upon the emission and noise control of the National Route 43. In Hanrei Jihd\ 
Osaka High Court, Japan.
120 1992c. Judgement upon the emission and noise control of the National Route 43 and Hanshin 
Expressway. In Minshu: The Supreme Court of Japan, the Second Petty Bench.
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future damage represented a disruption of their normal life, considering 
the motorways’ irreplaceable great benefit not only to the residents and 
businesses alongside the motorways but also to interregional transport 
and industrial economic activities both in quality and quantity, there is no 
serious illegality about not accepting the appellants’ request for the 
injunction12 .
The Supreme Court did not satisfactorily assess the motorway’s impact on public 
health122 and the possibility of reduced traffic by considering an alternative route. It 
again failed to recognise that citizens’ rights to health and safety constitute a part of 
the public interest in planning policy.
The legal standing of third parties in planning
As described in Chapter 6, it is extremely difficult for neighbouring residents (third 
parties in judicial review) to challenge the legality of the state’s development 
projects, even when it is recognised that such developments would cause injuries to 
citizens. The civil cases reviewed above also demonstrate that unless neighbouring 
residents had injuries of physical health, the state’s planning projects are unlikely to 
be quashed or significantly altered because of ‘the public interest’ of these projects. 
Even when the public administration’s action is considered to be a tort, such action 
cannot be revoked since the ‘public (the state)’ interest is superior to ‘private 
(individual)’ interests. The problem with this logic is that residents’ rights are not 
considered as a part of the public interests, but simply treated as private interests.
121 Ibid.
122 The Environmental Impact Assessment Act (EIA) was only promulgated in 1997, making Japan 
the last developed country to implement the statue on EIA. The Law for PRTR (Pollutant Release and 
Transfer Register) and Promotion of Chemical Management was enacted in 1999. As a consequence, 
there were insufficient evidences during the trial about the relation between automobile gas emissions 
and human health. The Law Concerning Reporting, etc. of Releases to the Environment of Specific 
Chemical Substances and Promoting Improvements in Their Management known as Pollutant Release 
and Transfer Register (PRTR) Act (2000).
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This leads to the question what kind of ‘private interests’ could be legally protected 
against ‘the public interest’, which appears to be dominated by the state in Japan. 
The Authorisation o f  the Japan National Railway Project Case (1978), in which 
nearby residents challenged the legitimacy of the development authorisation of a 
bullet train route, indicates the answer. The Supreme Court dismissed the challenge 
of third party residents who claimed that the development project contradicted the 
purpose of the Land Expropriation Act (Tochi Shuyd Ho), as follows:
The Land Expropriation Act was enacted with Article 1 stipulating its 
aim as ‘to balance the promotion of the public interest against private 
property rights and thus contribute to appropriate and rational national 
land use’, responding to the aim of the Constitution’s Article 29, Clause 
3, which stipulates ‘Private property may be taken for public use upon 
just compensation therefore’. Since the procedure of land expropriation 
based on this act is the system that balances the promotion of the public 
interest through implementing projects against the private property rights 
of land owners and related parties within the area of planned project, 
individual interests that this act aims to protect are construed solely as 
property rights and property-related benefits of land owners and related 
parties. However... in this case, since there is no dispute that the 
plaintiffs do not hold any right in relation to the property where the 
project is planned, the authorisation of the project would not cause any 
change on the legal status of the plaintiffs.
Furthermore, the aim of Article 20, Clause 3 of the Land Expropriation 
Act, which stipulates that ‘the project plan must contribute to appropriate 
and rational land-use’ as a precondition of project authorisation, must be 
construed in such a wav as to oblige administrative agencies to judge 
whether the land is going to be utilised appropriately and rationally from 
the viewpoint of the national economy, by balancing the disadvantages of 
the property owners holding land etc. within the designated area for the 
project and the related parties in relation to the public interest to be 
realised by the project through land expropriation etc. As for 
environmental protection, since the Act does not have a clause stipulating 
its scope, extent, method and so on, it is not appropriate to argue that 
Article 20, Clause 3 of the Land Expropriation Act also intends to protect 
individual and specific environmental benefits of citizens living nearby 
the project (underlined by the author)123.
123 1976. Judgement upon the request for the cancellation o f the authorisation of the development 
project - the legal standing of the residents nearby. In Gyoshu: Tokyo District Court, Japan.
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The Japanese court historically confined its interpretation of ‘legally protected 
interests’ in planning developments to economic property rights. Although the 
Japanese court hardly accepted the legal interests of third parties in planning, it was 
exceptionally willing to accept the legal standing of third parties when the injuries 
are directly connected with the loss of economic benefits. This is typically 
represented in cases where hotels or inns located in historic towns were successfully 
granted injunctions to restrain the construction of tall buildings in their vicinities, 
since the courts acknowledge that these tall buildings would obstruct the views from 
the plaintiffs’ properties, and were likely to cause negative impacts on the revenues 
of the plaintiffs’ businesses124.
Third parties had difficulties not only in challenging governments’ development
projects, which are automatically regarded to be in the public interest on most
occasions, but also in overturning the private sector’s developments that obtained
authorisation such as development permissions and building confirmations. Even
when authorised development plans do not comply with regulations, Japanese courts
rarely quashed granted authorisations, or ordered developers/ administrative bodies
to adjust these unlawful developments on third party’s requests (see Chapter 6).
Only recently have the Supreme Court begun recognising the rights of a third party
to challenge authorised developments in cases where the third party is likely to be
1
exposed to considerable dangers such as landslide with the completion of such 
developments.
124 1961. Sarugakyo Hot Spring (Onseri) case. In Hanrei Times (The Law Times Report)'. Tokyo High 
Court, Japan, 1973c. Kyoto Okazaki Yurakuso case. In Hanrei Jihd: Kyoto District Court, Japan.
125 1994d. Judgement upon the request for the cancellation of the development permission in the area 
where there is a danger of landslide: the legal standing of third party. In Minshu'. The Supreme Court 
of Japan, the Third Petty Bench.
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Apart from these exceptions, the court maintained that neither the City Planning Act 
nor the Building Standard Act is meant to protect ‘specific individual interests’, but 
rather to safeguard ‘the public interest in a general and abstract sense’ . For 
example, the Yokohama District Court denied the legal standing of neighbouring 
residents who requested to quash a development permission of a large-scale
1 7 7residential development that did not provide adequate roads adjacent to the 
planned development area, as stipulated in the City Planning Act. The residents 
based their complaint on this illegal aspect of the development and the lack of safety 
concerns. The court set aside the flaws in the development permission resulted from 
the public agency’s negligence, but argued that the claimed safety concerns were not 
significant enough to quash the development permission as follows:
After all, the relevant laws in this case remain to protect life-concerned 
interests of the residents living within the planned development area, and 
thus, it must not be construed as to protect the individual interests of the 
neighbouring residents living outside the development area .
The same logic can also be seen in the case of illegal building confirmation on 
farmland under the Building Standard Act without obtaining development permission 
under the City Planning Act and the Nature Conservation Ordinance129 (see Chapter
6). The legal standing of neighbouring residents who requested the annulment of the
126 See the quote from 1978c. Judgement upon the request of cancellation of development permission 
from neighbouring residents. In Gydshu: Yokohama District Court, Japan.
127 The Building Standard Act requires four metre wide roads for this development. However, there 
was 240 metre-long roads which did not comply with the stipulation by the Act in this development 
plan.
1999. Judgement upon the request for the cancellation of the development permission when the 
development does not comply with the City Planning Act. In Gydshu: Yokohama District Court, 
Japan.
129This is one of the major legal contradiction in Japanese planning regulation. Planning-related 
authorisations are given by different administrative bodies and are not necessarily linked to each other. 
1969. Judgement upon the injunction of night flights at Osaka International Airport. In Minshu: The 
Osaka District Court, Japan.
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illegal building confirmation for safety and environment reasons was rejected; the 
judiciary reasoned that the construction of the building had already been completed.
As seen in the cases above, the Japanese court rarely revokes flawed planning 
authorisation upon third party requests. Then, how has the court interpreted the 
public interest stipulated by planning statutes in relation to the neighbourhood? 
When neighbouring residents challenged a local government’s permission to 
construct a 180 hectare residential development, of which more than 72 percent was 
to be implemented in the urbanisation control area (UCA) and was located adjacent 
to a nature reserve, the 1982 Yokohama District Court ruling defined legally 
protected interests under the City Planning Act as follows:
The City Planning Act aims for ‘planning cities’ appropriate 
developments and well-ordered maintenance, thus contributing to the 
balanced national land development and the promotion of the public 
welfare (Article 1)’. In order to accomplish these aims, [the Act obliges 
the state to] lay down city planning, and therefore the basic principle of 
city planning is ‘to make rational land-use under appropriate controls in 
order to secure healthy and cultural urban life and functional urban 
activities while designing the good harmony with agriculture and fishery 
(Article 2)’. ‘Healthy and cultural urban life’ quoted here must not be 
interpreted as private interests of individuals and specific benefits of a 
healthy and cultural urban life for urban dwellers, but as a part of the 
public interest, which is the appropriate development and well-ordered 
maintenance of cities as the Act aims for, and ‘healthy and cultural urban 
life’ must be seen as a general and abstract benefit.
Hence, as the provision of development permissions in Article 29 of the 
City Planning Act sees the fulfilment of the public interest as the 
appropriate development and well-ordered maintenance of cities, a 
healthy and cultural urban life and functional urban activities, it is right 
to construe that the Act does not directly intend to protect the rights or 
specific benefits of residents who live in the vicinity of the planned 
development area (underlined by the author)130.
130 1978c. Judgement upon the request of cancellation of development permission from neighbouring 
residents. In Gydshu: Yokohama District Court, Japan.
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As can be seen from those cases, the Japanese court insisted that the rights of 
neighbouring residents who were affected by development were to be treated as 
‘private interests’; as such, they were not legally protected unless the residents were 
likely to undergo economic loss or life-threatening dangers from the developments. 
Furthermore, although Article 1 of the Building Standard Act stipulates that its aim is 
‘to protect citizens’ life, health and property’, and Article 2 of the City Planning Act 
‘to secure a healthy and cultural urban life and functional urban activities, while 
designing the good harmony with agriculture and fishery’, Japan’s administration 
and the court placed economic utility and monetary value of development above 
citizens’ safety and environmental concerns in actual planning practices. While the 
role of planning is clearly stipulated in these statutes to include protection of the 
quality of life, the court has not interpreted that citizens are eligible to defend such 
concerns in planning policy-making in the name of the public interest.
7.2 The Legal Dimension of the Authoritarian State
Another distinctive feature of planning in Japan is its authoritarian nature. First, 
Japan’s planning decision-making system and its administration operates within a 
highly hierarchical order between different levels of governments. Occasionally, 
local governments may take initiatives in planning policies to meet local needs. This 
could be due to strong political leadership in local governments or due to urgency for 
local planners to deal with crises such as rapid population growth/decline, financial 
crisis or acute environmental degradation. However, when local planning policies 
conflict with the ones by the central government, it becomes clear which government 
has the final say. While central bureaucracy maintains the principle of local 
autonomy with regard to planning at the municipality level (Japan. Ministry of Land
288
Infrastructure and Transport 2003b), the major court rulings have been contradicting 
this principle. The cases in this section demonstrate the ease with which developers 
can quash local government’s planning initiatives in court in cases where local 
development control tools are stricter than the national planning codes or when they 
appear to overshadow the power of higher authorities.
Second, as already referred to, both Japan’s public administration and the court often 
rejected citizens’ claims to the right to access planning information as well as to 
participate in planning decision-making. The reason why even unlawful 
developments were granted permission in Japan was ultimately found in the absence 
of effective planning enforcement as well as the lack of adequate information 
disclosure and consultation with local residents about proposed plans. The 
transparency of the planning decision-making procedure was not only undermined by 
the public administration but also by the judiciary. The court’s reluctance to admit 
the public access to planning information ended up strengthening of the authoritarian 
planning culture in Japan.
Finally, in addition to the technical obstacles in Japan’s judicial review system as 
explained in Chapter 6, the Japanese court does not provide judicial remedies to 
persons who suffer injuries due to illegal acts of administrative bodies. At best, the 
court nullifies such acts (Fuke 1989). Under the principle of legal institution’s non­
intervention into public administration’s acts, the court fails to exercise its power by
i o i
means of mandatory injunctions and mandamus . Nor does the court order relevant 
administrative bodies to take specific actions to remedy their errors (Fuke 1989).
131 [Latin “we command”] A writ issued by a superior court to compel a lower court or a government 
officer to perform mandatory or purely ministerial duties correctly. P.973. Gamer, Bryan A., and 
Henry Campbell Black. 1999. Black's law dictionary. 7th ed. St. Paul, Minn.: West Group.
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Under this doctrine of non-intervention, the role of the court remains insignificant 
when it comes to enabling changes in existing planning practices.
7.2.1 Local ordinances and national laws
Limited local autonomy in planning in Japan is evident in the prohibition of local
planning ordinances from setting codes stricter than national laws. At least until the
1960s, tjie government, the court and academics in Japan maintained that national
laws should have precedence over local ordinances when regulating the same matter 
11 1)(ikokuho sensenron) . The theory was construed that national laws set the highest 
standard of regulations, so that local government must not create ordinances laying 
down stricter standards than national laws (uwanose) or additional rules to regulate 
other dimensions of the same objective of the national laws (yokodashi).
This theory had to be relaxed when the parliament was slow to enact effective
environmental laws in the 1960s, when pollution problems had surfaced. Facing
fierce protests by resident groups against new developments, many local
governments created planning guidelines to protect their citizens from severe
environmental hazards. In 1975, the Supreme Court ruled that local government
could enact ordinances with stricter rules than national laws about public safety
1regulation, and the control of marches and mass demonstrations . In this judgment, 
the Supreme Court ruled that the illegality of local ordinances against national laws 
must be assessed with the intentions, objectives, contents and effects of both the law
132 This doctrine is derived from the word of Article 92 ‘ Regulations concerning organisation and 
operations of local public entities shall be fixed by law in accordance with the principle of local 
autonomy’ and article 94 ‘enact their own regulation within law’ of the Constitution of Japan as well 
as Article 14 of the Local Government Act ‘as far as not against laws and ordinances’.
133 1973a. Judgement upon the violation of the Road Safety Act and the Tokushima City Ordinance 
concerning marches and mass demonstrations. In Keishu: The Supreme Court of Japan, Grand Bench.
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and the ordinances and whether there were inconsistencies and conflicts between 
them to regulate the same issues. Since this ruling, the right of local governments to 
install ordinances has been strengthened and the court seems to have at least accepted 
the trend towards more local autonomy of planning regulations.
Takarazuka City Pachinko Parlour Ordinance Case
This general trend notwithstanding, it cannot be said that a sufficient level of local 
autonomy in planning control has been established. For example, on 9th July 2002, 
the Supreme Court dismissed the legal standing of Takarazuka City Council to seek 
an injunction of the construction of a pachinko parlour. The issue was about the 
Takarazuka City Ordinance, which regulates the construction of pachinko parlours134, 
amusement centres and love hotels , containing stricter codes than the Act 
Concerning the Control and Improvement of Entertainment Businesses (the 
Entertainment Business Act, Fuei Ho). The judgement undermined the development 
of planning ordinances as an effective tool to meet local needs such as promoting 
pleasant residential environment.
Takarazuka City is known as one of Japan’s oldest garden suburbs and attracts many 
tourists, which explains why the City Council is keen to protect its pleasant living 
environment. The 1983 Takarazuka City Ordinance No. 13 Concerning the 
Construction of Pachinko Parlours, Amusement Centres and Love Hotels, etc. was
134 Pachinko is a popular gambling game in Japan combing slot machine and pinball. A pachinko 
parlour is a gambling premise and often decorated with bright colours and neon as well as with loud 
music. Japan-guide.com. 2005. Pachinko [cited 5 July 2005]. Available from http://www.japan- 
guide.eom/e/e2065.html.
Love hotels (also known as boutique or fashion hotels) and motels (located on the roadside or the 
interchange of motorways) in Japan do have a particular type of clients, mainly couples to spend hours 
or nights. In many cases, the entrance area and the reception is shielded by smoke screen glass so that 
a couple arriving there, in particular by car, can use these hotels in a very discrete manner. These 
hotels are often designed in notorious kitsch styles (to attract the young population) and are thus in 
many cases not in harmony with their local environment.
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enacted to protect the city’s features from the adult entertainment businesses. 
Simultaneously, the Entertaining Business Act was amended in 1984 to control the 
locations of entertainment businesses nationally by concentrating these businesses in 
areas designated by prefectural ordinances under the requirement of the Act. In 
Japan, municipal governments cannot create additional zoning categories other than 
those defined by the City Planning Act. Furthermore, changing zoning areas is such 
a time-consuming process that the Council enacted ordinances to control the location 
of adult entertainment businesses in a number of zoning areas, in addition to the 
nationally designated areas for adult entertainment business premises.
A company owning a premise in the city’s quasi-industrial area, which was virtually 
used as a residential area, planned to build a pachinko parlour and asked the Council 
for development permission. The Council rejected the proposal based on its 
ordinance’s provision regulating adult entertainment business premises in areas close 
to schools, libraries, nurseries (within 100 metres’ distance) and hospitals and clinics 
(within 70 metres’ distance). However, the company obtained a building 
confirmation after complaining to the City’s Building Examination Committee and 
subsequently started the construction of the pachinko parlour. The Council sued the 
company, trying to halt the construction on the grounds that it was in violation of the 
City’s local ordinance.
Both the District and the High Court rulings rejected the Council’s request for the 
injunction as follows:
... The Entertainment Business Acts, with its 1984 amendment, set the 
highest and uniform standard for regulating locations of adult 
entertainment businesses across the nation. Although the protection of 
local public morals and living environment in response to local needs 
essentially falls under the responsibilities of a municipal government, a
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municipality must not use a local ordinance to enforce controls that are 
stricter than the Business Entertainment Act and the prefecture’s 
ordinance for this purpose735.
The case also left questions unanswered about the proper legal enforcement measures 
of planning controls, since there is no effective administrative enforcement system 
which can penalise illegal developments under any planning statute and ordinance. 
The Council expressed its concern about this issue in court as follows:
In reality, when an individual does not undertake responsibilities required 
by regulations and ordinances, and an administrative body cannot carry 
out such obligations in his/her place in the public interest either, it is not 
unreasonable to expect that an administrative body would ask the court 
for the enforcement of such responsibilities [of the individual]. If, on the 
contrary, an administrative body leaves the matter unattended and thus 
fails to meet the responsibilities of the public administration, it seems to 
be against the public interest137.
The Supreme Court ruled that the Council did not have legal standing to obstruct the 
construction, as there is no provision that allows the state and the local administrative 
body to enforce an injunction. In early 2007, the Supreme Court ordered Takarazuka 
City Council to pay £2.3 million (480 million Yen) to the pachinko parlour developer 
in compensation for the delayed construction (Asahi.com 2007).
Despite the endorsement by the central government for local autonomy in Japanese 
planning system, this judgement shows that its strong hierarchical order of laws does 
not allow local governments to decide independently on the future of local 
environment138. In this ruling, the duties of local assemblies in making ordinances in 
the public interest were not seriously considered.
136 1994a. The case of the Takarazuka City Local Ordinance regulating the construction of pachinko
parlours etc. In The Supreme Court Database: Kobe District Court, Japan.
f37Ibid.
138 This ruling can be compared with the Britain’s recent regulations about gambling and the extension 
of business hours of pubs. In both cases, local authorities control giving license to such premises 
considering social and community impact. For example, the Britain’s Gambling Reviewing Body
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In addition to this, the City Planning Act should also be in compliance with higher 
national planning laws, which mostly aim for national economic development (see 
Chapter 5). Not only are the functions of local ordinances scrutinised at the judicial 
level, but also they are firmly controlled by the central bureaucracy at both the 
legislative and the administrative levels. Japanese central bureaucracy maintained 
control over the content of local ordinances by means of administrative guidance 
such as ministerial communications and comments (Chiba 1984; Igarashi and Ogawa 
1993). For example, the central government issued a ministerial communication 
regarding vibration control, which prohibited local ordinances from setting higher 
standards than national laws. Also, the state showed strong disapproval of setting 
stricter pollution controls with ordinances (Chiba 1984). While the central 
government has no legal power to intervene in the content of local ordinances under 
the principle of local autonomy stipulated in the Constitution, ministerial 
communications in effect control local ordinances. Many academics regard this 
practice compromises local autonomy to the same extent as the allocation of 
subsidies and the authorisation of issuing local bonds do (Chiba 1984; Samuels 1983; 
Steiner 1965; Takeshita 1987). With all these limitations on planning ordinances, it 
seems very hard for local planning authorities to use legally binding planning tools to 
ensure that land-use is in line with local interests.
advised that ‘Under our proposals, local authorities will be responsible for licensing premises. They 
will apply the normal planning rules in terms of suitability of location etc and opening hours. We 
recommend 1) local authorities have the power to institute a blanket ban on all or particular types of, 
gambling in specific area; 2) in determining whether the location for gambling premises is appropriate 
the local authority have regard to the character of the locality and the use to which nearby buildings 
are put.’ Great Britain. Department for Culture Media and Sport. Gambling Review Body. 2006. 
Gambling Review Report HMSO, July 2001 [cited 22 March 2006]. Available from 
http://www.culture.gov.uk/global/publications/archive_2001/gamb_rev_report.htm. pp. 4-5.
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7.2.2 Planning agreements and national laws
The operational difficulties of local planning ordinances and problems with the 
effectiveness of enforcements under these ordinances led many local administrative 
bodies to resort to the use of kaihatsu shidd yoko (voluntary development agreement) 
in an attempt to control or mitigate development impacts on the local environment 
and public finance. In such development agreements, local authorities requested 
developers to: 1) offer financial contributions to councils for the construction of 
public facilities such as schools and nurseries; 2) limit the number of housing units in 
the planned areas to be within the capacity of the water supply system; 3) improve 
residential environments through the provision of roads and parks; 4) solve potential 
nuisance problems expected from proposed developments (Japan. City Planning 
Division of Kishiwada City Council 1979: 37). When developers were not willing to 
accept such development agreements, local authorities often pressurised them by 
refusing building confirmation or halted the provision of water supply and garbage 
collection to proposed developments.
These development agreements virtually acted to fill the void of ineffective 
development control under the City Planning Act. In fact, a 1983 survey by the 
Construction Ministry and the Home Ministry found that almost one-third of more 
than 1,000 local government bodies used residential land development guidance 
agreements (takuchi kaihatsu shidd yoko) (Igarashi and Ogawa 1993: 158). The 
survey also found that the vast majority of the local administrative bodies were very 
content with these development agreements (Igarashi and Ogawa 1993: 158). This 
indicates that, to a certain extent, planning as development control in the public
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interest operated outside the statutory framework at the local government level in 
Japan.
Nonetheless, the weak legal status of development agreements creates potential 
problems in the judicial review system, if developers refuse to accept such planning 
obligations requested by a non-statutory agreement. Indeed, developers took cases to 
court, protesting against the required compliance with these development agreements, 
in particular when local planning authorities threatened with the use of enforcement 
tools. Although the Japanese court was not totally against the use of development 
agreements, the practices were interpreted to be only acceptable as far as local
authorities asked developers for ‘voluntary cooperation’ in complying with planning
1 *10agreements . Therefore, local authorities that threatened reluctant developers with 
certain punishment tools are likely to lose in court, even when local planning 
authorities exercised their power in the public interest.
Musashino City Residential Developmental Guideline Case
The case of Musashino City, a suburb of Tokyo, well illustrates the limitations of a 
development agreement as an effective planning tool. Facing overwhelming housing 
growth and accompanying financial difficulties, Musashino City Council formed the 
Musashino Residential Development Guidelines (takuchi kaihatsu shidd yoko), 
requesting developers to provide public facilities and contribute to the expenses of 
the council to cover additional costs generated by large scale housing development. 
In the cited litigation, based on the guidelines, the Council requested the developer to 
share the cost of new schools which would be necessary following the developer’s
139 1983c. The pros and cons of collecting development charge under a voluntaiy planning agreement 
(Yoko ni motozuku Kaihatsu Kydryoku-Kin no Kyohi). In Jurist, an extra issue: Sakai Branch Office, 
Osaka District Court, Japan.
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construction of a high-rise apartment. The developer gained a building confirmation 
without obtaining the required planning approval from the City, and subsequently 
started its construction. The Council refused to provide water and sewer services to 
this building. The case settled out of court in 1974 and the developer agreed to share 
the cost for schools.
The same developer brought a second case to court in February 1977. In a similar 
fashion as before, the construction had started without meeting the requirements of 
the guidelines. Again, the Council refused to supply water to the building and its 
tenants who had moved in after the completion of its construction140. As a result of 
this lawsuit, the mayor was prosecuted for violation of the Water Supply Act (Suidd 
Ho) in 1978. The Supreme Court concluded that the mayor was guilty in 1988, 
dismissing his appeal141. The third case in Musashino City took place in May 1977. 
Another developer, who had already provided land for a park, roads, amusement 
equipment in the park and a water tank for fire prevention as required by the 
guidelines for the construction of an apartment block, was not willing to share the 
cost for new schools with the Council. After being threatened by the Council that it 
would stop the water supply, the developer saw no alternative but to pay partial cost 
for new schools. In 1988, the developer brought the case to court, asking the Council 
for the return of his contribution. After the appeal, the 1993 Supreme Court ruling 
acknowledged the necessity of its residential development guidelines as follows:
In Musashino City, the construction of high-rise apartments has rapidly
increased since 1969. As a result, not only have problems of sun light
140 The developer had managed to provide the tenants with water from the annex building until the 
Council started to supply water to the building eight months after the first tenant had moved in.
141 1985. The appeal of the mayor of Musashino City about the rejection of water supply under the 
voluntary planning agreement (Musashino Shicho Kyusui Kyohi Jiken Jokokushin). In Hanrei Times 
(The Law Times Report)'. The Supreme Court of Japan.
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blockage, deteriorated TV aerial reception and noises from building 
construction arisen, but it has also caused a shortage of schools, nurseries 
and traffic safety facilities, thus pressurising the local finance in 
providing these services. To protect the local environment against the 
sudden growth of residential developments and high-rise apartment 
construction, the Council formed the Musashino Residential 
Development Guidelines in 1971 after consultation with the local 
assembly in order to mitigate the impact of sizeable housing 
developments on the city’s finance142.
However, the Supreme Court ruled that the Council’s act of enforcing the voluntary 
development agreement by means of a punishment tool was illegal. The judgement 
concluded as follows:
The administrative guidance based on kaihatsu shidd yoko is intended to 
protect the local environment from excessive developments and is 
therefore supported by the majority of residents in Musashino City. 
However, the act [of the Council forcing the developer to share the cost 
for schools using a punishment tool] is an unlawful exercise of the 
authoritative power exceeding the limitation of the administrative 
guidance, which must have asked for the donation out of the developer’s 
voluntary will143.
This ruling was in line with ministerial communications from the Construction 
Ministry and the Home Ministry issued in the 1980s144, which were intended to 
redress undue development controls by local planning authorities under development 
agreements (Igarashi and Ogawa 1993; Takeshita 1987). The 1983 communication 
from Administrative Vice-Minister of the Construction Ministry instructed local 
governments as follows:
142 1988. Judgement upon the request of the return of the development charge for Musashino City 
educational facilities. In Hanrei Times (The Law Times Report)'. The Supreme Court of Japan, the 
First Petty Branch.
143 Ibid.
144 Japan. Administrative Vice Minister of the Construction Ministry. 1983. Takuchi Kaihatsu Shidd 
Yoko nikansuru Sochi Hoshin nituite (To Governors of Prefectures and Mayors of Specially 
Designated Cities: The guiding principles of the measures on residential land development 
administrative guidance agreements). Tokyo: Japan. Ministry of Construction, Japan. Director 
General of Planning Bureau, the Construction Ministry, and Japan. Chief of Home Ministry's 
Secretariat. 1982. Takuchi Kaihatsu Shidd Ydkoto no Unyo nituite (On the operation of residential 
development guidance agreements, etc.), edited by Governors of Prefectures and Mayors of Specially 
Designated Cities. Tokyo: Japan. Ministry of Construction.
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[Local governments] should rectify excessive development controls with 
development agreements and administrative guidance in responding to 
citizen’s demand for affordable and quality housing under the current 
economic condition of slow income growth and an increase in residential 
development cost145.
This communication criticised the punishment practices of development agreements 
such as rejecting utility services to unapproved developments (Igarashi and Ogawa 
1993: 162-7). With strong emphasis on the hierarchy of planning laws and public 
administrations, local governments cannot exercise adequate autonomy in planning 
policy, even when local public administrations simply respond to their citizens’ 
needs or the public interest.
7.2.3 Transparency and participation in planning
In addition to the issue of local autonomy in planning, Japanese planning decision 
procedures considerably lack adequate transparency as prerequisite of citizen 
participation in planning. Freedom of access to planning decisions is not guaranteed 
by the City Planning Act or other planning laws. Moreover, legal justice, did not 
secure the transparency of decision-making process in planning in a sufficient 
manner in the past. While the court often rejected requests for disclosures of 
planning-related information for reasons of privacy and businesses’ confidentiality, 
the most controversial logic for denying access to government information is the 
inappropriateness of the disclosure because the government is still in the process of 
[final] decision-making. The argument is that publishing provisional plans and other 
related raw materials could prevent the government from making fair and efficient 
decisions.
145 Japan. Administrative Vice Minister of the Construction Ministry (1983) cited by Igarashi and 
Ogawa (1993: 163).
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For example, based on the 1988 Kyoto Prefecture Information Disclosure Ordinance 
(Kyoto-fu Jyoho Kokai Jyorei), a citizen’s ombudsman group requested the Kyoto 
Prefectural Government to disclose information from a kydgikai (policy advisory 
committee) regarding possible dam sites at Kamo River in Kyoto. After being 
rejected by the Kyoto Prefectural Government, the ombudsman group took the case 
to the Kyoto District Court. The District Court acknowledged the importance of the 
ordinance and ordered the prefecture to release the information unless there was 
apparent and significant dangers resulting from the disclosure146 (Matsui 1996: 126-
7). However, the Osaka High Court upheld the view of the Kyoto prefecture, 
claiming that if the information for tentative plans was published, the raw evidence 
would cause confusion and misunderstanding among citizens147. The ombudsman 
group argued that the reasons for withholding information in the decision-making 
process should be clear and concrete, since the rejection of the disclosure of 
government information was against both the Constitution and the ordinance. 
However, upholding the High Court’s opinion, the Supreme Court later dismissed the 
challenge of the ombudsman group148.
In recent years, legal challenges for governmental information disclosure by citizen 
groups led to the publication of previously suppressed planning information149.
146 Kyoto District Court, 27 March 1991.
147 Osaka High Court, 23 March 1993.
148 1993. Judgement upon the request for information disclosure of possible dam sites. In Hanrei 
Times (The Law Times Report): The Supreme Court of Japan, the Second Petty Bench.
149 The suppressed minutes of the City Planning Council meeting about the authorisation of building 
an incinerator facility were ordered to be disclosed as a result of the litigation. 1983b. Judgement 
upon the request of information disclosure of the minutes of a City Planning Council meeting 
(Saitama-ken Joho Kdkai Jdrei Sosho Hanketsu). In Hanrei Times (The Law Times Report): Urawa 
District Court, Japan.
The report on land values of the city’s planned development area had been withheld for reasons of 
privacy of individual properties. The High Court quashed the city council’s rejection of the disclosure. 
1992b. Judgement upon legitimacy of suppression of the report on land values of the planned
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However, the major setback of transparency in planning is that the City Planning Act 
still makes the disclosure of planning information and citizen participation non­
mandatory. Furthermore, ministerial communications even discouraged citizen 
participation during the 1980s, when local planning authorities employed 
development agreements to control rapid residential developments (Igarashi and 
Ogawa 1993; Takeshita 1987). The 1983 Executive Communication from the 
Construction Ministry asked local planning authorities to reconsider development 
agreements, which instructed developers to consult with neighbourhood residents 
when developers planned large-scale residential developments. The 1983 Executive 
Communication instructed local planning authorities as follows:
When developers plan to build high and middle-rise apartment, councils’ 
requests to developers for consultation with neighbouring residents under 
kaihatsu shidd yoko is understood to intend to prevent conflicts between 
developers and neighbouring residents about matters such as sunlight 
blockage. Nonetheless, local governments’ requests to developers to 
disclose building plans beforehand, to hold meetings with neighbouring 
residents when problems are expected, and even to submit a written 
approval from neighbouring residents for the proposed plans, is regarded 
as inappropriate, since these requirements would restrict developers from 
exercising their rights [to develop] and cause the delay of construction150 
(quoted by Igarashi and Ogawa 1993: 164).
The court generally did not accept the rights of third parties [residents] to be 
informed of and consulted about development plans under the City Planning Act. 
The 1978 judgment on the request for the cancellation of the development
development area by Nagano City Council. In Hanrei Times (The Law Times Report): Tokyo High 
Court, Japan.
Citizens in Gifu requested the disclosure of the suppressed environmental assessment report on a road 
construction plan after the plan was endorsed. The Supreme Court ordered the road agency to 
disclose the information. 2003. Kunitachi high-rise apartment case: appeal. In The Supreme Court o f  
Japan Database: Tokyo High Court, Japan.
150 Japan. Administrative Vice Minister of the Construction Ministry. 1983. Takuchi Kaihatsu Shidd 
Ydkd nikansuru Sochi Hoshin nituite (To Governors of Prefectures and Mayors of Specially 
Designated Cities: The guiding principles of the measures on residential land development 
administrative guidance agreements). Tokyo: Japan. Ministry of Construction.
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permission, to which the majority of neighbourhood associations opposed, refused 
the right of the neighbourhood to be informed about nearby developments as follows:
Although the plaintiffs claim rights and interests of receiving materials 
and information on the development, there is no legal ground to accept 
such rights and also no room to construe that the City Planning Act 
protects such rights and interests151.
Although this ruling was made well before the Law Concerning Access to 
Information Held by Administrative Organs came into effect (Law No.42 of 1999, 
enacted on 1st April 2001, the Information Disclosure Act hereafter), the full 
disclosure of development plans based on the City Planning Act and other planning 
laws has not yet been compulsory. Furthermore, although the Information 
Disclosure Act obliges national governmental agencies to disclose information upon 
request, the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport (MLIT) can still withhold 
planning-related information on the grounds that it is still in the process of decision­
making. Article 5.5 of the Examination Standard o f Access to Information Held by 
the Ministry o f  Land, Infrastructure and Transport defines the MLIT’s deliberation 
and examination of materials as an exception of disclosure as follows:
Materials of discussion and examination etc.
[They are] Internal or liaison materials held by national organs, 
independent administrative agencies and local governments for 
deliberation, examination and negotiation, which may contain risks to 
obstruct candid opinion exchanges and neutrality of decision-makings 
unfairly, to cause unnecessary confusion among Japanese citizens, to 
result in advantages or disadvantages of certain people152.
151 1978c. Judgement upon the request of cancellation of development permission from neighbouring 
residents. In Gydshu: Yokohama District Court, Japan.
152 Japan. Chief of the Ministry's Secretariat of Land Infrastructure and Transport. 2004. Jyoho Kokai 
nikakawaru Kokudo Kotsusho Shinsa Kijun (The examination standard of access to information held 
by the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport). In The Examination Standard o f  Law 
Concerning Access to Information Held by Administrative Organs. Tokyo: Japan, the Ministry of 
Land, Infrastructure and Transport.
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Many commentators, resident groups and environmental campaigners expressed their 
frustration at the inaccessibility to governmental information at the administrative 
level. They often referred to the reluctance of officials as a legacy of a feudal 
doctrine, called ‘shirasimubekarazu, yorashimubeshi (The masses must not be 
informed, but make them dependent on the ruler)’. This dictum originated from the 
Chinese classic, The Analects, written around 500 B.C. by Confucius (Kon Zi), which 
remains essential to understand morals, culture and politics in contemporary East 
Asian countries (Confucius and Dawson 2000). This attitude to divide the ruler and 
the ruled still seems to obstruct the transparency and citizen participation in planning 
in Japan.
7.3 The Role of the Court in Japanese Planning
Legal justice is crucial to ensure that the public interest is materialised in planning 
practice. Modem planning systems in the West developed to incorporate new ideas 
such as amenity and social citizenship as ‘material consideration’ in the public 
interest, mobilised by the public’s protests through social movements, challenges in 
the plan-making process such as public inquiries and public examination, and finally 
by the legal justice system (McAuslan 1975; Purdue 1999; Taylor 1998). Citizen 
participation in planning is only fully secured when there are opportunities for the 
public to formally challenge the legitimacy of plan formation and the development 
control process (Barlow 1995). In this sense, the independence of the court from 
other governmental organisations is crucial to ensure that the public interest in 
planning is adequately examined through due process. The development of the 
judicial review system and the expansion of third party rights in modem planning 
require the impartiality of the court in responding to this task.
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Despite the increasing demand for independence of the court from other state 
functions to safeguard citizens’ rights as the public interest, the Japanese court was 
extremely reluctant to intervene in the decision-making of other state organs. The 
Supreme Court made it clear that the court could not order a governmental agency to 
remedy errors committed by the authority in the case of the Osaka International 
Airport. This non-interventionist attitude of the court towards administrative 
decisions contributed little to changing the concept of the public interest in Japanese 
planning system. This is particularly true concerning the introduction of new values, 
such as the preservation of historical assets, townscape and open spaces -  amenity 
and social life - which comprise the quality of life.
While amenity and social life is central themes of modem planning in the West, the 
Japanese court did not play a significant role in advancing these elements as the 
public interest in planning. As discussed before, the Japanese court came to accept 
the legal standing of third parties when developments are likely to have an impact on 
economic benefits or may affects the safety of life. The court started to acknowledge 
accumulating effects of hazardous developments on the long-term health of residents 
in affected communities as in the Osaka International Airport and Hanshin 
Expressway Pollution cases, so that victims received compensation. There are a 
small number of cases in which the loss of amenity due to developments was 
recognised as damage to ‘third party’ residents, enabling them to obtain either 
injunctions of such developments or compensation for past damage. However, these 
cases are still exceptional in Japan.
One of these entitlements is the right to sunlight. A series of civil suits seeking 
injunctions of high-rise developments that were blocking sunlight to neighbouring
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residences in the 1960 and the 1970s resulted in an amendment of the codes of the 
Building Standard Act to regulate building construction obstructing sunlight in 1976 
(Igarashi 1980; Sawai and Shiomi 1972). Another case is the substantial obstruction 
of views from residences due to the construction of buildings next door. Although 
so-called choboken (a right to a view) is yet to be established, a handful of claims led 
to injunction or compensation at lower courts, citing economic losses such as falling 
property values or business losses (Igarashi 2003a: 24-25).
Despite these contributions of the litigation to the progress of planning and
environmental policy in Japan, there is a pitfall in the interpretation of the public
interest in the past planning litigation. While the underlying cause of infringements
of a right to sunlight and a right to a view is related to uncoordinated land-use in
Japan, the court only acknowledged the violation of individual human rights. All the
judgments accepting third party rights in Japan* planning/environment litigation were
based on the following ideas. The acts of defendants infringed on personal rights,
because the impacts of the developments exceeded the tolerance limit of the
plaintiffs, so that the acts were considered as wrongful (tort). To protect collective
interests such as amenity and social life, citizens resorted to proclaim environmental
right as an extension of personal right in litigation in Japan. Consequently, all these
citizens’ claims for common concerns ended up being considered as private interests
in contrast to the public (state) interest in court. The limitation of this interpretation
is that the court does not regard the state’s failure to protect common interests such
as the environment as an infringement of the public interest in planning. Japanese
legal theory still considers the interests shared by the general pubic as reflex interests.
Reflex interest is considered as a privilege which certain individuals happen to
benefit because of the government’s actions. It is not regarded as a legal entitlement,
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rather treated as benevolence from the authority in Japan. Thus, the government can 
take away such a privilege from individuals anytime without any compensation 
(Gresser, Fujikura, and Morishima 1981: 133). Reflex interests are the mirror 
images of the public interest and are not perceived or protected as legal interests in 
Japan.
Whereas planning systems in the West developed through the protection of nature 
and the built environment as the public (common) interest, the interpretation of legal 
theories in Japanese planning led to quite opposite outcomes: the judiciary either 
defended the public interest as a national interest or safeguarded individual human 
rights as private interests. Under the current judicial review system in Japan, legal 
claims for amenity and social life, which is irrelevant to the property right of 
plaintiffs, will be principally dismissed for reasons of absence of the legal standing, 
except in the cases discussed above where individual rights are violated.
A further contradictory issue in planning litigation in Japan is that the court avoided 
giving any judgement on qualitative values such as local amenity. The judiciary 
claimed that it was not in a position to quash planning decisions made by other 
administrative agencies in the name of environmental right, as planning agencies did 
not recognise this right to be a part of the public interest. Even though the 
environment, and in particular amenity, is not satisfactorily protected in Japanese 
statutes, citizens in the communities and even local administrations do not have 
powers to challenge the legitimacy of developments that are likely to impact on their 
local environment. The following cases in Kunitachi City indicate the inadequacy of 
Japanese legal doctrines to protect amenity/social life and improve accessibility of 
the local built environment in the public interest.
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7.3.1 The Community right in Kunitachi City
Kunitachi Pedestrian Bridge Case
The typical attitude of Japanese judiciary toward amenity/social life is reflected in 
the Kunitachi Pedestrian Bridge Case. In 1974, a resident group in Kunitachi City 
sought a cancellation of the contract to construct a pedestrian bridge over the 
beautifully tree-lined University Avenue, which has been selected as one of The 100 
New Tokyo Views by the Bureau of Citizens and Cultural Affairs of the Tokyo 
Metropolitan Government since 1982. The campaigners challenged the development 
in view of safety and accessibility for the elderly and school children, as both a 
school and a day centre were located near this bridge. The plaintiffs also used 
environmental right, in particular visual amenity, which would be threatened by the 
construction of the pedestrian bridge. However, the court dismissed the plaintiffs’ 
plea as follows:
The plaintiffs’ claim that they used a level crossing at University Avenue 
before the completion of the pedestrian bridge is a mere reflex interest 
accompanying the use of the road as a public good. Thus, even if 
residents are now obliged to cross the road using the pedestrian bridge, 
we cannot infer that the plaintiffs’ rights or legally protected interests are 
harmed.
Not only the construction of a pedestrian bridge like this but all public 
policy must be decided by comprehensively examining costs and benefits 
of policy-making decisions on grounds of the public interest. When 
implementing policy, it is very hard to obtain everyone’s approval and 
support so that it is inevitable that some people will experience 
disadvantages and inconvenience or feel displeased by the 
implementation of certain public policy. However, if disadvantaged 
groups of people would be able to obstruct the enforcement of such 
policy with judicial tools in the name of environmental right, it is 
obvious that the function of administrative agencies would be paralysed; 
thus, administrative agencies would be forced to abandon the plans and
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make the existing condition remain, which would result in harming the 
public interest153.
The court also dismissed the plaintiffs’ claim that the pedestrian bridge would 
immediately lead to growth in traffic volume and the speed of vehicles using this 
road, thus increasing the risk of traffic accidents as well as air pollution. The court 
rejected the plaintiffs’ challenge citing the absence of their legal standing.
Kunitachi City Urban Design Control Ordinance Case
The Tokyo High Court’s ruling of 27th October 2004 on the residents’ request to 
dismantle a high-rise apartment which violated the code of the Kunitachi City Urban 
Design Control Ordinance reaffirmed the judiciary’s view on residents’ legal interest 
in the amenity and social life of localities. This ruling is very important to assess the 
effectiveness of the newly promulgated the Landscape Act (Keikan Ho) in June 2004 
(effective from December 2004). In response to a citizen group campaigning to 
protect the city’s aesthetic surroundings, the Tokyo District Court had ruled the high- 
rise apartment to be illegal, being twice as tall as the maximum height of the building 
standard (20 metre) as designated by the local ordinance, even though the building 
met the codes of the Building Standard Act and the City Planning Act154. The
District Court ordered the developer to remove the part of the building that exceeded 
the height limit. The High Court overruled the watershed judgement of the Tokyo 
District Court, reasoning as follows:
[An] attractive townscape must be fully protected and maintained by 
appropriate policy measures for present and future, as it creates the 
quality of national and local environment; thus beautiful townscape/ 
landscape is a common asset, bringing benefit to the national and local 
population. However, it is impossible to conclude that individuals or
153 1973b. Kunitachi pedestrian bridge case. In Hanrei Jiho: Tokyo High Court, Japan.
154 2001. Kunitachi high-rise apartment case. In Hanrei Jiho: Tokyo District Court, Japan.
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local residents hold specific legal rights or interests to enjoy attractive 
townscape/landscape based on civil law. Nonetheless, in case a view 
from particular places has specific importance and thus the benefits from 
this view are socially and objectively accepted as a legal interest in one’s 
life, the interest must be legally protected............
However, there is no current statute to accept an individuals’ right to 
enjoy an attractive townscape/landscape; this standpoint is the same as in 
the Landscape Act. While the Landscape Act defines the basic principles 
and responsibilities of the national government and others in devising the 
system for the formation of landscape master plans and landscape 
planning areas, the controls to shape beautiful landscapes in landscape 
districts and the support [to local administrations] through the 
Organisation for Landscape Management, there is no provision to 
stipulate an individual’s right to enjoy attractive landscape.
As the formation and conservation of beautiful landscape is closely 
related with national and regional nature, history, culture, livelihood and 
economic activities, it must be the role of the public administration to 
implement balanced policies based on professional and comprehensive 
standpoints under citizen participation. Without making good use of the 
systems above, accepting the individual’s rights or legal interests of 
particular residents who share the same opinion about the valuation of the 
specific landscape may create the danger of obstructing the formation 
and conservation of socially balanced good landscape155.
Again, this statement reveals the perception of ‘public’ and ‘private’ as the nation­
state versus individuals. Despite such an opinion, in fact, almost all 70,000 
Kunitachi City residents were opposed to the development, including the local 
assembly and the mayor (Igarashi 2003a). The resident group appealed to the 
Supreme Court. However, the Supreme Court upheld the High court’s ruling which 
confirmed that even a local government is not entitled to protect amenity within its 
administrative area under the new law and ordinances156.
It is reminiscent of the case where the court did not accept the legal standing of the 
Kyoto Buddhism Association, who sued a developer that was planning to construct a
155 2003. Kunitachi high-rise apartment case: appeal. In The Supreme Court o f Japan Database: 
Tokyo High Court, Japan.
156 2005. Judgement upon the request of the alteration of the Kunitachi high-rise apartment building. 
In The Supreme Court o f Japan Database: The Supreme Court of Japan, the First Petty Bench.
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60 metre-high hotel in the old capital city of Kyoto on grounds of religious, historical
and cultural environmental rights (landscape right)157. This development only
became possible when the state introduced the Comprehensive Design System (Sogo
Sekkei Seido) in 1980, which allowed the deregulation of height control (45 metre in
this case) of planned buildings in exchange for the provision of (small) open space
surrounding the buildings. Another high-profile case about amenity is that of users
of Hibiya Park, a large park in central Tokyo, who took a legal action against a
developer that was planning a 120 metre-high office building at the south of the Park,
claiming their right to use the park, personal and environmental right, the right to
1sunlight and safety in case of disasters . All these legal challenges were initiated 
by citizens aiming to protect the prominent townscape/landscape in Japan, which has 
not been sufficiently safeguarded under its planning laws. As explained in this 
chapter, public administrations in Japan are not obliged to inform and consult 
citizens about proposed plans, nor do local ordinances and guidance have adequate 
enforcement power to make developers comply with planning controls. Despite 
these defects in planning policy implementation, the public was not granted an 
opportunity to dispute the legitimacy of flawed developments in court in the name of 
the public interest in Japan.
7.4 Conclusion
Japan’s planning litigation discussed in this chapter suggests the strong orientation in 
Japanese planning towards capitalist development supported by the state. As a result,
157 1992a. The case of Kyoto Buddhism Association - judgement upon the request for an injunction of 
the building construction destructive to historical cityscape. In Hanrei Jiho: Kyoto District Court, 
Japan.
158 1978a. Hibiya Park case - environmental conservation of visual amenities of the park. In Hanrei 
Jiho: Tokyo High Court, Japan.
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even though the purpose of the City Planning Act is to promote ‘rational’ land use, 
the actual practices of the Japanese planning administration and the court rulings 
were far from protecting the environment and responding social concerns as the 
prime objectives of planning policy. Instead, the Japanese court confined legally 
protected interests in planning to the economic interest that properties can bring 
about. Under this ideology of seeing economic benefits as the foremost importance 
in planning, the public interest or ‘rational land use’ in planning was equated with the 
promotion of economic growth in the cited litigation. Accordingly, even minimal 
development controls were often ignored by developers. The rulings discussed in 
this chapter show that the rights to safety, amenity and social life were easily 
sacrificed when there were opportunities for economic gains by planned 
developments.
Moreover, the Japanese court firmly upheld the view that decisions by the state could
not be easily repealed or challenged by citizens in the name of the public interest,
even when there were flaws in the governments’ actions. With the legacy of the
sovereign Emperor from pre-war times, Japan’s judicial system did not function very
well when it judged whether to protect citizenship rights against the illegal acts and
errors of administrative power in the public interest. As the public interest in
planning in a modem democracy was only secured and progressed with citizens’
rights to challenge administrative decisions, the non-intervention principle adopted
by the Japanese court towards other state functions severely restricted potential
changes in the discourse on the public interest in its planning. Western planning
history shows that the public interest is not a rigid concept, but changes over time,
reflecting the demands of the public (Friedmann 1973; McAuslan 1980; Purdue
1999; Taylor 1998). The court is the last public domain for citizens to contest the
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public interest (fairness and legitimacy) of planning decisions under the rule of law. 
Therefore, undermining the power of the court diminishes the role of the public 
interest as a vehicle for changes in planning policy.
Although local governments are supposed to protect the public interest within their 
administrative areas, when it comes to development control, their power is limited 
despite the principle of local autonomy in Japan. Various practical difficulties 
surround the formation of effective planning ordinances under the current legal 
system, which forced local planning authorities to rely on voluntary planning 
agreements. However, non-statutory planning agreements proved to be too 
vulnerable when developers challenged such obligations in court. It should be 
stressed that the City Planning Council also undermines local planning power by 
taking over the role of local assemblies in planning decisions. This means that all 
three branches of the government of Japan failed to recognise that the public interest 
in planning should be accountable to local citizens.
Academics in the legal field criticised the strong vertical relationships that exist 
between central and local administration in Japan regarding the making of rules 
(Chiba 1984; Harano 1984; Igarashi and Ogawa 1993; Kusumoto 1984; Steiner 
1965; Takeshita 1984). The criticisms are centred on three issues. First, there is a 
view that the national government should only define minimum standards of 
planning controls under laws, not set maximum standards to local governments in 
planning, environment and social polic y in order to promote the public interest 
(Harano 1984; Igarashi and Ogawa 1993). Second, there is contradiction in the 
attitude of the central bureaucracy and the judiciary regarding the use of voluntary 
planning agreements by local governments, both in theory and in practice (Kusumoto
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1984). Although both institutions accepted the legitimacy of planning agreements 
when they were deemed necessary, penalty codes against violations of these planning 
agreements were seen to be illegal as detailed in this chapter. If the use of 
enforcement tools under planning agreements is unlawful, the planning agreement 
itself should be considered illegitimate as well (Kusumoto 1984). Finally, there is an 
argument that the influence of central bureaucracy on the contents of local 
ordinances and planning agreements through the means of administrative guidance, 
as well as the court’s opinions to support these practices, are against Chapter Eight of 
the Constitution, which guarantees local self government159 (Chiba 1984; Young 
1984).
Weak local autonomy in Japan is an obstacle to transforming the concept of the 
public interest into a more accountable and democratic one to citizens in the 
community. Many academics argue that Western history shows a strong relation 
between the progress of urbanisation and democracy (Boyer 1978; Castells 1977; 
Giddens 1985; Jones 1976; Tilly and Tilly 1975). In the nineteenth century, prior to 
national government policies, city administrations initiated democratic reforms and 
implemented planning policies in response to demands from local citizens (Hall 
1996a; Sutcliffe 1980; Sutcliffe 1981). Also, social movements flourished in cities 
in the twentieth century (Castells 1977; Giugni, McAdam, and Tilly 1999) so that 
they brought changes in planning policies in the West (Hall 1980; Simmie 1974; 
Taylor 1998). Japan is not an exception to this process. Citizen movements 
demanding pollution control and welfare provision in the 1960s and the 1970s
159 The relevant articles of the Constitution are as follows:
Article 94: Local public entities shall have the right to manage their property, affairs and 
administration and enact their own regulations within law.
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resulted in shifting environmental and planning policies at the local and subsequently 
the national level (McKean 1977; McKean 1981; Steiner, Krauss, and Flanagan 
1980). Similar to the West, the initiatives for planning changes were taken by 
progressive city administrations, as discussed in this Chapter and in Chapter 5 
(McKean 1977; Steiner, Krauss, and Flanagan 1980). However, the Japanese court 
was very slow to respond to these demands and changes.
The rulings discussed in this chapter reveal continued rejection of transparency and 
citizen participation in planning by both the public administration and the court in 
Japan, even in the twenty-first century. In the contemporary modem state, 
democracy or democratic policy-making cannot be secured only through elections. 
With the growing role of planning and the increasing influence of state power on the 
lives of citizens, it is inevitable for the state to disclose future land-use plans and 
relevant materials to the public, and then consult with stakeholders in order to ensure 
that planning decisions are accountable to the public. The significantly limited 
access to government information and opportunities of citizen participation in 
planning in Japan is against the principle of the public interest of the modem liberal 
democracy.
A further problematic issue is that the Japanese legal doctrine hardly accepted the 
public interest as a shared interest in the community or society as a whole. The court 
rulings here made it obvious that the public interest in planning was strictly the 
domain of Japanese governmental organisations. Within this rigid perception, the 
public was only represented and protected by the (central) state. Citizens’ interests 
were rarely seen as a part of the public interest in court, even though the number of
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the affected citizens and the extent of the effect by the disputed planning cases were 
considerable160.
Although Japan’s environmental litigation significantly contributed to change 
environmental policies and raise awareness about the importance of protecting 
human rights and the environment in development in the past, the strategy adopted 
by citizens to protect their interests (or community interest as in the cases in 
Kunitachi City) as environmental right had a double effect. While this tactic was 
intended to obtain a fair hearing, it ended up fixating the image of citizens’ rights 
versus the state’s interest as private versus public. These two interests were never 
integrated in Japan’s intellectual history either by the left (liberals and social 
democrats) or the right (conservatives and nationalists) in political thought (Oguma 
2002). Therefore, this ‘rights’ approach has serious limitations when it is used to 
protect amenity and social life. The rigid dichotomy between the public (the state) 
and the private (people) in the discourse in Japanese planning litigation made it 
almost impossible to advance the public interest as a collective concern for society.
Compared to the continuous redefinition in the concept of the public interest in 
Western planning history, the discourse on the public interest in Japanese planning is 
extraordinary rigid. It seems that both the current interpretation of the public interest
160 There was a case in Japan suggesting that the public interest could also include third parties’ 
interest in judicial review when such individual interests (not to be disturbed by noises from airplanes) 
deserved to be legally protected in addition to the general public interest. In this case, local citizens 
demanded the cancellation of a new air transport route licence at the Niigata Airport on grounds of 
excessive noise pollution. In the ruling, although the Supreme Court dismissed the neighbours’ plea, 
the Court did express the view that the residents’ rights should be included in the public interest, as 
their rights should not be affected by serious noise from airplanes. However, this is a rare example of 
where individuals’ rights are seen to constitute a part of the public interest, as the Supreme Court has 
not used this interpretation widely in subsequent cases such as in the Hanshin Expressway judgement 
in 1995. 1982. The legal standing of the neighbours surrounding the Niigata Airport - judgement on 
the cancellation of new air transport route licenses. In Minshu\ The Supreme Court, the Second Petty 
Bench.
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and the characteristics of planning are hardly different from the nineteenth century. 
The major reason for this rigidity of the public interest in Japanese planning is that its 
values and the interrelation of its institutions, in particular governmental institutions, 
have not been seriously challenged, and have therefore remained largely unreformed. 
Planning history in the West suggests that, in order for Japanese planning to change, 
the public sphere should be activated through lively open-minded arguments and the 
formation of autonomous civil associations. It also requires more extensive 
disclosure of government information, guarantee of citizen participation and open 
opportunities for legal challenges. Finally, the most important lesson from the West 




This conclusion chapter summarises the findings of the previous chapters and then 
suggests that Japan’s planning development in the past failed in producing good 
quality of life because of its rigid concept of the public interest. Section 8.1 
describes the scope of the thesis and its limitations. Section 8.2 analyses Japan’s 
planning culture through the four dimensions of the public/private dichotomy. 
Section 8.3 examines the role of the public interest in Japan’s planning practice. 
Then, Section 8.4 draws out recommendations on future planning development in 
Japan in relation to the public interest discourse. In Section 8.5, I summarise the 
contributions of this research to improve current planning practices, in particular, of 
late comers to modernisation.
8.1 Scope and Limitations of the Thesis
This thesis has been a journey to discover how the ideas of the public interest have 
shaped Japan’ planning culture. The thesis follows modem planning development in 
Japan, and finds out its impacts on the quality of life in relation to the built 
environment. As detailed in Chapter 3, Japan’s policy-makers, bureaucrats,
architects and planning professionals eagerly studied other countries’ planning 
systems from its inception (Ishida 1987a; Watanabe 2003). They have continued to 
import design and planning tools from Western liberal democracies161. Nonetheless, 
the consequences of implementing these planning schemes appear to be quite 
unsatisfactory, even disastrous as in the case of the growth-pole economic
161 See Special Issue: Importation of Urban Planning System in Japan. City Planning Review (2003), 
Vol. 52. No. 1.
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1 ^ 0development in early post-war years , and public-private partnership projects
1during the bubble economy (see Chapter 5). My interest in Japan’s planning 
started from this puzzle. Why have the nation and its people who have worked quite 
hard to catch up with planning innovations failed to achieve quality of life that 
matches the nation’s affluence? What are the obstacles for the Japanese to obtain the 
good built environment when their liberal, political, and social citizenship are fully 
supported by Japan’s very progressive Constitution?
To me, the public interest has been a guide to discover the little known process of 
Japan’s planning policy-making and the ideologies of its planning institutions. As 
explained in Chapter 5, some Japanese citizens defied the nation’s planning policy in 
the 1960s and 1970s to protect their environmental and personal rights through 
vigorous social movements. Chapter 7 showed that Japanese citizens engaged in 
long bitter battles in court, challenging the state’s discourse of the public interest in 
planning to protect a minimum standard of ‘cultural living’. The state’s responses to 
these conflicts revealed its ideologies of the public interest and how this shaped its 
planning policy.
As the nature of this inquiry relied on a broad historical analysis spanning over three 
centuries, some might argue that the analysis is too contextual and not specific 
enough. It can also be argued that the definition of ‘planning’ employed in this 
thesis is not accurate, as it is deliberately broad. However, I believe that the 
definition of planning of a country, or ‘planning culture’ as it is called by John
162 The growth-pole economic development strategy was first inspired by the US’s New Deal 
programme such as Hoover Dam construction in order to secure electric power. Britain’s Barlow 
Report (Royal Commission on the Distribution of the Industrial Population: 1939) was also influential 
on Japan’s national spatial planning.
163 Japan’s government and developers also implemented minkatsu projects by introducing public- 
private partnership schemes used in the urban regenerations of the US and British cities.
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Friedmann (Friedmann 2005), is determined by the ideas of the public interest in 
planning. I also treated the public interest as if it were a black box. The concept of 
the public interest is also hard to pin down and constantly changes. In this research, I 
focused on describing how people constructed this concept and deployed it in 
planning policy-making in Japan.
8.2 The Development of Planning Culture in Japan
The section discusses what forces have determined the way that the public interest in 
Japanese planning has been historically constructed, especially in relation to the 
market, the public sphere, social life and domestic life. These four aspects of 
‘public’ concepts introduced in Chapter 2, have influenced the ideologies of the 
public interest in Japanese planning over the course of its modernisation. The 
analysis explains well why Japan’s planning culture developed to such a position.
The state and the market
As explained in Chapter 3 the way the relationship between the state and the market 
evolved in Meiji Japan had crucial impacts on the concept of the public interest in its 
planning policy. The primary role of the developmental state in relation to planning 
was to build infrastructures, and renew the built environment in order to catch up 
with ‘modernisation’. The requirement for constructing Westem-style buildings and 
industrial infrastructures in the process of modernisation created an enormous 
demand for construction works. Through this process, the construction industry 
grew quickly, and became one of the largest business sectors in post-war Japan
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164(Foreign Press Center Japan 2006; Keizai Koho Center 2003; Levy 1993; Woodall 
1996). Chapter 5 well depicted that other businesses such as civil engineering, 
architecture, surveyors, finance, insurance, advertisement and real estate all benefited 
from the development and renewal of the built environment (Buntrock 2002). A 
strong alliance between these sectors and the government created a distinctive 
planning culture in Japan.
This alliance has also influenced the ideologies of Japan’s planning professionals. 
As explained in Chapter 6, the majority of Japan’s planning professionals had an 
affiliation with developers. Especially, professionals such as civil engineers and 
architects, gained profit from an increase in development projects, in particular from 
generously funded government projects (Buntrock 2002). Accordingly, those 
professionals became strong interest groups in Japan’s planning policy-making. This 
patron-client relationship between the state and professionals/developers also defined 
the role of Japanese planning towards the market. Its prime role also became to 
support economic development, not to control it.
The way in which Japan’s construction sector emerged determined the subsequent 
relationship between the state and the industry in planning. The liaison is inevitably 
clientelistic, connecting politicians, bureaucrats and businessmen for the same 
interest -  building something new. Chapter 5 described this process, in which the 
sector became a hotbed of corruption (Levy 1993; Schlesinger 1997; Woodall 1996), 
often involving the criminal underworld as an agent to materialise construction
164 The share of the construction industry in Japan’s GDP output consisted of 11.3 percent in 1980 and 
10.4 percent in 1990, declining to 6.2 percent in 2004 (Foreign Press Center Japan 2006: 82). The 
GDP share of Japan’s construction industry is distinctive compared to the other advanced economies: 
4.8 percent in the US (1999), 5.0 percent in the UK (2000) and 4.5 percent in France (1999). 
Furthermore, the industry still employs 6.2 million people, representing 9.8 percent o f the working 
population in 2002 (Keizai Koho Center, 2003: 42 and 113).
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projects (Hill 2003a; Kaplan and Dubro 2003) through out its post-war period. 
Tanaka Kakuei, who ruled Japan’s post-war politics as ‘shadow shogun’ even a 
decade after his conviction, epitomises the reality of Japan’s planning which has 
been consumed by the greed of the most powerful. This regime long claimed that 
big construction projects were in the public interest because they created'jobs, and 
enhanced economic development. The cosy relationship between the state 
institutions and these industries formed a formidable ‘growth machine’ as 
‘construction state’ in post-war Japan (Babb 2000; Kerr 2001; McCormack 2001; 
Schlesinger 1997; Woodall 1996).
Farmers, many of whom newly became landowners as a result of SCAP’s land 
reform, also benefited from less development controls. They have had an incentive 
to change in land-use from farming to residential or industrial use in the rapid 
urbanisation process because incomes from farming in Japan have been low (Dore 
1984: Ch.9). Since many farmers only hold a small size of farmland, the agricultural 
productivity has been at a low level in Japan (Dore 1984: Ch.9). As explained in 
Chapter 5, the state was also keen to reduce the ‘unproductive’ agricultural sector in 
favour of the industrial economy in the 1960s (Watanabe 1988). As 70 percent of 
the whole population lived in rural areas, and nearly half of the working population 
engaged in the agricultural sector immediately after the war (Japan. Statistics Bureau 
2006), ‘the freedom of land-use’ won the support of the majority as it was seen to 
improve chances for social betterment. Since strong property rights became well- 
entrenched in early post-war Japan, development controls could hardly be in the 
public interest in Japanese planning policy-making.
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The public sphere as a political community
Contrary to planning histories in Western Europe and the USA, the development of 
Japanese planning has not been strongly related to an open political community. A 
political community for planning exists in contemporary Japan; however it is 
extremely confined within the circle of the state bureaucracy, politicians and 
businesses as explained in Chapter 5 and 6. Participation in Japan’s planning policy­
making is not open to all stakeholders (Igarashi and Ogawa 1993; Miyamoto 1998). 
First of all, an autonomous civil society, which has represented an integral part of the 
public sphere in Western liberal states, was absent in Japan’s planning policy-making. 
In the history of Western planning, civil society, in particular non-profit 
organisations, contributed a great deal to improve the conditions of working class 
housing, to create amenities and to preserve the environment (see Chapter 2). These 
associations have shaped the direction of planning policy in Western liberal 
economies (Cherry 1996; Pennington 2000). However, as explained in Chapter 6, 
the planning governance in Japan has prevented autonomous civil associations from 
exerting a strong influence on planning policy-making. In addition, even civil 
society itself was mobilised by the state’s initiatives during pre-war times (see 
Chapter 3), this tendency still remains in post-war Japan (see Chapter 6).
Indeed, civil society organisations, in particular neighbourhood organisations, were 
important in supporting the totalitarian regime in pre-war Japan in order to promote 
‘thrift and diligence’ for the nation’s prosperity (see Chapter 3). Japan’s civil society 
associations were often deployed by the central bureaucracy to ‘educate’ local 
citizens and guide desirable outcomes for the authority in pre-war times (Garon 
1994; Garon 1997; Garon 2003; Pyle 1973; Smith 1978). Furthermore, business
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associations still account for 40 percent of all associational establishments in 
contemporary Japan (Tsujinaka 2003: 114). From its history of civil society 
development, the characteristics of many civil organisations in Japan are often 
conservative, hierarchical and development-oriented (Garon 2003; Pekkanen 2003). 
As a result, civil society organisations sometimes worked as if they were the lower 
level of government agencies in Japan (Pekkanen 2003).
In addition to the problem of the autonomy of civil associations, a Japanese 
individual also tends to assimilate his/her identity into the national identity. Japan’s 
construction of the nationhood towards modernisation has made it difficult to 
separate an identity of a Japanese individual from the nation. This is the reason why 
Japanese people were easily manipulated by the discourse of ‘national polity’ (see 
Chapter 3) and nihonjinron (see Chapter 5) which exaggerate cultural/racial 
homogeneity of the Japanese, persuading them to act in the same manner. 
Maruyama Masao, a politics professor famed for his Theory and Psychology o f Ultra 
Nationalism (1946), analysed how the state succeeded in penetrating the private 
sphere - everyday life of Japanese people, and mobilised it for the nation during the 
pre-war period through grassroots organisations (Maruyama 1963a; Maruyama 
1963c). Maruyama maintains the view of traditional liberal political thought which 
perceives the private sphere as the forefront of individuals’ moral and religious 
conscience against the state’s intrusion of individual liberty (Benhabib 1998: 86). In 
pre-war Japan, however, civil society worked for the authorities to control the 
autonomy of the private sphere as detailed in Chapter 3.
Second, while the public sphere is often activated by free exchanges of opinions led 
by leading intellectuals, academics, researchers, journalists and professionals, this
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role of the public sphere as enhancing lively arguments about politics and policy­
making is indeed very weak in Japan as detailed in Chapter 6. The harsh oppression 
of Japan’s academia and media in pre-war times (see Chapter 3) as well as the 
censorship and the anti-communist purge in the late US occupation period (see 
Chapter 4) have had a pervasive influence on the subsequent development of the 
public sphere in Japan. As a result, the state almost dictated policy-making without 
consulting ordinary citizens up to the late 1960s.
Furthermore, with weakening influences of the left in academia since the 1970s 
(Barshay 2004; Kersten and Williams 2006; Koschmann 1993), the principle that 
intellectuals should be politically and ideologically impartial, thus value-free seems 
to be established in contemporary Japan. However, the intellectuals of policy 
advisory committees who are supposed to steer public debates in policy-making did 
not function as an independent body to reflect a wide range of opinions in Japanese 
society, as they were carefully selected not to oppose the government’s proposals 
(see Chapter 6). In addition, the academic discourse of post-modernism detailed in 
Chapter 5 has also contributed the development of cultural relativism such as 
nihonjinron, which has ended up justifying the current planning condition in Japan as 
the culturally preferred form by its citizens (Buck 2000; Jinnai 1994). The 
problematic nature of its intellectual discourse has undermined the development of 
an open political community in Japan, which could have proposed variable policy 
choices to the public.
Moreover, the distinctive characteristics of planning professionals and academics 
have also shaped the discourse of Japanese planning. Due to its inception, planning 
in Japan was seldom considered to be a part of social science to mediate different
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interests in the built environment. It was regarded as technology to materialise the 
construction of ‘new’ development and art to demonstrate ‘modernity’ (Coaldrake 
1996; Smith 1978). Accordingly, there was no particular training for planners to 
study planning as a political process (Masser and Yorisaki 1994). Professional 
endeavours were concentrated on how to build or renew spaces and provide 
infrastructures efficiently (see Chapter 3 and 5).
In contrast, impacts caused by rapid urbanisation were addressed by mainstream 
social scientists in Japan, in particular economists whom the central government 
appointed to policy advisory committees such as the Economic Council (Keizai 
Shingikai). However, again, their policy suggestions tended to focus on how to 
promote overall ‘economic efficiency’ while minimising cost to the state and 
businesses as explained in Chapter 4 and 5. Many of them did not deal seriously 
with articulating the human costs of spatial development. As seen in Chapter 5, it 
was typical that many economists claimed that the deregulation of planning controls 
was in the public interest to remove economic inefficiencies in land-use (Iwata and 
Hatta 1997; Tochi Mondai Kondankai 1983). However, the policy recommendations 
from these elite academics often resulted in regressive effects on citizens’ lives. 
These effects are represented by rampant environmental problems, the lack of 
affordable housing, poor urban design and the shortage of green spaces (Ishida 
1987a; Sorensen 2002). Because Japan’s planning policy community has been 
underdeveloped and controlled by the state and the market to stimulate open policy 
debate (Nakamura 2000; Tsurutani 1986), the public interest as a representation of 
collective concerns for citizens has hardly been articulated in the policy-making 
process.
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The public realm as social life
As explained in Chapter 2, the public realm as ‘social life’ in the built environment 
has been an important agenda in Western planning histories. In particular, since the 
nineteenth century, there has been an emphasis on the creation of ample open space 
for social life (Van Rooijen 2000; Worpole 2000). Furthermore, Western planners 
have come to recognise that the liveability of cities has depended on the provision of 
these social spaces where people spontaneously interact (Jacobs 1972; Larkham 
1996; Tibbalds 1992; Worpole 2000). Although there has been a tendency to link 
public space with economic competitiveness, the growth of urban tourism, and the 
economic development by culture in recent years (Madanipour 2003: 224-227), its 
importance has been increasingly stressed as an indicator of the success of planning 
in relation to social capital building (Putnam 2000: 19). As a consequence, the 
representation of ‘public’ in the built environment has increased in weight in 
contemporary planning in the West.
In contrast, one of the most distinctive notions of modem Japanese cities is the 
failure to recognise social life as the public realm. There have been a number of 
places to offer such functions in old cities and towns in Japan. Historic Japanese 
cities had many temples with beautiful gardens, shrines and attractive high streets 
near these religious institutions. Although there were no squares in traditional 
Japanese cities as in Western cities, spaces near religious facilities and riversides 
offered the functions of socialisation and entertainment for citizens in the old days 
(Cybriwsky 1998; Jinnai 1994; Jinnai 2001; Kerr 2001). However, Japan’s modem 
planning has continuously erased those sociable spaces for citizens.
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The reason why social life has not been recognised as the public realm in Japan’s 
planning system is again due to the beginning of its modem planning and the concept 
o f ‘public’ as detailed in Chapter 2 and 3. When modem city planning was imported 
to Japan in the early Meiji period, planning was a tool to demonstrate to the world 
that the city was a showcase of the modem state (Cybriwsky 1998; Fujimori 1990; 
Smith 1978). This intention is quite visible in Westem-style buildings built in the 
Meiji period. As a result, the government’s investments to create ‘public’ spaces 
were mostly concentrated on the high city in Tokyo, while investments in the low 
city tended to be neglected in pre-war Japan (Cybriwsky 1998). While the blurred 
boundaries between public and private in the use of space were characteristics of pre- 
Meiji Japan, the modem state drew a distinction of ‘public’ and ‘private’ realm of 
spaces as the authority and individuals. Even though spaces are provided for the 
public in contemporary Japan, the metaphors that architects represent in these spaces 
often reflect ‘the nation’ and not the people (Coaldrake 1996; Stewart 1987). When 
public spaces are not so important for the authorities, these spaces are simply 
utilitarian in contemporary Japan (Shelton 1998: 168). This is an impact of Japan’s 
modernisation in which the state absorbed its society.
Gendered public domain
The weak feminist consciousness in Japan has also been a significant influence on 
the development of its planning system. As examined in Chapter 2, the contributions 
of feminist critiques to planning development in the West are two-fold. First of all, 
the female philanthropists’ initiatives for the working class housing reform in 
nineteenth century British and American industrial cities considerably influenced 
their planning culture, which valued the quality of living environment as a part of
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social citizenship (Meller 2004). Second, feminist critiques and social movements 
from the late 1960s challenged the elite-male-defined objectives of planning policy 
in the West (Garber and Turner 1995; Sandercock and Forsyth 2000; Young 1990) so 
that feminism succeeded in infusing an alternative concept of the public interest. 
These factors are surprisingly underdeveloped in Japan’s planning debates (see 
Chapter 6). The absence of feminist critiques in analysing existing planning policies 
appears to be important in explaining why the idea of citizenship as the public 
interest has rarely been an agenda in Japan’s planning policy-making.
The reason why feminism has not developed well in Japan is that women have 
struggled to build an identity other than the traditional gender role in order to 
challenge oppressions. As examined in Chapter 2 and 3, the Japanese authority 
considered the domestic domain (family) as the public (state) domain, to pursue 
‘modernisation’ as a national project (Nolte and Hastings 1991). A family was an 
important unit for the nation, as it was a place to nurture the old, educate children as 
a future generation, and reproduce moral values which the authority endorsed (Garon 
1993a; Garon 1994; Pyle 1973). Thus, the Japanese authorities valued women’s role 
as far as their activities served the goals which the elite defined (Fujiwara-Fanselow 
and Kameda 1994; Garon 1994; Garon 1997; Long 1996; Takeda 2005).
The way in which Japanese authority cultivated women’s role has striking 
resemblance with its careful construction of an identity of the Japanese as a 
homogeneous unit. To understand this rhetoric, Benedict Anderson’s account of a 
nation-state as ‘an imagined community’ is helpful (Anderson 1991). The Meiji 
oligarchy reinforced this logic as ‘a nation as an imagined family’ (Maruyama 
1963d). In this context, the Imperial Family has played a significant role as an icon
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conveying that the whole nation is a patriarchal family headed by the emperor. All 
Japanese (subjects) were the babies of the father, the emperor165. In such an extreme 
metaphor, each member has to perform a given role in Japanese society (family), and 
conflicts should be peacefully resolved by the patriarchy rule, not by law and order. 
It implies the fusion of ‘public (state and patriarchy)’ and ‘private (individual and 
female)’, in which the private is eternally obedient to the public. This patriarchy rule 
has been applied to all social relations in modem Japan -  in families, economy, 
education and politics. Wives, daughters, employees, students, and citizens, are all 
expected to follow what their superiors have decided for their minors’ best interest. 
This construction of the power structure in Japanese society prevented diverse views 
of planning from being discussed in the public interest.
8.3. The Role of the Public Interest in Japanese Planning
This section summarises what the roles o f the public interest have been in the 
development o f  Japanese planning. The discussion also analyses why Japanese 
planning has failed to produce good quality o f  life although the government has 
continued to import planning tools from the West and the national income has been 
one o f the highest in the world. It also gives an account why the idea o f  the public 
interest in Japanese planning has rarely been contested.
Planning and the market
As seen in the history of modem Britain, the primary role of the public interest in the 
planning of the leading industrial economies was to remedy externalities of the
165 A recent argument of a female emperor in Japan represents this issue. While the current first 
princes do not have male children as a future heir, the establishment has been reluctant to change the 
law to accept a female emperor so far.
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laissez-faire approach in the nineteenth century (see Chapter 1 and 2). Public health 
problems in nineteenth century Western industrial cities exposed the limitations of 
the free market economy, so that the government had to intervene in the land-use of 
individual properties in order to prevent health hazards in the public interest. 
However, Japan’s problems with its economy did not emanate from the progress of 
the industrial economy, but rose from the underdeveloped economy. This 
consciousness of being a latecomer to industrialisation formed a strong ideology in 
Japan, seeing economic development as the public interest in its planning policy.
The developmental state culture in planning was further reinforced in the process of 
the globalisation of the Japanese economy in the 1980s (see Chapter 5). The 
government started to attract new high-technology service industries to former 
industrial sites of major cities and new science parks known as ‘technopolises’. 
From 1980, MITI designated 26 regions where research and development was 
encouraged (Steffensen 1995). However, what the new planning initiatives since the 
1980s successfully promoted was the consumption of spaces - shopping, leisure and 
recreation. In the previous era, the spatial environment was necessary mainly for 
manufacturing production and the reproduction of the population. On the other hand, 
after the 1980s, the spatial environment itself became an object of desire and 
consumption in the name o f ‘new urban culture’ (Clammer 1997; McCormack 2001). 
Although the government promoted those planning projects to improve ‘the quality 
of life’ in the public interest, the initiatives ended in disaster both in urban and rural 
Japan.
Not only has this cultural hegemony in planning been maintained and protected by 
the discourse of international politics and lobbying of interest groups, Japan’s public
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administrations and judiciary have succeeded in defying citizens’ challenges to 
account for the public interest against the externalities of the market, by 
misinterpreting the rule of law principle (see Chapter 6 and 7). Accordingly, the 
planning ideology of the developmental state is unlikely to disappear in 
contemporary Japan.
Democracy and the public sphere
The conceptualisation of the public interest in modem planning also signifies the 
transformation of the public sphere of Western liberal democracies (see Chapter 1 
and 2). The nineteenth century housing reform initiatives in Western industrial cities 
were strongly linked with the rise of political and social citizenship of the working 
classes during this period (Ashworth 1954; Jones 1976). Intense labour movements 
in European cities threatened the foundations of the bourgeoisie public sphere and 
resulted in giving the masses opportunities to participate in parliamentary politics in 
later years (Geary 1981; Hinton 1983; Jones 1976). The working class housing 
reform was the middle classes’ attempt to ‘amend the moral of the working classes’, 
by improving their living conditions in deteriorated neighbourhoods (Ashworth 
1954; Fraser 1984; Hall 1996a; Thane 1996; Ward 1989). Therefore, the emergence 
of modem planning in the West can be interpreted as the diversification of the public 
sphere of a political community.
Japan’s Meiji elite well understood the dynamics of the industrial economy and its
impact on society from their trips to nineteenth century European cities as examined
in Chapter 2 and 3. The Meiji elite considered that Japan was not able to afford mass
democracy, because the nation had to strengthen its military first by state-led
economic development in order to survive in a hostile world (Pyle 1974). Therefore,
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they strove to suppress political liberalism and created the myth of national unity in 
order to prevent the expansion of a political community (see Chapter 2 and 3). Such 
oppression and manipulation of citizens resulted in the absence of autonomous civil 
society and individuals unless it served the state or the elite interest.
The marginalisation and circumscription of civil society in Japan impeded the 
development of the public sphere as an open political community. Up to the early 
1970s, citizens’ movements in Japan demonstrated that Japanese civil society was 
able to act for social justice and fairness as detailed in Chapter 5. In fact, citizen 
movements partly succeeded in promoting the quality of life agenda through media 
campaigns and litigation. Nevertheless, their success was short-lived.
The conservatives and their circles often criticised such locally based initiatives and 
local politics that sympathised with such movements by labelling them as local 
egotism against the nation’s ‘public interest’ (Avenell 2006; Lesbirel 1998; Smith 
2000). Accordingly, the public interest ended up being reduced to the national 
interest in the political discourse as well as in legal justice as examined in Chapter 7. 
In this context, whereas in Western liberal democracies what the public interest 
represents could be an instrument for civil society, or individuals, to challenge the 
legitimacy and fairness of governments’ planning decisions, the public interest in 
Japan has been used to justify the governments’ judgments in its planning policy. 
Accordingly, the public interest in Japan exists to bar citizens from objecting to 
planning decisions and helps to reproduce ‘authoritarian values’ in planning.
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Creating social life
Whereas Western planners have increasingly recognised social life as an integral part 
of planning in the public interest, Japanese planners have fundamentally lacked this 
understanding. Many Japanese planners sensed that social life was an essential part 
of planning through the observation of overseas regeneration projects, but they did 
not grasp the meaning of social life and how they could incorporate this factor into 
planning policy. Indeed, land-use planning and community development was the 
first policy arena where direct political participation appeared in the UK (Croft and 
Beresford 1996). Although many criticized the effectiveness of citizen participation 
in planning policy-making (Croft and Beresford 1996; Pennington 2000; Rydin 
1999), citizen participation is unquestionably important for contemporary planners in 
liberal democracies to know how the public considers social life in space. Whilst the 
quality of social life in relation to spatial use is likely the most debated theme in 
public consultation, the absence of the social life concept as the public interest in 
Japan’s planning culture resulted in the poor presentation of sociability in its public 
space and landscape.
The absence of social life concept in Japan’s planning policy originated from the 
inception of Japanese modem planning system. Planning professionals and 
architects as leading members of Japanese society worshiped modernisation, seen as 
necessary to make progress towards one of the Great Powers. Japanese bureaucrats 
and professionals emphasised the importance of efficiency, rationality and 
technology in planning policy. However, Japan’s planning values are not thoroughly 
grounded in modernism, on which Western planning drew in the past. As detailed in 
Chapter 2, the idea of modernism in Western planning cannot be separated from
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citizenship that guarantees political liberalism, democracy and equality (Gehl 1996a; 
Gehl and Gemzaee 1996b; Mitchell 2003). Most of all, the modernism in planning 
was a departure from the absolute state and religious values in the nineteenth century 
(Brain 1997; Worpole 1992; Worpole 2000). On the other hand, the Japanese 
establishment genuinely feared the impact of modernisation and industrialisation on 
Japanese ‘traditional’ values (see Chapter 2 and 3). As a result, the Japanese elite 
continually promoted its ‘authentic tradition’ inside and outside Japan (Vlastos 1998).
To accomplish this task, the Japanese government has used public spaces and its 
nature to enhance the imagery of the nationhood, as detailed in Chapter 3. First, the 
authority reinvented a number of historic sites to symbolise the Imperial Family and 
Shinto which in fact had not been the centre of Japanese culture in the previous era 
(Fujitani 1993; Ito 1998). Second, the authority gave emphasis to Japanese folklore, 
which linked to rural nature, as representation of national beauty (against modem 
thus immoral urban culture). Accordingly, the nation’s elite supported the works of 
nationalist naturalists, artists and literatures (Gavin 2000; Hashimoto 1998; 
Robertson 1998; Scheiner 1998). This tradition still continues in contemporary 
Japan. For example, the Japan External Trade Organization (JETRO) has issued its 
publication Japanese Lifestyles to promote Japanese culture abroad. Its 1999 edition 
featured an interview with a Japanese actress titled ‘ Japan -  A Blend o f Changing 
Customs and Unchanged Values' (Japan External Trade Organization 1999: 84-85). 
The message here is that Japan’s (authentic national) value has continued even 
though the social environment has changed.
Despite this ideal imagery of Japan’s scenery advocated by traditionalists (Gavin 
2000; Hashimoto 1998), changes in landscapes and the physical renewal of the built
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environment have never stopped in modem Japan. As detailed in Chapter 3 and 5, 
prominent Japanese architects, who frequently boasted of Japan’s cultural 
distinctiveness in their works, often caused the destruction of landscapes and old 
neighbourhoods (Buntrock 2002; Kerr 2001; Knabe and Noennig 1999; Popham 
1985; Stewart 1987). The chaotic built environment in modem Japan partly 
illustrates its elite’s two-faced attitude towards modernisation.
The insensibility of Japanese architects’ views to the existing environment started to 
show worrying signs in the 1970s, when Japan joined the top league of industrialised 
economies (see Chapter 5). The affluence of the nation and the freedom of land-use 
gave Japanese architects new justification to experiment with post-modern 
architecture corresponding to the post-Fordism era. Their sense of superiority is also 
based on middle- and high-brow Japanese architectural culture that has been 
supported by both the government and industries since the Meiji period (Buck 2000; 
Knabe and Noennig 1999). Because there is no organisation like Britain’s CABE 
(Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment) in Japan to control urban 
design and no statutory public consultation requirement for architects, many new 
buildings that are alien to the surrounding environment have been built in modem 
Japan (Knabe and Noennig 1999; Nute 2004).
Feminist critiques to planning
Although feminist critiques have transformed existing norms of the public interest in
modem planning in the West (Friedmann 1996; Greed 1994; Milroy and Andrew
1988; Sandercock and Forsyth 2000), feminist theories have had little impact on the
public interest discourse in Japanese planning. Since the late 1960s, the concept of
the public interest in planning and its professionals have faced strong criticism and
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resistance from citizens in the West, because the rational planning model advocated 
by planning professionals did not create communities where people would like to 
live and enjoy life (see Chapter 1 and 2). Feminist campaigners, a newly emerged 
social movement in the post-modern and multiculturalists’ era, rejected the existing 
planning neutrality and the public interest as being exclusively ‘white, male, and 
middle-class’ (Liggett 1996; Milroy 1996; Ritzdorf 1996). Despite its sweeping 
influences on modem planning and other public policy discourse in the West, 
feminist and post-modem ideas introduced to Japan neither changed the scope of 
citizen participation in planning nor did they encourage planners to include different 
voices in planning in the public interest (see Chapter 5 and 6).
This difference again seems to derive from Japan’s distinction between the public 
and private domains that differs from the West as explained in Chapter 2. Due to the 
construction of public/private dichotomies in Japan, women’s (as well as men’s) 
behaviours, either in the public or the private realm have been severely constrained 
by the state or elite defined ideal of women (and the Japanese) as seen in the 
discourse of national polity (see Chapter 2) and nihonjinron (see Chapter 5). This 
strict identity of women also affected the development of planning and other policy­
making in Japan. First, middle class women in pre-war Japan dedicated themselves 
to promoting the nation’s development (Garon 1993a; Garon 1994; Pyle 1973), so 
that even they sometimes ended up oppressing the minorities (Garon 1993a) and 
ignoring the most deprived women (e.g. miners, factory workers and prostitutes who 
were locked up by their employers) in the industrial society (Shin 2004:28-32). 
Unlike Western counterparts, Japanese middle class women did not infuse an idea of 
citizenship in the management of spaces in the pre-war period.
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During the post-war period, however, a number of women’s groups in Japan have 
been very active in grassroots social movements (see Chapter 6) such as the 
promotion of peace (Yamamoto 2004), food safety and the protection of the 
environment (Lam 1999; LeBlanc 1999). Nonetheless, constrained by the state- 
defined gender identity, many campaigners do not see their activities as feminist, 
instead claiming motherhood as a cause to participate in such social movements (Eto 
2005: 316-318; Yamamoto 2004: 193-194). There has been a sense of inhibition 
among Japanese women to express their opinions in public as individual citizens 
(Yamamoto 2004: 194), as they themselves tend to believe that women are ‘second 
class citizens’ and thus are not likely to be heard if they do not use the identity of a 
mother for taking such ‘political’ actions (Eto 2005: 318). This has prevented 
diverse concerns from being discussed as a planning agenda in post-war Japan.
Furthermore, post-modernism which is often associated with the rise of feminism in 
the West (Marchand and Parpart 1994; Nicholson 1989) has had an adverse effect on 
the promotion of feminist planning agenda in Japan. Some point out that modernism 
is still important for feminist development in resisting oppression from authorities 
and promoting equality amongst members of a society (Fainstein 1996; Hewitt 1996; 
Young 1990). However, by embracing diversities and pluralism, post-modernism 
has sometimes weakened the notion of universal citizenship represented by equal 
access to the public sphere (Hewitt 1996).
Indeed, post-modernism in Japan offered a diversity of consumption and life style 
choices for women (Clammer 1997; Iida 2002), but also embraced the existing 
gender role of Japanese women as ‘a choice’ as detailed in Chapter 5. Nevertheless, 
in reality, Japanese women do not actively ‘choose’ the traditional role of women,
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but they play the role because other choices are extremely constrained and 
unattractive, as they would have to sacrifice a great deal of their private life if they 
were to join the male-defined public life, either in works or politics. As a result, 
more women preferred being a full-time housewife to being a full-time worker in the 
1980s and 1990s compared to previous period166 (Ueno 1994: 32). Thus, the idea of 
post-modernism in Japan has inadvertently contributed to the rise of neo­
traditionalism among Japanese women, thereby ended up obstructing significant 
changes from happening to the discourse of the public interest in its planning policy.
Accordingly, Japan’s post-modernism and feminism has failed to challenge the 
existing values of its planning policy based on strong ‘scientific’ rationality. As 
explained in Chapter 3, Japan’s planning policy is a product of being modem 
(technology) with being traditional (the authoritarian state). Japan’s planning policy 
has developed replacing the public interest (politics in planning) with ‘scientific 
neutrality’. However, how this ‘neutrality’ has been constructed is questionable, as 
Japanese science has not been challenged by the Enlightenment up to now 
(Nakayama 1984). Moreover, ‘scientific neutrality’ in planning policy has been 
exclusively defined by elite males in Japan. While feminist critiques in the West 
attacked the same gender-blind scientific neutrality and the male-defined public 
sphere in modem planning policy (Fainstein 1996; Ritzdorf 1996), this is not the case 
in Japan.
166 In Ueno’s own research, 60 percent of those being questioned answered that they wanted to be a 
full-time housewife (Ueno 1994: 32).
8.4 Recommendations on Japan’s Planning Development
This section discuss how governments, businesses, planning professionals and 
citizens can use the public interest as a tool to promote good quality of life through 
planning policy in Japan. First, the relationship between the state and the market in 
Japanese planning needs to be re-examined in the public interest since the collapse of 
the bubble economy proves that the market can be a destructive force to the 
environment and people’s lives. Planning institutions in modem Japan have evolved 
based on the deep-set ideology of economic growth. This ideology has been further 
strengthened by the interests of their members, who have wished to expand their 
professional clout in the process of Japan’s modernisation. These institutional 
climates of Japan’s planning have had a deep imprint on Japan’s planning culture, 
even after the environment surrounding those institutions entirely changed. Japan 
became an economic superpower in the 1980s so that its economy does not need big 
construction projects anymore to enhance development. To re-evaluate the 
relationship between the state and the market in planning, promoting transparency 
and citizen participation in planning decision-making is essential. Moreover, there is 
a need to educate Japanese planners about the impacts of development planning and 
planners’ professional responsibilities to society.
Second, although both Japanese bureaucracy and academics now seriously address 
citizen participation as machi-zukuri (town-making), its effectiveness needs to be 
carefully evaluated. Making ‘a consensus’ in planning seems to appeal to Japanese 
minds as it is similar to the Japanese style management of ringi (round meeting). 
However, considering the history of Japanese civil society, the state-led citizen 
participation programme in planning would create the risk that civil society might
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lose its autonomy (Evans 2002). The history of Japan shows that the existence of 
civil society itself does not produce a democratic society. Civil society has its limits, 
as Japan’s civil society organisations actively supported the brutal totalitarian regime 
in the past for ‘modernisation’ and justified the invasion of its Asian neighbours. To 
ensure that proposed planning policies are in the public interest, all stakeholders 
should be given enough opportunities to discuss whether government proposals 
would satisfy their needs. The stakeholders of proposed plans should be entitled to 
challenge government policies if necessary. The government is required to explain 
why its proposals are the best to serve the public interest and how such policies are 
accountable to stakeholders. Otherwise machi-zukuri could turn out to be a mere 
devise to disguise ‘a consensus’ and authorise the prescribed plans.
A recent scandal surrounding the Town Meeting system in Japan well illustrates the 
limitation of public participation in the Japanese style. The Town Meeting system 
was introduced in 2001 under the initiative of Koizumi cabinet to encourage citizen 
participation in the making of key national government policies such as education, 
pension reform, environment and regional planning issues. High officials and 
ministers were invited to town halls all over the country to discuss issues across the 
board and answer questions from the public. Each town meeting cost 11 million Yen 
(£50,000) of taxpayers’ money (McCurry 2006). The scandal revealed that questions 
‘from the public’ at twenty-five town meetings were ‘sham’ as local governments 
paid those sixty-five questioners to ask ‘particular’ questions to the officials under 
requests from ministry bureaucrats to ‘guide’ discussions (ibid). This incident 
strongly suggests that the format of citizen participation in Japan needs more 
extensive debate.
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Third, Japanese local governments have been able to exercise little power over local 
planning decisions as the analysis of Chapter 7 revealed. Despite SCAP’s reforms to 
promote local autonomy, planning still de facto falls under the jurisdiction of central 
government. Even though local governments have certain latitude to decide on their 
own visions for the localities, final planning decisions are designed to bypass local 
assemblies (see Chapter 6). Planning decisions are still to be authorised by the 
exclusive [Prefectural] City Planning Council that is appointed by the prefectural 
government, although since 2000 municipal governments can form their own City 
Planning Council. This institutional arrangement made it difficult for local citizens 
to participate in planning policy-making and influence its outcomes. As a result, 
local interests have not been well incorporated into the public interest through either 
formal or informal politics in planning. The analysis of Chapter 7 shows that local 
planning should be the responsibility of local governments to make planning policy 
more accountable to local citizens.
Fourth, although some claim that people’s activities or minds define public spaces 
(Hidaka and Tanaka 2001), many reckon that the Japanese sense of beauty, whether 
it is traditional townscapes, gardens, lifestyle or products, is defined by order, 
simplicity, perfection and harmony with the environment (Ekuan 1998; Karan 2005: 
89-93; Moeran 1996). The government’s ignorance of ‘social life’ as the public 
realm has ended up eliminating the beautiful, but practical townscape of old towns 
and failing to provide sufficient open spaces in contemporary Japan. It resulted in 
the poor urban design, which does not offer quality of life to Japanese citizens in the 
public interest.
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To encourage debate about social life in spaces, the role of intellectuals, academics 
and professionals are crucial. As analysed in Chapter 3 and 6, planning education in 
Japan is still confined to rational science; it considerably lacks the studies of 
planning as politics, democracy and a tool to protect quality of life as a part of social 
citizenship. Moreover, the majority of Japan’s local governments and NPOs have 
not succeeded in attracting human capital to offer alternative planning policy choices 
to citizens (see Chapter 6). To overcome these obstacles, local autonomy and 
governments’ support to autonomous civil organisations (e.g. tax breaks, education 
and grants) are vital. Cities and villages cannot thrive without recognition of social 
life as the public interest.
Fifth, while Western feminists often describe the boundary between the public and 
private domains as the state/ market /civil society and families (Benhabib 1998; 
Landes 1998; Lister 2002), this division is different in Japan (Molony 2005; Nolte 
and Hastings 1991). While Japan’s modem state also prevented women from 
participating in the political domain during pre-war times, the state almost subsumed 
the family and private domain in the past to mobilise its citizens for the national goal 
(see Chapter 2 and 3). Because its legacy still pervades contemporary Japan (Garon 
2003), it appears to be harder for Japanese women compared to their Western 
counterparts to oppose planning policy as the state domain.
Certainly, many social movements emerged because some groups realised that they 
were being exploited and oppressed in a society (Tarrow 1998: 14; Young 1990: 39). 
Japan’s political history detailed in this thesis (Chapter 3, 4 and 5) shows that 
awareness of being deprived, and grievance against such injustice, has played a 
significant role to mobilise policy discourse. In this context, the minorities in Japan,
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1 (\Hburakumin and Japanese-Koreans have been well conscious of being oppressed in 
Japanese society. Thus, it is not a coincidence that these minorities in Japan 
succeeded to a certain extent in mobilising their interests in planning policy-making 
iin post-war Japan.
Ht was minorities’ grievance of being unfairly marginalised for a long time that 
mobilised them in solidarity to improve their quality of life in post-war Japan. 
Burakumin swiftly organised Buraku Liberation League (BLL) to improve their 
social standing in affiliation with JCP and JSP in early post-war years (Su-lan Reber 
1999; Upham 1987: Ch.3). Burakumin*s campaigns materialised in the enactment of 
the Special Measures Law for Dowa (assimilation) Projects (SML) in 1969 to 
promote burakumin*s access to favourable loans, education, good community 
facilities such as day care and public housing in their communities (Upham 1993b: 
328-329). On the other hand, Korean residents in Japan have been excluded from 
participating in policy-making because of their citizenship status as ‘foreigners’. 
However, they were able to represent their ethnic identity and solidarity in the 
reconstruction of a multi-cultural community in Nagata Ward of Kobe where the 
damage of the 1995 Hanshin-Awaji Earthquake was very severe (Okabe 1999).
In contrast, Japanese women were not very successful in incorporating their own 
agenda in planning because their ‘wifest and matemalist’ participation fronts led 
women’s concerns to be co-opted and subordinated into the mainstream (male- 
defined) interests (LeBlanc 1999; Liddle and Nakajima 2000; Uno 1993). For 
Japanese women, the public interest in planning seems to be given to them by the
167 Koreans were forced to work in Japan during Japan’s colonisation in 1910-45. At the end of the 
war, approximately 500,000 to 600,000 Koreans remained in Japan. Many of their descendants 
(estimated 1 percent of Japan’s population) still live in Japan while still holding Korean citizenship. 
Fukuoka, Yasunori. 1996. Koreans in Japan: past and present. Saitama University Review 31 (1):1-15.
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state and the patriarchy for ‘the right’ actions. The challenge for Japanese women is 
how to defy the state-defined roles of women and have their own individual opinions 
included in the public interest in planning decisions.
Sixth, the flawed rule of law in Japan has prevented the public interest from being 
articulated as social justice. The obvious defect of Japan’s legal system of planning 
is that there is no instrument to ensure government agencies are accountable to their 
citizens as examined in Chapter 7. As there are no formal opportunities for citizens 
to challenge proposed plans before implementation, the state has rarely been forced 
to change its original plans. There has also been little prospect for citizens to 
override planning decisions in court. Furthermore, the transparency of planning 
decisions was not secured until recently. Without an effective judicial review and 
public inquiry system in planning, the Japanese government have virtually eliminated 
all entitlements of citizens to challenge the legitimacy of planning decisions. The 
absence of such an important mechanism to redefine the public interest has 
undermined the influence from civil society on planning policy-making in Japan. It 
has resulted in weakening the advancement of citizenship -  quality of life -  to be 
promoted by planning policy in contemporary Japan. Therefore, the legal framework 
of planning should be reformed to allow citizens to challenge government decisions 
in public inquiries and judicial review if necessary.
8.5 The Thesis’s Contribution to Planning Studies
Japan’s experiences in planning development in the course of modernisation are
important lessons for developing countries that seek to promote economic
independence and democracy at the same time. One implication of Japan’s history
of planning policy is that the state can effectively lead industrialisation, providing
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basic infrastructures through long-term economic planning and government finance 
programmes as explained in Part 2. In addition, Japanese private companies built 
extensive railway networks in the metropolitan areas, by combining profits from 
their residential and retail developments alongside the rail routes. Japanese 
governments’ leadership in infrastructure building succeeded in materialising the 
dense public transport networks, and thus managed to keep the vitality, safety and 
sustainability of its city life. The second implication is that the distribution of 
political resources in planning to less privileged groups and regions can be a 
successful policy to reduce economic inequality within a state (Calder 1988; Garon 
and Mochizuki 1993b; Upham 1993a), although this was unintentional in Japan 
(SCAP’s land reform empowered the previously marginalised farmers as detailed in 
Chapter 4).
However, the negative impacts of Japan’s strong developmentalism in planning are 
quite obvious, as revealed in its rampant environmental problems and chaotic 
landscape (see Chapter 5). In addition to this, elite-led planning is set to fail, as it 
has hardly incorporated the public interest as a collective interest of all stakeholders. 
The thesis also illustrates that local autonomy is necessary to materialise democratic 
planning. Furthermore, the empowerment of the politically weak, in particular 
women, in planning policy-making is crucial to accomplish fair planning outcomes.
Japan’s experiences also suggest that public participation, which has been a popular 
device for democratic planning in both theory and practice (DeSario and Langton 
1987; Forester 1989; Healey 1996; Terao 1999), is not sufficient to bring the best 
policy outcome. A latecomer to modernisation like Japan still does not have strong 
liberalism as established in the West. Authoritarian culture as seen in its gender
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relationship pervades in every aspect of Japanese society, and such hegemony will 
not easily evaporate without continuous efforts of citizens.
Japan’s planning history indicates that a fair construction of the public interest is 
essential to implement ‘good’ planning. To achieve this, the vitalisation of public 
and social life outside the state is crucial. Academics and the mass media should 
play a leading role to explore ideas of the public interest other than the one being 
endorsed by the state and the establishment. Planning values in Japan, which are 
exclusively constructed by male planning professionals, economists, business elites 
and bureaucrats, need to be challenged. The hierarchical relationship between 
central and local governments, men and women, professionals and non-professionals, 
the state and individuals should be redressed. Real freedom of speech is only 
obtained by celebrating differences among social groups and accepting the diversity 
of opinions. There is no true consensus if the public interest is constructed as 
scientific neutrality, community or national consensus by suppressing alternative 
ideas.
Moreover, Japan’s experiences illuminates two critical factors explaining why it has 
been difficult to change the status-quo in planning development, although they are 
rarely addressed by planning academics. First, institutions, in particular the legal and 
regulatory framework, are important to secure the public interest in the market 
economy (Stiglitz 2002: 139). In modem liberal economies, property, especially 
homeownership, has become the foundation of society. However, it inherently 
accompanies many risks. For example, individuals’ financial commitments 
accompanied by homeownership made the government regulate building standards, 
the practices of housing loan companies and insurance firms. Stiglitz insists that the
346
expansion of the market economy requires the vast development of state supervision 
and regulations, to secure fair competition and law-abiding behaviour in the market 
(Stiglitz 2002: 139).
In this context, the Japanese governments have been too occupied with maximising 
economic output through planning (see Part 2), rather than regulating the ‘product’ 
(the built environment). Japanese home-owners and consumers recently discovered 
that some of the newly built high-rise apartments and hotels did not comply with the 
minimum construction standards for an earthquake of magnitude 5 (Pulvers 2006; 
Shimizu 2006). This is a real threat to the public, considering that Japan is an 
earthquake-prone country. Inspectors overlooked this fault since they examined false 
construction data. The damage to the buyers of these properties was not covered by 
the insurance, as the 1995 Product Liability Law is still underdeveloped in Japan. 
Back in 1995, many residents in Kobe lost their properties because of the earthquake. 
Furthermore, many of them ended up paying two mortgages later since Japanese 
insurances usually do not cover damage against natural disasters. These risks in the 
market are not simply individual risks, because the state has the responsibility to 
protect citizens against illegal conducts in the market and minimise social risks.
In a highly urbanised society, the state has to limit certain individual liberties in the 
public interest. In the modem state, individual homes cannot exist independently, as 
they should be served collectively by various public services and need to be highly 
regulated because of the high density in cities. Urbanisation increases social risks, 
where an individual’s careless behaviour might cause damage to other people. Urban 
living also requires various restrictions on the freedom of individual behaviour and 
properties, as nuisance might deprive neighbours of their right to enjoy life. Japan,
347
as a latecomer to modernisation, has tended to overlook the externalities of the 
market economy, as the state only concentrated on the growth of the economy.
Second, in addition to the significance of regulatory rules in the market economy, 
Japan’s planning history also demonstrates the importance of the rule of law to 
secure citizenship rights in liberal democracies in the public interest. The analysis of 
Chapter 7 shows that building a fair judicial framework is essential to achieve 
democratic planning outcomes in non-Westem states which have not established the 
solid rule of law principle. The principle of the rule of law in the modem state 
developed from limiting despotism: the power of the monarchy under rule by law 
(Clark 1999; Henderson 1980: 119; Shklar 1987). Derived from this origin, the rule 
of law in contemporary liberal democracies assumes that political leaders or public 
administrations might make mistakes, so that citizens should be given the right to 
seek remedies in court if they believe that the judgment of the government perverts 
the objectives of the law (Clark 1999; Shklar 1987).
The rule of law doctrine in modem society also functions to maintain the balance of 
powers within the state between the legislature, the executive and judicial branches 
(Bellamy 2005). The analysis of planning litigation in Japan examined in Chapter 7 
shows that the rule of law principle has been ignored as judges rather acted to justify 
decisions made by the governments when citizens challenged them. As explained in 
Chapter 6 and 7, Japanese judges have often taken a position not to intervene in 
governments’ policy decisions or political questions in judicial review, claiming that 
the court should not have power over the parliament and the public administration 
(Henderson 1968; Hook and McCormack 2001; Stockwin 1982: Ch. 10). However,
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by applying this rule, the court has limited the role of law to simply an order of the 
government rather than a tool to ensure justice in society.
It is ironic that Japan possesses one of the most advanced constitutions in the world 
in terms of the protection of human rights. The 1946 Constitution of Japan also 
emphasises the independence of the court by a newly introduced judicial review 
function, considering the history of the pre-war totalitarian regime. Many plaintiffs 
of Japan’s planning litigation referred to the public interest declared under the 
Constitution to defend their rights to pursue a minimum living standard, which has 
not been fully protected by Japanese planning laws (see Chapter 7). Almost all 
judges in Japanese court have dismissed references to the public interest of the 
Constitution and planning laws as a pure abstract notion, thus not relevant to 
planning litigation. As many scholars have pointed out, the Constitution’s articles on 
the standard of welfare have been mostly neglected or interpreted very lightly by 
Japanese judges (Henderson 1968; Stockwin 1982: Ch. 10). As a result, the rule of 
law and constitutional rule has not contributed very much to advance the public 
interest as citizenship rights in Japanese planning governance.
Although the public interest was once abandoned in Western planning policy-making 
for the question of its efficacy (Dahl 1961; Pennington 2000; Reade 1987), the idea 
of ‘public’ representing democracy, participation, sociability and equality has thrived 
and even revived as an important principle in planning theories lately (Campbell and 
Marshall 2000; Gehl and Gemzaee 1996b; Taylor 1994). The resilience of the public 
interest seems to represent its capacity; citizens can make planning more accountable 
and democratic for everyone affected by mobilising the discourse of the public 
interest. A comparison with Western histories illustrates that Japan’s planning
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culture of the developmental state could change, if the elite-defined ideologies of the 
public interest are contested in all arenas of policy processes: legislature, public 
administration and the judicial system.
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Chihd kairyo undo 
Chihd kofu zei 
Chiso Kaisei 
Chian Keisatsu Ho 





Dai san sector hojin







Literally the descendant from the heaven; 
describing the behaviour of ministry 
bureaucrats moving to public/private 







The general local allocation tax
The 1873 Land Tax Revision
The 1900 Public Peace Police Law
The 1925 Peace Preservation Act
District plan
Right to a view
Neighbourhood associations
The supreme principles of justice and the 
public interest
Private-public partnership company 
The Equal Employment Opportunity Act 
Local branch offices of central government 
Road Act 
Assimilation
The Entertainment Business Act
Impartial and non-partisan





Hanshin Kosoku Doro Kodan 












Jinjyd no kaoku 
Jumin undo 
Jutaku Kinyii Koko 
Jydhd Kokai Jyorei 
Jiyutd




The Ginza Brick Quarter
Reflex interests (distinguished from legal 
interests in Japan)
The Hanshin Superhighway Corporation
The centralisation of the Government 
Office District in Hibiya
Unpatriotic Japanese
Socially segregated neighbourhoods where 
burakumin live
Subsidy
Informal, private and real





















Kenchiku Kijun Ho 












Kokudo Riyd Keikaku 
Kokudo Riyd Keikaku Ho 








The predecessor of the Economic Planning 
Agency
The Economic Council





Cultivable Land Reorganisation Act
Public hearing
Public companies
Park; public / official gardens
The Pollution Control Basic Act
The national treasury disbursement
Appeal
National land planning
The National Land Use Plan
The National Land Use Planning Act
The Comprehensive National Land 
Development Act
The superiority of national laws over local 
ordinances




Public works or public enterprise, in 
particular infrastructure building projects
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Kokyo no fukushi 














(Minkan katsuryoku no katsuyd) 
Minsei iin
Mitsubishi Marunouchi Office-Gai 
Miyako
Mukashitsu sekinin 
Nihon Doro Kodan 
Nihonjinron
Nihon Hoso Kyokai (NHK)
Nihon Jutaku Kodan 
Nihon Kaihatsu Ginko
The public welfare 
The public interest 






Japan’s traditional wooden house
Literally town making; meaning 
community planning
Community planning council
Literally sacrifice of self in service to the 
public (the lord); a slogan calling for 




Utilising the ability of private enterprises
Volunteer community welfare officer




The Japan Highway Public Corporation
The theories on Japanese uniqueness
Japan Broadcasting Corporation
The Japan Housing Corporation; JHC
The Japan Development Bank 
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Nippon Keizai Dantai Rengdkai 
(Nippon Keidanren)
Nihon Kenchiku Gakkai
Nihon Kirisutokyo Fujin Kyofukai
Nihon Shakai Seisaku Gakkai
Nihon Toshi Keikaku Gakkai
Nihon Toshi Seibi Kodan
Nisshoken
Ndkyo
















The Architectural Institute of Japan
Women’s Christian Temperance Union
Japanese Social Policy Association
The City Planning Institute of Japan; CPIJ
The Housing and Urban Development 
Corporation
The right to sunlight
Agricultural Cooperatives
Norinchukin Bank; the central financial 
institution for agricultural, forestry and 
fishing co-operatives
Father-child
Public; the great house of the emperor




Good wife, wise mother
Strategies
Warrior
Making Japan a great place to live
The Five-Year Plan for Making Japan a 




Literally line-drawing; making the 





















Shotoku Baizo Keikaku 
Shufu Rengokai 
Shiikai oyobi Kessha Ho 
Shutoken Seibi Ho
Shuto Kosoku Doro Kodan 
Sogo Kaihatsu no Koso
The War Damage Rehabilitation Agency of 
Japan; WDRA
Society






Policy advisory committee 
Bullet train
The New Long-Run Economic Plan
The masses must not be informed, but make 
them dependent on the ruler
Blank zoning area
Men of spirit
Japan’s working class neighbourhoods
The emperor’s military deputy




The Plan to Double Individual Income
The Housewives' Federation
The Law on Associations and Meetings
The National Capital Region Development 
Act
The Tokyo Expressway Public Corporation 
The Idea of Comprehensive Development
Sogo Sekkei Seido 
Sonndjydi 
Sosho no seijukusei 
Suidd Ho
[Takuchij Kaihatsu shidd yokd
Tatemae
Teito
Tochi shihon shugi 
Tochi Kukaku Seiri Ho 





Tokutei Chiiki Sogo Kaihatsu Keikaku
Tokutei hojokin
Tokyo Shi-Ku Kaisei Jorei
Toshi keikaku shingikai 






The Comprehensive Design System
Honour the emperor, expel the barbarians
The ripeness of the cases
The Water Supply Act
municipal governments’ voluntary 
development control agreements with 
[estate] developers




The Land Expropriation Act
Civil suit
The Special Higher Police
Special public companies
The Recreation and Amusement 
Association; special official brothels for the 
US soldiers
Special Area Comprehensive Development 
Plans
Specific subsidy
Tokyo City-Ward Reform Ordinance; 
TCRO
City Planning Council
The Urban Redevelopment Law
















Zenkoku Sogo Kaihatsu Keikaku
Harmony
Japanese spirit, Western technology
Additional requirements





Pleasure ground / amusement park
The Fiscal Investment and Loan 
Programme; FLIP
The Tax Commission
The Comprehensive National Development 
Plan; CNDP
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Appendix 2: List of Acronyms
ALPA The Administrative Litigation Procedure Act
ANA All Nippon Airways
BLL Buraku Liberation League
CABE Commission for Architecture and the Built Environment
CNDP The Comprehensive National Development Plan
CPA City Planning Areas
CPU The City Planning Institute of Japan
FAR Floor area ratios
FLIP The Fiscal Investment and Loan Programme
FRG The Federal Republic of Germany
HE The Hanshin Expressway
HLC The Housing Loan Corporation
JAPIC The Japan Project-Industry Council
JAR Application for judicial review
JCP Japan Communist Party
JETRO The Japan External Trade Organization
JHC The Japan Housing Corporation
JNR The Japan National Railway
JSP Japanese Socialist Party
LDP Liberal Democratic Party
LTPC Local Town Planning Committee
MITI The Ministry of International Trade and Industry
MLIT The Ministry of Land, Infrastructures and Transport
MOF The Ministry of Finance
MP Member of the parliament
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NHK Nihon Hoso Kyokai (Japan Broadcasting Corporation)
NPO Non-profit organisation
NR The National Route
NTT The Nippon Telegraph and Telephone Public Corporation
PFI Private Finance Initiatives
RTPI Royal Town Planning Institute
SCAP The Supreme Command[er] for the Allied Powers
SII The U.S.-Japan Structural Impediment Initiative
SML The Special Measures Law for Dowa (assimilation) Projects
TCRO Tokyo City-Ward Reform Ordinance
TDR Transfer of development right
UCA Urbanisation Control Area
UPA Urbanisation Promotion Area
WDRA The War Damage Rehabilitation Agency of Japan
WECPNL Weighted Equivalent Continuous Perceived Noise Level
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1961. Sarugakyo Hot Spring (Onseri) case. In Hanrei Times (The Law Times Report): 
Tokyo High Court, Japan.
1962a. Judgement upon the request for the annulment of the land readjustment plan. 
In Minshii: The Supreme Court of Japan, Grand Bench.
1962b. Judgement upon the request of the annulment of the ordinance for the 
construction of the waste incineration facility. In Minshii: Supreme Court of Japan, 
the First Petty Bench.
1969. Judgement upon the injunction of night flights at Osaka International Airport. 
In Minshii: The Osaka District Court, Japan.
1970. Judgement upon the request for the annulment and cancellation of the change 
of the local railway route. In Gyoshii: Tokyo District Court, Japan.
1972. Hanshin Expressway case - judgement upon the injunction on the construction 
of the highway to prevent pollutions. In Hanrei Jihd: Amagasaski Branch Office, 
Kobe District Court, Japan.
1973a. Judgement upon the violation of the Road Safety Act and the Tokushima City 
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Court of Japan, Grand Bench.
1973b. Kunitachi pedestrian bridge case. In Hanrei Jihd: Tokyo High Court, Japan.
1973c. Kyoto Okazaki Yurakuso case. In Hanrei Jihd: Kyoto District Court, Japan.
1974a. Judgement upon the injunction of night flights at Osaka International Airport. 
In Minshii: The Osaka High Court, Japan.
1974b. Judgement upon the request for the injunction of the construction of a 
harbour on Nagahama beach. In Gyoshii: Matsuyama District Court, Japan.
1976. Judgement upon the request for the cancellation of the authorisation of the 
development project - the legal standing of the residents nearby. In Gyoshii: Tokyo 
District Court, Japan.
1977a. Judgement upon the case of Tokushima City waste incineration site. In 
Shomu Geppo: Takamatsu High Court, Japan.
1977b. Judgement upon the request for the cancellation of the basic plan of the 
number eight district of Ohita New Industrial City. In Gyoshii: Ohita District Court, 
Japan.
1978a. Hibiya Park case - environmental conservation of visual amenities of the park. 
In Hanrei Jihd: Tokyo High Court, Japan.
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1978b. Judgement upon the annulment of the designation of the zoning areas of 
Morioka City Plan. In Minshii: The Supreme Court of Japan, the First Petty Branch.
1978c. Judgement upon the request of cancellation of development permission from 
neighbouring residents. In Gyoshii: Yokohama District Court, Japan.
1980. Nagoya bullet trains' noise and vibration pollution case. In Hanrei Jihd: 
Nagoya High Court, Japan.
1981a. Judgement upon the appeal for the annulment of the building confirmation by 
Building Standard Act. In Gyoshii: Tokyo High Court, Japan.
1981b. Judgement upon the injunction of night flights at Osaka International Airport. 
In Minshii: The Supreme Court of Japan, Grand Bench.
1982. The legal standing of the neighbours surrounding the Niigata Airport - 
judgement on the cancellation of new air transport route licenses. In Minshii: The 
Supreme Court, the Second Petty Bench.
1983a. Iba historic site case - the standing of a local research group seeking for the 
conservation. In Hanrei Jihd: The Supreme Court of Japan, the Third Petty Bench.
1983b. Judgement upon the request of information disclosure of the minutes of a 
City Planning Council meeting (Saitama-ken Jyoho Kokai Jyorei Sosho Hanketsu). 
In Hanrei Times (The Law Times Report): Urawa District Court, Japan.
1983c. The pros and cons of collecting development charge under a voluntary 
planning agreement (Yoko ni motozuku Kaihatsu Kyoryoku-Kin no Kyohi). In Jurist, 
an extra issue: Sakai Branch Office, Osaka District Court, Japan.
1985. The appeal of the mayor of Musashino City about the rejection of water supply 
under the voluntary planning agreement {Musashino Shicho Kyusui Kyohi Jiken 
Jokokushin). In Hanrei Times (The Law Times Report): The Supreme Court of Japan.
1986. Judgement upon the emission and noise control of the National Route 43. In 
Hanrei Jihd: Osaka High Court, Japan.
1988. Judgement upon the request of the return of the development charge for 
Musashino City educational facilities. In Hanrei Times (The Law Times Report): The 
Supreme Court of Japan, the First Petty Branch.
1990. Judgement upon the request for the cancellation of the development 
permission for a golf ground. In Gyoshii: Gifu District Court, Japan.
1991. Judgement upon the request for the cancellation of the development 
permission after the development was completed. In Minshii: The Supreme Court of 
Japan.
1992a. The case of Kyoto Buddhism Association - judgement upon the request for an 
injunction of the building construction destructive to historical cityscape. In Hanrei 
Jihd: Kyoto District Court, Japan.
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1992b. Judgement upon legitimacy of suppression of the report on land values of the 
planned development area by Nagano City Council. In Hanrei Times (The Law Times 
Report): Tokyo High Court, Japan.
1992c. Judgement upon the emission and noise control of the National Route 43 and 
Hanshin Expressway. In Minshii: The Supreme Court of Japan, the Second Petty 
Bench.
1993. Judgement upon the request for information disclosure of possible dam sites. 
In Hanrei Times (The Law Times Report): The Supreme Court of Japan, the Second 
Petty Bench.
1994a. The case of the Takarazuka City Local Ordinance regulating the construction 
of pachinko parlours etc. In The Supreme Court Database: Kobe District Court, 
Japan.
1994b. Judgement upon on the request for the cancellation the development 
permission of the elevation of the Odakyu railway junction. In Gyoshii: Tokyo 
District Court, Japan.
1994c. Judgement upon Osaka Alkali Case. In Jurist: Daishinin (the Former 
Supreme Court of Japan).
1994d. Judgement upon the request for the cancellation of the development 
permission in the area where there is a danger of landslide: the legal standing of third 
party. In Minshii: The Supreme Court of Japan, the Third Petty Bench.
1997. Judgement upon the request for the cancellation of the Meguro Park project 
plan. In Kakyusai Shuyd Hanketsu Joho (Lower court prominent judgements): Tokyo 
District Court, Japan.
1999. Judgement upon the request for the cancellation of the development 
permission when the development does not comply with the City Planning Act. In 
Gydshu: Yokohama District Court, Japan.
2001. Kunitachi high-rise apartment case. In Hanrei Jihd: Tokyo District Court, 
Japan.
2003. Kunitachi high-rise apartment case: appeal. In The Supreme Court o f Japan 
Database: Tokyo High Court, Japan.
2005. Judgement upon the request of the alteration of the Kunitachi high-rise 
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of Japan, the First Petty Bench.
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